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3 
Abstract 
 
 
Hitherto, the relationships between political institutions and ethnopolitical 
(in)stability typically have been analysed by investigating the effects of single, 
formal political institutions such as electoral systems or state structures (see e.g. 
Reynolds 2002; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). My doctoral thesis criticises this 
research focus on two different yet equally relevant accounts: First, the tendency to 
single out the effects of individual institutions is based on the implicit – and as I 
claim: wrong – assumption that political institutions can be treated as separate 
entities and that it is only of secondary relevance of which broader set of institutions 
they form part. Second, despite studies which highlight the relevance of informal 
political institutions (see e.g. Sisk and Stefes 2005; Varshney 2002), they have 
received far less attention in the academic debate so far. 
 
‘Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism’ describes a new approach to the study of 
institutional incentives for ethnic violence which goes beyond the mere focus on 
single, formal political institutions by highlighting the effects of both institutional 
combinations and informal political institutions on the risk of ethnic civil war. To 
test the relevance of ‘Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism’, I use a grievance-based 
explanation of intrastate violence and binary time-series-cross-section analysis based 
on a personally designed dataset that covers 174 countries between 1955 and 2007. I 
present statistical evidence that high levels of corruption on the one hand, and 
institutional combinations of presidentialism, a majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and a unitary state structure on the other increase the risk of large-scale 
ethnic violence.  
 
Overall, my thesis contributes to the academic debate in three relevant regards: i) by 
conceptualising and testing Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism; ii) by describing a 
grievance-based explanation of large-scale ethnic violence which clearly identifies 
the key values of political representation; and iii) by presenting the EEI Dataset as 
the first comprehensive data source for the systematic statistical analysis of 
institutional incentives for ethnic civil war.  
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Chapter 1: Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
1.1. Introduction: A New Approach to the Study of Ethnic Violence  
 
This is a thesis about the impact of political institutions on the risk of large-scale 
ethnic violence. It contributes to the existing debate on the relationships between 
institutional design and violent ethnic conflict by highlighting the need to pay greater 
attention to both institutional combinations and informal political institutions when 
analysing the causes of ethnic civil wars. As the first, introductory chapter, the 
following sections will  
 
 describe the relevance of studying ethnic violence and present the central 
claims of this thesis (section 1.2.);  
 define crucial concepts including institutions, ethnic violence and ethnic 
groups (section 1.3.);  
 briefly outline key theories on ethnopolitical mobilisation and ethnic violence 
(section 1.4.), including the institutionalist tradition of inquiry (section 1.5.); 
and 
 review some well-known studies from the institutional incentives approach to 
ethnic violence to illustrate the academic debate’s lack of attention to 
institutional combinations (section 1.6.) and informal political institutions 
(section 1.7.).  
 Section 1.8. will conclude this chapter by summarising its central points.  
 
 
1.2. The Central Claims of this Thesis 
 
Large-scale ethnic violence can be hugely destructive. In addition to the immanent 
human and material losses incurred during episodes of ethnic civil war, armed 
confrontations between different ethnic groups can also lead to more far-reaching 
consequences, such as setbacks in the affected country’s political and economic 
development, or threats to the security and stability of entire regions due to possible 
spill-over effects (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Wolff 2007). Large-scale ethnic 
Chapter 1 – Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
 
 
17 
violence moreover poses a clear challenge to the system of global governance, for 
instance by undermining the development aid efforts of international organisations or 
by raising questions on whether or how to intervene (Addison and Murshed 2003; 
Lake and Rothchild 1996). 
 
The destructive potential of large-scale ethnic violence is particularly concerning, as 
violent ethnic conflict is not a rare phenomenon: Since the early 1960s, the number 
of violent intrastate conflicts vastly outweighs the frequency of war between 
sovereign states (Hewitt 2007; see also Figure 1 for a map on the number of major 
violent international and internal conflicts between 1990 and 2003). Within the last 
two decades of the 20
th
 century, nearly two-thirds of these violent intrastate disputes 
were ethnic conflicts (Scherrer 1999).
1
  
 
 
Figure 1: Crushed by War – World Conflicts. Source: Bournay (2005).  
 
                                                 
1
   To be precise, Scherrer (1999) finds that 64.7% of all violent conflicts between 1985 and 1994 had 
a dominant ethnic-induced or ethnicised character. 
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In this context, it is important to point out that it would be erroneous to assume that 
the number of ethnic conflicts increased drastically only with the end of the Cold 
War (cf. e.g. Brown 1993). As research by Gurr based on the Minorities at Risk 
project shows, the frequency of ethnopolitical disputes
2
 has increased steadily since 
the 1950s, accelerated sharply in the 1970s and – after reaching its height in the early 
1990s – levelled off after 1994 (Gurr 2000).  
 
Using data by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF)
3
 and looking exclusively at 
large-scale ethnic violence, we can confirm Gurr’s essential observation of a long-
term increase in the number of ethnic conflicts between the 1950s and early 1990s. In 
this context, ‘large-scale ethnic violence’ is used synonymously with the PITF’s 
definition of ‘ethnic wars’, i.e. armed disputes between governments and ethnic 
challengers which result in at least 1,000 direct fatalities over the full course of the 
armed conflict, exceed 100 conflict-related deaths in at least one year and during 
which each party has mobilised at least 1,000 people, including armed agents, 
demonstrators and troops (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009). As Figure 2 shows, the 
number of ethnic wars has followed a general upward trend from only one episode of 
large-scale ethnic violence in 1955 to a climax of 32 episodes in 1992, before 
decreasing steadily to 15 episodes in 2001 to 2003 and reaching another peak of 20 
episodes in 2005. Studying the causes of violent ethnic conflicts thus remains an 
important task for social scientists, as ethnic violence continues to represent one of 
the biggest challenges to the stability of states and international security. 
                                                 
2
   ‘Ethnopolitical disputes’ refers here to Gurr’s definition of ethnopolitical rebellion (i.e. the use of 
coercive power by ethnopolitical groups to compel governments either to fight or to negotiate 
change), although quite similar long-term trends can be observed for ethnopolitical protest as well 
(i.e. the strategy by ethnopolitical groups to mobilise a show of support, for instance in form of 
marches or demonstrations, that prompts officials to take favourable action for these groups) (Gurr 
2000). 
3
    The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) is ‘a panel of scholars and methodologists … [that inter 
alia provides data on] onsets of general political instability defined by outbreaks of revolutionary 
or ethnic war, adverse regime change, and genocide.’ (PITF 2012) The stated central objective of 
the PITF, ‘using open-source data, …[is] to develop statistical models that can accurately assess 
countries’ prospects for major political change and can identify key risk factors of interest to US 
policymakers.’ (ibid.) The datasets by the Political Instability Task Force are available online at 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfpset.htm .  
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From the vast number of theories to explain the causes of violent ethnic conflict (see 
also section 1.4.), the arguments set out in this thesis follow the institutionalist 
tradition of inquiry or, as I call it, the ‘institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence’.4 This school of thought argues that political institutions are a pivotal factor 
influencing the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability, as the risk of ethnic violence 
is likely to increase under political institutions that are not suitable for the degree of 
ethnic diversity in a given society (see section 1.5. for more details). The features and 
makeup of political institutions deserve particular attention when investigating 
incentives for ethnic violence because they set the rules under which political 
competition is to take place, shape human behaviour and, unlike other factors such as 
the availability of natural resources or the degree of ethnic diversity in a society, are 
                                                 
4
   Institutionalism is a wide field of research that analyses the effects of institutions on a variety of 
political, social and economic phenomena (see e.g. Peters 2001). The label ‘institutional incentives 
approach to ethnic violence’ is more precise in the sense that it refers only to those scholarly 
writings that deal with the impact of institutional design specifically on the risk of violent ethnic 
conflict. 
Figure 2: Number of Ethnic Wars between 1955 and 2007. Data source: PITF (2009). 
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comparatively easy to manipulate (cf. Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Lecours 2005). 
Presumably for these reasons, also policy-makers have long recognised institutional 
design
5
 as one of the best-suited approaches to ethnic conflict resolution (see e.g. 
Reynolds 2002).   
 
A closer look at the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence (see also 
sections 1.6. and 1.7.) reveals that, hitherto, the relationships between political 
institutions and ethnopolitical (in)stability typically have been analysed by 
investigating the effects of single,
6
 formal political institutions, such as electoral 
systems or state structures (see e.g. Reilly 2001; Reynolds 2002; Suberu 2001). This 
research focus is deeply flawed in two different yet equally relevant regards: First, 
the tendency to single out the effects of individual institutions is based on the 
implicit – and as I claim: wrong – assumption that political institutions can be treated 
as separate entities and that it is only of secondary relevance of which broader set of 
institutions they form part. Second, despite studies which highlight the relevance of 
informal political institutions (see e.g. Varshney 2001, 2002), they have received far 
less attention in the academic debate so far.  
 
My thesis addresses both these shortcomings with the theoretical conceptualisation 
and large-N testing of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, using data from the ‘Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism (EEI) Dataset’ that has been created specifically for the 
purpose of this thesis. Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism describes a new approach to 
the study of institutional incentives for ethnic violence which goes beyond the mere 
                                                 
5
    The term ‘institutional design’ is rather ambiguous, as it can be understood as either the intentional 
shaping and reshaping (cf. Goodin 1998) or the general features of political institutions (see e.g. 
Lijphart 2002). This analysis adopts the latter understanding by using ‘institutional design’ 
synonymously with ‘the characteristics and makeup of (both formal and informal) political 
institutions’.  
6
    As will be elaborated in more detail below, ‘single political institutions’ is not meant to imply that 
scholars belonging to the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence typically consider 
only one institution in their analyses. On the contrary, authors such as e.g. Cohen (1997), Hartzell 
and Hoddie (2007), Horowitz (1985) or Lijphart (1977) investigate a number of different 
institutions in their writings. However, the point I am highlighting is that these scholars treat 
political institutions as discrete, separable entities in the sense that they do not ask for the 
interaction effects between different institutions. Put differently, they might consider within the 
same piece of research which form of government and which electoral system are ‘best’ for 
ethnically diverse societies, but they do not ask how relevant it is that for instance a presidential 
form of government is either combined with a proportional or a majoritarian or a mixed electoral 
system for the legislature (see below and section 1.6.).  
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focus on single, formal political institutions. It aims to expand the current academic 
debate by highlighting the relevance of both institutional combinations and informal 
political institutions for the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. More specifically, 
Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism is based on the explicit acknowledgement that 
political institutions are ‘embedded entities’ in at least two regards: First, political 
institutions are embedded entities in the sense that they never exist on their own but 
always form part of a wider institutional arrangement. Hence, the effects of political 
institutions such as electoral systems or state structures do not occur as isolated 
phenomena, but necessarily depend on the broader set of political institutions that are 
joint within a political system. Second, political institutions can be socially 
embedded entities in the sense that they can affect the prospects of ethnopolitical 
(in)stability due to persisting patterns in human behaviour and despite their lack of 
open codification. Therefore, greater attention needs to be paid to the role of informal 
in addition to formal political institutions when analysing the causes of large-scale 
ethnic violence (see section 1.3. for relevant definitions).  
 
To illustrate the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, this thesis is 
structured as follows: As mentioned in section 1.1., this chapter lays the groundwork 
for the subsequent analysis by defining crucial concepts and outlining key arguments 
in the academic debate on the causes of violent ethnic conflict. Chapter 2 describes 
the causal mechanisms which, arguably, link political institutions to the risk of ethnic 
violence, using a grievance-based explanation of violent intrastate conflict. In a 
nutshell, the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2 states that political 
institutions which are associated with comparatively high levels of political 
exclusiveness are likely to increase the risk of ethnic violence. This is because they 
contribute to perceived or objective asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms of 
their political and socioeconomic standing, and arguably give rise to emotions of 
anger and resentment among those ethnic groups who consider their chances to 
obtain the values of political representation (relating to their political recognition, the 
likelihood with which resources and powers are distributed in their favour, and their 
perceptions of political, physical and economic security) to be comparatively low.  
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Chapter 3 will outline the relevance of the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism by focusing on combinations of different types of form of 
government (i.e. presidential, parliamentary or mixed), electoral system for the 
legislature (i.e. majoritarian, proportional or mixed) and state structure (i.e. unitary, 
federal or mixed). I focus on combinations of these specific formal political 
institutions, as previous research has identified them as being of particular relevance 
for the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds 
2002). The central argument presented in chapter 3 states that the lower the number 
of possible political winners provided by a given institutional combination, the more 
likely it is that this combination will increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. 
Consequently, in particular the combination of a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure is expected 
to heighten the risk of ethnic civil war. This is because it provides the lowest overall 
number of possible political winners compared to any other combination of 
presidential, parliamentary or mixed form of government, majoritarian, proportional 
or mixed electoral system for the legislature, and unitary, federal or mixed state 
structure. Political winners thereby are defined as those ethnic groups whose 
representatives are able to participate – and hence have the opportunity to promote 
the interests of the ethnic group they belong to or wish to represent – in the political 
decision-making process through official positions of political power, for instance as 
members of parliament or state ministers (see also section 2.4.). From this follows 
that the lower the number of possible political winners provided by an institutional 
combination, the lower is the number of ethnic groups in a given society who can 
obtain the values of political representation outlined in chapter 2. A low number of 
possible political winners is expected to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence, as it is likely to give rise to grievances among those ethnic groups who feel 
that the design of formal political institutions systematically prevents them from 
fulfilling their value expectations. 
 
Chapter 4 will highlight the relevance of the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism by using corruption as a prime example of an informal political 
institution. The central argument presented in chapter 4 states that corrupt dealings 
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are likely to increase the risk of ethnic civil war, as networks of corruption – given 
their ethnically exclusionary tendencies – can be assumed to affect the modus 
operandi of formal political institutions in such a way that those ethnic groups who 
stand outside of these networks have lower chances to obtain the values of political 
representation. The ‘ethnically exclusionary tendencies of corrupt dealings’ thereby 
refer to the tendency of networks of corruption to form along ethnic lines and benefit 
certain ethnic groups over others (see section 4.6.). The four scenarios by which 
networks of corruption can affect the modus operandi of formal political institutions 
in an ethnically exclusionary manner include the creation of direct incentives for 
political officeholders (e.g. through bribery or the sustenance of patronage networks) 
to manipulate the political decision-making process in favour of specific ethnic 
groups; the generation of distortions and ethnic bias in the political decision-making 
agenda; the establishment of a culture of selfish value-accumulation; and the 
undermining of the quality or prospects of democracy. All four scenarios clearly 
violate the ideal of representational justice (Wimmer 2002) and result in some ethnic 
groups having greater influence over the political decision-making process than 
others. Consequently, grievances are expected to rise among those ethnic groups who 
cannot reap the benefits of corruption, and ethnicity to become a likely fault line of 
violent confrontation. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 together form the empirical part of this analysis. Chapter 5 contains 
information on the ‘Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism (EEI) Dataset’ that has been 
developed specifically for the purpose of this thesis. The EEI Dataset provides an 
unprecedented compilation of quantitative data on different types of political 
institutions, the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence and further variables such as 
regime type or level of economic development that are commonly controlled for in 
the civil wars literature. As the first dataset of its kind, the EEI Dataset fills the need 
for a comprehensive data source which facilitates the systematic statistical analysis 
of the relationships between institutional design and ethnic civil wars. In total, the 
EEI Dataset contains 103 variables that provide information on 174 countries 
between 1955 and 2007. 
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Finally, chapter 6 will present the results from testing the impact of individual formal 
political institutions, institutional combinations and corruption on the risk of ethnic 
civil war, using binary time-series-cross-section analysis and building on arguments 
presented in chapters 2 to 4. Specifically, I will test the following key hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individual formal political institutions that rely on winner-takes-
all principles increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to 
individual formal political institutions that seek to disperse political gains.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional combinations which provide a relatively low 
number of possible political winners increase the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence compared to institutional combinations that provide a higher number 
of possible political winners.   
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of corruption, the higher is the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence. 
 
The statistical results presented in chapter 6 provide empirical support for the 
theoretical propositions outlined in chapters 3 and 4, that a) institutional 
combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature and unitary state structure, and b) corruption increase the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence, while holding common control variables in civil war research 
such as regime type or level of economic development constant. The statistically 
significant positive effects of corruption and institutional combinations of a 
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure on the risk of ethnic civil war are robust to various model 
specifications, and thus demonstrate the relevance of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism empirically.  
 
At first glance, the aforementioned arguments about institutional combinations and 
informal political institutions might sound deceivingly simplistic. However, a closer 
examination of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence reveals that, 
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so far, it has neglected the combined effects of specific institutional arrangements 
(see section 1.6.). This is not to say that scholars belonging to this school of thought 
typically focus just on one institution in their analyses (see also footnote 6). 
However, even if they do take the relevance of a variety of institutions into account 
(see e.g. Cohen 1997; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Reynolds 2002; Roeder and 
Rothchild 2005), they do not ask how the effects of political institutions might vary 
depending on the manner in which they are combined with each other. Put 
differently, even if they do consider within the same analysis, say, which form of 
government and which electoral system might be ‘best’ for ethnically diverse 
societies (see e.g. Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977), they typically fail to ask how 
relevant it is that for instance a presidential form of government is either combined 
with a proportional or a majoritarian or a mixed electoral system for the legislature 
(see section 1.6.). In this manner, scholars belonging to the institutional incentives 
approach to ethnic violence have tended to treat political institutions as discrete, 
separable entities and neglected the relevance of interaction effects between different 
institutions. 
 
A closer examination of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence also 
reveals that is has predominantly dealt with formal (i.e. openly codified) in contrast 
to informal political institutions. This research asymmetry is surprising, given that 
there is a small but nonetheless relevant pool of political science writings (e.g. Sisk 
and Stefe 2005; Varshney 2001, 2002) which has clearly highlighted the relevance of 
non-codified institutions for the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (see section 
1.7.). To illustrate the possible effects of informal political institutions on the risk of 
ethnic civil war, I focus on the role of corruption in chapters 4 and 6. I chose this 
particular informal political institution, because many seminal texts on the causes of 
violent intrastate conflict have alluded to the relevance of corruption before (e.g. 
Brass 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), however – so far – 
there has been no large-N analysis that actually tests its impact on the risk of ethnic 
civil war. 
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Overall, my thesis contributes to the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence in three relevant regards: First, my main contribution to the academic debate 
are the theoretical conceptualisation and large-N testing of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism, in order to highlight the aforementioned need for further 
investigations into the effects of institutional combinations and informal political 
institutions. Second, I present a grievance-based explanation of large-scale ethnic 
violence which, unlike previous analyses such as by Gurr (1993) or Dudley and 
Miller (1998), focuses exclusively on (and clearly identifies) the key values of 
political representation (see sections 2.5. to 2.7.). Finally, I fill an evident ‘data gap’ 
within the academic debate, as the EEI Dataset is the first comprehensive data source 
that is specifically intended for the systematic statistical analysis of institutional 
incentives for ethnic civil war (see chapter 5). Taken together, these three elements – 
i.e. the theoretical conceptualisation and large-N testing of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism, the development of a grievance-based argument that clearly 
identifies the core values of political representation, and the creation of the EEI 
Dataset – constitute this thesis’s main claim to originality.   
 
At the same time, it is important to highlight a few qualifications regarding the scope 
of subsequent arguments: First, institutional design might not only contribute to the 
risk of ethnic civil war, but ethnic civil wars can equally lead to changes in political 
institutions, especially if these are intended to manage or settle violent ethnic 
conflicts. This feeds into the broader argument that political institutions – like 
arguably most phenomena in the social sciences – equally can be thought of as 
dependent and independent variables (Grofman and Stockwell 2003). As I am more 
interested in what Elster (1997) describes as the ‘downstream’ analysis of the effects 
of political institutions rather than the ‘upstream’ study of how they come into being, 
I choose to treat political institutions as independent variables without further 
consideration of the factors that lead to their establishment. 
 
Second, ethnic identity formation and ethnopolitical mobilisation (defined as the 
process by which ethnic groups are recruited into political movements (Gurr 2000)) 
necessarily precede the engagement of ethnic contenders in large-scale violent action 
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(cf. ibid.). Yet, unless one would adopt the rather controversial view that ethnic 
identities are intrinsically politically salient and conflictual (see e.g. Smith 1993), 
these three processes do not need to have the same causes, and therefore ought to be 
distinguished very clearly from each other (cf. also Fearon and Laitin 2000). Hence, 
as it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse possible explanatory factors 
for ethnic identity formation, ethnopolitical mobilisation and ethnic civil war, I 
solely address the latter.  
 
Third, and closely related to the previous point, it has to be emphasised that it is the 
aim of this thesis to put Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism on the academic map, not 
to advance a complete theory of ethnopolitical mobilisation and ethnic violence. 
Consequently, I do not address questions such as why grievances ‘seem to be much 
more prevalent’ (Kalyvas 2007:422) than episodes of civil war or how ethnic groups 
overcome collective action problems. Instead, I propose a ‘basic incentives model’ of 
large-scale ethnic violence in the sense that I present a (possible) explanation for the 
underlying motivations of violent ethnic conflict, not for the proximate causes or 
contextual factors (such as group capacity levels, political or economic opportunity 
structures) that affect the particular timing and type of ethnopolitical action (cf. Gurr 
2000; Wolff 2007). It is in this light of an exploratory, ‘basic incentives’ analysis of 
ethnic civil war that subsequent arguments have to be read. 
 
Finally, I explicitly refer to the chances for the different ethnic groups in a given 
society to obtain the values of political representation, and, in the case of formal 
political institutions, the number of possible political winners. I do not consider the 
actual degree to which the interests of different ethnic groups are in fact considered 
in the political decision-making process, the number and type of political offices 
which their representatives hold, or the distance between the policy preferences of 
different ethnic groups and an actually implemented policy. This distinction of 
research foci is similar to the difference between asking whether there is a 
democratic framework in place that allows citizens to cast their votes in free and fair 
elections, or whether citizens decide to exercise this right once democracy has been 
established and what the outcomes of these elections are. While the first type of 
Chapter 1 – Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
 
 
28 
question asks for the general openness of the political system and the possibilities it 
provides for citizens to influence the political decision-making process, the second 
and third type of question explore why and how citizens make actual use of these 
possibilities.  
 
By explicitly referring to the chances provided by institutional design to be 
represented politically, not the actual degree to which different ethnic groups are 
indeed represented within a political system, the analysis at hand belongs to the first 
category of questions. This research focus is based on the recognition that there are 
circumstances beyond the features of political institutions that might influence 
whether an ethnic group’s interests are indeed included in a given decision-making 
process, or whether the final political output corresponds to the ethnic group’s goals. 
These circumstances include for instance logrolling between political officeholders 
or the salience of ethnopolitical issues in the first place, which – due to problems of 
data availability – have to be taken into account in a case-by-case analysis, but 
cannot be considered any further in the statistical part of this thesis.  
 
In this context, it should be noted that grievances which could motivate large-scale 
ethnic violence are not expected to arise each time the interests of a specific ethnic 
group are not included in the political agenda or do not correspond to a specific 
political output. Instead, such grievances are only expected to arise if institutional 
design systematically reduces the number of ethnic groups that can obtain the values 
of political representation outlined in chapter 2. Put differently, grievances are 
expected to arise not just from single political events such as one specific policy 
choice or the outcome of an individual election, but if the members of an ethnic 
group feel that the rules of the political game systematically prevent them from 
fulfilling their value expectations. Such grievances can be assumed to be particularly 
daunting when ethnic groups who feel politically excluded recognise that they are 
confronted with a catch-22: In order to be able to change the rules of the political 
game so that they can reap the benefits of political representation, they need to have 
high leverage over the political decision-making process already. This means that 
they are only likely to be able to increase their chances to obtain the values of 
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political representation if they already have high chances to obtain them anyway. 
Political exclusion or marginalisation
7
 are thus likely to perpetuate themselves, since 
those who are excluded from or marginalised in the political decision-making 
process are unlikely to affect its outcomes, and hence unlikely to be able to improve 
their situation (cf. Bashir and Kymlicka 2008). 
 
Following this outline of central claims and some crucial qualifications regarding the 
scope of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of key terms such as 
‘institution’, ‘ethnic violence’ and ‘ethnic group’. 
 
 
1.3. Defining Institutions, Ethnic Violence and Ethnic Groups  
 
The ‘old institutionalism’ in political science which preceded the behavioural 
revolution of the 1950s and 1960s focused mainly on the study of different 
administrative, legal and political configurations (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). 
Accordingly, ‘institutions’ typically referred to material structures or, more precisely, 
material elements of state and government such as bureaucracies, constitutions, 
cabinets or parliaments (Lecours 2005). New institutionalism – itself a direct 
response to behaviouralism’s analytical limitations (see Immergut 1998) – 
significantly expands this definition, as reflected for instance in the research by 
North, Crawford and Ostrom. North (1990) famously describes institutions as ‘the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, ... the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction’ (ibid.:3), while Crawford and Ostrom define 
institutions as ‘enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, 
norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and 
shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently 
occurring or repetitive situations.’ (Crawford and Ostrom 1995:582) Unlike the 
                                                 
7
   It is important to note the way in which this argument is phrased, as grievances might rise among 
the members of an ethnic groups not only if they are outright excluded from the political decision-
making process, but also if they feel that the degree of political representation which they are able 
to obtain still marginalises them within a given political system (Gurr 2000). As indicated in 
chapters 3 and 4, political institutions which systematically reduce the number of ethnic groups 
who can obtain the values of political representation might lead to both the outright exclusion or 
marginalisation of certain ethnic groups.  
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rather restrictive conceptualisation by old institutionalists, both these definitions 
leave ample scope as to what an institution could be, and include formal as well as 
informal institutions.   
 
Following Lauth (2000), formal institutions – such as electoral systems or federal 
arrangements – are openly codified, i.e. laid down in writing and guaranteed through 
the sanctioning mechanisms of state agencies. Informal institutions, on the other 
hand, such as corruption, clientelism and forms of civil disobedience, are known 
publicly and safeguarded through entrenched social mechanisms, but neither laid 
down in writing nor guaranteed by the state (ibid.). Building on North (1990), 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) and Lauth (2000), I define political institutions as 
enduring structures which shape political interactions, and whose properties are in 
turn based on repetitive or frequently occurring human interactions. Formal political 
institutions, whose different combinations stand at the centre of chapter 3, are laid 
down in writing and guaranteed by the state. Informal political institutions, whose 
relevance will be highlighted with the example of corruption in chapter 4, are 
socially entrenched structures of political interactions which endure over time due to 
persisting patterns in human behaviour, but which are not laid down in writing nor 
guaranteed by the sanctioning mechanisms of state agencies. 
 
While the aforementioned definition of formal and informal political institutions 
seems relatively straightforward, there is greater ambiguity surrounding the concepts 
of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnic violence’. The ambiguity regarding the former concept 
arises from the hitherto inconclusive debate concerning ethnic identity formation and 
salience. Depending on one’s broader theoretical framework, the defining features of 
ethnic groups can range from an emphasis on biological traits (see e.g. van den 
Berghe 1987) to a description of ethnic ties and consciousness as consisting 
primarily of a network of customs, norms and cultural codes which are themselves 
constructs of the modern epoch (see e.g. Anderson 1983).  
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Here, ethnic groups are defined in relatively broad terms (closer to the constructivist 
end of the spectrum)
8
 as ‘people who share a distinctive and enduring collective 
identity based on common descent, shared experiences, and cultural traits.’ (Gurr 
2000:4) Among the cultural traits which define group membership are language, 
religious beliefs, customary behaviour and region of residence (ibid.). This 
conceptualisation is broader than for instance the one offered by van den Berghe 
(1987) who restricts his argument to purely biological traits and stipulates that the 
core of ethnic groups typically consists of people ‘who know themselves to be 
related to each other by a double network of ties of descent and marriage.’ (ibid.:24) 
Due to its breadth, national, religious and other communal groups equally fall under 
Gurr’s definition of ethnic groups (Gurr 2000). This could be contested on the 
grounds that there are significant differences between for instance ethnic and national 
groups, as, when politically mobilised, the latter typically strive for political self-
determination or at least some form of politically separate existence, while the 
former do not necessarily aspire to political autonomy (ibid.; Kaufman 2001). The 
benefit of using Gurr’s (2000) definition, however, is that its breadth complies with 
the PITF’s operationalisation of ethnic challengers as any politically mobilised 
national, ethnic, religious or other communal minorities which challenge the 
government in order to bring about major changes in their status (Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff 2009). This consistency of concepts is an important consideration, as the 
statistical findings presented in chapter 6 are based on PITF data as dependent 
variable.  
   
The ambiguity regarding the concept of ethnic violence relates to the impetus behind 
armed confrontations, i.e. how one can know whether they are indeed 
ethnopolitically motivated. Having defined ethnic groups, it seems deceivingly easy 
to describe a violent ethnic conflict simply as ‘a[n armed] dispute about important 
political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic 
communities.’ (Brown 1993:5) However, civil wars are typically based on a variety 
                                                 
8
    I adopt a definition of ethnic groups that is closer to the constructivist end of spectrum, as there is a 
large amount of evidence which supports the idea that ethnicity is somehow socially constructed 
(see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2000; Varshney 2007). For a brief definition of constructivism, see 
section 1.4.. 
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of ‘inextricably fused motives’ (Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis 2005:2) in which 
different cleavages, such as ideological, economic or ethnic, might overlap, so that it 
can be difficult to categorise them clearly as either ‘ethnic’ or ‘non-ethnic’. While 
some might take this as support for the use of a generic category of ‘civil wars’ 
without further subtypes, there nonetheless are some very good reasons to distinguish 
ethnic from other types of violent intrastate conflicts.
9
 These reasons include that a 
generic category of ‘civil wars’ would ignore the intransigent ferocity with which 
specifically identity-based conflicts are often fought (Kaufmann 1996).
10
 It would 
neglect the very prominent ethnic element in conflicts such as those in Northern 
Ireland, Kosovo, Rwanda and Sri Lanka (see e.g. Wolff 2007). And it would 
disregard research findings which indicate that ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars do 
have different causes (Sambanis 2001).  
 
Admittedly, identifying ethnic conflicts in some cases might not be as easy as ‘one 
knows them when one sees them’ (Wolff 2007:2), due to the aforementioned 
potential overlap of different cleavages and motives in civil wars. However, I agree 
with the judgement of scholars such as for instance Gurr (2000), Sambanis (2001) 
and Wolff (2007) that there are nonetheless certain criteria with which one can make 
an educated judgement about the relevance of ethnicity within armed disputes, as in 
episodes of violent ethnic in contrast to non-ethnic conflict ‘the goals of at least one 
conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and … the primary fault line 
of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions.’ (Wolff 2007:2) Accordingly, ethnic as 
opposed to other forms of intrastate violence are here defined as armed disputes in 
which ethnic cleavages are the central lines along which mobilisation for violent 
                                                 
9   Conflicts between ethnic groups are not by definition violent. The word ‘conflict’ merely describes 
a situation in which two or more parties have different objectives and try to change their 
opponent’s behaviour by inflicting costs through the direct exchange of sanctions (Ackerman and 
Kruegler 1994). In general, the term ‘ethnic conflict’ can thus equally refer to ethnic violence as 
well as institutionalised forms of ethnic protest (e.g. in the context of electoral politics) or non-
violent actions outside of (formally) institutionalised political channels (e.g. in the form of 
boycotts or sit-ins). As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, I focus here on ethnic civil wars, i.e. 
episodes of violent ethnic conflict.  
10
  It might be worth noting that this reference is not to imply general agreement with the primordialist 
undertones of Kaufmann’s (1996) analysis; as elaborated in more detail in section 1.4., 
primordialism is too problematic an approach to ethnic conflict studies. This reference instead 
primarily alludes to Kaufmann’s point about the hardening of ethnic identities during violent 
ethnic conflicts which arguably has validity beyond the primordialist framework.  
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action takes place.
11
 Examples include for instance the repeated outbreak of large-
scale ethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda (1963-66, 1990-98 and 
2001) and the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka (which took on the form of an 
ethnic war between 1983 and 2009) (see PITF 2010).  
 
Two further details about the term ‘ethnic violence’ ought to be clarified at this point. 
First, in line with the PITF’s ethnic war data used in the empirical part of this thesis 
(see chapters 5 and 6), my main focus is on episodes of large-scale ethnic violence 
between the government and armed ethnic challengers. This excludes all those types 
of ethnic conflict that do not involve the government as one of the conflicting parties, 
that are non-violent or that manifest themselves in non-war types of action in which 
armed perpetrators attack unarmed civilians (see also section 5.3.). Second, unlike 
studies such as by Fearon and Laitin (2003a) or Fjelde (2009), my research focus is 
not on the onset but rather on the incidence of intrastate violence. In other words, I 
seek to explain the incidence of violent ethnic conflict in any given year, no matter 
whether it is the first conflict year or a continuation year. This focus on the incidence 
rather than the onset of ethnic civil war can be justified from both a theoretical and 
empirical point of view (see section 5.3.).  
  
On a final note, it might be worth pointing out that I use the term ‘ethnically diverse 
society’ synonymously with the concepts of ‘plural’ or ‘divided societies’ in the 
sense that it refers to societies which are not only multiethnic but where ethnicity 
also represents a politically salient cleavage (cf. Lijphart 1977; Rabushka and 
Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2001).
12
 I thereby use the term ‘ethnically diverse society’ as a 
catch-all phrase for all types of multiethnic societies in which ethnicity represents a 
                                                 
11
  In other words, ethnic conflicts are cases in which ‘support [is drawn] from and appeals to the 
interests of African Americans or Albanians or Amazonian peoples rather than the working class 
or the disenfranchised or the victims of environmental degradation.’ (Gurr 2000:6) 
12
   It is worth noting that, unfortunately, I won’t be able to test the political salience of ethnicity and 
its effects on the risk of ethnic civil war empirically, due to the still limited scope of both ethnic 
fractionalisation (as chosen in this thesis) and polarisation indices. Polarisation indices focus on 
the distribution of ethnic groups in a country and are typically highest when there are two groups 
of equal size. Fractionalisation indices are given by the likelihood that two randomly selected 
individuals from a population will belong to different ethnic groups and increase the more small 
groups there are (Alesina et al. 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002). Neither of them, however, measure the 
degree to which interests are politically organised along ethnic cleavages. 
Chapter 1 – Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
 
 
34 
politically salient cleavage, no matter how prominent this cleavage is within a 
country’s political life vis-à-vis other conflict lines or political identities.13  
 
Having laid the definitional groundwork for crucial terms including ‘institution’, 
‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnic violence’, it is now possible to turn to a brief overview of 
central theories on ethnopolitical mobilisation and ethnic violence. 
 
 
1.4. Theories on Ethnopolitical Mobilisation and Ethnic Violence 
 
In the attempt to explain the causes of ethnopolitical mobilisation and ethnic 
violence, the social sciences have generated numerous theories during the last 
decades. They include biosocial theories, modernisation theories, Marxist/Leninist 
theories, internal colonialism, ethnic pluralism, micro-social theories, system theories 
and multivariate models (Richmond 1987). Following Lake and Rothchild (1998), 
this multitude of approaches can be classified into three traditions of inquiry:
14
 
primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Primordialism argues that ethnic 
violence is rooted in tensions between different communities that result from fixed, 
‘naturally’ predisposed group identities, i.e. traits that are either biological or deeply 
entrenched due to centuries of past practices (see e.g. Geertz 1973; Smith 1986; van 
den Berghe 1987). Instrumentalism regards ethnic conflict as contingent upon the 
behaviour of political elites who instrumentalise ethnic features for their own 
material interests – often office-seeking purposes – and intentionally foster ethnic 
tensions (see e.g. Brass 1991; Cohen 1969; Snyder 2000). Finally, constructivism 
describes both feelings of ethnic belonging and ethnic violence as the outcome of 
social interactions and depending on the wider societal, political and economic 
circumstances (see e.g. Anderson 1983; Eriksen 2002; Mamdani 2001). 
                                                 
13
  In the words of Grofman and Stockwell (2003), this implies that the term ‘ethnically diverse 
societies’ equally subsumes plural and pluralistic societies, i.e. societies in which ‘politics is 
organized largely or entirely along ethnic lines, and two or more ethnic groups compete  for power 
at the center of the political system’ (Grofman and Stockwell 2003:102) as well as those ‘which 
are multiethnic in character but in which ethnic differences have been minimized in [political] 
importance.’ (ibid.)  
14
   This, of course, is an idealtypical distinction, as not each study on ethnopolitical mobilisation and 
ethnic conflict will fit neatly into this classification.  
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All three theories have distinct flaws. Lending itself to essentialist conclusions that 
ethnic divisions and conflict are a ‘natural’ given (Lake and Rothchild 1998), 
primordialism cannot explain why some identity groups – such as Croats and Serbs, 
Tutsis and Hutus – have experienced violent confrontations, while others – such as 
the Swiss – have remained peaceful (Hardin 1995). The thesis that only some groups 
would be naturally predisposed to be hostile while others would be naturally pacific, 
cannot be sustained, not only because it is implausible that interethnic hostilities are 
somehow programmed into individuals (ibid.) but also because it cannot explain 
variations in ethnic peace and violence over time (Varshney 2007). Instrumentalist 
explanations provide relevant insights into the contribution of political elites to the 
salience of ethnic tensions and outbreak of ethnic conflict, but fail to account for the 
question ‘why ethnic publics follow leaders down paths that seem to serve elite 
power interests most of all’ (Fearon and Laitin 2000:846; cf. also Kasfir 1979). 
Finally, constructivists have provided a considerable amount of evidence that 
ethnicity – contrary to primordialist claims – is not naturally predisposed but that 
ethnic identities are social phenomena which can change over time (Fearon and 
Laitin 2000; Lake and Rothchild 1998). However, they can be criticised for not 
adequately explaining the causes of ethnic violence, as the same set of circumstances 
– such as the historical process of economic modernisation and its impact on forms 
of social interaction – has led to the violent outbreak of ethnopolitical disputes in 
some places but not in others (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Varshney 2002).   
 
 
1.5. The Institutional Incentives Approach to Ethnic Violence 
 
A fourth tradition of inquiry that has been omitted by Lake and Rothchild (1998) 
despite its popularity in political science, and which stands at the core of this thesis, 
is the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence. This approach is not 
affected by the aforementioned criticisms, as it does not focus on enduring traits of 
ethnic identity, the rational behaviour of political elites or narratives and webs of 
social interactions as the main explanatory factor. Rather, the institutional incentives 
approach to ethnic violence is based on the claim that there is a clearly identifiable 
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relationship between institutional design and ethnopolitical (in)stability, and that 
ethnically diverse societies require different political institutions than comparatively 
homogeneous ones (Varshney 2002). According to this approach, ethnic violence is 
thus an outcome of the establishment of institutions that are not suitable for the 
degree of ethnic diversity in a society. Studies that follow this tradition of inquiry can 
be divided into those that deal with institutional incentives that cause ethnic violence 
to break out (e.g. Wilkinson 2004), and those that analyse institutional incentives to 
guarantee sustainable peace and political stability after the occurrence of civil wars 
(e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). 
 
The argument that political institutions affect ethnic violence is not new. Already 
John Stuart Mill recognised the relevance of institutional design for political stability 
and concluded that ethnically diverse societies require different political institutions 
than comparatively homogeneous ones. In ‘Considerations on Representative 
Government’ ([1861] 1975) he argues that democratic institutions are not suitable for 
societies in which several ethnic or national groups co-exist, as they would deepen 
tensions among the different parts of the population. For Mill, the free choice of 
representatives in a country made up of different nationalities not only causes the 
people to support policies on purely ethnic grounds, but also creates incentives for 
the government to foster antipathies between its people in order to instrumentalise 
them for its own interests. Mill concludes that, rather than democratic institutions, 
such countries require a despotic government which ‘chooses its instruments 
indifferently from all’ (Mill 1975:388) in order to prevent conflict.   
 
Possibly the most prominent debate within the institutional incentives approach to 
ethnic violence is that between Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz. According to 
Lijphart (1977, 1987, 2002), political stability – that is both stable democratic rule 
and sustainable peace – in ethnically diverse societies can be promoted through the 
establishment of consociational institutions which guarantee the participation of 
representatives of all significant parts of the population in the political decision-
making process. These institutions include: the sharing of executive power between 
political representatives of all relevant groups in society; a high degree of autonomy 
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for these groups to run their own internal affairs; proportionality of political 
representation as realised in particular through an electoral system of proportional 
representation (PR) for the legislature; and veto power for minorities (Lijphart 1977, 
2002).  
 
Horowitz (1985, 1991, 2002) on the other hand criticises consociationalism as 
cementing cleavages between different groups through their assured position within 
the political system, resonating Mill’s earlier claims that the choice of representatives 
for conflicting ethnicities might deepen tensions between them. As an alternative to 
consociationalism, Horowitz recommends in particular the implementation of 
institutions that create incentives for pre-electoral interethnic coalition by means of 
vote pooling, such as for instance the alternative vote (AV) system that was adopted 
in Fiji in 1997 (Horowitz 2002). According to Horowitz, the need for political actors 
to moderate their views on ethnopolitically controversial issues and to seek 
interethnic compromises in order to win elections serves more to reduce ethnic 
tensions than the political security offered to ethnic minorities in consociational 
power-sharing
15
 arrangements.
16
 
 
The institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence has not been without its 
critics. Varshney (2002), for instance, argues that it can neither explain regional or 
local variations of ethnic violence by typically focusing on national-level institutions, 
nor why episodes of ethnic conflict vary over time even if institutions rarely change 
due to their inherent inertia. Both these criticisms, however, can be easily dismissed, 
                                                 
15
  It is important to note that the terms ‘consociationalism’ and ‘power-sharing’ should not be used 
synonymously, as consociations are only one particular type of power-sharing arrangements (e.g. 
Horowitz 2002). ‘Narrowly’ defined, strategies of power-sharing are all those methods which aim 
to ensure that the representatives of all major ethnic groups are included in the political decision-
making process (cf. Rothchild and Roeder 2005a). More broadly, power-sharing includes all 
practices ‘that promote meaningful inclusivity and balanced influence for all major groups in a 
multiethnic society’ (Sisk 1996:9). 
16
  A more thorough analysis of the Lijphart/Horowitz debate would have to take a number of further 
aspects into account. They include, for instance, the reliance of Lijphart’s early consociational 
writings on a primordial view of ethnicity (Lijphart 2001), arguments about the arguably 
undemocratic (cf. Lijphart 2002) or overly elite-centred (Barry 1975; Horowitz 2002) nature of 
consociationalism, and the  performance of consociational power-sharing arrangements compared 
to other methods of managing ethnic diversity (see McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Sisk 1996).  
However, although the Lijphart/Horowitz debate fills a major part in the academic debate on 
institutional incentives to ethnic violence, it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate 
these different issues in more detail.  
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as institutional analyses do not claim that institutions are the sole cause of political 
events or outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Rather, they recognise that 
institutions influence political processes by structuring other factors – such as class 
struggles, the behaviour of political actors or the salience of ethnic cleavages – which 
equally have to be taken into account in order to explain political outcomes and, in 
this context, variations in ethnic violence (ibid.; see also Birnir 2007; Lecours 2005; 
Posner 2005; Sisk 1996).  
 
Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism responds to a different shortcoming of the 
institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence in political science which cannot 
be that easily dismissed: namely that, typically, the relationships between political 
institutions and ethnic violence have been analysed by merely investigating the 
effects of single, formal political institutions such as electoral systems or state 
structures. As aforementioned (see section 1.2.), this shortcoming can be translated 
into two different yet equally relevant criticisms: that a) the institutional incentives 
approach to ethnic violence has neglected the relevance of institutional combinations 
(see section 1.6.), and b) there is a significant research asymmetry in favour of 
openly codified institutions (see section 1.7.). 
 
 
1.6. Literature Review on the Neglect of Institutional Combinations  
 
So far, there is no well-known study within the institutional incentives approach to 
ethnic violence that explicitly asks for the interaction effects of political institutions 
on the risk of ethnic civil war.
17
 Put differently, scholars belonging to this school of 
                                                 
17
  A 2011 conference paper by Lee and Lin asks for the interaction effects of form of government, 
electoral system for the legislature and the number and spatial distribution of ethnic groups on the 
probability of different types of ethnopolitical rebellion. I do not count this conference paper as a 
well-known publication, as it is a relatively recent study that lacks clear theoretical grounding and 
has yet to be disseminated to a larger academic audience. It also should be noted that there are 
several significant differences between the conference paper by Lee and Lin (2011) and this thesis. 
The most relevant differences include: First, the lack of a clear theoretical explanation in Lee and 
Lin’s (2011) analysis why certain institutional combinations should increase or decrease the risk of 
violent ethnic conflict. Instead, these authors seem to assume that ethnic groups are somewhat 
inevitably more prone to engage in violent conflict if they are spatially concentrated or if ethnic 
minority groups face an ethnic majority group (see Lee and Lin 2011:6). Second, Lee and Lin’s 
analysis only focuses on combinations of different forms of government and electoral systems for 
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thought have tended to focus on single political institutions in the sense that they 
have failed to ask how relevant it is for the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability 
that certain institutions (such as a specific form of government and a specific type of 
electoral system and state structure) are combined with each other in a given political 
system. This tendency within the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence 
to single out the effects of individual institutions is based on the implicit assumption 
that political institutions can be treated as separate entities and that it is only of 
secondary relevance of which broader set of institutions they form part. As I will 
elaborate in more detail in chapters 3 and 6, this assumption is a fallacy, as the 
effects of electoral systems, forms of government and any other type of political 
institution do not occur as isolated phenomena, but necessarily depend on the broader 
set of political institutions that are joint within a political system.  
 
A brief examination of the analyses by Cohen (1997), Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), 
Reilly (2001), Roeder and Rothchild (2005), Reynolds (2002), Suberu (2001) and 
Wilkinson (2004) reveals the failure of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence to investigate how the effects of political institutions might vary depending 
on the manner in which they are combined with each other. These analyses have 
been chosen on the basis that they have been published fairly recently, but are 
already established enough to have been quoted widely in the literature on the 
relationships between institutional design and ethnopolitical (in)stability. As the 
literature review in this section will highlight, none of the aforementioned studies 
asks for the combined effects of a given set of political institutions.  
 
The assumption that political institutions can be treated as discrete, separable entities 
becomes particularly apparent in the research by Reilly (2001), Suberu (2001) and 
Wilkinson (2004) whose very premise is the focus on a single, formal political 
institution each.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
the legislature, while I focus on combinations of different forms of government, electoral systems 
for the legislature and state structures. Finally, unlike Lee and Lin (2011), I do not consider 
interaction effects between institutional combinations and the number and spatial distribution of 
ethnic groups. This is because, unlike Lee and Lin (2011) and for reasons outlined in section 2.2., I 
prefer not to use the MAR data on ethnic group features.   
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According to Reilly (2001), centripetal institutions which create incentives for 
rational political actors to cooperate, moderate and accommodate between 
themselves and their rivals, are most suitable for the democratic management of 
ethnic disputes. In order to support this claim, he identifies the design of electoral 
systems as key institutional choice in ethnically diverse societies, and investigates 
the effects of preferential voting in Australia, Estonia, Fiji, Northern Ireland, Papua 
New Guinea and Sri Lanka. In doing so, Reilly provides empirical evidence which 
confirms Horowitz’s arguments about the conflict-mitigating benefits of vote-
pooling.  
 
Suberu (2001) highlights the conflictual nature of federalism in Nigeria. On the one 
hand, he acknowledges that Nigeria’s federal structure has been essential to the 
country’s survival as a single political entity through the mitigation of ethnic 
violence in five ways: by localising ethnic disputes in individual states; by 
fragmenting and crosscutting ethnic identities; by protecting ethnic minorities from 
the direct hegemony of larger ethnic groups; by promoting state-based identities as a 
cleavage that is independent of and competitive with ethnic identities; and by 
devolving federally controlled resources to territorial constituencies. On the other 
hand, however, he also demonstrates how federalism has increased interethnic 
tensions through competition over power and resources in four distributive arenas: 
revenue allocation, territorial reorganisations, intersegmental relations (or what 
Suberu calls ‘the federal character principle’) and population censuses.  
 
In his study of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, Wilkinson (2004) argues that town-level 
and state-level electoral incentives account for where violence breaks out, and where 
and when police forces are deployed to prevent riots. Using a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative evidence, he claims that the likelihood with which 
democratic states will protect their minorities depends on their governments’ 
electoral interests to do so. According to Wilkinson, politicians in government will 
increase the supply of protection for minorities when these are an important part of 
their own party’s or coalition partner’s support base, or when a high degree of party 
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fractionalisation heightens the probability that the governing party will have to enter 
a coalition with minority-supported parties in the future.  
 
At first sight, each of these three authors makes a compelling case about what seems 
to be a crucial variable influencing the chances of ethnopolitical stability. A closer 
examination, however, shows that the exclusive focus on a single, formal political 
institution might be rather problematic: Although Wilkinson (2004) explicitly 
analyses the actions of state governments, he does not take into account how the 
specific features of India’s federal design have shaped the party systems on the 
subnational level (which are central to his analysis), and how this interplay between 
federalism and party system features might have affected the risk of ethnic violence 
(see Mitra 2000). Wilkinson’s rather restricted research focus thus ignores relevant 
findings by other authors according to which the many variations in federal design 
(both between countries and over time) and the chances of political representation 
they provide are a crucial factor influencing the balance of power between political 
actors and the likelihood of ethnopolitical stability (see e.g. Watts 1998).  
 
Suberu (2001) seems to recognise the relevance of institutional combinations when 
he acknowledges that federal principles have played a critical role in the discussions 
surrounding the adoption and design of presidentialism in Nigeria’s Second and 
Third
18
 Republic (1979-1983 and 1999-today). However, he does not investigate any 
further whether Nigeria’s presidential form of government, despite its reliance on a 
broad-based electoral formula,
19
 has in fact contributed to interethnic disputes over 
powers and resources, or whether these conflicts would have been likely to occur 
under any other type of executive combined with Nigeria’s federal structure. In other 
words, Suberu seems to be aware that the effects of Nigeria’s state structure and form 
of government on the risk of ethnic violence are intimately intertwined. But 
                                                 
18
 Contrary to its official label as Fourth Republic, I intentionally refer to the republic declared in 1999 
as the Third Nigerian Republic. This is because the intended Third Republic, whose constitution 
was promulgated in 1989, was aborted even before its formal inauguration (cf. Suberu and 
Diamond 2002). 
19
 According to the 1979 Constitution, the successful presidential candidate had to win a least 25 
percent of the votes in thirteen of Nigeria’s nineteen states in addition to a plurality of votes 
nationwide. Similarly, the 1999 Constitution requires the successful presidential candidate to win at 
least 25 percent of the votes in twenty-four of Nigeria’s thirty-six states and the Federal Capital 
Territory Abuja in addition to a nationwide plurality of votes.  
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nonetheless, he shies away from discussing whether presidentialism – through its 
reliance on winner-takes-all principles (Linz 1990a; see also section 3.4.) – has 
reinforced the negative effects of federalism on ethnopolitical stability, or whether it 
has helped to protect ethnic minorities together with the dispersion of power under 
federal principles, thanks to its strict separation of legislative and executive powers 
(cf. Horowitz 1991; see also section 3.4.).  
 
Similarly, Reilly (2001) mentions several times in his book that rather than the 
electoral system for the legislature alone, it might be its interplay with a specific type 
of executive that influences the prospects of ethnopolitical stability. But despite this 
acknowledgment, he does not elaborate these arguments any further. Instead, he 
treats electoral rules as separate entities and pays little to no attention with which 
other institutions (such as forms of government or state structures) they are 
combined. This is even more surprising, as Reilly in fact cites the literature outside 
of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence (specifically: Mainwaring 
1993) that has highlighted the interaction effects between types of executives and 
electoral systems for the legislature, and thus demonstrated the relevance of 
analysing institutional combinations (see section 3.7. for further details). 
 
Unlike Reilly (2001), Suberu (2001) and Wilkinson (2004), the volumes by Hartzell 
and Hoddie (2007), Roeder and Rothchild (2005) and Reynolds (2002) explicitly set 
out to analyse several political institutions that have an impact on ethnopolitical 
(in)stability. Both Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) and Roeder and Rothchild (2005) ask 
for the viability of power-sharing institutions to secure sustainable peace in post-civil 
war societies, but come to different conclusions. While Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) 
argue that power-sharing institutions greatly enhance the chances for enduring peace 
by providing political security to former wartime opponents, Roeder and Rothchild 
(2005) call for caution, as they find only few examples of long-term successes with 
power-sharing. To reach these conclusions, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) analyse the 
effects of political, military, territorial and economic power-sharing or power-
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dividing
20
 institutions as guaranteed by civil war settlements. Among these 
institutions are for instance electoral proportional representation, the integration of 
the state and rebel security forces, federalism and preferential policies to distribute 
economic resources among rival groups. The political institutions considered in 
Roeder and Rothchild’s (2005) edited volume include inter alia federalism, 
parliamentarism and electoral systems of proportional representation.  
 
Although both works by Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) and Roeder and Rothchild 
(2005) investigate a number of different political institutions, they still suffer from 
the same one-dimensionality as those studies that explicitly focus on just a single, 
formal political institution. This is because the contributors to these two volumes 
single out each institution they consider one by one – be they party systems, electoral 
systems, military, economic or federal arrangements – instead of investigating the 
interplay between different political institutions. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) seem to 
emphasise the relevance of interaction effects between institutions by arguing that 
different dimensions of institutional design – political, military, economic and 
territorial – can reinforce each other. However, just like Reilly (2001), Roeder and 
Rothchild (2005), Suberu (2001) and Wilkinson (2004), they only analyse the 
individual (i.e. non-interacted) effects of single political institutions and fail to ask 
how the effects of these institutions might vary depending on the manner in which 
they are combined with each other.  
 
The same criticism holds for Reynolds’s (2002) edited volume on the 
interrelationship between institutional design, conflict management and democratic 
                                                 
20
 It should be noted that, while ‘power-dividing’ is a crucial term in both the volumes by Hartzell and 
Hoddie (2007) and Roeder and Rothchild (2005), their analyses understand it very differently: 
Hartzell and Hoddie define power-dividing institutions as institutions that – in contrast to power-
sharing measures which bring antagonistic groups together and foster increased contact between 
them – help separate or buffer groups from one another; for these authors, power-sharing and 
power-dividing measures are inextricably linked which is why they treat them as one category of 
institutions. Roeder and Rothchild, on the other hand, are careful to distinguish power-sharing 
clearly from power-dividing measures and, in contrast to Hartzell and Hoddie, define the latter as 
those strategies which expand civil liberties at the expense of government, empower different 
majorities in independent organs of government and balance decision-making centres against each 
other in order to check each majority (Rothchild and Roeder 2005b); for these authors, power-
dividing measures are better suited than power-sharing institutions to help consolidate peace after 
civil wars beyond short-term transitional arrangements (ibid.). 
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development. This is surprising, as Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds explicitly 
acknowledge in the volume’s introduction that political institutions need to be treated 
as ‘a holistic package …[as they] interact in complex ways’ (Belmont, Mainwaring 
and Reynolds 2002:4). But despite this explicit acknowledgment, none of the 
volume’s subsequent chapters investigates how relevant it might be for the prospects 
of ethnopolitical (in)stability that specific political institutions are combined with 
each other (such as whether a presidential form of government and a unitary state 
structure are combined with a majoritarian as opposed to a proportional or mixed 
electoral system for the legislature). In this manner, also the volume by Reynolds 
treats political institutions as discrete, separable entities and fails to consider their 
interaction effects on the risk of ethnic civil war.  
 
To describe the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence as predominantly 
focusing on the individual effects of single political institutions thus is not to say that 
scholars belonging to this school of thought tend to focus just on one institution in 
their analyses. On the contrary, the Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), Reynolds (2002) and 
Roeder and Rothchild (2005) volumes identify a number of different political 
institutions that have a relevant impact on ethnopolitical stability. What this review 
criticises is rather that none of these studies goes beyond one-dimensional 
comparisons of, for instance, the advantages of one type of electoral system over the 
other: Even if these analyses take the relevance of a variety of institutions into 
account, they do not ask how the effects of political institutions might vary 
depending on the manner in which they are combined with each other. 
 
This focus on individual rather than combined effects of political institutions can also 
be recognised in the Lijphart/Horowitz debate which is resumed in the Reynolds 
volume. Both authors consider several formal political institutions, including 
electoral systems, forms of government, federalism and regional autonomy. As 
alluded to earlier (see section 1.5.), Lijphart indeed refers to a specific set of political 
institutions with his model of consociational democracy, in which he puts particular 
emphasis on the sharing of executive power and group autonomy while identifying 
proportionality and mutual veto as secondary characteristics (Lijphart 2002). 
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Nevertheless, neither Lijphart nor Horowitz investigate the joint effects of these 
institutions, i.e. how institutional design influences the prospects of ethnopolitical 
(in)stability depending on which political institutions are combined with each other. 
Rather, their debate has mainly revolved around individual effects of single formal 
institutions by tending to emphasise the benefits and perils of individual institutions 
instead of their interaction. In this sense, the Lijphart/Horowitz debate – just like the 
remainder of the book by Reynolds (2002) and the volumes by Hartzell and Hoddie 
(2007) and Roeder and Rothchild (2005) – has revolved around a specific list of 
individual institutions rather than an investigation of how important it is that 
particular institutions are combined in a certain way. This becomes especially 
evident in their famous recommendations for the South African electoral system for 
the legislature (Lijphart 1987; Horowitz 1991), in which the relevance of other 
institutions – such as whether list PR is combined with parliamentarism (Lijphart 
1987) or an AV system with presidentialism (Horowitz 1991) – is mentioned but not 
treated as crucial to their analyses. 
 
That not even the academic debate surrounding the model of consociational 
democracy considers the joint effects of institutional combinations can be further 
illustrated with reference to the 1997 article by Frank Cohen. Although he does not 
apply the term ‘consociationalism’, Cohen explicitly refers to Lijphart’s work as a 
guideline in his attempt to analyse whether proportional or majoritarian democratic 
institutions manage ethnic strife more effectively. Using linear regression analysis 
for a dataset that contains information on 830 ethnic minorities subject to democratic 
rule between 1945 and 1989, he finds statistical support for the Lijphart-inspired 
claim that proportional institutions which give ethnic minorities ‘a realistic chance of 
explicit representation in the institutions of power’ (Cohen 1997:627) are better 
suited to reduce ethnic tensions than majoritarian ones. But although Cohen tests 
various elements that he identifies as crucial for proportional ethnic conflict 
management, such as a PR electoral system for the legislature and multipartism, his 
hypotheses nonetheless remain one-dimensional in the sense that they merely refer to 
the individual effects of single institutions: None of his 13 hypotheses (seven of 
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which relate to his control variables) investigates the joint effects of specific 
institutional combinations. 
 
As the above selection of authors has shown, the institutional incentives approach to 
ethnic violence has remained one-dimensional in scope by neglecting the relevance 
of institutional combinations and restricting itself to pairwise comparisons of 
individual institutions. This lack of studies that investigate the effects of institutional 
combinations on the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability has resulted in a 
significant gap in the academic debate which completely omits findings by authors 
such as Tsebelis (1995), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a), Lijphart (1999) and 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005). Their studies, whose central claims will be 
outlined in section 3.7., demonstrate that it is not just of secondary but of crucial 
relevance for political outcomes how institutions are combined with each other. 
Hence, even though these studies do not focus on questions of ethnopolitical stability 
themselves, they indicate how the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism might lead to new insights about the impact of institutional design on 
the prospects for ethnopolitical (in)stability (see also section 3.7.). Accordingly, the 
theoretical considerations and empirical findings presented in chapters 3 and 6 will 
highlight the need for a new research agenda that explicitly asks for the effects of 
institutional combinations.  
 
 
1.7. Literature Review on the Neglect of Informal Political Institutions 
 
My second criticism against the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence 
states that there is a pronounced research asymmetry in favour of formal political 
institutions such as electoral rules and state structures (see e.g. the readings presented 
in section 1.6.), i.e. political institutions that are laid down in writing and guaranteed 
by the sanctioning mechanisms of the state (see section 1.3.). Informal political 
institutions, on the other hand, which are neither laid down in writing nor guaranteed 
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by the state but endure over time due to persisting patterns in human behaviour (cf. 
Lauth 2000), are relatively neglected.
21
  
 
To illustrate this point briefly, one can look for instance at the volume by Roeder and 
Rothchild (2005) presented in section 1.6., which asks for the viability of power-
sharing institutions to secure sustainable peace in post-civil war societies. Both the 
introduction by Roeder and Rothchild and the chapter by Hoddie and Hartzell 
contain an explicit – yet no further elaborated – acknowledgment that power-sharing 
arrangements need not be openly codified. But despite this acknowledgement, only 
the essay by Sisk and Stefes assesses in detail the relevance of informal political 
institutions for the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. Specifically, Sisk and 
Stefes’s analysis of South Africa’s power-sharing experience illustrates how informal 
political institutions can serve as essential supplement to formal power-sharing 
arrangements in ethnically diverse societies. According to these authors, the 
implementation of formal power-sharing institutions during the early stages of the 
transition from apartheid to full democracy helped guarantee short-term peace and 
facilitated democracy-building. Socially entrenched patterns of interethnic 
cooperation and moderation – or, as Sisk and Stefes call it, practices of ‘informal 
power-sharing’ – on the other hand have been crucial to sustain peace in the longer 
term and after the end of formal power-sharing. The fact that out of the 13 chapters 
in Roeder and Rothchild’s (2005) volume only the essay by Sisk and Stefes deals 
with the role of informal political institutions, is symptomatic for a more general 
tendency within the institutional incentives to ethnic violence to pay far greater 
attention to formal than to informal political institutions (see also Cohen 1997; 
Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Reilly 2001; Reynolds 2002; Suberu 2001; Wilkinson 
2004 presented in section 1.6.).  
 
In addition to the essay by Sisk and Stefes, the relevance of analysing informal 
political institutions is further confirmed by Varshney’s (2001, 2002) investigation of 
civil society structures as explanatory factors for Hindu-Muslim riots in India. 
                                                 
21
  Interestingly enough, this criticism not only holds for the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence, but also for comparative research on political institutions more generally (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004).  
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Seeking a theory that can explain local or regional variations in ethnopolitical 
(in)stability, Varshney finds that the type of civic engagement – that is interethnic or 
intraethnic, associational or everyday interactions – has a significant impact on the 
likelihood that violent ethnic conflict will occur. Associational forms of civic 
engagement include, among others, business assocations, sports clubs or trade 
unions, whereas everyday forms of civic engagement are routine interactions of life 
such as, for instance, family visits, joint meals or children playing together. Through 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative research, drawing on a variety of 
materials (such as archival resources, interviews and newspaper surveys) and 
considering both the national and local level of analysis, Varshney concludes that 
forms of civic engagement which are interethnic and associational are particularly 
conducive to ethnic peace. This is because they create and represent social ties which 
can countervail the impact of events or political strategies that would otherwise lead 
to the polarisation of ethnic groups (e.g. partitions, civil wars, the defeat of an ethnic 
party in elections or the attempts by politicians to exacerbate interethnic tensions for 
their own office-seeking purposes). Whereas both everyday and associational forms 
of civic engagement promote peace if they are interethnic and robust, Varshney 
points out that the latter have a substantially greater capacity to withstand potentially 
polarising events or strategies, as the utility of everyday engagement declines with 
the size of the locality (i.e. it is higher in villages or small towns than in cities or 
metropolises).   
 
Apart from Sisk and Stefes (2005) and Varshney (2001, 2002), also Lijphart 
explicitly acknowledges that it is only of secondary relevance for their impact on 
political stability in ethnically diverse societies whether political institutions are 
openly codified or not. Although the aforementioned Lijphart/Horowitz debate has 
primarily centred on the design of formal political institutions such as electoral 
systems or state structures, Lijphart writes in ‘Democracy in Plural Societies’ (1977) 
that some consociational institutions, such as the veto power of minorities, ‘can be an 
informal and unwritten understanding or a rule that is formally agreed on and 
possibly anchored in the constitution’ (ibid.:38, italics added). He reinforces this 
argument in his 1996 article on ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy’ in which he 
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explicitly states that the ‘minority veto in power-sharing democracies usually 
consists of merely an informal understanding’ (Lijphart 1996:261). These arguments 
imply that the effects of formal and informal political institutions are of equal 
significance and should therefore be given similar consideration.    
 
If authors such as Lijphart (1977, 1996), Sisk and Stefes (2005) and Varshney (2001, 
2002) already highlighted the relevance of informal political institutions, why, then, 
do they nonetheless remain almost completely neglected within the institutional 
incentives approach to ethnic violence? A possible explanation why the 
institutionalist tradition of inquiry tends to favour the study of formal political 
institutions is that the more restricted understanding of institutions as openly codified 
entities has the advantage of analytical clarity (cf. Helmke and Levitsky 2004; 
Thelen and Steinmo 1992). In other words, formal political institutions make easier 
objects of study as they are easier to identify (cf. Immergut 1998). Nevertheless, the 
almost complete neglect of informal political institutions cannot be justified for at 
least two reasons. 
 
First, restricting research to purely formal notions of what constitutes an institution is 
based on the misinterpretation that it is their materiality which makes political 
institutions ‘real’, i.e. allows them to affect political outcomes (cf. Giddens 1984). In 
other words, it neglects what has been identified as one of new institutionalism’s 
seminal departures from old institutionalism, namely the insight that political 
interactions are not only shaped by openly codified structures such as forms of 
government or electoral systems, but also by norms, values and socially entrenched 
(but not openly codified) patterns of behaviour (cf. Lecours 2005). Precisely this 
point becomes apparent in the aforementioned analyses by Lijphart (1977, 1996), 
Sisk and Stefes (2005) and Varshney (2001, 2002), which clearly demonstrate that 
informal political institutions are as relevant for the prospects of ethnopolitical 
stability as formal political institutions. 
 
Second, the research asymmetry in favour of formal political institutions also 
neglects the often significant interaction effects between formal and informal 
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political institutions, and the fact that issues of political representation are not 
confined to the electoral or, for that matter, formal institutional context (Saward 
2005). As will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 4, informal political 
institutions such as corruption do not change the actual form of formal political 
institutions (Lauth 2000). However, they do affect their modus operandi which in 
turn has an impact on the chances of different ethnic groups to obtain the values of 
political representation outlined in chapter 2.  
 
In response to the research asymmetry in favour of formal political institutions, the 
theoretical considerations in chapter 4 and empirical findings in chapter 6 will 
highlight the need for a more balanced research agenda within the institutional 
incentives approach to ethnic violence that takes greater account of the impact of 
informal political institutions on the risk of ethnic civil war.  
 
 
1.8. Conclusion: The Purpose of this Thesis 
 
The relationships between political institutions and ethnopolitical (in)stability 
typically have been analysed by putting predominant emphasis on the effects of 
single, formal political institutions such as electoral systems, forms of government or 
state structures (see e.g. Reilly 2001; Reynolds 2002; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; 
Suberu 2001; Wilkinson 2004). I criticise this research focus in two different yet 
equally relevant regards: First, the tendency to single out the effects of individual 
institutions is based on the implicit – and as I claim: wrong – assumption that 
political institutions can be treated as separate entities and that it is only of secondary 
relevance of which broader set of institutions they form part. Consequently, there is 
currently no well-known study that explicitly asks for the impact of specific 
institutional combinations on the risk of ethnic civil war. I thus address a clear gap in 
the academic debate by investigating how relevant it is for the prospects of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability that certain institutions (i.e. certain forms of government, 
electoral systems for the legislature and state structures) are combined with each 
other in a given political system (see chapters 3 and 6). Second, despite studies 
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which highlight the relevance of informal political institutions for the risk of violent 
ethnic conflict (see e.g. Lijphart 1977, 1996; Sisk and Stefes 2005; Varshney 2001, 
2002), they have been largely neglected in the academic debate so far. I therefore 
seek to move beyond the mere focus on formal political institutions that is typical for 
the institutionalist tradition of inquiry by further illustrating the effects of socially 
entrenched (but not openly codified) structures of political interactions on the 
prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. The theoretical assumptions outlined in 
chapter 4 and the statistical results presented in chapter 6 will use corruption as a 
prime example of an informal political institution and demonstrate its impact on the 
risk of large-scale ethnic violence.  
 
Taken together, these two aims (i.e. to highlight the relevance of institutional 
combinations and of informal political institutions for the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence) make up Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism. This new approach to the study 
of institutional incentives for ethnic violence centres on the explicit 
acknowledgement that political institutions are ‘embedded entities’ in the sense that 
a) they never exist on their own but always form part of a wider institutional 
arrangement and b) they can affect the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability even if 
they are not openly codified but exist over time due to persisting patterns in human 
behaviour. 
 
In order to clarify the causal relationship between institutional design and the risk of 
ethnic civil war in general, and substantiate the relevance of institutional 
combinations and informal political institutions for the prospects of ethnopolitical 
(in)stability in particular, this analysis uses a grievance-based explanation of violent 
intrastate conflict. The central tenets of this theoretical framework will be outlined in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Institutional Incentives for Ethnic Violence 
 
2.1. Introduction: Political Institutions and the Risk of Ethnic Civil War 
 
The institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence contains a vast number of 
possible explanations how different political institutions may causally affect the risk 
of ethnic civil war (see e.g. sections 1.6. and 1.7.). In this thesis, I use a grievance-
based explanation of violent intrastate conflict which centres on the identification of 
three key reasons why being represented politically is so valuable to ethnic groups. 
These key values of political representation refer to the political recognition of ethnic 
groups, the likelihood with which resources and powers are distributed in their 
favour, and their perceptions of political, physical and economic security. To present 
the theoretical framework for my analysis, the following sections will 
 
 outline the central tenets (section 2.2.), strengths and weaknesses (section 
2.3.) of grievance-based arguments;  
 highlight the relevance of high levels of political inclusiveness (section 2.4.); 
and 
 describe the intrinsic and instrumental values of political representation 
(sections 2.5. to 2.7.).  
 Section 2.8. will conclude this chapter by summarising its central points.  
 
  
2.2. Grievance-Based Explanations of Violent Intrastate Conflict 
 
Numerous studies within the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence have 
pointed to the apparent link between ethnic civil wars and the systematic political 
exclusion or marginalisation of certain ethnic groups. For instance, Bertrand (2004) 
argues that the causes of ethnic violence in Indonesia in the late 1990s and early 
2000s lie in low levels of political inclusiveness, as ‘most obviously, when groups 
are excluded from representation or the ability to pursue their interests within given 
institutions, they may become increasingly alienated from the state.’ (Bertrand 
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2004:4) Similarly, DeVotta (2005) highlights with reference to Sri Lanka’s ethnic 
civil war between 1983 and 2009 that high levels of political exclusiveness are likely 
to increase the risk of violent ethnic conflict, because ‘a system of rules designed to 
marginalise, subjugate and humiliate minorities could unleash reactive nationalism 
and undermine polyethnic coexistence.’ (DeVotta 2005:146) Although they come to 
partly very different conclusions about which type of institutional design may be 
most suitable for ethnically diverse societies (see section 1.5.), also Horowitz and 
Lijphart agree that ‘civil violence, military coups … can all be traced to this problem 
of inclusion-exclusion’ (Horowitz 1985:629), as ‘it is naïve to expect minorities 
condemned to permanent opposition to remain loyal, moderate, and constructive.’ 
(Lijphart 2004:98) To explain this apparent link between levels of political 
inclusiveness provided by institutional design and the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence, I use a grievance-based explanation of violent intrastate conflict.  
 
According to grievance-based explanations of violent intrastate conflict such as 
relative deprivation theory, ethnic violence is a concrete expression of accumulated 
grievances about the non-fulfilment of certain value expectations. Derived from the 
frustration-aggression theory formulated in the late 1930s, relative deprivation theory 
argues that ethnopolitical instability originates from a discrepancy between ‘the 
goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled’ 
(Gurr 1970:24), and ‘the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting 
and keeping.’ (ibid.) Ethnic groups who perceive that they cannot get the values they 
feel entitled to, are expected to develop emotions of anger and resentment which – 
taking additional factors such as levels of group cohesions or state strength into 
account (see below) – can translate into violent action (Gurr 2000; Harff and Gurr 
2003).  
 
According to the relative deprivation model, ‘values’ are all ‘desired events, objects, 
and conditions for which men strive.’ (Gurr 1970:25) Gurr classifies these into three 
categories: welfare values, which contribute directly to physical well-being and self-
realisation; power values, which determine the extent to which men can influence the 
actions of others and reversely can avoid unwanted interference by others in their 
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own actions; and interpersonal values, which represent psychological satisfactions 
sought in nonauthoritative interactions with other individuals and groups (ibid.). 
Feelings of entitlement to a given value and grievances about the non-fulfillment of 
certain value expectations thereby must rely on a reference category in the sense that 
members of an ethnic group are only expected to grow resentful if they have a 
standard of what they should have in comparison to someone or something else 
(ibid.). Possible reference categories include for instance other ethnic groups (in the 
same or a neighbouring country), a different sector of society or one’s own ethnic 
group in the recent past (Soeters 2005). 
 
Relative deprivation theory has been modified repeatedly since the publication of 
Gurr’s seminal volume ‘Why Men Rebel’ in 1970. Particularly noteworthy is the 
increase in attention paid to structural conditions which, given the relative 
deprivation of one or more ethnic groups, make the incidence of violent intrastate 
conflict more likely (Brush 1996). These conditions include, for instance, the 
territorial concentration of ethnic groups or high levels of group cohesion which help 
overcome collective action problems, and a weak state or authoritarian norms that 
encourage strategies of ethnopolitical rebellion rather than protest (Gurr 2000).
22
  
 
The increased interest in conditions that make the translation of grievances into 
violent action more likely is a reaction inter alia to criticisms against early versions 
of the relative deprivation model that it cannot explain why relative deprivation does 
not always lead to armed disputes (Brush 1996). This insight that grievances do not 
inevitably lead to ethnic violence is illustrated in Figure 3: If ethnic groups are not 
able to overcome collective action problems – for instance due to low group cohesion 
(Gurr 2000) – they will not mobilise for any form of large-scale ethnopolitical action 
and grievances among these groups remain latent (Outcome 1). Ethnic groups who 
do overcome collective action problems need not necessarily resort to violent means 
either, but might pursue their goals through non-violent strategies (cf. Varshney 
2007). These in turn can be distinguished into non-violent action that takes place 
within formally institutionalised political channels, such as debates in parliament or 
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    See footnote 2 for the definition of ethnopolitical rebellion and protest according to Gurr (2000).  
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electoral politics in ethnically diverse democracies (Outcome 2), and non-violent 
action that takes place outside of these formally institutionalised channels, such as 
protests, boycotts or strikes (Outcome 3). Of course, Outcomes 2 to 4 in Figure 3 
need not exclude each other, as members of an ethnic group may change or combine 
different strategies to achieve their goals (cf. Schock 2005). 
 
 
 
 
In this context, it is important to point out again (see section 1.2.) that I  propose a 
‘basic incentives model’ of large-scale ethnic violence in the sense that I focus on the 
underlying motivations of violent ethnic conflict, not the proximate causes or 
contextual factors that affect the particular timing and type of ethnopolitical action 
(cf. Gurr 2000; Wolff 2007). Put differently, it goes beyond both the theoretical 
interest and the practical scope of this thesis to analyse the trigger events, capacity or 
opportunity factors that facilitate the translation of grievances into violent action. As 
there is no easily available quantitative data
23
 e.g. on levels of ethnic group cohesion 
or state strength that would be suitable for the empirical part of this thesis (see 
chapters 5 and 6), such contextual factors that affect the particular timing and type of 
ethnopolitical action ought to be investigated in separate case studies. 
                                                 
23
  The seminal Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset is not suitable for the binary time-series-cross-
section analysis presented in chapter 6 for a variety of reasons. First, it is not advisable to pool the 
data provided in the different phases of the MAR project, as some variables have been altered and 
are thus not strictly comparable over time (Saideman and Ayres 2000; see also CIDCM 2007; 
Davenport 2003). Second, the MAR dataset has been criticised for neglecting ethnic groups in 
power (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). Finally, the MAR project’s lack of testing for inter-
coder reliability (CIDCM 2007; Davenport 2003) leads to concerns about data quality. 
No ethnopolitical mobilisation 
→ Outcome 1: grievances remain latent 
Ethnopolitical mobilisation 
 
Grievances 
Outcome 3: non-institutional  
non-violent action (e.g. protests) 
Outcome 4: violent action Outcome 2: non-violent action 
within formally institutionalised 
channels (e.g. electoral politics) 
Figure 3: The Four Possible Outcomes of Grievances. 
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2.3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Grievance-Based Approach 
 
The main benefit of using a grievance-based explanation of violent intrastate conflict 
lies in the fact that it shifts the analytical focus from political elites to the perceptions 
and impact of institutional design among ethnic masses. Unlike research by authors 
such as Lijphart, Horowitz and Reilly (who focus on the motivations of political 
leaders to assess the suitability of different institutions for ethnically diverse 
societies), grievance-based explanations of violent intrastate conflict thus help to 
explain institutional incentives for ethnic violence among ethnic publics and not just 
their leaders. 
 
However, despite this considerable benefit, my choice of a grievance-based 
explanation of large-scale ethnic violence nonetheless could be contested on at least 
three grounds. First, it could be questioned in light of analyses which argue that  
grievances have little explanatory power for violent intrastate conflicts, especially 
when compared to economic conditions or opportunities. Of particular relevance in 
this context is the so-called greed versus grievance debate that has dominated the 
civil wars literature since the late 1990s (see e.g. Bodea and Elbadawi 2007; Collier, 
Hoeffler and Rohner 2009; Regan and Norton 2005), following statistical findings by 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) which indicate that civil wars are not the 
consequence of accumulated grievances. According to these authors, the risk of 
violent intrastate conflict instead increases depending on financial opportunities 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and expected gains conditional upon victory that 
outweigh the costs of violent action (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Early versions of 
the greed argument (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2000) thereby have 
focused on ‘greed’ literally in the sense of the self-enrichment, profiteering and 
rapacity of rebel groups (Aspinall 2007), while later versions have become more 
differentiated by arguing that ‘what counts is ... “feasibility” (Collier and Hoeffler 
2005, 629) or “opportunity” (Collier, Hoeffler, and Sambanis 2005, 3), insofar that 
insurgent movements can only emerge and be sustained when resources are available 
to finance them.’ (Aspinall 2007:951)  
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In recent years, an increasing number of scholars, including Collier and Hoeffler 
themselves, have come to recognise that explanations for civil wars are typically not 
that clear-cut and that the greatest value might lie with theoretical accounts which 
mix greed and grievance factors (e.g. Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis 2005; Korf 
2005; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009; see also sections 2.6. and 2.7. on the overlap of 
greed and grievance factors in this thesis). Nevertheless, there are two crucial reasons 
why I pay rather little attention to possible greed factors in subsequent arguments. 
These reasons are a) that most greed-based analyses of intrastate violence are 
bordering on the atheoretical, due to the difficulty of finding a proper explanation 
why self-interested economic agents would choose war over other alternatives to 
achieve their aims (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009); and b) that the expected gains 
and financial opportunities highlighted by greed-based explanations should not be 
seen as either intrinsically ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the risk of ethnic violence, but rather 
that their precise effects are highly context-dependent (Berdal 2005).  
 
Of course, none of this is to say that grievance-based models of intrastate violence 
are faultless, which leads to the second potential criticism against my theoretical 
framework: namely, that I will not be able to actually test my arguments on the 
causal links between political institutions and the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. 
This is a limitation not specific to this thesis, but to any analysis using the relative 
deprivation model or another grievance-based framework: Since both relative 
deprivation and grievances are inherently subjective concepts which refer to the 
perceptions and emotions of people, they are very hard, if not even impossible, to 
measure directly (Dudley and Miller 1998; Kalyvas 2007).
24
 Studies which use the 
grievance concept therefore typically rely on so-called ‘objective measures of 
grievances’ (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Dudley and Miller 1998; Gurr and Moore 
1997). This means that, instead of trying to quantify the perceptions or emotions of 
people, grievances are measured indirectly by reference to variables that are assumed 
to cause grievances, such as for instance high levels of economic inequality (Collier 
                                                 
24
  The Minorities at Risk project quantifies ethnic group grievances by relying on ‘statements and 
actions by group leaders and members or observations of grievances by third parties.’ (CIDCM 
2007:14) It could, however, be questioned how representative these statements, actions or 
observations really are, i.e. how far they truly reflect the sentiments of the members of an entire 
ethnic group about certain political, economic or cultural issues. 
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and Hoeffler 2004) or political institutions that provide low levels of political 
inclusiveness (see this thesis). Grievance-based analyses of intrastate conflict thus 
rely on proxies of the grievance concept without being able to operationalise it 
properly.  
 
Ultimately, the lack of direct grievance measures implies that social scientists cannot 
provide any direct empirical evidence to support grievance-based arguments. 
Nonetheless, this is far from saying that grievance-based explanations of violent 
intrastate conflict ought to be dismissed altogether. On the contrary, despite its 
apparent empirical limitations, the grievance concept possesses considerable staying 
power, as it has remained a prominent social science tool for more than 40 years. 
Like many other social science concepts, grievance-based explanations of violent 
intrastate conflict represent an ‘inference to the best explanation’ (cf. Lipton 2004) 
and as such, despite being imperfect, have intuitive appeal to guide academic 
analyses (cf. Regan and Norton 2005).  
 
The final criticism that could be raised against my theoretical framework refers to the 
fact that subsequent arguments rest on the implicit assumption that ethnic groups are 
at least to a certain degree internally homogeneous entities. To be more precise, 
subsequent arguments rest on the implicit assumption that the members of an ethnic 
group have common value expectations and share certain opinions or interests which 
can be represented politically. This assumption could be criticised on the grounds 
that ethnic groups might consist of factions with different political agendas (see e.g. 
Alonso and Ruiz 2005), which in turn leads to questions about the conditions under 
which a value may be called a value for an entire ethnic group and among whom 
exactly grievances are likely to arise if certain value expectations are not fulfilled.  
 
But while these are interesting questions to raise, there is little benefit in 
distinguishing here the values, opinions and interests of ethnic subgroups, as it could 
lead to both theoretical and statistical confusion concerning issues such as 
comparability with other studies or criteria for subgroup selection (cf. Vega 1992). 
Just like the research by scholars such as Wimmer (2002) and Cederman and 
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Girardin (2007), I therefore treat ethnic groups as homogeneous entities within my 
grievance-based explanation, although I am aware that there can be relevant 
subdivisions. 
 
 
2.4. Why Political Inclusiveness Matters  
 
My thesis differs from previous grievance-based analyses e.g. by Gurr (1970, 1993) 
or Dudley and Miller (1998) in that I focus on value expectations and – in case of 
their non-fulfilment – grievances relating specifically to the design of political 
institutions. The reasoning behind this research focus becomes apparent in the causal 
mechanisms
25
 elaborated in sections 2.5., 2.6. and 2.7.. They serve to illustrate that 
institutional design which provides low levels of political inclusiveness can give rise 
to a variety of social, political or economic grievances. These different kinds of 
grievances are likely to arise because political representation helps to obtain welfare, 
power and interpersonal values alike (cf. Gurr 1970; see also section 2.2.). In other 
words, being represented politically contributes directly to the physical well-being 
and self-realisation of ethnic groups (see sections 2.6. and 2.7.); their ability to 
influence potentially harmful actions against them (see section 2.7.); and the 
psychological satisfaction they might get from the knowledge that they are 
recognised members of the political community (see section 2.5.). Consequently, 
political institutions which are associated with low levels of political inclusiveness 
contribute to perceived or objective asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms of 
their political as well as socioeconomic standing, and arguably give rise to emotions 
of anger and resentment among those ethnic groups who consider their chances to 
obtain the values of political representation to be comparatively low. The relevance 
of grievances relating to levels of political inclusiveness can be illustrated with a 
brief reference to the episodes of ethnic war in Burundi (1972, 1988-2005) and Sri 
Lanka (1983-2009) (PITF 2010):  
 
                                                 
25
  At the risk of stating the obvious, but bearing in mind the ‘good deal of confusion’ (Mahoney 
2001:578) about what constitutes a ‘causal mechanism’ (see ibid. and e.g. Hedström and Swedberg 
1998), this analysis defines it simply as the hypothetical connection that explains the causal effect 
of one variable on the other. 
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During German as well as Belgian colonial rule and much of the post-independence 
period, the power distribution between ethnic groups in Burundi had favoured the 
Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority (Dravis 2000; Ndikumana 1998). In line with 
their doctrine of ‘divide et impera’, the colonial administrations had privileged the 
Tutsis, who represent approximately 14% of the population, over the Hutus, who 
make up about 85% of society (CIA 2009). Following independence in 1962, state 
bureaucracies remained firmly under Tutsi control until well into the 1990s, despite 
the initiation of reforms by President Pierre Buyoya in 1989 to open the political 
system to greater Hutu participation (Dravis 2000). Instead, the effective 
privatisation of state institutions through clientelism, patronage and rent seeking 
helped the Tutsi elites to further consolidate their power and marginalise the Hutus 
also after independence (Ndikumana 1998). The resulting grievances among Hutus 
about low levels of political inclusiveness can be seen as a pivotal motivation for the 
incidence of large-scale ethnic violence in Burundi, as demands for fairer treatment 
repeatedly degenerated into forceful confrontations between Hutu challengers and 
Tutsi-dominated government authorities (cf. Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005). 
 
Also in Sri Lanka, grievances relating to levels of political inclusiveness seem to 
have contributed to the violent ethnic conflict between Tamil insurgents and the 
Sinhalese-dominated government authorities. Formerly Ceylon, Sri Lanka gained 
independence from British colonial rule in 1948. The Sinhalese represent the 
country’s largest ethnic group with approximately 74% of the population, followed 
by 18% Tamils – consisting of 6% Indian Tamils and 12% Sri Lankan Tamils – and 
7% Muslims; Tamils are the majority in Sri Lanka’s north and east where the number 
of conflict-related fatalities has been highest, while there is significant ethnic 
intermixing in Colombo and parts of the south (Bloom 2003; ICG 2006a). Under 
British colonial rule, the Tamils had experienced preferential treatment in terms of 
educational, economic and employment opportunities, including the state as well as 
the private sector (Bloom 2003). Following independence, the passage of the Sinhala 
Only Act in 1956, besides ending the status of English as official language, altered 
this power imbalance by placing the Tamils at disadvantage in obtaining civil service 
employment. At the same time, in response to violent protests surrounding the 
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Sinhala Only Act, Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike abandoned earlier 
promises to give Tamils federal autonomy in the Tamil-majority areas (Rudolph 
2003). This lack of federal autonomy, together with the first-past-the-post electoral 
system used for all parliamentary elections before 1989, reduced incentives for 
interethnic coalitions and contributed to the political marginalisation of the Tamil 
minority (DeVotta 2005). The resulting grievances among the Tamils about low 
levels of political inclusiveness are frequently cited as a key motivation for the 
separatist ethnic civil war in Sri Lanka (see e.g. ibid.; ICG 2006a; Rudolph 2003).  
 
Far from being elaborate case studies, the references to Burundi and Sri Lanka 
nonetheless illustrate the (arguable) relevance of levels of political inclusiveness for 
the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. ‘Levels of political inclusiveness’ 
thereby refer to the likelihood with which the opinions and interests of the different 
ethnic groups in a given society are represented politically, i.e. the likelihood with 
which they are ‘made present’ in the political decision-making process (cf. Pitkin 
1967; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2006). Demands for greater political 
inclusion are thus nothing else than demands for greater political representation in 
the sense that the voices and interests of all ethnic groups in a society are recognised 
as politically relevant (cf. Kymlicka 1996). At the core of such demands stands the 
ideal of ‘representational justice’ where the state responds to all its people and where 
the interests of no ethnic group are systematically excluded from the political 
decision-making process (Wimmer 2002).  
 
As illustrated in the Sri Lankan example, levels of political inclusiveness on the one 
hand depend on the manner in which certain political institutions have been openly 
codified, i.e. on the design of formal political institutions such as electoral systems or 
state structures. This is the case because the features of formal political institutions 
affect the number of possible political winners, i.e. the number of ethnic groups 
whose representatives
26
 can hold political offices such as member of parliament or 
                                                 
26  These ethnic group representatives need not belong to an ethnic political party, but can also belong 
to a non-ethnic political party or run as independent candidates (cf. Birnir 2007). I do not make 
any further distinction between these different types of ethnic group representation, because it is a) 
neither practically feasible due to issues of data availability, nor b) theoretically relevant, as one 
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state minister (see chapter 3 for further details). From this follows that the lower the 
number of possible political winners provided by the design of formal political 
institutions, the lower is the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of 
political representation outlined in sections 2.5. to 2.7..  
 
At the same time, it would be erroneous to argue that chances to obtain the values of 
political representation only depend on the design of formal political institutions. 
Rather, as the aforementioned role of clientelism and patronage in Burundi has 
shown, socially entrenched structures of political interactions equally influence 
levels of political inclusiveness and thereby can contribute to asymmetries between 
ethnic groups in terms of their political and socioeconomic standing (see chapter 4 
for further details).
27
 This substantiates Lijphart’s (1977), Sisk and Stefes’s (2005) 
and Varshney’s (2001, 2002) recognition that both types of institution deserve equal 
attention (see section 1.7.), as grievances relating to levels of political inclusiveness 
can arise from the design of formal and informal political institutions alike. 
 
 
2.5. The Intrinsic Value of Political Representation 
 
Previous analyses of institutional incentives for ethnic violence have provided 
comparatively few insights why giving greater political representation to ethnic 
groups should have conflict-reducing effects. For example, neither Cohen (1997) nor 
Reilly (2001) (see section 1.6.) present a substantive explanation why being 
represented politically might be such a desirable goal for ethnic groups. Instead, 
Cohen (1997) relies on the simple acknowledgement that political representation 
increases the likelihood with which ethnic groups can alter the ethnic status quo 
                                                                                                                                          
can assume that levels of political inclusiveness equally affect all of the aforementioned types of 
ethnic group representative. 
27
  Of course the design of formal and informal political institutions inevitably affects the political 
inclusion of a variety of social groups, not only ethnic ones. While it would thus be interesting to 
ask whether the impact of institutional design on levels of political inclusiveness might lead to 
grievances and possibly violent conflict also along e.g. socioeconomic or gender lines, these 
questions go beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I focus solely on institutional design and the 
political representation of ethnic (as opposed to any other type of social) groups, since ethnicity in 
particular can ‘serve as a formidable instrument of social and political exclusion.’ (Cederman and 
Girardin 2007:175; see also e.g. the analyses by Bertrand 2004, DeVotta 2005, Horowitz 1985, 
Lijphart 2004 and Wimmer 2002 for further illustration of this point).  
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through formally institutionalised channels, while Reilly (2001) merely states in a 
few minor side-comments that the electoral victory of political candidates grants 
them access to state resources. Both studies thus border on the atheoretical in the 
sense that they take the desirability of political representation as a given, without 
elaborating the concrete benefits of political inclusion any further. 
 
To take greater account of the reasons why levels of political inclusiveness might be 
so important, my grievance-based explanation of large-scale ethnic violence clearly 
identifies three key values of political representation. These values refer to the 
political recognition of ethnic groups (see this section), the likelihood with which 
resources and powers are distributed in their favour (section 2.6.), and their 
perceptions of political, physical and economic security (section 2.7.). Building on 
core assumptions of the relative deprivation model (see section 2.2.), I will outline in 
the following paragraphs why political institutions that provide low levels of political 
inclusiveness – and, as such, reduce the number of ethnic groups that can obtain the 
values of political representation – are likely to lead to grievances that increase the 
risk of ethnic civil war.
28
  
 
To identify the main benefits of political inclusion, it makes sense to distinguish 
between the intrinsic and instrumental values of political representation. Objects or 
practices have instrumental value if they help achieve relevant extrinsic ends, i.e. 
objectives that are important independently of the objects or practices that helped 
achieve them (Réaume 2000). According to this definition, both sections 2.6. and 
2.7. will present instrumental values, as they argue that political representation is 
valuable to ethnic groups because it helps to affect the distribution of resources and 
powers, and perceptions of security respectively. Intrinsic values, on the other hand, 
relate to the worth of objects and practices by themselves. Hence, objects and 
                                                 
28
  Two important qualifications ought to be noted briefly: First, for the sake of simplicity, I implicitly 
assume that the values of political representation outlined below are universally held among all 
ethnic groups. This assumption is based on purely practical reasons, as it would be impossible for 
the scope of this thesis to investigate for which ethnic groups it reasonably could be argued that, 
by and large, political recognition, influence over the distribution of resources and powers, and 
perceptions of security are no desirable objectives. Second, it would be equally unfeasible to 
identify precise reference categories for feelings of relative deprivation for particular cases. Hence, 
I take the existence of such reference categories as a given and will not mention them any further.    
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practices are intrinsically valuable if they do not merely help to achieve other 
objectives but if they are considered a relevant good per se (ibid.). 
 
The argument that political representation is intrinsically valuable is based on the 
normative assumption that having ‘voice’ (in the sense of one’s interests being 
considered in the political decision-making process) is a desirable because 
intrinsically rewarding experience for all ethnic groups (Bashir and Kymlicka 2008): 
According to arguments by political philosophers such as Mansbridge (2000) and 
Kymlicka and Norman (1994), ethnic groups want to make their interests heard and 
government to respond to them, as it affirms their status as recognised members of a 
political community. In this view, national unity, widespread understanding of policy 
implications for different segments of society and enhanced legitimacy of political 
decisions are constituent parts of the intrinsic value of political representation, as 
they cannot be achieved independently from the political recognition of the different 
ethnic groups in a given society (cf. ibid.; Mansbridge 2000; Réaume 2000).  
 
Presumably, political representation is an intrinsic value for all ethnic groups, as 
quests for political recognition and participation in politically relevant debates have 
spanned both countries and centuries. They include comparatively recent democracy 
movements in South Africa, Indonesia, Burma and Zimbabwe as well as 
longstanding practices of public political discourse in India, China, Japan, the Arab 
world and different communities in Africa (Sen 2003). Likewise, social movements 
that invoke the intrinsic value of political representation by equating ‘just’ political 
representation with the ‘treatment [of all ethnic groups in society] as equally valuable 
and dignified parts of “the people”’ (Wimmer 2002:4) have emerged as 
accompaniment of political modernity in a range of societies from Iraq to Mexico 
and Switzerland (ibid.). The notion that it is an intrinsic value for all ethnic groups in 
a society to be considered in the political decision-making process is also reflected in 
the increasing concern of ethnically diverse liberal democracies to grant ethnic 
minorities special representation rights in order to affirm their political standing (see 
Kymlicka 1996).  
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The combination of the two arguments that political representation has intrinsic value 
for ethnic groups and that the non-fulfilment of certain value expectations gives rise 
to grievances which – under the ‘right’ set of circumstances (see section 2.2.) – 
might lead to ethnic violence, results in the first causal mechanism linking political 
institutions to the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. It states that political 
representation is intrinsically valuable for ethnic groups, as being ‘made present’ in 
the political decision-making process is an intrinsically rewarding experience which 
affirms their status as recognised members of a political community. If formal or 
informal institutional design systematically reduces the number of ethnic groups who 
can obtain the values of political representation, grievances are expected to arise 
among those ethnic groups who feel that their voices and interests are not likely to be 
considered in the political decision-making process, and who thus perceive a 
discrepancy between the degree of political recognition they feel entitled to and their 
political recognition currently guaranteed through political institutions. As a 
consequence of these grievances, the risk of ethnic violence can be expected to 
increase. 
 
 
2.6. The First Instrumental Value of Political Representation  
 
The second causal mechanism linking institutional design to the risk of ethnic 
violence centres on the first instrumental value of political representation. This value 
follows from the insight that the features of political institutions and the actions taken 
within them affect the distribution of resources such as economic wealth or access to 
information (March and Olsen 1989). These resources in turn contribute to the 
powers of different political actors, both in terms of the degree to which they can 
influence political decisions and the extent to which they can induce others to act in a 
way that benefits the powerholder (ibid.).  
 
The likelihood with which the different ethnic groups in a given society can 
influence the distribution of resources and powers depends on the levels of political 
inclusiveness provided by both formal and informal political institutions. For 
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instance, as Pande’s (2003) analysis of political reservation in Indian states shows, 
the (mandated) political representation of minority groups in state legislatures – i.e. 
in formal political institutions – is positively correlated with improvements in their 
economic status. This is because group representatives can use their positions within 
these institutions to influence policy decisions about government spending and 
resource redistribution in the minority groups’ interests (ibid.). Likewise, Fung 
(2003) points out that the involvement of civil society – an informal political 
institution – in the political decision-making process contributes directly to the 
diffusion of policy beneficiaries, as it can give previously underrepresented groups 
(i.e. groups that might be marginalised within formal political institutions) the 
opportunity to promote a more equitable distribution of resources and powers. 
Political representation through either formal or informal political institutions thus 
helps to achieve tangible gains, as the likelihood that the distribution of resources 
and powers benefits a given ethnic group is directly linked to the likelihood with 
which its interests are brought to the political decision-making table.  
 
From this follows that normative claims about representational justice and the 
desirability of political representation may go beyond the merely intrinsic value of 
being ‘made present’ as a recognised member of the political community. Rather, 
whether a group’s interests are considered in the political decision-making process 
becomes a question about principles of equality and justice also in more pragmatic 
terms: Giving ethnic groups a recognised voice in politics not only affirms their 
membership in a political community. It also gives them the opportunity to affect the 
distribution of resources and powers in their favour.  
 
The combination of this insight about the first instrumental value of political 
representation with the argument that the non-fulfilment of certain value expectations 
gives rise to grievances which – under the ‘right’ set of circumstances (see section 
2.2.) – might lead to ethnic violence, results in the second causal mechanism linking 
political institutions to the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. It states that 
political representation has instrumental value for ethnic groups, as it increases the 
likelihood with which they can affect the distribution of resources and powers in 
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their favour. If formal or informal institutional design systematically reduces the 
number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of political representation, 
grievances are expected to arise among those ethnic groups who feel that they have 
comparatively few chances to influence policy decisions which affect their 
socioeconomic standing, and who thus perceive a discrepancy between the influence 
over the distribution of resources and powers they feel entitled to and the degree of 
influence currently guaranteed through political institutions. As a consequence of 
these grievances, the risk of ethnic violence can be expected to increase. These 
arguments illustrate the potential overlap of greed and grievance factors (see also 
section 2.3.), as – following the first instrumental value of political representation – 
grievances relating to low levels of political inclusiveness can be seen as a product of 
the strife for resource access. This point will be elaborated in more detail in the 
following section which presents the second instrumental value of political 
representation.  
 
 
2.7. The Second Instrumental Value of Political Representation 
 
The third and final causal mechanism linking political institutions to the risk of 
ethnic violence is based on the implications of the ethnic security dilemma as 
described by Saideman (1998) and Saideman et al. (2002). It identifies a second 
instrumental value of political representation which centres on the recognition that 
having voice in the political decision-making process (and thus a possible say over 
its outcomes) has a direct impact on the perceptions of security among ethnic groups 
(Saideman 1998).  
  
The security dilemma has been a central concept in international relations theory for 
more than 50 years (Roe 2005). It is based on the realist assumption that the 
condition of anarchy in the international system leads to a competition for power 
between states that are trying to increase their security (Posen 1993). The main tenets 
of the security dilemma can be summarised as follows: Where there is no 
international sovereign to protect it, State A will take measures to strengthen its 
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position within the international system in order to remain secure and autonomous. 
However, as it may be difficult, if not even impossible, for other states to distinguish 
whether State A’s actions are offensive or defensive, State B is likely to perceive 
State A’s measures as threatening, even if there are no expansionist inclinations 
(Jervis 1978). State B therefore will respond by building up its own strength, leading 
to a spiral of action and reaction in which the behaviour of each side is seen as 
threatening (Roe 2005). The security dilemma describes this spiral where ‘many of 
the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of 
others’ (Jervis 1978:169), so that ‘what one does to enhance one’s own security 
causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.’ (Posen 1993:104) 
 
Posen (1993) has famously taken the security dilemma from international relations 
theory and applied it to the study of ethnic conflict. His concept of an ethnic security 
dilemma states that the aforementioned spiral of action and reaction does not just 
affect relations between states, but equally occurs between proximate ethnic groups 
when central authority collapses in multiethnic empires. It occurs, according to 
Posen, because the process of imperial collapse produces a situation of emerging 
anarchy, where the absence of a sovereign (i.e. the absence of an effective, common 
central government) compels the groups that used to constitute the multiethnic 
empire to provide for their own security (ibid.; Roe 2005). The three elements on 
which Posen puts particular emphasis are: a) the fact that the newly independent 
groups won’t be able to distinguish clearly between offensive and defensive 
capabilities of neighbouring groups, and are likely to perceive them as a threat; b) 
conditions such as the existence of ‘ethnic islands’ (i.e. isolated ethnic groups that 
are surrounded by another group’s people) which might create incentives for a 
preventive war; and c) windows of vulnerability and opportunity that originate from 
the uneven progress of state formation among the newly independent ethnic groups 
(Posen 1993). Overall, Posen’s model of an ethnic security dilemma is best suited to 
explain incentives for preventive ethnic wars against what is perceived to be a 
threatening neighbour (Roe 2005). Although path-breaking in introducing the 
security dilemma to the study of ethnic conflict, there are, however, several 
shortcomings in Posen’s (1993) argument. 
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First, Posen’s (1993) example of the Croat-Serb conflict following Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration fails to arrive at any explicit conclusion regarding the intentionality of 
the conflicting parties (Roe 2005): Posen does not offer any substantive evidence 
whether Croats and Serbs were indeed security-seekers or whether their perceptions 
of threatening behaviour were based on incorrect assumptions (ibid.). Second, Posen 
fails to consider that anarchy might be a consequence rather than a cause of the run-
up to war, and that the build-up of arms by the Yugoslav republics might have been a 
factor which contributed to the collapse of the federal government rather than a 
reaction to it (Kaufman 2001). Finally, and most importantly, Posen’s arguments 
apply to a rather limited number of cases: As he focuses explicitly on the process of 
imperial collapse, he completely omits the state and existing authority from his 
considerations, rendering his approach less useful for the analysis of existing states 
or of empires before they disintegrate (Saideman 1998).  
 
Saideman (1998) and Saideman et al. (2002) respond to this latter criticism by 
offering a modified version of the ethnic security dilemma. According to these 
authors, the ethnic security dilemma can emerge in ethnically diverse societies even 
if there is an effective, common central government in place. Their argument starts 
with the idea that the greatest potential threat to ethnic groups is the government of 
the country they reside in, as the state’s resources can be used to inflict serious harm 
on any given ethnic group, going as far as genocide (Saideman 1998; Saideman et al. 
2002). As the state may be biased toward or against them, and following the logic of 
‘if my group does not capture the state, someone else’s will’ (Saideman 1998:135), 
the different ethnic groups in society will aim to make the state their ally: In the 
search for security, they will either engage in a competition for control of the existing 
state, or try to secede to control their own state. But because one group’s attempts to 
control the state will be perceived as threatening by others, they will equally compete 
to influence or even control the government, leading to a spiral of action and reaction 
which causes all to be worse off, as it ‘creates the risk that a relatively neutral or 
harmless government will fall into the hands of one group that could dominate the 
others.’ (Saideman et al. 2002:107)    
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Saideman’s (1998) and Saideman et al.’s (2002) version of the ethnic security 
dilemma is of much greater use for this thesis than Posen’s (1993) original model, as 
it takes the relevance of the existing state into account. The key insight that derives 
from Saideman’s (1998) and Saideman et al.’s (2002) analyses is that perceptions of 
security among ethnic groups depend on their access to the state, i.e. whether they 
have ‘some level of representation’ (Saideman et al. 2002:107) in the political 
decision-making process. According to Saideman (1998), political representation 
makes ethnic groups feel more secure in the political, physical and economic 
dimension: Political representation provides ethnic groups with feelings of enhanced 
political security, as it improves their ability to influence policy decisions, including 
those that might be potentially harmful to them. Consequently, ethnic groups whose 
interests are excluded from the political decision-making process are likely to feel 
less politically secure, as they have no say over government policies that the ethnic 
groups in power might use against them (ibid.).  
 
Having political security, in turn, directly affects how physically secure (relating to a 
group’s survival) and economically secure ethnic groups feel (ibid.): Because 
political representation increases the likelihood with which ethnic groups can 
influence government policies,
29
 it increases their chances to avert or attenuate 
decisions that might threaten their physical security. Political representation also 
contributes to perceptions of economic security, as it increases the likelihood with 
which an ethnic group can influence economic policies and the distribution of 
resources in its favour (see also section 2.6.).     
 
In sum, political representation derives its second instrumental value from the fact 
that it helps ethnic groups feel politically, physically and economically more secure. 
The third and final causal mechanism linking political institutions to the risk of 
ethnic violence combines this insight with the argument that the non-fulfilment of 
certain value expectations gives rise to grievances which – under the ‘right’ set of 
circumstances (see section 2.2.) – might lead to ethnic violence. It states that political 
                                                 
29
  How high exactly this likelihood is, depends on a variety of additional factors, such as the number 
of representatives acting on behalf of an ethnic group or the types of resources at their disposal. 
For reasons outlined in section 1.2., I will not consider these additional factors any further.   
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representation has instrumental value for ethnic groups, as it increases the likelihood 
with which they can influence potentially harmful government policies and, in doing 
so, makes them feel more secure. If formal or informal institutional design 
systematically reduces the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of 
political representation, grievances are expected to arise among those ethnic groups 
who feel that their chances to shape state decisions are comparatively low, and who 
thus sense a discrepancy between the degree of political, physical and economic 
security they feel entitled to, and the degree of (perceived) security currently 
guaranteed through political institutions. As a consequence of these grievances, the 
risk of ethnic violence can be expected to increase.  
 
Just like the first, also the second instrumental value of political representation 
illustrates the potential overlap of greed and grievance factors: According to the 
arguments outlined in this and the preceding section, grievances relating to low 
levels of political inclusiveness are at least partly a product of the strife for resource 
access (see section 2.6.) and economic security (see this section). At the same time, 
this is far from saying that ethnic contenders are mainly driven by greed: As has been 
highlighted in the preceding sections, political representation is a valuable good for 
ethnic groups beyond the purely economic dimension, as it equally affirms their 
status as recognised members of a political community (see section 2.5.), and affects 
their perceptions of physical and political security alike (see this section). Together 
with the general shortcomings of theoretical frameworks that focus primarily on 
greed factors to explain violent intrastate conflicts (see section 2.3.), the recognition 
that a greed-based model would not be able to grasp all the values of political 
representation further supports my choice of a grievance-based explanation.  
 
 
2.8. Conclusion: Institutional Incentives for Ethnic Violence 
 
My grievance-based explanation of large-scale ethnic violence centres on the 
identification of three key values of political representation. They relate to the 
political recognition of ethnic groups (see section 2.5.), their likely influence over the 
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distribution of resources and powers (see section 2.6.), and their perceptions of 
political, economic and physical security (see section 2.7.). I thus argue that political 
representation provides welfare, power and interpersonal values alike (see section 
2.4.), as it contributes directly to the physical well-being and self-realisation of ethnic 
groups, their ability to influence potentially harmful actions against them and their 
psychological satisfactions as recognised members of a political community.  
 
Formal or informal political institutions which provide comparatively low levels of 
political inclusiveness systematically reduce the number of ethnic groups who can 
obtain the values of political representation. In doing so, they contribute to perceived 
or real asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms of their political and 
socioeconomic standing, and can be the source of a variety of social, political or 
economic grievances. Consequently, emotions of anger and resentment are expected 
to arise among those ethnic groups who consider their chances to obtain the values of 
political representation to be comparatively low, and who thus perceive a 
discrepancy between the degree of political recognition, likely influence over the 
distribution of resources and powers, and promise of political, physical and economic 
security they feel entitled to, and the degree of these conditions currently guaranteed 
through their country’s institutional design. As a consequence of these grievances, 
the risk of ethnic violence can be expected to increase.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 will build on the causal mechanisms outlined in this chapter in 
order to highlight the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism (see chapter 1). 
Specifically, Chapter 3 will focus on the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism by highlighting the relevance of institutional combinations for the 
risk of large-scale ethnic violence (see also section 1.6.). Chapter 4, on the other 
hand, will refer to the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism by 
using corruption as a prime example of an informal political institution that can be 
expected to affect the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (see also section 1.7.).   
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Chapter 3: The Relevance of Institutional Combinations  
 
3.1. Introduction: The First Dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
So far, there is no well-known study within the institutional incentives approach to 
ethnic violence which explicitly asks for the interaction effects of political 
institutions on the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (see section 1.6.). In 
response to this gap in the academic debate, this chapter presents the first dimension 
of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism which highlights the relevance of institutional 
combinations for the risk of ethnic civil war. In contrast to chapter 4, the following 
sections thereby deal exclusively with formal political institutions, i.e. political 
institutions that are laid down in writing and guaranteed through the sanctioning 
mechanisms of the state (Lauth 2000; see also section 1.3.). Specifically, this chapter 
focuses on different types and combinations of form of government, electoral system 
for the legislature and state structure. I focus on these specific institutions, as 
previous research has identified them as being of particular relevance for the 
prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds 2002).  
 
My central argument in this chapter states that the lower the number of possible 
political winners provided by a given institutional combination, the more likely it is 
that this combination will increase the risk of ethnic violence (see section 3.7.). 
Consequently, in particular the combination of a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure can be 
expected to heighten the risk of ethnic civil war (see ibid.). To illustrate the relevance 
of this argument and present the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, 
the following sections will 
 
 summarise the main assumptions that underlie this chapter (section 3.2.); 
 explain why I mainly focus on formal political institutions and their 
combinations in ‘basically open’ regimes (section 3.3.);   
 outline the expected impact of presidentialism (section 3.4.), majoritarian 
electoral systems for the legislature (section 3.5.) and unitary state structures 
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(section 3.6.) – when treated as separate entities – on the risk of ethnic civil 
war; and 
 highlight the relevance of institutional combinations for the prospects of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability (section 3.7.).  
 Section 3.8. will conclude this chapter by summarising its central points.  
 
 
3.2. The Theoretical Underpinnings of this Chapter  
 
Building on the grievance-based explanation of violent ethnic conflict outlined in 
chapter 2, I put particular emphasis on formal political institutions which are based 
on winner-takes-all principles, i.e. presidential forms of government, majoritarian 
electoral systems for the legislature and unitary state structures. These institutions 
systematically reduce the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of 
political representation and therefore can be expected to give rise to grievances 
which are likely to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence.
30
  
 
Political institutions that rely on winner-takes-all principles tend to concentrate gains 
from the electoral competition for a political office, and lead to a clear juxtaposition 
of those who are included and those who are excluded from the political decision-
making process. In the case of presidentialism and a majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature, political competitors need to win a plurality or majority (however 
specified)
31
 of votes in order to win a political office. In the case of a unitary state 
structure, whoever wins control over the central government automatically wins 
                                                 
30
  To avoid any of the misunderstandings which are likely to arise when one makes more general 
arguments about the effects of institutional design (cf. Linz 1990b), it should be noted that none of 
this is to say that certain types or combinations of political institutions ipso facto increase the risk 
of ethnic violence. Due to nuances in the design of forms of government, electoral systems for the 
legislature and state structures which cannot be addressed in more detail in this analysis (see 
below) and the relevance of factors aside from institutional design to explain the incidence of 
ethnic wars (see section 2.2.), there are bound to be exceptions to the arguments presented in this 
chapter. It is thus important to point out that I seek to identify general trends regarding the effects 
of institutional combinations on the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. The relevance of 
further, more nuanced factors ought to be investigated in separate case study analyses.    
31
  Different plurality or majority specifications include for instance absolute or qualified majority 
systems, majoritarian preferential systems and plurality or majority systems with vote distribution 
requirements.  
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control over all noncentral governments (Lijphart 1999). Those groups who 
overcome these thresholds will gain political representation; those who don’t remain 
unrepresented (see e.g. Cohen 1997; Lijphart 1999; Przeworski 1991). In this 
manner, political gains and losses become absolute, and turn political competition 
into a zero-sum game (cf. Linz 1990a). Due to these high thresholds for political 
gains, political institutions that rely on winner-takes-all principles decrease levels of 
political inclusiveness and heighten the stakes of political competition (cf. Cohen 
1997).  
 
Parliamentary and mixed forms of government, proportional and mixed electoral 
systems, and federal and mixed state structures, on the other hand, are institutions 
which disperse political gains. In contrast to institutions that are based on winner-
takes-all rules, they offer multiple points of political victory and decrease thresholds 
for political representation (cf. ibid.; Lijphart 2004). They achieve this by 
establishing multiple levels of government (in the case of federalism and mixed state 
structures), distributing political offices by proportion (in the case of proportional 
and, at least partly, mixed electoral systems for the legislature) and overcoming the 
concentration of political power in a one-(wo)man-executive (in the case of 
parliamentary and mixed forms of government). Hence, unlike winner-takes-all 
rules, gain-dispersing
32
 institutions structure political competition in such a way that 
political gains become relative, as they encourage these gains to be distributed 
among multiple competitors. This increases the number of possible political winners, 
thus heightens levels of political inclusiveness and decreases the stakes of political 
competition (cf. Cohen 1997).    
 
The comparison of winner-takes-all and gain-dispersing institutions is not meant to 
imply that the latter guarantee that the interests of all ethnic groups within a given 
                                                 
32
 It may be worth emphasising that I use the term ‘gain-dispersing institutions’ (i.e. political 
institutions that disperse political gains and power) to describe all formal political institutions that 
are not based on winner-takes-all rules. This includes both proportional institutions (i.e. 
parliamentary forms of government, proportional electoral systems for the legislature and federal 
state structures) which are sensitive to proportions and ‘distribute policy-making power relative to 
some demographic or political principle’ (Cohen 1997:610), and mixed institutions (i.e. mixed 
forms of government, mixed electoral systems for the legislature and mixed state structures) which 
combine majoritarian and proportional elements.   
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society will be represented politically. Also under gain-dispersing institutions, certain 
ethnic groups may experience political exclusion or marginalisation. This might for 
instance be the case for groups whose representatives are unable to overcome the 
effective electoral thresholds under proportional electoral systems for the legislature 
(cf. Boix 1999; Lijphart 1999) or for minorities within a federal unit who lack the 
numerical strength to be represented within the federal unit’s formal political 
institutions (cf. Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996). The important point, however, remains 
that gain-dispersing institutions, compared to winner-takes-all institutions, 
nonetheless decrease the number of possible political losers, as they lower the 
thresholds for political representation and encourage the distribution of political 
gains among multiple competitors (see also sections 3.4. to 3.6.).
33
  
 
A few qualifications regarding this chapter’s analytical scope ought to be highlighted 
at this point. As becomes evident in the subsequent paragraphs, most of these 
qualifications are based on questions of data availability, and therefore should not be 
seen as theoretical weakness of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism. Instead, they point 
to wider methodological issues that go beyond the aims of this thesis.   
 
First, I do not differentiate in this chapter how the effects of institutional design 
might vary depending on the cleavage structure, the political salience of ethnicity or 
the degree of ethnic diversity within a given society. A number of criticisms could be 
raised against this lack of differentiation. They include for instance: a) that the 
conflict-mitigating effects of certain types of political institutions might be enhanced 
if ethnic and other cleavages crosscut (see Lijphart 1977); b) that it is 
methodologically questionable to assess the effects of institutional design on the 
prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability in countries where ethnicity hardly plays a 
role in politics anyway (see Reilly 2001); and c) that the establishment of 
majoritarian political institutions is more likely to lead to the permanent exclusion of 
                                                 
33  I intentionally do not argue that the main alternative to winner-takes-all institutions are power-
sharing arrangements which mandate a predetermined number of ethnic group representatives for 
specific offices. Such types of assured representation should not be seen as ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
solution to lower the risk of ethnopolitical instability, as – depending on a country’s political 
context – they might provide little incentives for political moderation and interethnic cooperation 
(Rothchild and Roeder 2005b; Sisk 1996).  
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certain ethnic groups if one ethnic group represents a clear majority within a given 
society, rather than if there are many groups of which none makes up more than 50% 
of the electorate (see Horowitz 1985, 2002).  
 
While these may be valid criticisms to raise, I unfortunately cannot address them any 
further, for purely practical reasons: So far, there is no data suitable for the statistical 
part of this analysis which measures either cleavage structure
34
 or political salience 
of ethnicity in different countries and across time.
35
 Moreover, I intentionally do not 
test the possible interaction effects between degrees of ethnic diversity and political 
institutions in my statistical analysis, as ethnic fractionalisation as well as ethnic 
polarisation indices (in their current format) are rather limited in scope and hence 
might lead to unreliable results. Their main limitations include the fact that neither 
ethnic fractionalisation nor ethnic polarisation indices measure the political salience 
of ethnicity (see footnotes 12 and 35) and that, so far, there is no comprehensive 
ethnic fractionalisation or ethnic polarisation index which is sensitive to time (i.e. 
that depicts changes in the ethnic composition of different societies over a certain 
number of years).  
 
The second qualification regarding this chapter’s analytical scope is that I can 
consider only a limited number of factors that may counterbalance or reinforce the 
gain-dispersing or winner-takes-all principles on which different political institutions 
are based. Factors which I will consider further in my analysis include the use of 
communal rolls, seat reservations (see section 6.4.) and broad-based electoral 
formulas for the presidency (see section 3.4.), as data on these institutions are 
relatively easy to obtain. Seat reservations and communal rolls may help to 
countervail the winner-takes-all principles on which majoritarian electoral systems 
for the legislature are based (cf. Norris 2008; Reynolds 2005), while a broad-based 
                                                 
34
  Notably, Selway (2011) created a new dataset which contains information on the ‘crosscuttingness’ 
of cleavages in 128 current countries (plus some selected provinces and former countries). While 
this unprecedented attempt to capture cleavage structures is in itself impressive, it is, however, 
unsuitable for this thesis due to certain questionable assumptions that underlie Selway’s (2011) 
dataset. They include for instance the assumptions that group categories within cleavages are 
mutually exclusive and that all cleavages are of equal political salience (ibid.).   
35
  As mentioned in footnote 12, ethnic fractionalisation or polarisation indices do not measure the 
degree to which political interests are organised along ethnic cleavages. 
Chapter 3 – The Relevance of Institutional Combinations 
 78 
electoral formula for the presidency arguably can counterbalance the winner-takes-all 
principles that underlie presidential forms of government (Horowitz 1991). An 
example for such a broad-based electoral formula for the presidency is the 
requirement of Nigeria’s 1979 Constitution that the successful presidential candidate 
had to win at least 25 per cent of the votes in thirteen of Nigeria’s nineteen states in 
addition to a plurality – or, should there be only two presidential candidates, a 
majority – of votes nationwide (ibid.). 
 
At the same time, however, there are a number of additional factors that may 
counterbalance or reinforce gain-dispersing or winner-takes-all principles which I 
cannot consider any further in this analysis. For instance, the fact that proportional 
electoral systems tend to lower electoral thresholds compared to majoritarian and 
mixed electoral systems, might become irrelevant if the representatives of certain 
ethnic groups are disadvantaged at the party and candidate registration, recruitment 
or campaigning stages (Norris 2008). Likewise, the degree of proportionality of any 
type of electoral system is influenced by factors such as electoral district magnitude 
or the size and spatial distribution of voters for different parties (Rose 1984).  
 
Unfortunately, however, I cannot take these factors into greater account, as there is 
no easily available data for my large-N analysis (see chapters 5 and 6) which would 
depict advantages or disadvantages for ethnic group representatives at the party and 
candidate registration, recruitment or campaigning stages. Likewise, I do not pay any 
further attention to electoral district magnitude or the size and spatial distribution of 
the voters for different parties, as it can be difficult to find data for the latter (cf. Rose 
1984) and challenging to calculate district magnitude in systems with two or more 
tiers (see Gallagher and Mitchell 2008). Also on a theoretical level, similarly to 
authors such as Golder (2005), Massicotte and Blais (1999) and Norris (2008), I am 
more interested in the underlying (winner-takes-all or gain-dispersing) mechanics on 
which formal political institutions are based, and less in contextual factors (such as 
district magnitude) which influence their outcomes. Hence, although I explicitly 
acknowledge that the precise number of political winners and losers under any 
institutional design ultimately depends on a variety of additional factors apart from 
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whether political institutions are based on winner-takes-all or gain-dispersing 
principles, I will not consider these contextual factors any further.  
    
The third qualification regarding this chapter’s analytical scope refers to the fact that 
I distinguish forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state 
structures into three subtypes each without making further differentiations (cf. also 
e.g. Przeworski 1991). This necessarily neglects finer details, such as for instance the 
difference between polycommunal, non-communal and mixed federalism (see Sisk 
1996)
36
 or the numerous variations among presidential, parliamentary and mixed 
systems (see Elgie 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992).
37
 Thus, while I am fully aware 
that there is a vivid academic debate about the potential benefits and perils of 
different types of federal design (see e.g. Erk and Anderson 2009; Roeder 2009; Sisk 
1996), I do not consider the effects of these different types of federalism any further, 
due to the lack of easily available, suitable data for the statistical part of this thesis 
which would distinguish polycommunal, non-communal and mixed federal 
structures. Instead, I use the broader assumption shared by authors such as Bermeo 
(2002), Cohen (1997) and Saideman et al. (2002), that the precise type of federal 
structure is secondary to the fact that federations, however designed, increase 
opportunities of political representation (and thus the number of possible political 
winners) by establishing multiple levels of government. Moreover, using a relatively 
parsimonious typology of forms of government (as well as electoral systems and 
state structures), with only three subtypes each, is preferable over using one with 
further differentiations, as it provides for greater analytical clarity and ‘attract[s] 
greater consensus in the research literature.’ (Norris 2008:148)   
 
                                                 
36
  Territorial divisions in polycommunal (aka ethnofederal) state structures closely correspond to 
ethnic groups, i.e. federal units are understood to represent geographically concentrated 
communities (Bunce and Watts 2005). Territorial divisions in non-communal federal countries, on 
the other hand, have no ethnic base (Duchacek 1973 cited in Sisk 1996). Mixed federal structures 
combine some territorial units that have an ethnic base with others that do not (ibid.). 
37
  Shugart and Carey (1992) emphasise the partly significant differences between popularly elected 
presidents in terms of their legislative and nonlegislative powers, e.g. regarding their decree and 
budgetary powers or authority over the cabinet. Elgie (1997) highlights the great diversity of 
parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes by distinguishing them into six overarching models 
based on power relations within the executive branch. These models include monocratic 
government, collective government, ministerial government, bureaucratic government, shared 
government and segmented government. 
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The final qualification regarding this chapter’s analytical scope is that my 
classification of forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state 
structures is based exclusively on the manner in which they have been openly 
codified in ‘constitutional clauses and laws, but also standing orders and norms 
actionable at law.’ (Lauth 2000:24; see also the EEI Dataset Codebook in Appendix 
III) Of course, actual political practices may deviate from formal regulations and 
hence put codification-based typologies of political institutions into doubt (cf. Elster 
1997). However, due to issues of both data availability and comparability with other 
studies, there would be little benefit in coding variables on the de facto rather than 
the de iure workings of formal political institutions.  
 
 
3.3. Institutional Design in ‘Basically Open’ Regimes 
  
Following on the previous point, there is, however, one important exception to the 
lack of a distinction between the de iure and de facto workings of formal political 
institutions: Both the classification of presidential, parliamentary and mixed forms of 
government, and of majoritarian, proportional and mixed electoral systems for the 
legislature presuppose the democratic character of a political system. These 
categories become meaningless under an autocratic framework, as it constrains the 
legitimate and lawful functioning of these institutions (cf. Diamond and Morlino 
2004), and hence impedes an adequate assessment of their effects on the risk of 
ethnic civil war. For instance, even though North Korea employs a majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature according to its 2006 Electoral Law (IPU 2011), 
the lack of free and fair electoral competition between political candidates implies 
that the formal definition of the electoral system has no real bearing on the 
composition of the Supreme People’s Assembly (cf. Freedom House 2011). 
Likewise, Rwanda qualifies as a mixed form of government according to its 2003 
Constitution.
38
 Yet, due to a ban on the main opposition party and deficiencies in 
horizontal accountability, political power has been clearly concentrated in the hands 
of the president (Polity IV Project 2009).  
                                                 
38
   See section 3.4. for the definition of mixed forms of government. 
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For these reasons, it is necessary to distinguish between the de iure establishment of 
a presidential, parliamentary or mixed form of government and a majoritarian, 
proportional or mixed electoral system for the legislature on the one hand, and 
whether the operation of these institutions is de facto constraint by an autocratic 
framework on the other. Consequently, my arguments about the likely effects of 
these institutions on the risk of ethnic violence are conditional on these institutions’ 
existence in a ‘basically open’ political setting. This qualification does not apply to 
the distinction of different types of state structure, as all of its categories (i.e. federal, 
unitary and mixed) can exist under both a democratic and autocratic framework (cf. 
Saideman et al. 2002). Examples of autocratic regimes in which power has been 
formally and practically divided between different levels of government include, 
amongst others, federalism in the former Yugoslavia and the United Arab Emirates 
(ibid.; Elazar 1991).
39
  
 
As will be elaborated in more detail in section 5.4., I use the term ‘democracy’ as 
synonym for political regimes which are ‘basically open’ in the sense that their 
democratic features outweigh their autocratic ones (cf. Kurtz 2004). Conversely, I 
classify political regimes as autocratic if they are ‘basically closed’ in the sense that 
their autocratic features prevail over their democratic ones. My dichotomous use of 
the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’ admittedly could be criticised on the grounds 
that it ‘lumps together countries with very different degrees of democracy [or 
autocracy]’ (Bollen and Jackman 1989:612) and takes little account of the prevalence 
of so-called hybrid regimes or anocracies which combine both democratic and 
                                                 
39
  Of course it could be questioned how far any non-democracy may be described as politically 
decentralised, since autocracies might ‘assign decision-making powers to regional legislatures in 
principle, [but] in practice … infringe on the jurisdiction of these legislatures, flout the legislation 
they produce, and install regional politicians that do not challenge the national government’s 
authority.’ (Brancati 2006:652) In response to this point, it is important to recognise that the 
association between democracy and political decentralisation (specifically in the form of 
federalism) is a common, but not an essential one (Saunders 1995). For instance, the federal state 
structure of the former Soviet Union created meaningful opportunities for specific minorities to 
realise their political aspirations (Roeder 1991), while several autocratic regimes in Latin America 
prior to the third wave of democratisation strengthened subnational governments clearly beyond 
mere window-dressing (Eaton 2006). I therefore assume that federal and, to a lesser degree, mixed 
state structures in both democratic and autocratic settings can increase the number of possible 
political winners compared to unitary state structures. To address potential criticisms against this 
assumption, I will include a brief test in chapter 6 to see whether the effects of different state 
structures on the risk of large-scale ethnic violence change if they are only identified in countries 
whose political regimes are ‘basically open’ (cf. Kurtz 2004).  
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autocratic features (see e.g. Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Mansfield and Snyder 
1995). Ultimately, however, it remains an inconclusive debate whether it is more 
appropriate to regard political regimes as being located on a continuous scale of 
democracy (see e.g. Bollen and Jackman 1989), or as bounded wholes which can be 
meaningfully classified into ‘either-or’ categories (see e.g. Alvarez et al. 1996; 
Sartori 1987, 1991). In a sense, it therefore falls to the judgement of the individual 
researcher and her specific analytical aims to choose whether a dichotomous or 
graded  distinction of political regime types may be more suitable (cf. Collier and 
Adcock 1999). For the sake of simplicity, I prefer a dichotomous distinction. 
 
On the basis of these specifications, the following sections will outline the features 
and expected effects of different formal political institutions and their combinations 
on the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. For reasons outlined in section 3.2., I 
thereby will pay particular attention to those institutions which rely on winner-takes-
all principles, i.e. presidential forms of government (section 3.4.), majoritarian 
electoral systems for the legislature (section 3.5.) and unitary state structures (section 
3.6.). 
 
 
3.4. Presidentialism and the Risk of Ethnic Violence 
 
The merits and perils of presidential forms of government have been studied 
extensively concerning their impact on the prospects to establish and maintain stable 
democracy (see e.g. Cheibub 2007; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring and 
Shugart 1997b; Norris 2008; Przeworski 2000). At the same time, however, 
surprisingly little has been written on how presidentialism might affect the risk of 
ethnic violence (Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds 2002). Exemplary for this 
predominant focus on questions of democratic rather than ethnopolitical stability is 
the seminal debate that has followed Linz’s (1990a, 1994) identification of six main 
perils of presidentialism. These perils include: a) the potential personalisation of 
political power in a president who, without being dependent upon parliamentary 
confidence, not only holds executive power but also serves as symbolic head of state; 
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b) the democratic legitimacy of both the president and the legislature through 
independent elections, which might complicate the solution of conflicts between the 
two institutions; c) the temporal rigidity of the presidential office which makes 
adjustments to unexpected political developments difficult; d) the zero-sum character 
of presidential elections which is likely to lead to the spread of a political winner-
takes-all mentality; e) the risk of political polarisation among politicians as well as 
the electorate that follows from this winner-takes-all mentality; and f) the weakening 
of political parties, as presidents in presidential forms of government, unlike prime 
ministers in parliamentary ones, do not depend on the allegiance of their party or 
majority coalition to stay in power (ibid.).  
 
Although several statistical analyses support Linz’s (1990a, 1994) core argument that 
presidential systems, on balance, tend to be more unstable democracies than 
parliamentary ones (see e.g. Cheibub 2007; Przeworski 2000), his reasoning remains 
contested to date. Among the earliest and most pronounced critics of Linz’s 
arguments is Horowitz (1990) who inter alia points out that also in parliamentary 
systems political power might become personalised, and that the possibility to 
remove the government in the middle of its term need not be an inherent advantage 
of parliamentary systems but, especially when coalitions are unstable, can itself 
foster political crises (ibid.).  
 
While it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the Linz/Horowitz 
debate in more detail, it is interesting to note that both authors recognise the impact 
presidentialism may have in fostering (Linz 1994) or mitigating (Horowitz 1990) 
interethnic tensions. Neither of these two authors, however, puts issues of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability at the centre of their analyses. As aforementioned, this is 
indicative of a broader tendency within the academic debate to pay greater attention 
to the effects of different forms of government on the prospects of democracy rather 
than on the risk of ethnic violence. By highlighting the often understated relevance of 
forms of government for the risk of ethnic civil war, my arguments in this section 
Chapter 3 – The Relevance of Institutional Combinations 
 84 
thus address a further weakness of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence.
40
  
 
Before outlining the arguable effects of presidentialism on the prospects of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability in more detail, it should be noted that there is a variety of 
competing proposals about how to define presidential, parliamentary and mixed 
forms of government (see e.g. Linz 1994; Sartori 1997; Stepan and Skach 1994). For 
the purpose of this thesis, I rely on the relatively unambiguous classification by 
Cheibub (2007) which builds on the question ‘whether the government can be 
removed by the assembly in the course of its constitutional term in office’ (Cheibub 
2007:15): Systems in which the government cannot be removed by the legislature are 
presidential. Systems in which the government can only be removed by the 
legislature are parliamentary. And systems in which either the legislature or the 
independently (i.e. directly or indirectly) elected president can remove the 
government are mixed (ibid.).
41
 Distinguishing different forms of government in this 
manner avoids the potential pitfalls of alternative conceptualisations, such as the 
ambiguities that can arise when defining presidential forms of government with a 
reference to the popular election of the head of government (e.g. Shugart and Carey 
1992) or the extent of the president’s political powers (e.g. Sartori 1997). Cheibub’s 
(2007) classification criteria for instance make clear that Israel had a parliamentary 
form of government between 1996 and 2001 (as the entire government could be 
removed by the legislature) even though the prime minister as head of government 
was popularly elected, and that Venezuela prior to 1999 had a presidential form of 
                                                 
40
  If one were to rank-order forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state 
structures according to the attention they have received in the academic debate on institutional 
incentives for ethnic violence, electoral systems for the legislature easily would take first place, as 
they are frequently referred to as key institutional choice in ethnically diverse societies (see e.g. 
Horowitz 2002; Lijphart 2004; Reilly 2001). State structures would follow comfortably on second 
place, as academics and policy-makers have paid ‘surprisingly favourable attention’ (Roeder 
2009:203) to federal and other territorial autonomy arrangements as a means to reduce the risk of 
violent ethnic conflict (see e.g. Bermeo 2002; Horowitz 1991; Wolff 2009). Forms of government, 
however, would lag behind on third place, as – despite some relevant insights into the effects of 
parliamentarism, presidentialism and mixed forms of government on the prospects of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability (see e.g. Alonso and Ruiz 2005; Lijphart 2004; Suberu and Diamond 
2002) – they are rarely treated as a pivotal factor in the constitutional setup of ethnically diverse 
societies. 
41
 Mixed forms of government include, without further distinction, semi-presidential (Elgie 1999), 
semi-parliamentary (Linz 1994), premier-presidential and president-parliamentary (Shugart and 
Carey 1992) forms of government (cf. also Cheibub 2007).  
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government (as the government could not be removed by the legislature) even 
though the president had no constitutionally mandated legislative powers (Cheibub 
2007).  
 
Although the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence has paid 
comparatively little attention to the role of forms of government (see footnote 40), 
there is a small but nonetheless relevant pool of insights regarding the possible 
effects of presidentialism on the risk of ethnic violence. From this pool of insights, 
five arguments about the presumed merits of presidentialism in ethnically diverse 
societies stand out in particular: First, an independently – and, specifically: directly – 
elected presidency is said to enable ethnic groups to gain access to executive power 
even if they do not hold a majority in parliament (Horowitz 1991), and hence to 
reduce ‘the stakes of control for any particular institution or office’ (Sisk 1996:54). 
Put differently, while the likelihood for the different ethnic groups in a given society 
to obtain executive power under parliamentary forms of government is determined 
by the number of seats they obtain in parliamentary elections, the independent 
elections of president and legislature under presidential forms of government 
arguably offers more chances to be represented politically. According to this 
argument, not presidentialism but rather parliamentary forms of government with a 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and disciplined parties are based on 
winner-takes-all principles (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b). 
 
Second, combined with a broad-based electoral system for the presidency, 
presidential systems arguably encourage pre-electoral interethnic coalitions, and thus 
foster norms of negotiation and inclusion (Horowitz 1991). The example which 
Horowitz applauds in particular is the presidential form of government and broad-
based electoral system for the presidency established in the 1979 Constitution of 
Nigeria (see section 3.2.) which, in his view, has been more conducive to lowering 
the risk of ethnic civil war than the parliamentary form of government that Nigeria 
had inherited at independence (Horowitz 1991). 
 
Chapter 3 – The Relevance of Institutional Combinations 
 86 
Third, the separation of powers between president and legislature under presidential 
forms of government presumably ‘allows each to serve as a check on the other, even 
when the same party dominates both branches’ (Saideman et al. 2002:110), so that 
ethnic groups have ‘more points within the [political] system to block unfavorable 
actions.’ (ibid.:111) According to Saideman et al. (2002), the mutual independence 
of executive and legislature under presidentialism is thus likely to improve 
perceptions of security specifically among ethnic minorities and hence to reduce the 
risks for ethnic violence described by the ethnic security dilemma (see section 2.7.), 
as at least ‘in principle … only presidentialism allows the parliament to be 
autonomous from the executive, and even to legislate against the executive’s (the 
President’s) will.’ (Alonso and Ruiz 2005:5)    
 
Fourth, proponents of presidentialism in ethnically diverse societies have argued that 
a president, elected by the entire electorate voting as one constituency and in her 
constitutional status as chief executive, may reduce the risk of violent ethnic conflict 
by serving as a symbol of national unity (cf. Suberu and Diamond 2002). Finally, a 
powerful president is said to reduce the risk of ethnopolitical instability, as she may 
overcome potential political confrontations or deadlocks between representatives of 
different ethnic groups (see Horowitz 1991). 
 
At first sight, the aforementioned five arguments about the presumed merits of 
presidential forms of government in ethnically diverse societies might seem 
relatively convincing. A closer look, however, reveals that each of the 
aforementioned points is ultimately flawed. To respond to each of the arguable 
virtues of presidentialism outlined above in reverse order, it is important to note, 
first, that numerous scholars such as Jones (1995), Mainwaring (1993) and 
Valenzuela (2004) have highlighted the rather high risk of political deadlocks in 
presidential forms of government (cf. Cheibub 2007). This clearly puts into doubt 
Horowitz’s (1991) assumptions about the effectiveness of presidentialism to 
overcome possible political impasses or gridlocked confrontations between 
representatives of different ethnic groups. Second, the argument about the president’s 
function as a symbol of national unity is rather brittle, as it is contingent on the 
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behaviour of political actors and specifically the president’s statesmanship (Sisk 
1996). As Suberu and Diamond (2002) point out with reference to the presidential 
form of government in Nigeria’s Second and Third Republic, there is little indication 
of presidentialism helping to bring members of different ethnic groups closer 
together, not least due to widespread suspicions among the Nigerian population that 
whoever becomes president is likely to use their office mainly to the advantage of 
their own ethnic group.  
 
Third, while the mutual independence between the executive and the legislature 
under presidentialism in theory might help to improve perceptions of security 
specifically among ethnic minorities, this argument is flawed, as in practice not all 
presidential forms of government are based on a clear separation of powers (Alonso 
and Ruiz 2005). Fourth, as Figure 10 in Appendix I illustrates, Horowitz’s (1991) 
appraisal of presidential forms of government that rely on a broad-based electoral 
system for the presidency only applies to a rather small number of cases: The two 
most commonly used types of electoral system for the presidency in countries with a 
presidential form of government between 1955 and 2007 have been plurality and 
absolute majority systems (see Figure 10 in Appendix I). Conversely, electoral 
systems with a vote distribution requirement (as established for instance by Nigeria’s 
1979 Constitution) have been among the least commonly used presidential electoral 
systems during the same period of time (ibid.). Thus, despite Horowitz’s (1991) 
appraisal of presidential forms of government that rely on a broad-based electoral 
system for the presidency, attempts to ‘soften’ the zero-sum character of presidential 
elections through the use of vote distribution requirements have been very rare 
indeed. Moreover, even where a broad-based presidential election formula is in 
place, it may fail to ‘de-ethnicise’ the presidency, as arguably is the case in Nigeria 
where presidents continue to be seen as acting mainly in the interests of their own 
ethnic group (Suberu and Diamond 2002).  
 
Finally, the argument that the independent election of the president under 
presidential forms of government enhances the chances for the different ethnic 
groups in a given society to be represented politically is highly questionable, as it 
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neglects other crucial elements of presidentialism which clearly reflect its reliance on 
winner-takes-all principles. These elements include the zero-sum character of 
presidential elections, the temporal rigidity of the presidential office, the non-
collegial nature of the executive and the comparatively low frequency of coalition-
building. 
 
Both the zero-sum game between the candidates in presidential elections and the 
temporal rigidity of the presidential office are among the perils of presidentialism 
highlighted by Linz (1990a, 1994) and listed earlier in this section. The identification 
of a zero-sum game between presidential candidates refers to the fact that there is 
only one winner for the presidency in presidential elections and no form of 
compensation for the losing candidates (ibid.; see also e.g. Przeworski 1991). 
Following the ‘Linzian view’ (Cheibub 2007:7) of presidentialism, the zero-sum 
character of political competition for executive power in presidential systems is 
inevitable, as ‘the presidency is occupied by a single person … [and hence] not 
divisible for the purposes of coalition formation.’ (ibid.:9) The winner-takes-all 
outcome of presidential elections is thereby exacerbated by the temporal rigidity of 
the president’s term in office: As the president, once elected, cannot be removed 
from her office bar through an impeachment, those groups who consider themselves 
winners and losers of presidential elections are defined for the entire presidential 
mandate (Linz 1990a, 1994).  
 
Closely related to this is the third reason why presidentialism is evidently based on 
winner-takes-all principles, namely the non-collegial nature of the executive, i.e. the 
reliance of presidential forms of government – leaving aside the exceptional case of 
Switzerland (cf. Norris 2008) – on a one-(wo)man-executive with a purely advisory 
cabinet (Lijphart 2004). This concentration of executive branch authority in the 
hands of one individual (the president) creates unfavourable conditions for the 
formation of broad, meaningful power-sharing executives and further highlights the 
exclusionary tendencies of presidentialism (Lijphart 2002; Norris 2008; Sisk 1996).  
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Finally, presidential forms of government are associated with a lower frequency of 
coalition formation than parliamentary or mixed forms of government (see e.g. Riggs 
1997; Stepan and Skach 1994; Valenzuela 2004). Presidentialism has been argued to 
lack incentives for coalitional cooperation due to the mutual independence of the 
executive and the legislature, the president’s sense of a popular mandate and the 
aforementioned zero-sum character of presidential elections (cf. Cheibub 2007): The 
mutual independence of executive and legislature implies that the president does not 
have to seek support from political parties other than her own while, conversely, 
political parties are not committed to cooperating with the government even if they 
join it (cf. ibid.). Likewise, the president’s independence from the legislature 
combined with her sense of a popular mandate (due to the nationwide character of 
presidential elections) might lead her to avoid seeking cooperation and overestimate 
her ability to govern alone (cf. ibid.). Lastly, the zero-sum character of presidential 
elections is unlikely to foster a climate of (coalitional) cooperation, but on the 
contrary may intensify competitiveness among political actors (cf. ibid.; see also 
Cohen 1997). Cheibub (2007) challenges these arguments by highlighting that 
coalition-building in presidential democracies is not generally rare; however, 
importantly for my argument – and irrespective of what the reasons for this 
phenomenon might be – also his data analysis shows that coalition-building is indeed 
less frequent under presidential than under parliamentary or mixed forms of 
government (see ibid.).  
 
In sum, these four elements (i.e. the zero-sum character of presidential elections, the 
temporal rigidity of the presidential office, the non-collegial nature of the executive 
and the comparatively low frequency of coalition-building) illustrate that presidential 
forms of government are clearly based on winner-takes-all principles. According to 
the grievance-based explanation of ethnic violence outlined in chapter 2, this reliance 
on winner-takes-all rules can be assumed to be detrimental to the prospects of 
ethnopolitical stability, as it systematically reduces the number of possible political 
winners and hence the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of political 
representation.  
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By comparison, parliamentary forms of government provide a higher number of 
possible political winners, as, first, the losing candidates in the competition for 
executive power are compensated by their role as opposition leaders in parliament 
(Przeworski 1991). Second, the winner from the competition for executive power can 
only govern as long as she receives sufficient support from the legislature (ibid.). 
And, third, the cabinet is a collegial decision-making body which provides a more 
favourable setting for power-sharing executives and coalition-building (Lijphart 
2002, 2004). Thus, even where parliamentary forms of government are combined 
with a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and disciplined parties (cf. 
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b), they still create a positive-sum game – and hence 
stand in contrast to presidentialism’s reliance on winner-takes-all principles – due to 
the political compensation for losing candidates in the competition for executive 
power, the temporal flexibility of the government’s term in office and the divisibility 
of executive power (cf. Cheibub 2007; Linz 1990a; Przeworski 1991).  
 
Also mixed forms of government provide a greater number of possible political 
winners than presidentialism. This is because the government’s responsibility to both 
the legislature and an independently elected president in mixed forms of government 
creates less temporal rigidity and greater incentives for coalition-building (cf. 
Cheibub 2007; Shugart and Carey 1992), while there can also be substantial sharing 
of executive power between the president, prime minister and cabinet  (cf. Lijphart 
2004).  
 
For these reasons, when treated as separate entities (i.e. considered outside of 
specific institutional combinations), presidential forms of government can be 
expected to increase the risk of ethnic violence compared to both parliamentary and 
mixed systems.   
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3.5. Majoritarian Electoral Systems and the Risk of Ethnic Violence 
 
The design of electoral systems for the legislature is frequently referred to as key 
institutional choice in ethnically diverse societies (see e.g. Horowitz 2002; Lijphart 
2004; Reilly 2001). This emphasis on the role of electoral systems for the legislature, 
although rarely explained in much detail (see ibid.), presumably stems from the 
recognition that the main purpose of legislatures under any democratic form of 
government – and whatever constitutionally granted functions they might have – is to 
give ‘voice … to the diversity of ideological or other partisan divisions in the polity 
and society.’ (Shugart and Carey 1992:4) From this purpose follows that the electoral 
rules for the national legislature (i.e. the rules according to which votes are translated 
into seats) are a basic yet crucial indicator for the representativeness of any political 
system (cf. ibid.; Norris 1997).  
 
Unlike the distinction of forms of government, the definition of different types of 
electoral system has attracted far less controversy in the academic debate (Sartori 
1997). For the purpose of this analysis, I classify electoral systems for the legislature 
into three main types: majoritarian, proportional and mixed. By moving beyond the 
traditionally used simple dichotomy of proportional versus majoritarian electoral 
systems, this threefold categorisation allows to account easily also for those countries 
which employ a combination of majoritarian and proportional electoral formulas (cf. 
Golder 2005).
42
 Following Golder (2005), I define majoritarian electoral systems as 
systems that require the winning candidate to obtain either a plurality or majority of 
the vote. Proportional electoral systems, on the other hand, allocate seats in 
proportion to a party’s (or candidates’) share of the vote (ibid.), while mixed systems 
employ a mixture of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules (ibid.). Unlike 
Golder (2005), and for the sake of simplicity, I do not classify electoral systems with 
multiple tiers into a separate category. Instead, following the example of authors 
such as Massicotte and Blais (1999), I identify these systems as majoritarian, 
proportional or mixed, depending on the electoral formula(s) used to translate votes 
                                                 
42  In line with Golder (2005), my definition of electoral systems for the legislature centres on the type 
of electoral formula used to translate votes into seats. For reasons outlined in section 3.2., I do not 
consider other electoral system features such as district magnitude or formal thresholds.   
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into seats in the different electoral tiers (see also section 5.5.). According to these 
definitions, majoritarian electoral systems include those that employ either plurality, 
absolute or qualified majority requirements, such as for instance the first-past-the-
post, limited vote and alternative vote (AV) systems (Golder 2004). Proportional 
electoral systems, on the other hand, include quota and highest average systems 
using party lists, as well as the single transferable vote (STV) (ibid.).
43
   
 
Following Norris (1997) and Reilly (2002), one can identify two core debates about 
the effects of electoral system design which are of particular relevance for this thesis. 
The first debate asks whether majoritarian electoral systems are superior to 
proportional ones (Norris 1997). The second whether list proportional representation 
(PR) or preferential electoral systems (such as AV and STV) are more suitable for 
ethnically diverse societies (Reilly 2002). For reasons outlined below, my main focus 
will be on the first of these two debates. 
 
Discussions about whether list PR or preferential electoral systems are more suitable 
for ethnically diverse societies centre on questions whether pre-electoral cooperation 
or post-election bargains are more likely to encourage interethnic accommodation 
(Mitchell 2008). In particular consociationalists recommend list PR (typically based 
                                                 
43
  Both AV and STV are so-called ‘preferential’ electoral systems. As both systems have been 
criticised as being ‘confusing’ (Threlfall 2011) or complicated (see Lijphart 2004), it is worth 
outlining their main features briefly (see Golder 2005; Norris 1997; Reilly 2001, 2002; Reynolds, 
Reilly and Ellis 2008 for the following points): Under AV systems, candidates are presented in 
single-member districts. Voters rank candidates in order of their preference on the ballot paper. 
The candidate who has won an absolute majority of first preference votes in her district is elected, 
with no form of compensation for the losing candidates. If no candidate wins an absolute majority, 
the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated from the count. The second 
and later preferences on the ballots of the eliminated candidate are then assigned to the remaining 
candidates in the order in which they have been marked on the ballot papers. This process is 
repeated until one candidate has an absolute majority. Under STV systems, on the other hand, 
candidates are presented in multi-member districts. Voters rank candidates in order of their 
preference on the ballot paper. The total number of votes is counted then divided by the number of 
seats in the district plus one, and any candidate who has received one or more first preference 
votes than this number is immediately elected. If no candidate has received the amount of first 
preference votes necessary to be elected, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences 
is eliminated from the count. The second and later preferences on her ballots are then allocated to 
the remaining candidates in the order in which they have been marked on the ballot papers. At the 
same time, the surplus votes of an elected candidate (i.e. those above the number of votes 
necessary to be elected) are redistributed according to the second and later preferences on the 
elected candidate’s ballots, so that the total redistributed vote equals the candidate’s surplus. This 
process continues until all seats for the district are filled. 
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on closed lists)
44
 as best choice for ethnically diverse societies, because they 
arguably increase the likelihood that a broadly representative legislature will be 
elected, encourage post-electoral coalition-building, are simple to operate, and foster 
the establishment and maintenance of strong, cohesive parties (cf. ibid.; Lijphart 
1991, 2004). Preferential electoral systems, on the other hand, are expected to 
promote pre-electoral interethnic alliances and to create incentives for political 
moderation, as they encourage politicians to campaign not just for first-preference 
votes from their own community, but also for second-preference votes from other 
groups (see e.g. Horowitz 1991; Mitchell 2008; Reilly 2001, 2002). In this manner, 
preferential electoral systems such as AV and STV are said to give political systems 
a ‘centripetal spin’ and – in contrast to list PR systems – arguably reduce the risk of 
cementing ethnic cleavages (Reilly 2001, 2002).  
 
While I thus fully acknowledge that there is a relevant academic debate on the 
strengths and weaknesses of list PR versus preferential electoral systems in ethnically 
diverse societies, I cannot consider this debate any further. This is mainly due to 
practical reasons, as relatively few countries employed a preferential electoral system 
for the legislature during the time period considered in my statistical analysis (see 
chapters 5 and 6; cf. also Reilly 2002). Hence, it would be of little benefit for my 
data analysis to classify preferential electoral systems for the legislature into a 
separate category. Instead, I include AV systems in my majoritarian electoral system 
category and STV systems in my proportional one (see section 5.5.), since AV 
‘systematically discriminates against those at the bottom of the poll in order to 
promote effective government for the winner’ (Norris, 1997: 302), while STV 
follows the inclusionary logic of a proportional electoral system (Mitchell, 2008). 
For these reasons, it also makes little sense to consider the list PR versus preferential 
electoral systems debate any further at this point. As aforementioned, my main focus 
instead lies on the academic debate surrounding the strengths and weaknesses of 
proportional versus majoritarian electoral systems. 
                                                 
44
  Under closed list PR systems, each party presents a list of candidates to the electorate in multi-
member electoral districts. Voters vote for a party and parties receive seats in proportion to their 
share of the vote. These seats are then allocated to political candidates in order of their position on 
the party list (Norris 1997; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2008).  
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Discussions regarding the choice between majoritarian and proportional electoral 
systems typically address the former’s emphasis on government effectiveness and 
accountability, and the latter’s aim to give political voice to a diversity of social 
groups and promote greater fairness for minority parties (Norris 1997). The central 
tenets of these discussions can be summarised as follows: Majoritarian electoral 
systems are based on winner-takes-all principles whereby the candidate – or, in 
majoritarian electoral systems using multi-member districts such as the limited vote, 
the candidates – supported by a plurality or majority of the vote are elected, while all 
other voters remain unrepresented (cf. Golder 2005; Lijphart 1999). In legislative 
elections, this tends to lead to an exaggeration of parliamentary seats for the party in 
first place (even if it only holds a plurality of votes nationwide), with the aim to 
produce a decisive parliamentary majority (Lijphart 1999; Norris 1997, 2002). Under 
parliamentary forms of government, this in turn facilitates the establishment of a 
strong (i.e. single-party) government and thus reduces the likelihood that coalition 
governments need to be formed (cf. ibid.). In this manner, majoritarian electoral 
systems for the legislature are said to enhance both government effectiveness and 
accountability, as single-party executives arguably will find it easier to implement 
their manifesto promises compared to coalition executives (Norris 2004), and voters 
will have less difficulties ‘to assign blame or praise for the government’s 
performance and to reward or punish parties accordingly’ (ibid.:70). Moreover, 
office-seeking politicians specifically under majoritarian electoral systems with 
single-member districts and candidate-ballots are expected to feel individually more 
accountable and build relatively strong links with their voters, in order to secure their 
support in future elections (cf. ibid.). 
 
On the other hand, however, the reliance of majoritarian electoral systems for the 
legislature on winner-takes-all principles implies that the trade-offs for achieving 
decisive majorities, government effectiveness and accountability are significant. As 
only those candidates are elected to parliament who win a plurality or majority of the 
vote within their electoral districts while the losing candidates receive nothing, 
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majoritarian electoral systems tend to increase the hurdles for smaller parties
45
 and 
heighten the stakes of political competition (Cohen 1997; Norris 1997, 2002). Due to 
this tendency to concentrate political gains from the electoral competition for a 
political office (see also section 3.2.), majoritarian electoral systems for the 
legislature are frequently associated with the political exclusion or marginalisation of 
certain ethnic groups (see e.g. DeVotta 2005; Saideman et al. 2002). A case in point 
is Northern Ireland where – not least thanks to the reintroduction of the first-past-the-
post electoral system in 1929 – the Unionists representing the Protestant majority 
(approximately two-thirds of the population) were able to form a one-party 
government for the entire period from 1921 to 1972, while excluding representatives 
of the Catholic minority from executive power (Lijphart 1977). Moreover, as for 
instance DeVotta (2005) highlights with reference to Sri Lanka’s plurality system 
that was employed for the country’s parliamentary elections before 1989, 
majoritarian electoral systems such as first-past-the-post are unlikely to create 
incentives for interethnic cooperation but on the contrary might encourage strategies 
of ethnic outbidding.  
 
Therefore, following the grievance-based explanation of ethnic violence outlined in 
chapter 2, the reliance of majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature on winner-
takes-all rules can be assumed to be detrimental to the prospects of ethnopolitical 
stability, as it systematically reduces the number of possible political winners and 
hence the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of political 
representation.  
 
By comparison, proportional electoral systems provide a higher number of possible 
political winners, as they stand in contrast to the winner-takes-all logic on which 
majoritarian electoral systems are based: By aiming to ensure the proportional 
translation of a party’s (or candidates’) share of votes into the number of seats in 
parliament, proportional electoral systems tend to lower the hurdles for smaller 
parties, increase the effective number of parliamentary parties and heighten the 
likelihood of coalition executives under parliamentary forms of government (Cohen 
                                                 
45
  This is in particular the case if the support for smaller parties is spatially dispersed (see Norris 
1997). 
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1997; Lijphart 1999; Norris 1997, 2002, 2004). Unlike majoritarian electoral 
systems, proportional ones thus disperse political gains and increase levels of 
political inclusiveness. Moreover, in particular list PR can encourage the creation of 
ethnically diverse party lists and, consequently, lower incentives for ethnically 
exclusive platforms, as political parties, ‘both large and small, … need to appeal to a 
wide spectrum of society to maximize their overall national vote.’ (Reynolds 
1999:97)
46
 
 
Finally, also mixed electoral systems for the legislature
47
 provide a greater number of 
possible political winners than majoritarian ones. This is because they allocate a 
certain amount of parliamentary seats through a proportional formula (Golder 2005) 
and – compared to majoritarian electoral systems – heighten the number of 
parliamentary parties as well as the likelihood of coalition executives under 
parliamentary forms of government (Norris 1997, 2004). 
 
For these reasons, when treated as separate entities (i.e. considered outside of 
specific institutional combinations), majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature 
can be expected to increase the risk of ethnic violence compared to proportional and 
mixed systems. 
   
 
                                                 
46
  It is important to note that there is a variety of criticisms against proportional electoral systems 
which I do not consider any further. These criticisms include inter alia that proportional electoral 
systems arguably bear the danger of excessive party fragmentation which may lead to policy 
stalemates, ineffective governing coalitions and an overall climate of political instability (cf. 
Ishiyama 2009; Norris 2004). I do not consider these or other criticisms against proportional 
electoral systems any further, as my main focus – following the grievance-based explanation 
outlined in chapter 2 – is solely on the number of possible political winners provided by formal 
political institutions. With this research focus in mind, proportional electoral systems as well as 
mixed electoral systems should be associated with a lower risk of ethnic civil war than 
majoritarian electoral systems (see above).  
47
  I do not make any distinction between different forms of mixed electoral systems, such as whether 
they use the majoritarian and proportional electoral formulas dependently or independently, or 
whether – if they belong to the latter category – they can be described as coexistence, 
superposition or fusion types (see Golder 2005 for more details). Overall, I have hardly written 
about mixed electoral systems in this section, as they are rarely given much relevance in the two 
core debates mentioned above, and because – with the exception of e.g. Carey and Hix (2009) – 
there has been relatively little empirical investigation into the effects of mixed electoral systems on 
the proportionality of electoral outcomes (cf. Golder 2005).   
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3.6. Unitary State Structures and the Risk of Ethnic Violence 
 
Although the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence contains few 
comparative studies on the effects of federal and unitary state structures (cf. Bermeo 
2002), academics and policy-makers have paid ‘surprisingly favourable attention’ 
(Roeder 2009:203) to federal arrangements as a means to reduce the risk of violent 
ethnic conflict.
48
 This ‘favourable attention’ (ibid.) has been shared by proponents of 
consociationalism, integrative power-sharing and power-dividing alike: According to 
proponents of consociationalism, in particular polycommunal federalism
49
 reduces 
the risk of ethnopolitical instability, as it allows ethnic groups who might represent a 
minority nationwide, but a majority within a given federal unit, to rule over 
themselves in certain areas of exclusive concern (see e.g. Lijphart 1977). Following 
the integrative power-sharing model based on Horowitz (1985),
50
 federal 
arrangements increase the prospects of ethnopolitical stability, as they disperse 
                                                 
48
   It is worth pointing out that the effects of different types of state structure are often analysed with 
particular regard to their impact on separatist or secessionist movements (see e.e.g Bunce and 
Watts 2005; Roeder 2009), i.e. movements whose protagonists seek to establish either an 
autonomous region within an existing state or a separate, independent state (Horowitz 1985). Due 
to issues of data availability, I do not distinguish between secessionist and non-secessionist ethnic 
wars in my statistical analysis (see also section 5.3.).  
49
  See footnote 36 for the definition of polycommunal, non-communal and mixed federalism. For 
reasons outlined in section 3.2., I do not distinguish any further between different types of federal 
arrangement, such as whether they are based on polycommunal, non-communal or mixed 
principles (see Sisk 1996), or whether they are symmetric or asymmetric (see Watts 1998). 
Instead, I use the broader assumption that the precise type of federalism is secondary to the fact 
that federal state structures, however designed, increase opportunities of political representation 
(and thus the number of possible political winners) by establishing multiple levels of government 
(see also Bermeo 2002; Cohen 1997; Saideman et al. 2002). Likewise, it would go beyond the 
scope of this thesis to investigate the precise set of circumstances under which ‘federalism can 
either exacerbate or mitigate ethnic conflict’ (Horowitz 1985:603): According to previous studies 
within the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence, the effects of federal arrangements 
on the risk of violent ethnic conflict ultimately might depend on factors such as e.g. the behaviour 
of political elites and their desire for interethnic compromise (Malešević 2000); the settlement 
patterns and internal divisions of ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985); or the distribution of force 
between disputing parties (Meadwell 2009). I will not consider these factors any further, as they 
are difficult if not impossible to quantify for the statistical part of this analysis. Instead, their 
relevance for the impact of federalism on the risk of ethnic violence ought to be investigated in 
more detail in separate case study analyses. 
50
  The integrative power-sharing model consists of five elements (Sisk 1996): 1. the dispersion of 
power ‘to take the heat off of a single focal point’ (Horowitz 1985:598), e.g. by dividing power 
among institutions at the centre or by creating lower-level units with important policy functions; 2. 
territorial devolution or reserved offices to emphasise intraethnic competition; 3. institutions that 
create incentives for interethnic cooperation, such as electoral laws that create incentives for pre-
electoral alliances by means of vote pooling; 4. policies that encourage alignments based on non-
ethnic cleavages; and 5. the managed redistribution of resources to reduce disparities between 
ethnic groups.  
Chapter 3 – The Relevance of Institutional Combinations 
 98 
political power through the creation of multiple levels of government and, where 
federal units are controlled by ethnic groups with prominent subdivisions, encourage 
intra- rather than interethnic competition (ibid.; Sisk 1996). Finally, proponents of 
the power-dividing approach
51
 favour in particular non-communal federalism, as it 
promotes a horizontal and vertical division of powers (i.e. among different branches 
of the central government as well as between the central and federal governments), 
and increases opportunities of political representation without privileging certain 
ethnic groups over others (Roeder 2005).  
 
Before elaborating the likely effects of different state structures on the risk of ethnic 
civil war in more detail, the defining features of unitary, federal and mixed state 
structures ought to be clarified briefly. It thereby is important to note that – similarly  
to the conceptualisation of different forms of government (see section 3.4.) – the  
definition of both federal and mixed state structures is highly contested. This is due 
to a variety of reasons, ranging from ambiguities in some countries’ constitutions 
regarding their state structures (cf. Watts 1998), through discussions about whether 
federalism ought to be defined from a formal institutional or behavioural perspective 
(Zheng 2007), to the fact that both ‘federalism’ and ‘autonomy’ can have a variety of 
different meanings (see Ackrén 2009; Watts 1998).  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, I identify state structures exclusively on the basis of 
their open codification (see also sections 3.2. and 5.6.) and define them as follows: 
Federal state structures combine principles of shared rule and self-rule (Watts 1998) 
by featuring ‘a layer of institutions between a state’s center and its localities … 
[which has] its own leaders and representative bodies … [who also] share decision-
making power with the center.’ (Bermeo 2002:98) The centre and territorially 
defined subunits of the state thereby possess their own formally guaranteed spheres 
of responsibility (cf. Bunce and Watts 2005), with most federal systems relying on an 
autonomous constitutional, supreme or high court to deal with potential disputes 
between the central and federal state governments (He 2007; Watts 1998). Shared 
institutions at the centre typically include a bicameral national legislature where the 
                                                 
51
  See footnote 20 for a brief outline of the power-dividing approach. Roeder (2005) uses the term 
‘power-dividing’ in accordance with Rothchild and Roeder (2005b). 
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representatives in the second chamber are drawn from the federal units (Norris 
2008).  
 
In unitary state structures, on the other hand, the central government controls all 
noncentral governments, and there is no formally guaranteed division of power 
among multiple levels of government with distinct spheres of responsibility (cf. 
Lijphart 1999). Correspondingly, the relationship between a state’s centre and its 
subunits or localities is one of subordination rather than autonomy and coordination 
(Bunce and Watts 2005).  
 
Finally, I use the term ‘mixed state structures’ to describe non-federal states with at 
least one autonomous region, i.e. at least one territorial subunit whose executive, 
legislative and judicial institutions have the formally guaranteed power to exercise 
public policy functions in at least one cultural, economic or political sphere 
independently of other sources of authority in the state (cf. Ackrén 2009; Wolff 
2009). Like federal systems, countries with a mixed state structure are thus 
politically decentralised in the sense that ‘there is a vertical division of power among 
multiple levels of government that have independent decision-making power over at 
least one issue area.’ (Brancati 2006:654) Mixed state structures are, however, 
distinct from federal ones, as territorial subdivisions need not extend across the entire 
state territory (Wolff 2009), nor is there necessarily a formal guarantee that 
representatives of the autonomous region(s) can share political power at the centre 
(cf. ibid.). Examples of non-federal states with at least one autonomous region 
include China, France, Italy and Indonesia.     
 
As ‘comparative studies of federalism and unitarism are surprisingly rare’ (Bermeo 
2002:98), it is difficult to find analyses which explicitly outline arguable benefits of 
unitary state structures for the prospects of ethnopolitical stability. Instead, the 
academic debate has tended to focus on the effects of different types of federal and 
mixed state structures, and whether they should be seen as a conflict deterrent or a 
conflict agent (Brancati 2009). According to the latter side of the academic debate, 
there are at least four key reasons why federal and mixed state structures might 
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heighten rather than reduce the risk of violent ethnic conflict: First, federal and 
mixed state structures might lead to a fierce competition over powers and resources 
between the centre and territorial subunits of the state as well as among different 
subunits, and thus foster conflict instead of helping to diffuse it (cf. Suberu 2001). 
Second, in particular when federal or mixed state structures grant autonomy to 
certain ethnic groups, this might reinforce ethnic cleavages and, by privileging some 
ethnic groups over others in a given federal state or autonomous region, encourage 
secessionism rather than create incentives for interethnic compromise (see e.g. 
Roeder 2009). Third, problems of minority exclusion can also develop within federal 
units or autonomous regions, so that the establishment of federal or mixed state 
structures might simply defer the risk of ethnopolitical instability to the subnational 
level instead of being able to solve it conclusively (cf. Sisk 1996). Finally, depending 
on issues such as the number of regional legislatures or the timing of national and 
regional elections, there is a risk of regional parties gaining strength under federal or 
mixed state structures which might reinforce ethnic identities, foster interethnic 
tensions and seek to mobilise ethnic groups for violent conflict (Brancati 2006, 
2009). Using these arguments about the potential risks of federal and mixed state 
structures in ethnically diverse societies e contrario, one could thus assume that 
unitary state structures should decrease the risk of ethnic violence, as they do not 
divide power among multiple levels of government and, hence, are arguably free of 
the risks associated with territorial autonomy arrangements.  
 
At the same time, however, the aforementioned points about the possible perils of 
federal and mixed state structures are challenged by arguments about the often 
stability-enhancing effects of political decentralisation (cf. Bermeo 2002; Brancati 
2009). Leaving aside the arguable benefits of federalism mentioned at the beginning 
of this section (see Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977; Roeder 2005), there are at least six 
key reasons why federal and mixed state structures might reduce rather than heighten 
the risk of violent ethnic conflict: First, the creation of territorially defined subunits 
of the state can serve to localise ethnic conflicts in these subunits, lessen the 
likelihood that they will spread across the entire state territory and thus reduce the 
risk of major disruptions of the national government (cf. Suberu 2001). Second, in 
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particular federal arrangements might help to foster interethnic accommodation by 
promoting state-based identities as a cleavage that is independent of and competitive 
with ethnic identities (ibid.). Third, the establishment of multiple levels of 
government under federal and mixed state structures may reduce the risk of 
ethnopolitical instability, as it increases the number of settings for peaceful 
bargaining (cf. Bermeo 2002) and creates a type of ‘subnational training ground’ for 
politicians to learn how to seek interethnic compromise over certain issue areas (cf. 
Horowitz 1991). Fourth, the establishment of multiple levels of government 
presumably brings the government ‘closer to the people’ (Brancati 2009:8), thereby 
making citizens more aware of government activities and creating incentives for 
them ‘to work from within the government to achieve their goals’ (ibid.) rather than 
resorting to violent action strategies. Fifth, federal and mixed state structures might 
help to promote ‘the best of both worlds’ in the sense that ethnic groups who control 
certain federal units or autonomous regions can ‘realize their aspirations for self-
determination while simultaneously preserving the overall social and territorial 
integrity of existing states.’ (Wolff 2009:28) Finally, non-unitary state structures 
arguably lower the stakes of competition for the central government, as ethnic groups 
can seek to gain political representation also in the political institutions of the federal 
units or, under mixed state structures, in the autonomous region(s) (cf. Cohen 1997). 
Federal arrangements thereby offer even more possibilities of political representation 
than mixed state structures, as federalism’s principle of shared rule – which does not 
necessarily exist under mixed state structures (cf. Wolff 2009) – gives ethnic group 
representatives from different federal units the opportunity to influence also the 
national decision-making process through shared political institutions at the centre 
(cf. Kymlicka 2007). In this manner, federalism’s principles of self-rule and shared 
rule clearly provide ethnic group representatives with more opportunities to exercise 
formal political power than they would have under any other type of state structure. 
 
Following the grievance-based explanation of violent ethnic conflict outlined in 
chapter 2, the most relevant aspect from the aforementioned merits and perils of 
different state structures is their impact on the number of possible political winners. 
As has been indicated in the preceding paragraphs, unitary state structures 
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systematically reduce the number of possible political winners compared to federal 
and mixed state structures due to their reliance on winner-takes-all rules: Unitary 
state structures decrease the chances for the different ethnic groups in a given society 
to obtain the values of political representation compared to federal and mixed state 
structures, as there is no formally guaranteed division of power among multiple 
levels of government with distinct spheres of responsibility. Instead, unitary state 
structures rely on winner-takes-all principles in the sense that whoever controls the 
central government also controls all noncentral governments, due to the strict 
subordination of the latter to the former (Bunce and Watts 2005; Lijphart 1999).  
 
In contrast to this, federal systems systematically increase the number of possible 
political winners compared to both unitary and mixed state structures: Unlike unitary 
state structures, federalism creates opportunities for ethnic group representatives to 
gain political office within territorially defined subunits of the state that have their 
own formally guaranteed spheres of responsibility (cf. Bunce and Watts 2005). 
Moreover, unlike mixed state structures, federalism also creates opportunities for 
ethnic group representatives to influence the national decision-making process 
through shared political institutions at the centre (cf. Kymlicka 2007).  
 
Mixed state structures, too, provide a higher number of possible political winners 
than unitary ones, as – just like federal state structures – they create opportunities of 
political representation within territorially defined subunits of the state and thus 
lower the stakes of competition for the central government (cf. Cohen 1997).  
 
For these reasons, when treated as separate entities (i.e. considered outside of 
specific institutional combinations), unitary state structures can be expected to 
increase the risk of ethnic violence compared to federal and mixed state structures.  
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3.7. Institutional Combinations and the Risk of Ethnic Violence  
 
Based on the arguments outlined in sections 3.4. to 3.6., we can categorise the 
aforementioned forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state 
structures into those which provide a comparatively low, high or medium number of 
possible political winners (see Table 1).  
 
 
 Category A: 
low number of 
possible political 
winners 
Category B: 
high number of 
possible political 
winners 
Category C: 
medium number of 
possible political 
winners 
 
Form of government  
 
 
presidential  
 
 
parliamentary 
 
 
mixed 
 
Electoral system majoritarian proportional mixed 
 
State structure 
 
unitary federal mixed 
 
Table 1:  Categorisation of Formal Political Institutions according to the Number of Possible Political 
    Winners They Provide.  
 
Compared to their counterparts in categories B and C, the formal political institutions 
included in category A of Table 1 provide a relatively low number of possible 
political winners due to their reliance on winner-takes-all principles. These 
institutions thus systematically reduce the number of ethnic groups that can obtain 
the values of political representation outlined in chapter 2. They include a 
presidential form of government (see section 3.4.), a majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature (see section 3.5.) and a unitary state structure (see section 3.6.). 
Conversely, the institutions listed in category B of Table 1 offer a relatively high 
number of possible political winners, as they increase opportunities for political 
representation and disperse points of political victory the most compared to their 
counterparts in categories A and C. They include a parliamentary form of 
government, a proportional electoral system for the legislature and a federal state 
structure. Finally, category C of Table 1 contains those formal political institutions 
which provide a medium number of possible political winners. This is to say that the 
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institutions in category C offer greater chances to be represented politically and 
hence to obtain the values of political representation compared to their counterparts 
in category A, but lower chances than their counterparts in category B (cf. Kymlicka 
2007; Lijphart 2004; Norris 1997; Wolff 2009). They include a mixed form of 
government, a mixed electoral system for the legislature and a mixed state structure. 
Before using this categorisation in Table 1 to deduce the likely effects of different 
institutional combinations on the risk of violent ethnic conflict, it is worth recalling 
the aim of the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism. 
  
As has been elaborated in more detail in section 1.6., previous studies within the 
institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence have typically ignored the 
possible interaction effects between different political institutions, and instead tended 
to single out the effects of individual political institutions such as electoral systems 
and state structures. By neglecting the relevance of institutional combinations, i.e. 
failing to ask how the effects of political institutions might vary depending on the 
manner in which they are combined with each other, the analysis of institutional 
incentives for violent ethnic conflict has remained one-dimensional in scope. This 
one-dimensionality of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence is 
based on the implicit assumption that political institutions can be treated as separate 
entities and that it is only of secondary relevance of which broader set of institutions 
they form part. This is not to say that scholars within the institutional incentives to 
ethnic violence have tended to focus just on one institution in their analyses; 
however, even if they take the relevance of a variety of institutions into account, they 
typically treat them as a list of individual institutions instead of asking how important 
it is that particular institutions are combined in a certain way (see section 1.6.). 
 
The one-dimensionality of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence is 
particularly surprising, as there are several studies outside of this approach (i.e. 
which do not deal with questions of ethnopolitical (in)stability) that have already 
highlighted the relevance of interaction effects between different political 
institutions. Granted, these studies still represent an overall comparatively small 
because newly emerging area of research, as up to the mid-1990s institutional 
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debates in general focused mainly on individual institutions (such as forms of 
government) and restricted themselves to pairwise comparisons of their subtypes 
(such as parliamentarism versus presidentialism) (Tsebelis 1995). But nonetheless, 
analyses by authors such as Tsebelis (1995), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a), 
Lijphart (1999) and Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) have provided important 
insights regarding the fact that the effects of political institutions do not occur as 
isolated phenomena, but necessarily depend on the broader set of political 
institutions that are joint within a political system. 
 
Tsebelis (1995) was among the first scholars who highlighted the need to analyse not 
just single, formal political institutions, but to examine the effects of specific 
institutional combinations: In order to assess the impact of veto players on a political 
system’s capacity to produce policy change, Tsebelis (1995) determines the number 
of veto players by looking at entire sets of political institutions, i.e. by asking inter 
alia which form of government and state structure are combined with each other in a 
given political system.  
 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a) highlight the interaction effects between 
presidentialism and the type of electoral system used for congressional and 
presidential elections. According to these authors, variations in the performance of 
presidentialism are best understood by examining the institutional arrangement of 
form of government and electoral system combined, as electoral rules and sequences 
affect the number of parties and the nature of party discipline which in turn condition 
executive-legislative relations.  
 
Also Lijphart’s (1999) ‘Patterns of Democracy’ illustrates that institutional 
combinations matter and that political institutions should not be treated as discrete, 
separable entities. In this analysis, Lijphart distinguishes between the consensus and 
majoritarian model of democracy, and contrasts these models using ten variables on 
two different dimensions.
52
 Examining altogether 36 democracies between 1945 and 
                                                 
52 The first dimension is the executives-parties dimension which includes five variables on the 
arrangement of executive power, the party and electoral system, and interest groups: concentration 
of executive power in cabinets, executive-legislative relations, type of party system, type of 
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1996, he demonstrates statistically significant correlations among certain variables 
along these two dimensions – hence highlighting the relevance of institutional 
combinations – and analyses the combined effects of the consensus and majoritarian 
model of democracy on macro-economic management, control of violence and 
democratic quality (measured inter alia through accountability and electoral 
participation).  
 
Finally, Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) explicitly acknowledge that levels of 
corruption are not just influenced by individual political institutions, but by the 
broader set of institutions that are joint within a political system. Specifically, 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman argue that the combination of presidentialism and a 
PR electoral system for the legislature might be especially detrimental, as it 
‘produce[s] a particularly corruption-prone political system.’ (Kunicová and Rose-
Ackerman 2005:594) 
 
The aforementioned studies by Tsebelis, Mainwaring and Shugart, Lijphart, and 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman highlight that it is not just of secondary but in fact of 
crucial relevance how different political institutions are combined with each other in 
a given political system. By moving beyond pairwise comparisons of individual 
political institutions, these authors challenge the notion that political institutions can 
be treated as discrete, separable entities. Instead, they demonstrate how the analysis 
of specific institutional combinations can broaden our understanding about the 
impact of institutional design on political outcomes. This insight has yet to enter the 
research agenda of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence, as so far 
there is no well-known analysis which explicitly asks how important it is for the 
prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability that particular institutions are combined in a 
certain way. The first dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism addresses this 
gap within the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence by highlighting the 
likely effects of specific institutional combinations on the risk of ethnic civil war (see 
                                                                                                                                          
electoral system and interest group system. The second dimension (i.e. the federal-unitary 
dimension) contains five variables to distinguish federalism and unitary government. These 
variables include division of power between different levels of government, concentration of 
legislative power, flexibility of constitutions, judicial review and dependency of central banks 
(Lijphart 1999).  
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also section 1.2.). To illustrate the relevance of the first dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism, I use the following assumptions: 
 
According to the grievance-based explanation of violent ethnic conflict outlined in 
chapter 2, we can assume that the lower the number of possible political winners 
provided by a given institutional combination, the more likely it is that this 
combination will increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. Put differently, we 
can assume that the lower the level of political inclusiveness provided by a specific 
combination of form of government, electoral system for the legislature and state 
structure, the more likely it is that this combination will heighten the prospects of 
large-scale ethnic violence. This is because political institutions which are associated 
with low levels of political inclusiveness can be expected to contribute to perceived 
or objective asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms of their political as well as 
socioeconomic standing, and to give rise to emotions of anger and resentment among 
those ethnic groups who consider their chances to obtain the values of political 
representation to be comparatively low (see also section 2.4.). In this context, there is 
no reason to believe that the apparent link between ethnic civil wars and levels of 
political inclusiveness (see section 2.2.) should only hold for individual institutions 
such as electoral systems or state structures when analysed as discrete, separable 
entities. Instead, following previous research into the relevance of institutional 
combinations (see Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Lijphart 1999; Mainwaring 
and Shugart 1997a; Tsebelis 1995), we can assume that it is the level of political 
inclusiveness provided by the combination of different institutions in a given 
political system, and not just by individual political institutions treated in isolation, 
that influences the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability.  
 
Building on the arguments outlined in sections 3.4. to 3.6., and using the 
categorisation of different forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature 
and state structures presented in Table 1, we therefore can assume that in particular 
the combination of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system 
for the legislature and unitary state structure is likely to heighten the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence. This is because this particular combination of political 
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institutions provides the lowest overall number of possible political winners 
compared to any other combination of presidential, parliamentary or mixed form of 
government, majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral system for the legislature, 
and unitary, federal or mixed state structure (cf. Table 1). Political systems which 
include a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure thus systematically reduce the number of ethnic 
groups who can obtain the values of political representation outlined in chapter 2, 
compared to any other possible combination of the different forms of government, 
electoral systems for the legislature and state structures listed in Table 1. 
 
At first glance, this argument about the relevance of institutional combinations for 
the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (due to their impact on the overall number 
of possible political winners within a political system) might sound deceivingly 
simplistic. Yet, as there is currently no well-known study which explicitly asks how 
relevant it is for the risk of violent ethnic conflict that particular institutions are 
combined in a certain way, this thesis proposes a relevant, new research agenda to 
overcome the one-dimensionality of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence.
53
   
 
 
                                                 
53
  As becomes evident in the preceding paragraphs, my expectations regarding the likely impact of 
specific institutional combinations on the risk of ethnic civil war are based on the (implicit) 
assumption that forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state structures are 
of equal relevance in their impact on the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. Unlike authors 
such as Horowitz (2002), Lijphart (2004) or Reilly (2001) who describe in particular electoral 
systems for the legislature as key institutional choice in ethnically diverse societies, I thus 
intentionally abstain from presenting certain political institutions as being more important than 
others. Instead, I assume that forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state 
structures each provide distinct political gains for which there is no clear rank order in terms of 
their relevance.  Specifically, forms of government influence the chances for ethnic groups to hold 
executive power and thus to have a say over the articulation and implementation of national 
policies (Shugart and Carey 1992). Electoral systems for the legislature affect the chances for 
ethnic group representatives to hold executive power specifically under parliamentary forms of 
government (see e.g. Horowitz 1991), and – more importantly – serve as a key indicator of the 
representativeness of any political system, whatever form of government it may have (cf. Shugart 
and Carey 1992; Norris 1997; see also section 3.5.). State structures determine the amount of 
vertical power-sharing in a political system and the degree to which the competition for control 
over the central government ‘has nationally comprehensive consequences.’ (Cohen 1997:610) As 
there is no plausible reason to argue that some of these institutions should be inherently more 
important than others, I do not rank them in terms of their relevance when considering them either 
on their own or as part of a specific institutional arrangement. 
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3.8. Conclusion: Why Institutional Combinations Matter 
 
Hitherto, the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence has remained one-
dimensional in scope, as there is currently no well-known study which explicitly asks 
how important it is for the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability that particular 
institutions are combined in a certain way. I seek to overcome this apparent gap in 
the academic debate through the presentation of the first dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism, i.e. by highlighting the relevance of institutional 
combinations for the risk of large-scale ethnic violence.  
 
Building on the grievance-based explanation of violent ethnic conflict outlined in 
chapter 2, the central argument presented in this chapter states that the lower the 
number of possible political winners provided by a given institutional combination, 
the more likely it is that this combination will increase the risk of ethnic violence 
(section 3.7.). Hence, from all possible combinations of the formal political 
institutions presented in sections 3.4. to 3.6., in particular the combination of a 
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure is expected to heighten the prospects of ethnopolitical 
instability, as it provides the lowest overall number of possible political winners. 
This particular institutional combination thus systematically reduces the number of 
ethnic groups who can obtain the values of political representation outlined in 
chapter 2, compared to any other combination of the forms of government, electoral 
systems for the legislature and state structures included in this analysis. This can be 
expected to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence, as political institutions 
that provide low levels of political inclusiveness arguably contribute to perceived or 
real asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms of their political and socioeconomic 
standing, and therefore can be the source of a variety of social, political or economic 
grievances (see chapter 2).  
 
The main aim of the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism as 
presented in this chapter is thus to highlight the need for scholars belonging to the 
institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence to pay greater attention to the 
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specific combination of formal political institutions in a given political system and 
the overall number of possible political winners it provides. The following chapter 
will outline the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism by illustrating 
the relevance of informal political institutions for the prospects of ethnopolitical 
(in)stability. It will do so by using corruption as a prime example of an informal 
political institution that can be expected to affect the prospects of ethnopolitical 
(in)stability (see also section 1.7.).   
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Chapter 4: Corruption and the Risk of Ethnic Civil War 
 
4.1. Introduction: The Second Dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
Research on the relationships between institutional design and the prospects of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability hitherto has tended to favour the study of formal political 
institutions over that of informal ones (see section 1.7.). In response to this 
pronounced research asymmetry within the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence, this chapter presents the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism which highlights the relevance of non-codified institutions for the 
risk of ethnic civil war. In contrast to chapter 3, the following sections thus deal 
exclusively with structures of political interactions that are neither laid down in 
writing nor guaranteed by the sanctioning mechanisms of the state, but which endure 
over time due to persisting patterns in human behaviour (Lauth 2000; see also section 
1.3.). Specifically, this chapter focuses on corruption as a prime example of an 
informal political institution that arguably affects the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence. 
 
My central argument in this chapter states that networks of corruption – given their 
tendency to form along ethnic lines and benefit certain ethnic groups over others – 
are likely to affect the modus operandi of formal political institutions in such a way 
that those ethnic groups who stand outside of these networks have comparatively low 
chances to obtain the values of political representation outlined in chapter 2. This is 
likely to give rise to grievances among those ethnic groups who stand outside of 
ethnically exclusionary networks of corruption, and to increase the risk of large-scale 
ethnic violence. To illustrate the relevance of this argument and present the second 
dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, the following sections will 
 
 highlight the role of informal political institutions for the risk of ethnic 
violence (section 4.2.); 
 define corruption (section 4.3.) and illustrate its apparent relevance for the 
prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (section 4.4.); 
 present the main assumptions that underlie this chapter (section 4.5.); 
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 outline the ethnically exclusionary tendencies of corruption (section 4.6.); and 
 describe the expected impact of corruption on the risk of ethnic civil war, 
using the grievance-based explanation of violent ethnic conflict presented in 
chapter 2 (section 4.7.). 
 Section 4.8. will conclude this chapter by summarising its central points.  
 
 
4.2. Informal Political Institutions and the Risk of Ethnic Violence 
 
The mere focus on formal political institutions when trying to understand 
institutional incentives for large-scale ethnic violence is too narrow for two key 
reasons (see section 1.7.): a) because political institutions need not be openly 
codified in order to affect the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability, but can 
themselves be socially embedded entities (see e.g. Lijphart 1977, 1996; Sisk and 
Stefes 2005; Varshney 2001, 2002); and b) because there are often significant 
interaction effects between formal and informal political institutions.  
 
Following on the latter point, and as will be outlined in more detail in section 4.7., 
informal political institutions such as corruption do not change the actual form of 
formal political institutions (Lauth 2000). For instance, unless there is an actual 
constitutional change, a presidential form of government remains codified as a 
presidential form of government, no matter how high the levels of corruption within 
a given country. However, informal political institutions can affect the modus 
operandi of formal political institutions by penetrating them and creating an 
alternative set of rules and structures that shape the behaviour of political actors and 
open up sources of influence beyond the formal competences of political office (cf. 
ibid.).  
 
At first glance, this could be seen as something positive in the sense that informal 
political institutions may offer alternative forms of political influence to ethnic 
groups who feel disadvantaged by the design of formal political institutions, e.g. if a 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature (Norris 2002) or a presidential form 
of government lower the chances for their representatives to hold political office 
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(Linz 1990a). However, a closer look at corruption as a prime example of an 
informal political institution reveals that its risks for the prospects of ethnopolitical 
stability are much higher than its potential merits:
54
 Due to its tendency to form 
along ethnic lines and benefit
55
 some ethnic groups over others (see section 4.6.), 
corruption is likely to contribute to perceived or real asymmetries between ethnic 
groups in terms of their political and socioeconomic standing, and thus to increase 
rather than reduce the risk of large-scale ethnic violence (see section 4.7.).  
 
It is precisely for this reason (i.e. its tendency to form along ethnic lines and benefit 
certain ethnic groups over others) why I have chosen corruption as a prime example 
of an informal political institution in this analysis. As will be elaborated in more 
detail in section 4.7., I identify four possible scenarios in which networks of 
corruption may affect the modus operandi of formal political institutions in an 
ethnically exclusionary manner: by creating direct incentives for political 
officeholders (e.g. through bribery or the sustenance of patronage networks) to 
manipulate the political decision-making process in favour of specific ethnic groups; 
by biasing the political decision-making agenda; by leading to a culture of selfish 
value-accumulation; and by undermining the quality or prospects of democracy. All 
four scenarios clearly violate the ideal of representational justice (Wimmer 2002) and 
result in some ethnic groups having greater influence over the political decision-
making process than others. In this manner, socially entrenched practices of 
corruption systematically reduce the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the 
values of political representation outlined in chapter 2, thus contribute to the 
aforementioned perceived or objective asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms 
of their political and socioeconomic standing, and arguably give rise to emotions of 
                                                 
54
  Of course, this is far from saying that all informal political institutions are likely to increase the risk 
of large-scale ethnic violence. For instance, certain types of civil society structures might improve 
the prospects of ethnopolitical stability (Varshney 2001, 2002; see also section 1.7.). It is thus 
important to emphasise that my arguments here deal specifically with corruption and should not be 
generalised for all types of non-codified institution. 
55 ‘Benefits of corruption’ here do not merely refer to the immediate status, financial or other material 
gains from corrupt dealings to which especially greed-based explanations of intrastate violence 
might wish to pay closer attention. Instead, the gains from corruption on which I focus in 
particular are the more profound, structural benefits for ethnic groups who can obtain the values of 
political representation outlined in chapter 2, i.e. benefits in terms of their political recognition, 
likely influence over the distribution of resources and powers, and perceptions of political, 
economic and physical security (see also section 4.7.). 
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anger and resentment among those ethnic groups who consider their chances to 
obtain the values of political representation to be comparatively low. These 
grievances in turn are expected to increase the risk of ethnic violence.  
 
Before elaborating the likely impact of corruption on the risk of ethnic violence in 
more detail, it is necessary to define clearly what ‘corruption’ actually means. 
 
 
4.3. Defining Corruption 
 
Any study dealing with the issue of corruption needs to begin by considering two 
closely related problems: how to define corruption and how to measure it. At the 
bottom of both problems stands the fact that corruption is an inherently context- and 
perception-dependent phenomenon. Referring to the old question of the tree falling 
in the forest, this is not to say that it only makes a sound if someone is around to hear 
it, i.e. corruption can and does exist even if people do not know about it. Rather, 
corruption depends upon people’s perceptions and their generational and cultural 
context in the sense that what might be identified as corruption in one cultural circle 
or at a specific point in time, need not be perceived as such in another (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999; Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002).
56
  
 
On the one hand, this implies that any definition of corruption bears an inherent 
danger of containing not only normative but also ethno-centric connotations (ibid.; 
Nye 1967). On the other, this also contributes to the problem of how to measure 
corruption: Since corruption is an informal practice that is largely hidden from public 
view and where there are few incentives for its participants to be open about their 
dealings (Galtung 2006), hard data about the precise extent of corrupt practices 
within any given country are very difficult to come by.  
 
                                                 
56 My aim in this thesis is to identify general trends regarding the impact of corruption on the 
prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability using large-N analysis (see chapters 5 and 6). Although I 
am fully aware that the precise definitions as well as forms and effects of corrupt practices are 
highly context-dependent (see e.g. Williams 1999), it therefore is a methodological issue rather 
than a shortcoming of my general research agenda that I cannot take further account of country-
specific nuances in the definition or measurement of corrupt practices. 
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Problems regarding the measurement of corruption and the use of so-called 
subjective data in this analysis (i.e. the International Country Risk Guide’s [ICRG] 
Corruption Index that is based on the subjective assessment of country experts) will 
be discussed in more detail in section 5.7.. It is, however, worth highlighting at this 
point that the difficulties one encounters when trying to define and measure 
corruption are nothing extraordinary in the social sciences, as concepts such as 
‘class’, ‘democracy’ or indeed ‘ethnic conflict’ are similarly contested in their 
meaning and possible operationalisation for quantitative research. It is thus important 
to be aware that – by asking for the effects of corruption on the risk of ethnic 
violence – one is dealing with two famously ambiguous concepts at the same time. 
However, as it would go beyond the scope of this thesis – and possibly of any single 
analysis – to overcome the contested definitions and measurements of ‘corruption’ 
and ‘ethnic violence’, these ambiguities have to be accepted as an unavoidable aspect 
of the academic debate.   
 
Leaving the aforementioned issues of context- and perception-dependence aside, I 
rely on the commonly used (even though admittedly rather broad) definition of 
corruption as the misuse of public authority for private gain (e.g. Gillespie and 
Okruhlik 1991). Issues such as whether corrupt practices are organised or 
disorganised, predictable or unpredictable (Kaufmann 1998), or to which degree 
corrupt dealings benefit an officeholder either personally as a private individual or in 
her capacity as a public official (Philp 2002; Thompson 1995) are of little relevance 
for the purpose of this thesis and will hence not be considered any further.  
 
The use of a rather broad definition of corruption on the one hand has the advantage 
of what Sartori (1970, 1984) describes as the benefits of a relatively high location on 
the ladder of abstraction, namely that it avoids conceptual stretching and allows to 
analyse a greater number of cases than if a more detailed and hence more restrictive 
conceptualisation was used (see also Sartori 1970 cited in Collier and Levitsky 
1997). On the other hand, however, such a relatively high location on the ladder of 
abstraction does not tell us anything about further specifications regarding the 
participants in corrupt dealings, their determinants, the goods involved and the level 
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on which corruption takes place within a political system. Since the corruption 
literature has provided numerous and partly very detailed typologies of corrupt 
practices over the decades, it therefore needs to be highlighted briefly how – by 
reference to the broad definition of corruption as the misuse of public authority for 
private gain – I address the aforementioned specifications within this analysis: 
 
First, the most frequently investigated type of corruption is that involving public 
officials (Gardiner 1993). However, corrupt practices can equally take place between 
people of whom no one holds a public office, such as when a sales representative 
offers an extra payment to a prospective buyer if their product is selected (ibid.) or if 
a representative of the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) 
accepts money from (people posing as) private businessmen for helping a particular 
country’s bid to host the 2018 World Cup (BBC Online 2010a). These types of 
business or, more generally, non-public-official-centred corruption are not 
considered in this analysis, as they are neither theoretically relevant for the 
arguments outlined below nor are they measured by the ICRG Corruption Index used 
in the statistical part of this thesis (see also section 5.7.). 
 
Second, when defining corruption as the misuse of public authority for private gain, 
the question arises how to determine whether a public official has indeed misused her 
authority. According to Gardiner (1993), the three sources of criteria to define 
standards of official integrity are legal (i.e. has the public official violated the legal 
codes regulating her behaviour in office),
57
 public-interest-centred (i.e. has the public 
official harmed the public interest) and public-opinion-centred (i.e. how the people 
within a given country define corrupt behaviour, possibly in contrast to their laws).
58
 
                                                 
57
 When talking about legal standards, it is worth noting that even though corruption might go hand 
in hand with other criminal offences such as fraud and money laundering, or might even be part of 
organised crime, they nonetheless should be seen as distinct phenomena: Corruption, as 
understood in this analysis, by definition centres on public officials, whereas fraud, money 
laundering and organised crime can but by no means have to involve public officeholders 
(Gardiner 1993). Put differently, and as stated earlier in this section, corruption necessarily 
involves the (mis)use of public power, while the other types of criminal offence do not (Jain 
2001). 
58
  As Gardiner (1993) and other authors such as Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991) acknowledge, these 
are commonly used but not necessarily ideal standards, as they all lend themselves to further 
questions that are not easily answered, such as how to define ‘the public interest’ or how to deal 
with a possible incongruence between legal codes and societal norms. Precisely because these are 
Chapter 4 – Corruption and the Risk of Ethnic Civil War 
 117 
Guided by the choice of the ICRG corruption data (see also section 5.7.), I  rely on a 
conception of ‘misuse of public authority’ and, conversely, official integrity which 
does not fit neatly into any of the categories outlined by Gardiner (1993). Instead, the 
expert analyses on which the country ratings of the ICRG Corruption Index are based 
assess the extent of illegal activities (Akçay 2006) such as ‘demands for special 
payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, … tax assessments, 
[or] police protection’ (The PRS Group, Inc. 2010) as well as the prevalence of more 
ambiguous behaviour such as ‘suspiciously close ties between politics and business.’ 
(The PRS Group, Inc. 2010) They – and, by extension, this thesis – thus use a 
definition of official integrity which mixes legal standards and subjective 
judgements. 
 
Third, corrupt dealings can be distinguished according to the goods involved, both in 
terms of the type of private gain for the corrupt official, and the ‘good’ or ‘service’ 
corrupt officials might provide (if any) in exchange for such gains. To elaborate this 
point further, it is useful to take a step back and consider Nye’s (1967) famous 
distinction of corrupt behaviour into ‘bribery (use of a reward to pervert the 
judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by 
reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).’ (ibid.:419)59 These 
types of corrupt dealings can differ substantially regarding the ‘service’ or ‘good’ a 
corrupt official might provide in exchange for a private gain, ranging e.g. from no 
service or good at all in case she merely embezzles public funds (i.e. misappropriates 
them for her own benefit), through legislative favours in exchange for a bribe, to 
nepotist job reservations. At the same time, the ‘private gains’ public officials make 
out of corruption need not be pecuniary but can also relate for instance to the status 
of the public official, such as by securing political support through patronage (Nye 
                                                                                                                                          
difficult-to-answer questions that are of little relevance for my actual research topic, I do not 
consider them any further.  
59
  This list easily could be expanded by adding further categories such as special interest capture that 
is neither bribe- nor nepotism-based (i.e. where some groups might use other unusual forms of 
influence over policy-makers to receive preferential treatment), or by identifying more precise 
subcategories such as vote-buying (i.e. a special interest group trying to influence the voting 
behaviour of legislators in order to enact certain legislation) as a special form of bribery (cf. 
Gardiner 1993; Jain 2001). 
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1967; Stokes 2007). These private gains do not have to go, so to speak, right into the 
corrupt official’s pocket either, but might equally be used to benefit for instance the 
official’s family, close private clique or political party (Nye 1967; Gardiner 1993). 
Again guided by the choice of the ICRG Corruption Index which does not 
distinguish between different types of corrupt dealings nor between different gains 
for corrupt officials, these nuances regarding corrupt practices and the precise goods 
involved cannot be considered any further. Instead, they are all subsumed indistinctly 
under the general heading of ‘corruption’.  
 
Finally, corrupt dealings can be distinguished according to the level on which 
corruption takes place within a political system, both in terms of the rank of the 
public official and, closely related to this, the size of the private gains involved. The 
two categories commonly used for this distinction are ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption. 
In the latter type of corrupt practices, high government officials make major gains, 
while the former involves smaller gains for low-level officials (Goldsmith 1999; 
Lambsdorff 2005).
60
 Contrary to the example given by Caiden (2007), ‘petty’ 
thereby should not be equated with ‘trivial’, and ‘large’ (or ‘grand’) with ‘disruptive’ 
corruption (ibid.:78), since (depending on their prevalence) both petty and grand 
corruption can have considerable negative effects on a country’s economic and 
political performance (Doig and Riley 1998; Lambsdorff 2005). For this reason, I 
focus on the overall extent of corruption within a political system which includes, 
without further distinction, both petty and grand forms of corrupt dealings. This 
tallies yet again with the choice of data in the statistical part of this analysis, as the 
ICRG Corruption Index does not differentiate between petty and grand corruption 
either, but provides an assessment of the overall extent of corruption within a given 
political system, i.e. among high government officials as well as throughout lower 
levels of government (Gatti 2004; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; The PRS Group, Inc. 
2010).   
 
                                                 
60
 Interestingly enough, there is no standard threshold (regarding the size of gains or precise rank of 
officials involved) to distinguish petty from grand corruption. This might be not least due to the 
aforementioned difficulty to obtain hard data about corrupt dealings and hence to devise a 
meaningful classification scheme. 
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In sum, my use of the term ‘corruption’ as ‘the misuse of public authority for private 
gain’ thus by definition excludes all types of non-public-official-centred corruption; 
relies on a conception of official integrity  that is based on both legal standards and 
subjective assessments; subsumes a variety of practices under the general heading of 
corruption, including for instance bribery, patronage and nepotism, no matter what 
type of private gains the corrupt official makes or what type of ‘good’ or ‘service’ 
she promises in exchange (if any); and includes both petty and grand corruption. All 
these specifications are in line with the description of the ICRG Corruption Index 
used in the statistical part of this thesis (see also section 5.7.).  
 
On the basis of this definitional groundwork, we can illustrate the apparent relevance 
of corruption for the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability with reference to some 
brief country examples.   
  
 
4.4. Why Corruption Matters  
 
A vast majority of the literature on the effects of corruption hitherto has focused on 
the impact of corrupt practices on economic and political performance indicators, 
specifically in terms of economic growth and the quality or prospects of democracy 
(see e.g. Bertrand 2004; Huntington 1968; Leff 1964; Mauro 1995; Méndez and 
Sepúlveda 2006; Seligson 2002). Only in recent years, an increasing number of 
analyses has begun to ask for the impact of corruption also on the prospects of armed 
conflict and sustainable peace (see e.g. Cheng and Zaum 2008; Galtung and Tisné 
2009; Le Billon 2003; Philp 2008). To be clear, many seminal texts on the causes of 
violent intrastate conflict have alluded to the relevance of corruption before (to name 
a few: Brass 1997; Brown 1996; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 
2003a). It is, however, a fairly recent development that the effects of corrupt 
practices are put at the centre of civil war or peace studies, and dealt with in a more 
systematic fashion (cf. Fjelde 2009; Philp 2008).  
 
The fact that corruption has only recently gained more systematic attention as a 
possible explanatory factor for the risk of intrastate violence is surprising, as there 
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are numerous country examples which seem to provide at least tentative evidence for 
the apparent relevance of corrupt dealings. For instance, the brief country reference 
to Burundi in section 2.4. has alluded to the negative impact of corruption on levels 
of political inclusiveness and hence the prospects of ethnopolitical stability: Here, 
Tutsi representatives (particularly those of the South) had been able to use socially 
entrenched networks of clientelism and patronage to undermine the political and 
economic standing of the Hutus (Ndikumana 1998). The Tutsi elite had effectively 
captured the state well into the 1990s by privatising certain aspects of public life, 
thereby bypassing official processes of political representation and creating an 
asymmetric access to political power (see ibid.). In this manner, persistent patterns of 
clientelism and patronage – which can be subsumed, among other things, under the 
term ‘corruption’ (see section 4.3.) – contributed to the political exclusion of the 
Hutus (Ndikumana 1998), and illustrate the potential relevance of corruption for the 
representation of different groups’ interests in the political decision-making process. 
A brief reference to Afghanistan and Nigeria similarly helps to illustrate how, under 
partly very different political, economic and social circumstances, networks of 
corruption have formed along ethnic lines and exercised relevant influence on the 
prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability:  
 
No matter how much this perception might need to be qualified (see Smith 2007), 
Nigeria is frequently associated with a ‘pandemic’ (Erero and Oladoyin 2000:280) of 
corruption which has affected all spheres of society and become increasingly 
institutionalised over the years (ibid.). The tendency of networks of corruption to 
form along ethnic lines and benefit some ethnic groups over others thereby can be 
traced back at least to colonial times (see Falola 1998). By 1966, six years after 
Nigeria’s independence, corruption was rampant (Spalding 2000), with the spoils of 
corrupt dealings clearly being distributed among ethnic lines, contributing to a fierce 
competition for state resources and the rise of interethnic tensions (Diamond 1988). 
In this strained environment, grievances among those ethnic groups who felt 
disadvantaged in their political and socioeconomic standing due to the ethnically 
exclusionary tendencies of corruption became a relevant motivating factor for the 
first, Eastern Ibo sponsored coup in January 1966 (see Clarno and Falola 1998) and 
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the subsequent outbreak of large-scale ethnic violence in the Biafran civil war (see 
ibid.). Likewise, corruption in the current Third Republic of Nigeria continues to fuel 
the grievance discourse among those ethnic groups who feel disadvantaged due to 
their lack of access to the gains from corruption (Smith 2007), and plays a relevant 
role in the political platform of ethnic militias in the Niger Delta (ICG 2006b). 
 
Compared to Nigeria, the role of ethnicity in corrupt dealings in Afghanistan seems 
to be more difficult to identify due to the fact that ideological, ethnic and economic 
cleavages in the Afghan society have become deeply intertwined (cf. Cramer and 
Goodhand 2002; Rubin 2007). Nonetheless, recent analyses on the political 
development of Afghanistan have begun to unveil the relevance of ethnically 
exclusionary networks of corruption since the country’s modern state-building 
efforts. According to these analyses, practices of ethnic favouritism in corrupt 
dealings in Afghanistan go back to at least the late 19
th
 century (Asian Development 
Bank et al. 2007) and seem to persist until this day thanks to their self-perpetuating 
momentum (ibid.; Goodhand 2008). Even though support for the Taliban nowadays 
and in the 1990s can be explained partly by their anti-corruption discourse 
(Goodhand 2008), ‘there are no signs that corruption did not exist under the Taliban 
as patron-client relationships continued to exist throughout the country’ (IWA 
2007:21) and which, due to widespread ethnic discrimination (ibid.), are likely to 
have benefited some ethnic groups over others. Also in contemporary Afghanistan, 
following the US-led intervention in 2001, there seems to be a tendency that the 
gains of corruption – both in terms of immediate financial and status gains, as well as 
the more profound structural benefits on which I focus in this analysis (see sections 
2.5. to 2.7.; see also footnote 55) – are distributed along ethnic lines (cf. ibid.; Asian 
Development Bank et al. 2007). As Cramer and Goodhand (2002) highlight, the 
ethnic favouritism entrenched in corrupt dealings in Afghanistan thereby has 
contributed to ‘a growing sense of grievance’ (ibid.:900) which, following the 
theoretical assumptions outlined in section 4.7., is likely to have increased the odds 
of the country’s violent conflict between ethnic Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaris 
since 1992 (PITF 2009).  
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Admittedly, since all ethnic conflicts are multicausal phenomena, the origins of 
large-scale intrastate violence in Burundi, Nigeria and Afghanistan in reality are 
likely to be much more complex than could be presented above. For instance, the 
aforementioned country examples did not mention the relevance of international 
influences in Afghanistan (see e.g. Rubin 2007) or the role of political agency in 
Nigeria’s conflict history (see e.g. Diamond 1988). However, although I fully 
acknowledge that there are a number of additional factors which might have 
influenced the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability in my country examples, I do 
not consider them any further, as I attach greater importance to corruption as a 
possible explanatory factor for the risk of ethnic violence. This is because I expect 
corruption to be a particularly relevant source of grievances that might translate into 
violent action, due to its impact on the modus operandi of formal political 
institutions and hence the levels of political inclusiveness in any given society (see 
also sections 4.2. and 4.7.).  
 
 
4.5. The Theoretical Underpinnings of this Chapter 
 
To explain the relevance of corruption for the prospects of ethnopolitical 
(in)stability, one could either use a greed- or grievance-based explanation of large-
scale ethnic violence.
61
 For instance, as illustrated by Le Billon (2003), corruption 
fits the grievance perspective of violent intrastate conflict insofar as one could argue 
that the negative impact of corrupt dealings on a country’s economic performance, 
levels of equality and government legitimacy might cause socioeconomic and 
political grievances that can translate into armed conflict (see ibid.). On the other 
hand, one could also use corruption as element of a greed-based explanation of 
intrastate violence, as, under relatively high levels of corruption, state resources 
might be perceived as a ‘lootable commodity’ by self-interested economic agents 
(see ibid.): If these self-interested economic agents currently control lucrative corrupt 
channels, they might be willing to defend them with violent means against potential 
threats, or – if they do not currently control corrupt channels – they might try to 
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  See sections 2.2. and 2.3. for a brief summary of the greed and grievance perspectives. 
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capture the state in order to enrich themselves and the group they belong to (see 
ibid.).
62
 Finally, one could also argue that ‘grievances among marginalized groups 
and greed-driven jockeying within dominant ones’ (Le Billon 2003:417) are two 
sides of the same coin, as the potential grievances among those ethnic groups who do 
not benefit from the spoils of corruption, and the self-interested attempts by political 
powerholders to secure control over corrupt channels are inextricably linked 
phenomena (cf. ibid.; North et al. 2007).
63
  
 
However, in addition to the more general theoretical limitations of greed-based 
models of violent intrastate conflict (see section 2.3.), there are two more key reasons 
why I do not consider the role of greed factors any further when trying to explain the  
causal link between corruption and the risk of large-scale ethnic violence: First, as 
becomes evident in the aforementioned summary of greed-based arguments 
according to Le Billon (2003), greed-based explanations of violent intrastate conflict 
primarily focus on the motivations of self-interested economic agents. This research 
focus is ultimately too narrow, as it overemphasises the role of a select set of 
political actors (i.e. those actors controlling or seeking to control corrupt channels), 
while neglecting the relevance of the wider, structural effects of corruption on the 
modus operandi of formal political institutions. Second, the argument that ethnic 
contenders are primarily driven by economic self-interest is also too limited: As has 
been highlighted in chapter 2, ethnic groups might equally seek political recognition 
                                                 
62
 It is worth pointing out that Le Billon (2003) implicitly refers to early versions of the greed 
argument which have focused on ‘greed’ literally in the sense of the self-enrichment, profiteering 
and rapacity of rebel groups (Aspinall 2007; see also section 2.3.), rather than later versions which 
have paid more attention to questions of feasibility and opportunity for insurgent movements 
(ibid.). 
63
 There are at least three key weaknesses in Le Billon’s (2003) analysis which ought to be 
highlighted briefly at this point: First, Le Billon goes into hardly any detail regarding the causal 
assumptions on which greed- and grievance-based explanations of intrastate violence are based, 
and – as he does not establish explicit links between his own work and seminal arguments put 
forth e.g. by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) or Gurr (2000) – does little to locate his analysis 
within the broader greed versus grievance debate. Second, Le Billon concentrates on the role of 
corruption in armed conflicts more generally, and thus fails to identify ethnic civil wars as a 
distinct type of intrastate violence (see also section 1.3.). Third, Le Billon fails to highlight the 
ethnically exclusionary tendencies of corruption and its impact on the modus operandi of formal 
political institutions. My analysis overcomes these three weaknesses, as I clearly outline the causal 
assumptions of greed- and grievance-based arguments (see sections 2.2. and 2.3.), identify ethnic 
civil wars as a distinct type of intrastate violence (see section 1.3.) and highlight the ethnically 
exclusionary tendencies of corruption (see section 4.6.) as well as its interaction effects with 
formal political institutions (see section 4.7.).  
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(see section 2.5.), or political and physical security (see section 2.7.), and do not have 
to be purely driven by desires for self-enrichment. For these reasons, I prefer to focus 
on the relevance of grievance factors when analysing the (arguable) causal link 
between corruption and the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability, and do not 
consider greed-based explanations any further.  
 
Three further qualifications regarding this chapter’s analytical scope ought to be 
highlighted briefly at this point:  
 
First, despite my negative expectations regarding the impact of corruption on the 
prospects of ethnopolitical stability, I do not make any recommendations for concrete 
anti-corruption measures. This lack of recommendations is based on the 
acknowledgment that anti-corruption measures might in fact further heighten the risk 
of intrastate violence, if they are not carefully tailored to each country in which they 
are applied or if they threaten the economic and political interests of powerful groups 
and individuals (cf. Le Billon 2003; North et al. 2007). I therefore leave it to future 
research to investigate the feasibility of different anti-corruption strategies, and to 
assess how far they might or might not give rise to new types of grievances, different 
from the ones outlined in section 4.7., which could jeopardise the prospects of 
(ethno)political stability.    
 
Second, as mentioned in section 1.2., I am generally more interested in what Elster 
(1997) describes as the ‘downstream’ analysis of the effects of political institutions 
rather than the ‘upstream’ study of how they come into being. Hence, I do not 
address any further the plethora of possible factors that might influence the specific 
level of corruption in a given country.
64
 In this context, it is worth mentioning that, 
since the 1990s, the design of formal political institutions has received increased 
attention in the academic debate on the causes of corruption (see Treisman 1998). 
For instance, Persson and Tabellini (2003) famously argue that electoral systems 
with large districts and those with voting over individuals under plurality rule both 
reduce the prevalence of corrupt practices, as there are arguably fewer free-rider 
                                                 
64
   See e.g. Shaxson (2007) and Treisman (1998, 2000) for an overview of such factors. 
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problems when voters directly choose individual incumbents, and a greater choice set 
available to voters in large districts.
65
 Similarly, authors such as Heywood (1996) 
and Rose-Ackerman (1994) highlight the potential relevance of state structures for 
levels of corruption (see Treisman 1998). According to Heywood (1998), the 
establishment of multiple levels of government might increase the prevalence of 
corruption inter alia by offering opportunities for the development of new spoils 
systems. Following, on the other hand, Rose-Ackerman (1994), in particular federal 
state structures might help to reduce levels of corruption, inter alia thanks to 
additional levels of law enforcement agencies in federal states. In principle, it 
therefore might be interesting to ask for the possible causal links between levels of 
corruption and the formal political institutions presented in chapter 3. However, as 
this would lead me into the broader debate about possible causes of corrupt dealings, 
these questions simply go beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, they ought to be 
addressed in more detail in separate analyses.         
 
Finally, my arguments inevitably give rise to questions of possible reverse causality 
when considering that corruption might not only increase the risk of ethnic civil wars 
but that, conversely, the context of war might provide a fertile ground for corrupt 
dealings, e.g. through defence related contracts, licensed looting or wages of ghost 
soldiers (cf. Le Billon 2003). However, the relevance of such questions should not be 
overstated, as they need not weaken the arguments presented in this chapter: Even if 
the context of war might lead to rises in corruption, this does not preclude the 
argument that corruption, due to its ethnically exclusionary tendencies, can also give 
rise to grievances which are likely to increase the risk of violent ethnic conflict. In 
other words, while concerns about reverse causality are very common in the social 
sciences, they should not be seen as reason to dismiss certain research questions 
altogether, as all phenomena such as corruption, ethnic conflict, democratisation, 
socioeconomic inequalities or levels of economic development are simultaneously 
the consequence and, conversely, the cause of a variety of different factors. 
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 Persson and Tabellini (2003) acknowledge that these two effects tend to offset one another, as 
proportional electoral systems typically combine large districts with party-list ballots, while 
majoritarian electoral systems typically combine small districts with voting over individual 
candidates. Hence, there is no simple answer to the question whether majoritarian or proportional 
electoral systems are more conducive to lowering levels of corruption (ibid.). 
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Ultimately, concerns about possible endogeneity are thus a ‘non-issue’ in the sense 
that they might be unavoidable in the (quantitative) analysis of social science 
phenomena more generally. Instead, greater emphasis should be laid on the actual 
contributions of my arguments to the newly emerging debate about the impact of 
corruption on the risk of intrastate violence mentioned in section 4.4.. Specifically, 
my thesis contributes to this debate on three different levels: by asking for the effects 
of corruption on the risk of ethnic (as opposed to any other type of) civil war;
66
 by 
presenting new statistical evidence for the impact of corruption on the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence (see chapter 6); and by highlighting the ethnically exclusionary 
tendencies of corruption and its impact on the modus operandi of formal political 
institutions. The latter point, i.e. the ethnically exclusionary tendencies of corruption, 
will be outlined in more detail in the following section. 
 
 
4.6. The Ethnically Exclusionary Tendencies of Corruption 
 
According to authors such as Le Billon (2003) and Fjelde (2009), corruption, 
functioning as an informal channel of wealth distribution, can help to ‘buy peace’ 
(i.e. lower the risk of civil wars) by giving material rewards to otherwise antagonistic 
groups in exchange for their political acquiescence. The potentially stability-
enhancing effects of corruption thereby depend inter alia on how ‘politically savvy 
and economically benign’ (Le Billon 2003:424) the use of material inducements 
through corrupt channels is and whether it is based on ‘careful ethnic balancing’ 
(Fjelde 2009:203) and ‘”crosscutting” network[s] of clientelism’ (ibid.). 
 
While I do not wish to deny the potential merits of corruption altogether, I am 
nonetheless skeptical towards the ‘corruption buys peace’ argument, as it seems to be 
based on rather questionable assumptions. In particular, it seems to me that the 
examples of ethnically balanced networks of corruption used by Fjelde (2009) – in 
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  As of now, several analyses in the newly emerging debate about the impact of corruption on the 
risk of violent intrastate conflict either do not acknowledge the difference between ethnic and non-
ethnic civil wars, or fail to elaborate it sufficiently (see e.g. Fjelde 2009; Galtung and Tisné 2009; 
Le Billon 2003; Philp 2008).  
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oil-producing Cameroon and Gabon
67
 – are exceptions to the rule rather than 
common occurrences. Unfortunately, there is currently no quantitative data that 
would allow me to substantiate this claim by measuring and comparing the role of 
ethnic cleavages in corrupt dealings between countries and across time. However, 
there are numerous analyses which allude to the tendency of networks of corruption 
to form along ethnic lines and benefit some ethnic groups over others. For instance, 
Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997) find a significant and positive 
correlation between ethnolinguistic fractionalisation and corruption, which the 
former famously interprets as evidence that ‘bureaucrats may favor members of their 
same group.’ (Mauro 1995:693) Also Easterly (2001) (based on research by 
Svensson (1998)), Wimmer (2002) and Nye (1967) acknowledge the relevance of 
ethnic favouritism in corrupt dealings and anti-corruption policies respectively, while 
numerous case studies – such as on Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 2002), Iraq 
(Gillespie 2006), Burundi, Nigeria and Afghanistan (see section 4.4.) – further 
illustrate that ethnic group belonging plays an important role in the way how 
corruption is conducted and, more importantly, whom it benefits. On the whole, 
these analyses present convincing, systematic evidence that corruption tends to be 
ethnically exclusionary in nature, and that it rarely contains an element of ‘careful 
ethnic balancing’ (Fjelde 2009:203). 
 
In this context, particular emphasis needs to be put on the way in which my argument 
is phrased, i.e. that I refer to tendencies, not necessities, as I am cautious not to argue 
that corrupt dealings always contain an ethnic element. Put differently, the term 
‘ethnically exclusionary’ does not preclude the existence of corrupt dealings along 
non-ethnic lines or between members of different ethnic groups altogether. However, 
following Wimmer’s (1997, 2002) institutionalist approach to nationalism and ethnic 
politics, there are grounds to assume that, when ethnicity is a politically salient 
cleavage, it is likely that ethnic identities will become the central focal point of 
networks of corruption. Following Wimmer (1997, 2002), this is likely to be the case 
because there are strong incentives in the modern nation-state, when rulers ‘are no 
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  In this context, it might be worth pointing out that Fjelde’s (2009) analysis centres on the effects of 
corruption in oil-rich states, i.e. she focuses in particular on the use of oil rents through corrupt 
channels to ‘placate restive groups’ (Fjelde 2009:199). 
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longer legitimized by the principles of dynastic succession, God’s grace, or 
civilizational progress’ (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010:94), for political 
officeholders to gain legitimacy by favouring co-ethnics over others (ibid.). In this 
manner, ethnicity can ‘serve as a formidable instrument of social and political 
exclusion’ (Cederman and Girardin 2007:175), and might help to explain the 
arguable link between corruption and the risk of large-scale ethnic violence.
68
  
 
At the same time, it should be clarified that my assumption regarding the relevance 
of ethnic cleavages in corrupt dealings does not imply that all corruption is ultimately 
based on ethnic nepotism. Building on the definition of nepotism as the ‘propensity 
to favor kin over nonkin’ (van den Berghe 1987:18) – for instance by giving a 
position to a relative rather than a better-qualified applicant (Gardiner 1993) – the 
concept of ethnic nepotism is based on socio-biological conceptions of ethnicity 
according to which ‘ethnic groups can be perceived as extended kin groups … [who] 
tend to favour their group members over non-members because they are more related 
to their group members than to the remainder of the population.’ (Vanhanen 
1999:57) As mentioned in section 1.4., such primordialist understandings of ethnicity 
are highly problematic, not least due to their essentialist connotations about ‘the 
nature’ of ethnic group identities. Thus, even though nepotism is one of the practices 
subsumed under my definition of corruption in this analysis (see section 4.3.), 
corrupt dealings among members of the same ethnic group should not be reduced to 
an element of ‘kin’ in the sense of socio-biological relations. This tallies with the 
more constructivist understanding of ethnic group identities that underlies my 
analysis (see section 1.3.) as well as with the fact that the data used in the statistical 
part of this analysis do not allow us to distinguish nepotist from other types of 
corrupt dealings (see also section 4.3.). 
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  Due to the lack of quantitative data to measure and compare the role of ethnic cleavages in corrupt 
dealings between countries and across time, it is not possible to assess whether ethnically 
exclusionary networks of corruption are more likely to exist the more diverse or the more divided 
a society is. It might be reasonable to expect that ethnically exclusionary tendencies in corrupt 
dealings are particularly pronounced in deeply divided societies where ‘separate organizations … 
permeate and divide every aspect of society on the basis of identity.’ (Sisk 1996:15) However, due 
to the lack of data to test this expectation, I am confined to the admittedly rather broad claim that 
networks of corruption tend to form along ethnic lines and benefit some ethnic groups over others, 
no matter how diverse or divided a society is.  
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The tendency of networks of corruption to form along ethnic lines and benefit some 
ethnic groups over others, as outlined in this section, builds the premise for the 
following identification of four possible scenarios in which networks of corruption 
may affect the modus operandi of formal political institutions in an ethnically 
exclusionary manner (see section 4.7.). 
 
 
4.7. Corruption and the Risk of Ethnic Violence 
 
As mentioned in section 4.2., informal political institutions such as corruption do not 
change the actual form of formal political institutions, i.e. they do not alter the 
official terms in which formal political institutions have been codified (Lauth 2000). 
However, they can affect the manner in which formal political institutions operate, 
by penetrating them and creating an alternative set of rules and structures that shape 
the behavior of political actors and open up sources of influence beyond the formal 
competences of political office (cf. ibid.). Before describing the different scenarios in 
which corruption may influence the modus operandi of formal political institutions in 
an ethnically exclusionary manner, it is worth recalling the aim of the second 
dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism.  
 
As has been elaborated in more detail in section 1.7., a vast majority of studies 
within the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence has focused on the role 
of formal political institutions when seeking to understand the causes of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability. By largely neglecting the role of informal political 
institutions, i.e. by failing to acknowledge the relevance of non-codified structures of 
political interactions, the analysis of institutional incentives for violent ethnic conflict 
has followed the misconception that it is their materiality which allows political 
institutions to influence political outcomes (cf. Giddens 1984). Put differently, 
proponents of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence have largely 
neglected the new institutionalist insight that political interactions are not only 
shaped by openly codified institutions such as forms of government or electoral 
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systems, but also by norms, values and socially entrenched patterns of human 
behaviour (cf. Lecours 2005). 
 
In response to this pronounced research asymmetry in favour of formal political 
institutions, the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism highlights the 
relevance of corruption as a prime example of a socially embedded (i.e. informal) 
political institution. I expect corruption to affect the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence due to its impact on the manner in which formal political institutions 
operate (cf. Lauth 2000). There are four different scenarios in which corruption can 
affect the modus operandi of formal political institutions in an ethnically 
exclusionary manner: 
 
Corruption, first, has a direct impact on the modus operandi of formal political 
institutions if political officeholders are either bribed to manipulate the political 
decision-making process in favour of a specific ethnic group or do so in exchange for 
political support from their ethnic followers, i.e. in order to sustain networks of 
patronage. Ultimately, this can lead to a state capture-like situation where members 
of a specific ethnic group, through informal means (i.e. corrupt channels), have more 
forceful voice in the political decision-making process than others, as they are able to 
exercise more influence over the formulation of public policies than members of 
another ethnic group (cf. Ndikumana 1998). In this manner, high levels of corruption 
privatise certain aspects of public life, undermine official processes of political 
representation and create an asymmetric access to political power (see ibid.; see also 
Thompson 1993).   
 
Second, corruption can distort the political decision-making agenda not only through 
direct manipulation incentives for political officeholders such as bribes or patronage, 
but also because the necessary secrecy of corruption implies that those policy areas 
which offer better opportunities for secret dealings will gain disproportionate 
relevance (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). For instance, demands for secrecy might shift 
a country’s investment and policy-making priorities from valuable health and 
education projects into potentially useless defense and infrastructure ones, if the 
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latter promise to ease corrupt transactions (ibid.). Following the ethnically 
exclusionary tendencies of corruption outlined in section 4.6., political officeholders 
are likely to try to maximise gains for their own ethnic group. Therefore, the 
aforementioned distortions of the political decision-making agenda may result in the 
neglect especially of those policy areas which are of particular interest to ethnic 
groups that stand outside of ethnically exclusionary networks of corruption.  
 
Third, the secrecy, deceit and self-interested motives behind corruption are likely to 
undermine practices of consultation and consensus-building between political actors 
(see Chandler 2002). Consequently, political processes can become atomised in the 
sense that there is little concern among public officials and their ethnic supporters 
about the effects of their actions on other ethnic groups (cf. Easterly and Levine 
1997). Under these circumstances, members of those ethnic groups who have access 
to state resources and powers will try to maximise their benefits from corrupt 
dealings, possibly until they exhausted the pool of possible gains (ibid.), while 
neglecting the interests of all other ethnic groups (cf. Nyamnjoh 1999). This culture 
of selfish value-accumulation is likely to foster asymmetries between ethnic groups, 
not only because it might affect the political consideration of some ethnic groups 
more negatively than others, but also because it is likely to motivate if not even 
legitimise strives for state capture.  
 
Fourth, on the whole, corruption can be expected to have negative effects on the 
quality or prospects of democracy,
69
 because – ‘by breaking the logic of formal rules 
in various places’ (Lauth, 2000:35) – it inter alia undermines political and 
                                                 
69
  I will not test the impact of corruption on democracy and democratisation empirically, as it would 
require the collection and analysis of extensive data that are largely irrelevant for the main topic of 
this thesis. Instead, I refer to the findings by authors such as Lauth (2000), Seligson (2002) and 
Thompson (1993) which clearly support the negative effects of corrupt dealings on the quality of 
democracy. In this context, I also treat Bertrand’s (2004) argument with caution that corruption 
might be a potentially beneficial factor for democratisation if the public awareness of corruption 
contributes to the discontent with autocratic regimes and thus creates incentives among citizens to 
demand regime change (ibid.). Rather, I assume that the potential risks of corruption largely 
outweigh its potential benefits, as high levels of corruption – if they take lasting root during the 
transition process – might ultimately stifle democratisation and lead to the establishment of a 
hybrid regime rather than an institutionalised (i.e. consolidated liberal) democracy (cf. Huntington 
1968; Seligson 2002). On the basis of these arguments, I expect corruption to have a detrimental 
effect on both the quality and prospects of democracy.    
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administrative processes, and leads to an increasing lack of transparency and 
accountability (ibid.). This lack of transparency and accountability in turn implies 
that it is easier for some groups or individuals to monopolise state power to the 
detriment of others (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2003), and to use corrupt means to secure 
their own political survival (cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). 
 
All four scenarios clearly violate the ideal of representational justice (Wimmer 2002) 
as the state no longer responds equally to the interests of all its citizens, and thus 
lower the level of political inclusiveness in a given political system. In this manner, 
the impact of corruption on the modus operandi of formal political institutions 
systematically reduces the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of 
political representation outlined in chapter 2, and can be expected to contribute to 
perceived or real asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms of their political and 
socioeconomic standing (see also section 4.4.).  
 
Of particular concern in this context is the fact that the effects of corruption on the 
modus operandi of formal political institutions can gain self-perpetuating momentum 
in the sense that corruption might multiply its own negative effects through a vicious 
circle of corrupt dealings, government inefficiency and political pessimism (cf. Lauth 
2000; see Figure 4 for illustration): By creating a set of informal rules and structures 
that offer political influence beyond the formal competences of political office, 
corruption can hollow out the functions of formal political institutions to such a 
degree that people are likely to lose trust in the broader political process and develop 
more general concerns over the representativeness of their political system (cf. 
Chandler 2002). This negative impact of corruption on the functions of formal 
political institutions in turn can lead to a further rise in corrupt dealings, as citizens 
might (rightly or wrongly) assume that corrupt dealings have become the most 
effective way to obtain government services (see Lauth 2000). Once this vicious 
circle begins, the disparities between different ethnic groups regarding their chances 
to obtain the values of political representation are likely to intensify, and to further 
increase grievances among those ethnic groups who stand outside of ethnically 
exclusionary networks of corruption.  
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In sum, there are four possible scenarios in which networks of corruption may affect 
the modus operandi of formal political institutions in an ethnically exclusionary 
manner: by creating direct incentives for political officeholders (e.g. through bribery 
or the sustenance of patronage networks) to manipulate the political decision-making 
process in favour of specific ethnic groups; by biasing the political decision-making 
agenda; by leading to a culture of selfish value-accumulation; and by undermining 
the quality or prospects of democracy.
70
 As they unduly enhance the influence of 
certain ethnic groups over the political decision-making process (and possibly 
worsen that of others) through informal means, all four scenarious lower the level of 
political inclusiveness in a given political system. Following the grievance-based 
explanation of ethnic violence outlined in chapter 2, the level of political 
inclusiveness in a given political system directly affects the ability of the different 
ethnic groups in a given society to obtain the values of political representation, 
relating to their political recognition, likely influence over the distribution of 
resources and powers, and perceptions of political, economic and physical security 
(see sections 2.5. to 2.7.). Consequently, by lowering the level of political 
                                                 
70 
Due to issues of data availability, it is not possible to assess the degree to which these four 
scenarios tend to occur individually or in combination with each other. Ultimately, however, the 
possible interaction effects between these four scenarios are of little relevance at this point, as they 
do not influence my central argument about the (expected) negative impact of corruption on the 
prospects of ethnopolitical stability. 
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inclusiveness, the aforementioned four scenarios are likely to deepen political and 
economic inequalities between those ethnic groups who are ‘in’ and those who are 
‘out’ of ethnically exclusionary networks of corruption. These inequalities in turn 
can be expected to give rise to emotions of anger and resentment among those ethnic 
groups who consider their chances to obtain the values of political representation to 
be comparatively low, which – following the theoretical framework outlined in 
chapter 2 – is likely to increase the risk of ethnic violence. As networks of corruption 
tend to form along ethnic lines and benefit certain ethnic groups over others (see 
section 4.6.), I thus expect grievances to rise among those ethnic groups who cannot 
reap the benefits of corruption, and ethnicity to become a likely fault line of violent 
confrontation. 
 
 
4.8. Conclusion: The Likely Effects of Corruption  
 
Hitherto, the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence has largely 
neglected the relevance of informal political institutions for the prospects of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability, based on the apparent misconception that it is their 
materiality which allows political institutions to influence political outcomes (cf. 
Giddens 1984). The second dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
addresses this pronounced research asymmetry in favour of formal political 
institutions by highlighting the relevance of corruption (as a prime example of an 
informal political institution) for the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. The second 
dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism thus clearly builds on the new 
institutionalist insight that political interactions are not only shaped by openly 
codified institutions such as forms of government or electoral systems, but also by 
norms, values and socially entrenched patterns of human behaviour (cf. Lecours 
2005). 
 
Following the grievance-based explanation of violent ethnic conflict outlined in 
chapter 2, the central argument presented in this chapter states that corrupt dealings 
are likely to increase the risk of ethnic civil war, as networks of corruption – given 
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their ethnically exclusionary tendencies (see section 4.6.) – can be assumed to affect 
the modus operandi of formal political institutions in such a way that those ethnic 
groups who stand outside of these networks have lower chances to obtain the values 
of political representation than those ethnic groups who are included in these 
networks (see section 4.7.). In this manner, corruption is expected to have a negative 
impact on the prospects of ethnopolitical stability, as it systematically reduces the 
number of ethnic groups who can obtain the values of political representation 
outlined in chapter 2, contributes to perceived or objective asymmetries between 
ethnic groups in terms of their political and socioeconomic standing, and thus 
arguably gives rise to emotions of anger and resentment among those ethnic groups 
who consider their chances to obtain the values of political representation to be 
comparatively low. The risk of corruption for the prospects of ethnopolitical stability 
is thereby exacerbated by the fact that the effects of corrupt dealings on the modus 
operandi of formal political institutions – and hence on the levels of political 
inclusiveness in a given political system – can gain self-perpetuating momentum (see 
ibid.). These assumptions about the likely impact of corruption on the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence illustrate the relevance of the second dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism by highlighting the possible causal links between 
informal political institutions and the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability.  
 
On the basis of the arguments outlined in chapters 1 to 4, the remainder of this thesis 
will turn to the quantitative analysis of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism. Chapter 5 
presents detailed information on the ‘Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism (EEI) 
Dataset’ that has been created specifically for the purpose of this thesis. Chapter 6 
contains the results from testing the effects of both institutional combinations and 
corruption on the risk of large-scale ethnic violence, using binary time-series-cross-
section analysis.  
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Chapter 5: The EEI Dataset 
 
5.1. Introduction: A New Dataset on Institutions and Ethnic Civil War 
 
Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism proposes a general explanation for the effects of 
institutional combinations and informal political institutions on the risk of violent 
ethnic conflict throughout space and time. Hence, it is most suitable to test its 
relevance with a large-N approach and time-series-cross-sectional dataset. 
Accordingly, this chapter contains key information on the ‘Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism Dataset’ (‘EEI Dataset’ for short) that has been compiled as a new 
dataset on institutions and ethnic civil war specifically for the purpose of this thesis. 
Further details on the variables in the EEI Dataset (including the data sources used 
for their coding) can be found in the EEI Dataset Codebook attached in Appendix III. 
To present key information on the EEI Dataset, the following sections will 
 
 outline the general aims and scope of the EEI Dataset (section 5.2.); and 
 present the variables it includes on: 
o  large-scale ethnic violence (section 5.3.),  
o democratic forms of government (section 5.4.),  
o electoral systems for the presidency and legislature (section 5.5.),  
o state structures (section 5.6.),  
o institutional combinations (section 5.7.),  
o corruption (ibid.), and  
o commonly used control variables in the civil wars literature (section 
5.8.).   
 Section 5.9. will conclude this chapter by summarising its central points.  
 
 
5.2. Filling the ‘Data Gap’ in the Academic Debate 
 
Surprisingly, the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence overall contains 
‘relatively little large-N analysis of the relationships between political institutions 
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and ethnic conflict.’ (Saideman et al. 2002:105) Consequently, there is a pronounced 
lack of well-known or publicly available datasets that contain information on 
different types of political institutions, the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence 
and further variables such as regime type or level of economic development which 
are commonly controlled for in the civil wars literature. For instance, the seminal 
replication data for Fearon and Laitin’s (2003a) article on ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 
Civil War’ which are frequently used (with certain modifications) in statistical 
analyses of violent intrastate conflict (see e.g. Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fjelde 
2009; Humphreys 2005) do not provide any information on political institutions at 
all. Similarly, Cederman, Wimmer and Min’s (2010) ‘Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) 
Dataset’ contains extensive information on ethnic groups’ access to state power, but, 
interestingly, no variables on institutional design, such as whether a country has a 
unitary, federal or mixed state structure, or whether it uses a majoritarian, 
proportional or mixed electoral system for the legislature. Scholars such as Cheibub 
(2007) and Golder (2005) have previously published invaluable data on selected 
types of political institutions such as forms of government (Cheibub 2007) or 
electoral systems for the legislature and the presidency (Golder 2005). However, 
their datasets are not (and were not meant to be) suitable for the analysis of 
institutional incentives for ethnic violence. Even those datasets which were designed 
specifically to test the impact of (formal) institutional design on different types of 
ethnic conflict, such as by Roeder (2005) and Saideman et al. (2002), are rather 
limited in scope, as they cover relatively few countries, years and variables.
71
 There 
is thus a clear need for a comprehensive dataset which facilitates the systematic 
analysis of the relationships between institutional design and ethnic civil wars.   
 
The EEI Dataset fills this apparent ‘data gap’ in the academic debate by providing an 
unprecedented amount of quantitative information for the statistical analysis of 
                                                 
71
  The EEI Dataset is more extensive in scope than the datasets by Roeder (2005) and Saideman et al. 
(2002), inter alia as it provides more annual data than Saideman et al. (namely for all years 
between 1955 and 2007, rather than just the years between 1985 and 1998) and includes 
information on more countries than Roeder (namely by considering countries with a population of 
at least 500,000 in contrast to Roeder’s consideration of only those countries with a population of 
at least one million). Moreover, Roeder’s and Saideman et al.’s datasets seem to contain a far 
smaller range of control variables than the EEI Dataset, as they apparently lack relevant 
quantitative information for instance on different types of colonial legacies, population size or oil 
wealth. 
Chapter 5 – The EEI Dataset 
 138 
institutional incentives for large-scale ethnic violence. In total, the EEI Dataset 
contains 103 variables which provide data on 174 countries between 1955 and 
2007.
72
 In order to facilitate the analysis of regional trends (see also the graphs in 
Appendix I), all 174 countries have been identified as belonging to one of the 
following seven world regions: Africa (except North Africa); Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe; East Asia and Pacific; Europe (except Eastern Europe) and North 
America; Latin America and Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa; and South 
Asia. 
 
It is worth pointing out that only 9 out of the 103 variables in the EEI Dataset have 
been merely copied from existing data sources.
73
 The vast majority of information in 
the EEI Dataset draws on data provided by scholars such as Cheibub (2007), Fearon 
and Laitin (2003a), and Golder (2005), but extensively modifies these scholars’ 
original variables by double-checking and correcting their values, extending their 
temporal and geographical scope, and adding new coding categories (see Appendix 
                                                 
72  Data on countries that became independent after 1955 or/and which ceased to exist before 2007 
were added from the year of the countries’ internationally recognised independence until the last 
year of their internationally recognised existence according to the COW Project State System 
Membership List version 2008.1 (COW 2008). In order for a country to be included in the EEI 
Dataset, it has to be listed as a member of the state system by the COW Project State System 
Membership List version 2008.1 (ibid.) and must have had a total population of greater than 
500,000 in 2008 according to the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008 (Marshall and Jaggers 
2009a). Countries that ceased to exist before 2008, such as Czechoslovakia or the German 
Democratic Republic, have been included if they are listed as former members of the state system 
by the COW Project and had a total population of greater than 500,000 in their last year of 
existence according to the population variable in the EEI Dataset (see section 5.8. and Appendix 
III). The EEI Dataset also contains information on six countries that are not listed by the COW 
Project State System Membership List version 2008.1: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia, the Soviet Union, Tanganyika and 
the United Arab Republic. These countries are either missing from the COW Project State System 
Membership List version 2008.1 (such as the United Arab Republic) or have been subsumed under 
the conventional short name of their successor entity (e.g. in the COW Project State System 
Membership List version 2008.1 ‘Vietnam [1954-2008]’ refers to both the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam [1954-1976] and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [1976-today]). The aforementioned 
six countries have been included as internationally recognised independent countries in the EEI 
Dataset in addition to the ones listed by the COW Project (2008), as they are territorially and 
constitutionally different from their successor entities, and have been recognised as separate state 
system members by the United Nations (UN 2006) or at least two major powers. 
73
  These copied variables include: the COW Project country codes; the ethnic war variable based on 
the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007; the three variables on involvement in violent 
international conflict based on data by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009; 
Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources and Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources; 
the Revised Combined Polity Score from the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008; and the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Corruption Index by The PRS Group, Inc. (2009) (see 
the EEI Dataset Codebook in Appendix III for further details). 
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III for further details). To name just a few examples, e.g. Cheibub’s (2007) data on 
forms of government have been significantly corrected and extended using 
constitutional texts, information from government and parliament websites, and 
relevant academic publications on individual countries.
74
 Likewise, Golder’s (2005) 
original variable on electoral systems for the presidency has been extended, corrected 
and modified with further coding categories, using information from the Oxford 
Scholarship Series on Elections in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe (Nohlen 
2005a; Nohlen 2005b; Nohlen and Stöver 2010; Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann 2001a; 
Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann 2001b; Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut 1999), the 
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2010), the 
Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA 2010), the 
Political Database of the Americas (PDBA 2010), constitutional texts, government 
and parliament websites, and relevant academic publications on individual countries. 
Finally, some variables in the EEI Dataset have been completely newly coded, such 
as those on colonial legacies, the incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country, 
different types of state structure and the use of communal rolls or seat reservations to 
enhance ethnic, national or religious minority representation in the national 
legislature (see Appendix III for further details).  
 
The next sections will describe in more detail the data on large-scale ethnic violence 
(section 5.3.), formal political institutions and their combinations (sections 5.4., 5.5., 
5.6. and 5.7.), corruption (section 5.7.) and control variables such as levels of 
economic development or a country’s colonial legacies (section 5.8.) that have been 
included in the EEI Dataset.  
 
 
5.3. Data on Large-Scale Ethnic Violence  
 
The dependent variable to test the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
denotes the incidence of ethnic civil war according to data by the Political Instability 
                                                 
74
  If no constitutional text was available and if different academic publications contradict each other 
on the form of government (or any other type of formal political institution) in a given country 
year, I chose the information on which two out of three sources agree.  
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Task Force (PITF) Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007 (PITF 2009). According to 
the PITF, ethnic wars are ‘episodes of violent conflict between governments and 
national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in 
which the challengers seek major changes in their status.’ (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 
2009:6) From this definition follow two relevant specifications: First, in line with its 
focus on ‘episodes of violent conflict between governments and … ethnic 
challengers’ (ibid., italics added), the PITF does not provide information on ‘rioting 
and warfare between rival communal groups … unless it involves conflict over 
political power or government policy’ (ibid.) as a proxy for fighting the government 
itself. Second, the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set explicitly focuses on ethnic wars
75
 
and thus generally does not provide information on non-war types of violent action.
76
 
The PITF only includes acts of mass murder by state agents against unarmed 
members of an ethnic group in the ‘ethnic war’ category if the victims of these acts 
were suspected of supporting armed ethnic challengers (ibid.).
77
  
 
Two minimum thresholds must be fulfilled in order for a violent ethnic conflict to be 
included in the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set (ibid.): First, each conflict party must 
mobilise at least 1,000 people, either as armed agents, demonstrators or troops 
(mobilisation threshold). Second, there must be 1,000 or more direct conflict-related 
deaths over the full course of the armed conflict,
78
 and at least one year in which the 
annual conflict-related death toll exceeds 100 fatalities (conflict intensity threshold). 
                                                 
75
  The PITF defines wars as ‘unique political events that are characterized by the concerted (or major) 
tactical and strategic use of organized violence in an attempt by political and/or military leaders to 
gain a favorable outcome in an ongoing, [sic] group conflict interaction process.’ (Marshall, Gurr 
and Harff 2009:4) 
76
  ‘Non-war types of violent action’ refer to episodes of violence in which armed perpetrators attack 
non-armed civilians (Scherrer 1999). A worst-case example of a non-war type of mass ethnic 
violence is the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. For further descriptions of non-war types of (mass) 
violent action, such as genocide, politicide and democide, see McGarry and O’Leary (1993), Harff 
(2003) and Rummel (1995) respectively.  
77
  As the researchers behind the PITF admit themselves, the lines between war and non-war types of 
violence – just like the distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic wars – can become blurred in 
reality (see Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009). This, however, raises more general methodological 
questions about data collection and data reliability in ethnic conflict studies which go beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
78
  The PITF defines the full course of an armed conflict as ‘a continual episode of armed conflict 
between agents of the state and agents of the opposition group during which there is no period 
greater than three years when annual conflict-related fatalities are fewer than 100 in each year’ 
(Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009:6). Fatalities can either result from armed conflict, terrorism, 
rioting or government repression (ibid.). 
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The PITF data thus do not include information on smaller-scale acts of violence that 
fall below the aforementioned mobilisation and conflict intensity thresholds. Nor do 
they distinguish episodes of ethnic war in which ethnic challengers want to 
overthrow the existing government and replace it with a new regime from episodes 
of ethnic war in which ethnic challengers seek to create a new sovereign state (or 
achieve greater regional autonomy) out of some portion of the existing one (cf. 
Mason and Fett 1996).  
 
As mentioned in section 1.3., the latter lack of differentiation between different types 
of ethnic war (i.e. whether they are based on strives for political self-determination or 
regime change) explains why I do not distinguish between different types of ethnic 
violence in my thesis either. It is, however, more problematic that the PITF employs 
a relatively high mobilisation and conflict intensity threshold, as this implies that  
potentially relevant smaller-scale episodes of ethnic civil war are automatically 
excluded from my data analysis (cf. Zartman 2011). I am willing to accept this 
arguable weakness of the PITF data, as the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set currently is 
the only major, publicly available dataset on large-scale ethnic violence that is 
suitable for the binary time-series-cross-section analysis presented in chapter 6. For 
instance, the seminal UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Datasets (see Gleditsch et al. 
2002) apply a lower conflict intensity threshold than the PITF, as they provide 
information on armed interstate and intrastate conflicts that resulted in as few as 25 
battle-related deaths in a given year (ibid.). However, as they do not distinguish 
between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars, the UCDP/PRIO data are not an 
appropriate source for my dependent variable. Ultimately, there thus is no suitable, 
publicly available alternative to the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set. 
 
As will be explained in more detail in section 6.3., the measurement level of the 
dependent variable plays a decisive role in choosing an appropriate estimation 
procedure for the large-N analysis. In the EEI Dataset, the ethnic war variable takes 
on the value ‘1’ for all country years in which one (or, in rare cases, more than one) 
episode of ethnic war occurred according to the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-
2007 (PITF 2009), and the value ‘0’ for all country years in which the PITF reports 
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no ethnic war (ibid.). It is worth pointing out that the precise day and month in which 
an ethnic war started or ended according to the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-
2007 are irrelevant for the coding of the ethnic war variable in the EEI Dataset. 
Hence, even if an episode of large-scale ethnic violence started relatively late (e.g. in 
December) or ended relatively early (e.g. in January) in a given year, the ethnic war 
variable in the EEI Dataset still identifies the relevant year as a conflict year.  
 
Following on this last point, and as briefly mentioned in section 1.3., this thesis 
differs from other studies such as by Fearon and Laitin (2003a) or Fjelde (2009) in 
that I focus on the incidence, not the onset of large-scale intrastate violence. 
Accordingly, the ethnic war variable in the EEI Dataset indicates the incidence of 
large-scale ethnic violence in any given country year, no matter whether it is the first 
conflict year or a continuation year. This focus on the incidence rather than the onset 
of ethnic war can be justified with four relevant reasons: First, according to 
grievance-based explanations of ethnic violence, grievances are the underlying cause 
of violent action throughout entire episodes of conflict, not just for their onset (see 
Gurr 2000; Harff and Gurr 2003). Second, it is equally important to explain why 
there is ethnic war at any given time as it is to find out how conflicts start or how 
they end (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002a). Third, the possible effects of time on the 
hazard of war are likely to cancel each other out and hence are not a major problem 
when analysing the incidence rather than the onset of ethnic war (cf. Elbadawi and 
Sambanis 2002b). For instance, the time spent fighting might intensify the hatred 
between conflicting parties, but can also increase the willingness to withdraw from 
battle due to the high costs of violence (ibid.). Finally, prior statistical findings 
indicate that there are no important changes if either the onset or incidence of ethnic 
war are used as dependent variable (Reynal-Querol 2002). Hence, for these 
theoretical and empirical reasons, I prefer to focus on the incidence rather than the 
onset of ethnic civil war in my thesis. 
 
Having outlined the dependent variable for my data analysis, the following sections 
will describe my key independent variables. 
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5.4. Data on Democratic Forms of Government 
 
The key independent variables to test the relevance of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism describe the level of public-official-centred corruption (see chapter 
4) and which form of government, type of electoral system for the legislature and 
state structure were combined (see chapter 3) in different country years. Before 
outlining the data on these formal and informal political institutions in the EEI 
Dataset in more detail, two relevant qualifications ought to be pointed out briefly: 
First, as has been mentioned in section 3.2., my classification of formal political 
institutions and their combinations is based exclusively on the manner in which they 
have been openly codified in national constitutions and constitutional amendments as 
well as any other laws or formal documents (such as peace treaties) which affect the 
form of government, electoral system for the legislature and state structure in a given 
country year. Second, since both the distinction of presidential, parliamentary and 
mixed forms of government on the one hand, and of majoritarian, proportional and 
mixed electoral systems for the legislature on the other become meaningless under an 
autocratic framework (see section 3.3.), the identification of these formal political 
institutions presupposes the democratic character of a political system.
79
 Hence, the 
two variables in the EEI Dataset to identify democratic forms of government and 
electoral systems for the legislature automatically take on the value ‘0’ for all 
country years under an autocratic political regime.   
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’ are used rather 
broadly in the sense that they describe political regimes which are either ‘basically 
open’ or ‘basically closed’ (cf. Kurtz 2004). Political regimes are considered to be 
democratic or ‘basically open’ if their democratic features outweigh their autocratic 
ones according to the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008 (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2009a), i.e. if they have a Combined Polity Score > 0 (cf. Kurtz 2004). 
Conversely, political regimes are considered to be autocratic or ‘basically closed’ if 
their autocratic features outweigh their democratic ones, i.e. if they have a Combined 
                                                 
79
  As noted in section 3.3., this qualification does not apply to the distinction of different state 
structures, as all of its types (i.e. federal, unitary and mixed) can exist under both democratic and 
autocratic settings. 
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Polity Score ≤ 0.80 In line with these specifications, the two variables to distinguish 
presidential, parliamentary and mixed forms of government on the one hand, and 
majoritarian, proportional and mixed electoral systems for the legislature on the other 
automatically take on the value ‘0’ for all years in which a country’s Combined 
Polity Score according to the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008 is ≤ 0. For 
those country years in which the Combined Polity Score takes on one of the so-called 
standardised authority scores to mark interruption periods (-66), interregnum periods 
(-77) or transition periods (-88), or in which no data are available from the Polity IV 
Project dataset version p4v2008, additional sources were consulted, including reports 
by Freedom House (Freedom House 2010), the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010),
 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU 2010), the ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 2010), the U.S. 
Library of Congress Country Studies (United States Library of Congress 2010)
 
and 
relevant academic publications on individual countries. These sources were used to 
gather as much information as possible for the country year in question on the key 
criteria on which the calculation of the Combined Polity Score is based, i.e. the 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, 
constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of political participation and 
the regulation of participation (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b). This information was 
then used to assess whether a country’s political regime was basically open or 
basically closed during those years in which the Combined Polity Score provides no 
information on a political regime’s democratic and/or autocratic qualities. As Table 2 
illustrates, the number of independent countries with a population greater than 
500,000 in 2008 (or their last year of existence, see section 5.2.) has grown from 82 
in 1955 to 162 in 2007. However, from these countries, the number of basically open 
regimes outweighs that of basically closed regimes only since 1991.
81
  
 
                                                 
80
  It is worth pointing out that, unlike Kurtz (2004), I treat country years in which the Combined 
Polity Score takes on the value ‘0’ as country years under a basically closed regime (see also 
Appendix III).   
81
  This growth in the number of independent countries with a population greater than 500,000 in 2008 
(or their last year of existence) and of the proportion of basically open regimes is reflected in the 
graphs included in Appendix I, but will not be made explicit again. 
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Year Number of independent 
countries 
Number of basically 
open regimes 
Number of basically 
closed regimes 
1955 82 36 46 
1956 85 38 47 
1957 87 40 47 
1958 87 38 49 
1959 87 39 48 
1960 105 42 63 
1961 110 43 67 
1962 115 46 69 
1963 116 46 70 
1964 119 46 73 
1965 121 49 72 
1966 124 50 74 
1967 125 48 77 
1968 128 49 79 
1969 128 47 81 
1970 129 46 83 
1971 135 43 92 
1972 135 42 93 
1973 135 42 93 
1974 136 42 94 
1975 140 43 97 
1976 140 41 99 
1977 140 42 98 
1978 141 44 97 
1979 141 47 94 
1980 141 47 94 
1981 141 46 95 
1982 141 48 93 
1983 141 50 91 
1984 141 50 91 
1985 141 51 90 
1986 141 54 87 
1987 141 53 88 
1988 141 54 87 
1989 141 57 84 
1990 144 70 74 
1991 154 82 72 
1992 158 88 70 
1993 160 93 67 
1994 160 97 63 
1995 160 96 64 
1996 160 96 64 
1997 160 95 65 
1998 160 98 62 
1999 160 100 60 
2000 160 103 57 
2001 160 103 57 
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2002 161 105 56 
2003 161 104 57 
2004 161 104 57 
2005 161 107 54 
2006 163 110 53 
2007 162 110 52 
 
Table 2:  Number of Independent Countries, Basically Open and Basically Closed Regimes between  
  1955 and 2007. 
 
 
As Figure 1 in Appendix I illustrates, it is interesting to note that, among the 
basically closed regimes worldwide, the number of divided forms of government has 
been far greater than that of monolithic forms of government in the entire time period 
between 1955 and 2007, i.e. autocratic forms of government with a legislature or a 
political party in addition to the chief executive have been much more common than 
autocratic forms of government that have neither a legislature nor a political party 
(cf. Alvarez et al. 1996).   
 
Among the basically open regimes worldwide, I use the definitions by Cheibub 
(2007) to distinguish presidential, parliamentary and mixed forms of government 
(see also section 3.4.). Hence, systems have been identified as presidential in the EEI 
Dataset if the government cannot be removed by the legislature; as parliamentary if 
the government can only be removed by the legislature; and as mixed if either the 
legislature or the independently (i.e. directly or indirectly) elected president can 
remove the government (ibid.). I use a residual category for those country years 
during which the democratic features of a country’s political regime outweighed the 
autocratic ones, but none of these definitions can be usefully applied. This includes 
Albania in 1990, i.e. the country’s last year under a Communist constitution; Niger 
between 1991 and 1992, i.e. the country’s last two years under its 1989 one-party 
constitution; and Iran between 1997 and 2003, due to the uniqueness of the Islamic 
Republic’s institutional arrangements.  
 
Figure 2 in Appendix I illustrates the number of these different forms of government 
worldwide between 1955 and 2007. It clearly shows that parliamentarism has been 
the most common democratic form of government worldwide throughout this entire 
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time period, followed by presidentialism and mixed forms of government. While the 
number of presidential forms of government has been increasing steadily since 1976, 
the number of both parliamentary and mixed forms of government experienced a 
pronounced upward surge in the late 1980s/early 1990s. The number of 
parliamentary forms of government increased from 25 in 1955 to 43 in 2007; that of 
presidential forms of government from 9 in 1955 to 38 in 2007; and that of mixed 
forms of government from 2 in 1955 to 29 in 2007.  
 
Figures 3 to 9 in Appendix I moreover confirm previous findings that democratic 
forms of government tend to cluster by region (see e.g. Norris 2008). Specifically, 
parliamentarism has been the most common democratic form of government 
throughout the entire time period of 1955 to 2007 in four out of seven regions: East 
Asia and the Pacific (Figure 5, Appendix I), Europe (except Eastern Europe) and 
North America (Figure 6, Appendix I), the Middle East and North Africa (Figure 8, 
Appendix I), and South Asia (Figure 9, Appendix I). Presidentialism, on the other 
hand, has been the most common democratic form of government in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (Figure 7, Appendix I) throughout the same time period. Mixed 
forms of government have become the most common democratic form of 
government in Central Asia and Eastern Europe since 2004 (Figure 4, Appendix I). 
 
The following sections will present the EEI Dataset’s variables on further formal 
political institutions besides forms of government, i.e. electoral systems for the 
presidency and legislature (section 5.5.), and state structures (section 5.6.). 
 
 
5.5. Data on Electoral Systems for the Presidency and Legislature 
 
The EEI Dataset contains information on both parliamentary and presidential 
electoral systems. The latter information was included following Horowitz’s (1991) 
argument that the type of electoral system for the presidency plays an important role 
for the impact of presidentialism on the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability (see 
also section 3.4.). Hence, the variable on electoral systems for the presidency in the 
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EEI Dataset distinguishes different types of electoral systems for the presidency 
specifically in countries with a presidential form of government.
82
 Following, with 
minor alterations, the coding scheme by Golder (2004, 2005), this variable 
distinguishes between plurality, absolute majority, qualified majority, electoral 
college, preferential and vote distribution requirement systems. I also use a residual 
category for those country years under a presidential form of government in which 
none of the aforementioned electoral system categories can be usefully applied. This 
includes Burundi’s transitional government between 2002 and 2004; Sri Lanka 
between 1977 and 1981, i.e. in the first years following the change from a 
parliamentary to a presidential form of government; and Switzerland between 1955 
and 2007, due to the uniqueness of the rotation principle for the Swiss presidency. 
 
As Figure 10 in Appendix I illustrates, the two most commonly used types of 
electoral system for the presidency in countries with a presidential form of 
government between 1955 and 2007 have been plurality and absolute majority 
systems. Conversely, electoral systems with a vote distribution requirement as well 
as preferential electoral systems have been among the least commonly used 
presidential electoral systems during the same period of time. Thus, despite 
Horowitz’s (1991) appraisal of presidential forms of government that rely on a 
broad-based electoral system for the presidency, attempts to ‘soften’ the inevitable 
zero-sum character of presidential elections through the use of preferential voting or 
vote distribution requirements have been very rare indeed (see also section 3.4.).  
 
Apart from presidential electoral systems, the EEI Dataset also includes information 
on parliamentary electoral systems.
83
 The classification of different types of electoral 
system for the legislature in the EEI Dataset is based, with minor alterations, on the 
definitions by Golder (2005). According to Golder (2005), majoritarian electoral 
systems require the winning candidate to obtain either a plurality or majority of the 
                                                 
82
 As noted in the EEI Dataset Codebook (Appendix III), the variable on electoral systems for the 
presidency automatically takes on the value ‘0’ for all years in which a country’s regime was 
either basically closed or in which a country employed a non-presidential (i.e. parliamentary or 
mixed) democratic form of government. 
83
  The terms ‘parliamentary electoral system’ and ‘electoral system for the legislature’ refer to the 
type of electoral system used for a country’s elections to the national legislature in unicameral 
systems, and to the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral systems. 
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vote, while proportional systems allocate seats in proportion to a party’s (or 
candidates’) share of the vote, and mixed systems employ a mixture of majoritarian 
and proportional electoral rules (see also section 3.5.). Unlike Golder (2005), 
electoral systems with multiple electoral tiers are not treated as a separate category in 
the EEI Dataset, but have been identified as majoritarian, proportional or mixed 
depending on the electoral formula(s) used in the different electoral tiers to translate 
votes into seats (see also section 3.5.). Following these definitions, majoritarian 
electoral systems are those that employ either plurality, absolute or qualified majority 
requirements (Golder 2004). Examples include for instance the first-past-the-post, 
limited vote and alternative vote systems (ibid.). The latter have been classified as 
majoritarian in the EEI Dataset without any further indication of the fact that they are 
based on preferential voting, since AV ‘systematically discriminates against those at 
the bottom of the poll in order to promote effective government for the winner.’ 
(Norris 1997:302; see also section 3.5.) Proportional electoral systems, on the other 
hand, include quota and highest average systems using party lists as well as the 
single transferable vote (Golder 2004). The latter type of electoral system has been 
classified as proportional in the EEI Dataset without any further indication of the fact 
that it is based on preferential voting, since STV follows the inclusionary logic of a 
proportional electoral system (Mitchell 2008; see also section 3.5.). 
 
In line with the replication data for Golder’s (2005) article, I classify electoral 
systems as mixed if more than 5% of deputies
84
 have been elected by an electoral 
formula that is different from the one used to elect all other deputies. This includes 
electoral systems under which more than 5% of the seats in the national legislature 
were awarded as bonus seats to political parties that either won the highest number of 
votes at the electoral district level (such as in Sri Lanka since 1989) or countrywide 
(such as in Greece since 2007), while all other seats were awarded according to a 
proportional electoral formula. In contrast to Golder’s replication data, I also take 
account of questions of district magnitude insofar as I code electoral systems as 
mixed if a country (such as Somalia between 1964 and 1968) officially employed a 
proportional electoral system countrywide, yet more than 5% of deputies were 
                                                 
84
  With ‘5% of deputies’ I mean 5% of deputies in the national legislature in unicameral systems, and 
5% of deputies in the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral systems.  
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elected in single-member districts, while all other deputies were elected in multi-
member districts.
85
 
 
Figure 11 in Appendix I illustrates the number of different types of electoral system 
for the legislature in basically open regimes worldwide between 1955 and 2007. It 
clearly shows that proportional electoral systems for the legislature have increased 
steadily in number since 1980. Proportional electoral systems were the most common 
type of parliamentary electoral system worldwide between 1956 and 1961, and from 
1983 onwards. The number of majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature, on 
the other hand, experienced a pronounced upward surge from 28 in 1990 to 36 in 
1991 and 38 in 1992, before decreasing gradually to 27 in 2004. Mixed electoral 
systems for the legislature have grown steadily in number since 1986. The number of 
proportional electoral systems for the legislature increased from 16 in 1955 to 53 in 
2007; that of majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature from 17 in 1955 to 31 
in 2007; and that of mixed electoral systems for the legislature from 3 in 1955 to 26 
in 2007.    
 
Figures 12 to 18 in Appendix I demonstrate that electoral systems for the legislature, 
just like democratic forms of government (see section 5.4.), have a certain tendency 
to cluster by region. Specifically, proportional electoral systems have been the most 
common type of parliamentary electoral system in basically open regimes throughout 
the entire time period from 1955 to 2007 in two out of seven regions: Europe (except 
Eastern Europe) and North America (Figure 15, Appendix I), and Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Figure 16, Appendix I). Majoritarian electoral systems, on the other 
hand, have been the most common type of electoral system for the legislature in 
basically open regimes throughout the same time period in Africa (except North 
Africa) (Figure 12, Appendix I) and South Asia (Figure 18, Appendix I). Mixed 
electoral systems became the most common type of electoral system for the 
                                                 
85
   Issues such as whether mixed electoral systems are dependent or independent, potential restrictions 
on the number of freely contestable seats in parliament, the use of communal rolls or the 
employment of indirect election arrangements (such as the Basic Democrats system in Pakistan’s 
1962 and 1965 legislative elections) are irrelevant for the coding of the variable on parliamentary 
electoral systems.  
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legislature in basically open regimes in East Asia and the Pacific from 2001 onwards 
(Figure 14, Appendix I).    
 
As indicated in section 3.2., positive action strategies such as communal rolls or seat 
reservations in parliament can serve as ‘backdoor mechanisms to ensure minority 
representation’ (Reynolds 2005:307) and may be used to countervail or at least 
attenuate the winner-takes-all principles on which majoritarian electoral systems for 
the legislature are based (cf. ibid.; Lijphart 1996; Norris 2008). The EEI Dataset 
therefore also contains a dummy variable which marks those years under a basically 
open political regime in which a country employed either seat reservations or 
communal rolls in order to ensure the political representation of certain ethnic, 
national or religious minorities in the national legislature in unicameral systems, or in 
the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral systems.
86
 As Figure 19 in 
Appendix I illustrates, the number of countries with a basically open regime using 
communal rolls or seat reservations to enhance ethnic, national or religious minority 
representation in the national legislature has increased from 5 in 1955 to 18 in 2007, 
with a steady upward trend in the number of countries using such mechanisms 
beginning in 1987. A closer look at the EEI Dataset reveals that in 1955 ‘backdoor 
mechanisms to ensure minority representation’ (Reynolds 2005:307) were only used 
in basically open regimes in three regions: East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East 
and North Africa, and South Asia. In 2007, such mechanisms were used in basically 
open regimes in six regions: the aforementioned three, Africa (except North Africa), 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. It is, 
however, important to emphasise that seat reservations and communal rolls to 
enhance ethnic, national or religious minority representation in the national 
legislature remain comparatively rarely employed measures, as only approximately 
16% of basically open regimes (i.e. 18 out of 110) used them in 2007. Of the 24 
democratic countries that have employed such mechanisms between 1955 and 2007 
(see ‘MinRep’ in Appendix III for a complete list), the following 13 used them under 
a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature: Afghanistan 2005-07, Burma 
1955-61, Cyprus 1960-1980, Ethiopia 1994-2007, Fiji 1970-86 and 1990-2005, India 
                                                 
86
  The precise number of reserved seats is thereby irrelevant for the coding of this variable (see also 
Appendix III). 
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1955-2007, Iran 1997-2003, Lebanon 1955-2007, Mauritius 1968-2007, New 
Zealand 1955-1995, Pakistan 1988-98 and 2007, Syria 1955-57 and Zambia 1964-67. 
 
 
5.6. Data on State Structures 
 
In addition to the aforementioned variables on forms of government (section 5.4.) 
and electoral systems for the presidency and legislature (section 5.5.), the EEI 
Dataset also contains information on different types of state structure as the final 
formal political institution that I consider in this analysis (see section 3.6.). The state 
structures variable distinguishes unitary, federal and mixed state structures based on 
the following definitions (see ibid.): State structures are unitary if there is no 
formally guaranteed division of power among multiple levels of government with 
distinct spheres of responsibility (cf. Lijphart 1999). State structures are federal if 
they feature a formally guaranteed ‘layer of institutions between a state’s center and 
its localities … [which has] its own leaders and representative bodies … [who also] 
share decision-making power with the center’ (Bermeo 2002:98), and where both the 
centre and territorially defined subunits of the state possess their own formally 
guaranteed spheres of responsibility (cf. Bunce and Watts 2005). State structures are 
mixed if otherwise unitary states contain at least one autonomous region, i.e. at least 
one territorially defined subunit whose executive, legislative and judicial institutions 
have the formally guaranteed power to exercise public policy functions in at least one 
cultural, economic or political sphere independently of other sources of authority in 
the state (cf. Ackrén 2009; Wolff 2009). Mixed state structures are thereby distinct 
from federal ones, as they do not ‘necessitate territorial subdivisions across the entire 
state territory’ (Wolff 2009:42-3), nor is there necessarily a formal guarantee that 
representatives of the autonomous region(s) can share political power at the centre 
(cf. ibid.).
87
  
 
                                                 
87
  Issues such as the degree of power exercised by the representative bodies of federal state units or 
autonomous regions, or the formal conditions under which the autonomy status of a given region 
in mixed state structures may be revoked are irrelevant for the coding of the state structures 
variable. On the other hand, however, a region is only considered to be autonomous if its 
autonomy status has been formally recognised by the central government (see also Appendix III). 
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Figure 20 in Appendix I illustrates the number of different types of state structure 
worldwide between 1955 and 2007. It clearly shows that the number of unitary state 
structures has outweighed that of federal and mixed state structures worldwide by far 
within this entire time period. The number of federal state structures worldwide has 
hardly changed between 1955 and 2007, while the number of mixed state structures 
has followed a small but steady upward trend since 1971. The number of countries 
with a federal state structure increased from 16 in 1955 to 22 in 2007; that of 
countries with a unitary state structure from 57 in 1955 to 113 in 2007; and that of 
countries with a mixed state structure from 9 in 1955 to 27 in 2007. 
 
Figures 21 to 27 in Appendix I indicate few but nonetheless relevant patterns in the 
geographical dispersion of different types of state structure. While unitary state 
structures, expectedly, have been the most common type of state structure in most 
regions for the entire time period from 1955 to 2007, one region deviates from this 
general trend: Europe (except Eastern Europe) and North America. Here, mixed state 
structures have been the most common type of state structure since 1999, while 
unitary state structures became the least common type of state structure in this region 
in the same year (Figure 24, Appendix I). Mixed state structures have been a more 
common type of state structure than federal state structures for prolonged periods of 
time in East Asia and the Pacific (Figure 23, Appendix I), and Europe (except 
Eastern Europe) and North America (Figure 24, Appendix I). While unitary and 
federal state structures have existed in each world region at one point between 1955 
and 2007, there never was a country with a mixed state structure during this time 
period in South Asia (Figure 27, Appendix I). In this context, it is important to note 
that the relatively low levels of fluctuation in the numbers of different state structures 
compared to forms of government and electoral systems (see sections 5.4. and 5.5.) 
should not be seen as straightforward evidence that state structures tend to change 
less frequently than other types of formal political institutions. Rather, it has to be 
borne in mind that the coding of the state structures variable in the EEI Dataset, 
unlike the variables on forms of government and electoral systems, is not affected by 
regime changes, as it does not matter for its coding whether political regimes are 
basically open or basically closed (see also section 3.3.). 
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5.7. Data on Institutional Combinations and Corruption 
 
The variables on democratic forms of government, electoral systems for the 
legislature and state structures (as outlined in the preceding sections) form the basis 
of the dummy variables used to test the relevance of the first dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism (see chapter 3). Specifically, the EEI Dataset includes 27 
dummy variables that identify which democratic form of government, electoral 
system for the legislature and state structure were combined in a given country year. 
These 27 dummy variables correspond to the 27 possible institutional arrangements 
that result from combining either a presidential, parliamentary or mixed form of 
government with either a majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral system for the 
legislature and either a unitary, federal or mixed state structure. To name just a few 
examples, these different dummy variables thus for instance mark those years in 
which a given country combined presidentialism, a majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature and unitary state structure, or in which there was a combination of 
parliamentarism, a proportional electoral system for the legislature and federal state 
structure.   
 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix I present an overview of all institutional combination 
variables in the EEI Dataset, ordered by type of institutional combination (Table 1) 
and frequency in country years (Table 2). Both tables include the 27 aforementioned 
institutional arrangements that result from combining either a presidential, 
parliamentary or mixed form of government with either a majoritarian, proportional 
or mixed electoral system for the legislature and either a unitary, federal or mixed 
state structure, as well as the three institutional arrangements that result from 
distinguishing autocracies according to their state structure (i.e. autocracies with 
either a unitary, federal or mixed state structure). As Table 2 in Appendix I 
illustrates, the four least common institutional combinations (by number of country 
years) have been a presidential form of government with a majoritarian electoral 
system for the legislature and mixed state structure (9 country years); a mixed form 
of government with a mixed electoral system for the legislature and mixed state 
structure (13 country years); a mixed form of government with a mixed electoral 
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system for the legislature and federal state structure (16 country years); and a mixed 
form of government with a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
mixed state structure (also 16 country years). Conversely, autocracies with a unitary 
state structure have been by far the most common institutional arrangement (3349 
country years), followed by parliamentary forms of government with a majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure (565 country years), 
and presidential forms of government with a proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure (471 country years). The type of institutional 
combination on which I put particular emphasis in chapter 3 – i.e. a presidential form 
of government with a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary 
state structure – has existed in 150 country years between 1955 and 2007 according 
to the EEI Dataset. It thus is the 10
th
 most common institutional combination 
worldwide between 1955 and 2007 out of the 30 institutional arrangements included 
in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix I. 
 
Instead of using dummy variables, it could be argued that an alternative strategy to 
test the effects of different institutional combinations on the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence would be to create interaction terms between the variables on formal 
political institutions in the EEI Dataset. Such an alternative strategy, however, would 
lead to significant practical difficulties. First, it would require estimating too many 
parameters at once, namely the institutional interactions as well as their constituent 
terms. Second, and more importantly, interaction effects in nonlinear models (such as 
those using binary time-series-cross-section analysis) are famously difficult to 
interpret, since they ‘cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign, magnitude, 
or statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term’ (Ai and Norton 
2003:129), but instead require the computing of cross derivatives or cross differences 
(ibid.). This difficulty of interpretation is mainly due to the fact that the magnitude of 
the interaction effect in nonlinear models, just like the marginal effect of a single 
variable, depends on all covariates in the model and can have different signs for 
different observations (ibid.). The interpretation of interaction effects in nonlinear 
models thereby becomes even more difficult if, as would have to be the case in this 
thesis, one is interested in interactions between more than two variables (cf. Norton, 
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Wang and Ai 2004). For these reasons, the use of dummy variables to identify 
different types of institutional combinations and test their effects on the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence is preferable over the alternative strategy of using interaction 
terms between the variables on formal political institutions in the EEI Dataset. 
 
In order to test the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, using 
corruption as a prime example of an informal political institution (see chapter 4), the 
EEI Dataset includes the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Corruption Index 
by The PRS Group, Inc. (2009). Starting with the year 1984, this index provides 
annual data on the level of corruption within a country’s political system, based on 
assessments by country experts. It takes into account the extent of a variety of 
corrupt dealings, including ‘demands for special payments and bribes connected with 
import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or 
loans … [as well as] actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business.’ (The PRS Group, Inc. 2010; 
see also section 4.3.) The ICRG Corruption Index ranges between 0 and 6, with low 
numbers indicating high levels of corruption and high numbers indicating low levels 
of corruption. 
 
As mentioned in section 4.3., corruption is a phenomenon that is intrinsically 
difficult to measure. This difficulty arises, first, from the fact that the identification 
of corrupt practices is generally context- and perception-dependent in the sense that 
what might be identified as corruption in one cultural circle or at a specific point in 
time, need not be perceived as such in another (see section 4.3.). Second, hard data 
about the precise extent of corruption within any given country are not easy to 
obtain, as corruption is an informal practice that is largely hidden from public view, 
with few incentives for its participants to be open about their dealings (Galtung 
2006). Supposedly objective data such as on the numbers of criminal convictions for 
corrupt practices can be contested on the grounds that a) they seem to measure the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives rather than the extent of corruption itself, 
and that b) they do not lend themselves to cross-national comparisons, not least since 
Chapter 5 – The EEI Dataset 
 157 
the legal definitions of corruption differ between countries (Lambsdorff 2006).
88
 As 
previously stated (see section 4.3.), the difficulties one encounters when trying to 
define and measure corruption are nothing extraordinary in the social sciences, as 
numerous concepts such as ‘class’, ‘democracy’ or ‘ethnic conflict’ are similarly 
contested in their meaning and possible operationalisation for quantitative research. 
Rather than questioning the attempt to measure corruption altogether, it is therefore 
more important to ask for the utility and limitations of specific corruption indices (cf. 
Galtung 2006).   
 
Following on this last point, the ICRG Corruption Index’s main limitation derives 
from the fact that it is a subjective measure of corruption which is based on 
assessments by country experts. This reliance on expert evaluations is potentially 
problematic, as the experts’ perceptions of corruption might not only be culturally 
biased (Lambsdorff 2006; see also section 4.3.) but may also reflect the experts’ 
opinions about the causes of corruption rather than their observations of the 
frequency of corruption (Treisman 2007). In addition, The PRS Group, Inc. provides 
little directly available information on the precise manner in which the values of the 
ICRG Corruption Index are obtained. Consequently, questions such as on inter-coder 
reliability or why exactly corruption ratings might change over different country 
years are difficult to answer (cf. ibid.). 
 
On the other hand, however, the reliance of the ICRG Corruption Index on expert 
evaluations should not be criticised too harshly: Given the aforementioned difficulty 
in obtaining hard data about the extent of corruption, perception-based indices 
currently provide the best available method for measuring corruption levels at all 
(Lambsdorff 2006). Moreover, the ICRG Corruption Index has several clear 
advantages over alternative measures of corruption including for instance the 
Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International (Transparency 
International 2010) or the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). Three advantages of the ICRG Corruption Index over 
the latter two indices stand out in particular: First, strictly speaking, neither the 
                                                 
88
  This latter aspect, of course, links back to the aforementioned point about corruption’s general 
context- and perception-dependence. 
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Transparency International nor the World Bank data on corruption are suitable for 
use in time-series-cross-section analysis, inter alia as inter-year changes in the values 
of these indices might not only reflect changes in corruption perceptions but also the 
use of different sets of sources for the construction of these indices in successive 
years (Treisman 2007). Second, both the Transparency International and World Bank 
corruption indices (unlike the ICRG Corruption Index) are obtained by aggregating 
information from a variety of different sources which raises questions about how 
compatible these sources are and what exactly the indices are ultimately measuring 
(ibid.). Finally, one of the most widely-quoted reasons for the preferability of the 
ICRG Corruption Index over the corruption data by Transparency International and 
the World Bank is that it covers the largest number of countries and years (see e.g. 
ibid.; Alesina and Weder 1999; Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006). For all these reasons, I 
consider the ICRG Corruption Index as the most suitable source of corruption data 
for my binary time-series-cross-section analysis presented in chapter 6.  
 
In order to ease the interpretation of my statistical results in chapter 6 and the 
description of (average) levels of corruption across countries and over time (see 
Figures 28 to 35, Appendix I), I invert the ICRG Corruption Index by subtracting its 
original values from 6. In this manner, high values of the inverted ICRG Corruption 
Index indicate high values of corruption and low values low levels of corruption. On 
the basis of this inversion, we can identify the following patterns of average levels of 
corruption: As Figure 28 in Appendix I illustrates, the average level of corruption 
worldwide decreased slowly but steadily between 1984 and 1993, and followed a 
general upward trend between 1994 and 2002. The average worldwide level of 
corruption increased from 2.806 in 1984 to 3.573 in 2007 according to the inverted 
ICRG Corruption Index.  
 
Figures 29 to 35 in Appendix I, on the other hand, illustrate average levels of 
corruption between 1984 and 2007 by region. They show that the lowest average 
levels of corruption within this time period can be found in Europe (except Eastern 
Europe) and North America (Figure 32, Appendix I), while the highest average 
levels of corruption in the same time period have been observed in South Asia 
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(Figure 35, Appendix I). Central Asia and Eastern Europe (Figure 30, Appendix I) 
and Europe (except Eastern Europe) and North America (Figure 32, Appendix I) 
have experienced a clear upward trend in their average levels of corruption from the 
early 1990s to the early 2000s. Africa (except North Africa) (Figure 29, Appendix I), 
East Asia and the Pacific (Figure 31, Appendix I) and the Middle East and North 
Africa (Figure 34, Appendix I) have seen a steady increase in their average levels of 
corruption from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s (Figure 31, Appendix I) or mid-
2000s (Figures 29 and 34, Appendix I) respectively. Both Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Figure 33, Appendix I) and South Asia (Figure 35, Appendix I) have 
experienced a pronounced upward surge in their average levels of corruption from 
2001 to 2002. 
 
Having thus outlined the key independent variables for my data analysis in the 
preceding sections, I can now turn to the description of my control variables. 
 
 
5.8. Control Variables  
 
The EEI Dataset contains an extensive number of variables which are commonly 
controlled for in the civil wars literature (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003a; Hegre et al. 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). These variables 
include: 
 
a) the number of years without large-scale ethnic violence,  
b) the incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country,  
c) the involvement in violent international conflicts,  
d) population size,  
e) level of economic development as measured in levels of GDP per capita,  
f) degree of socioeconomic inequalities as measured through Vanhanen’s Index 
of Power Resources (Vanhanen 2003),  
g) status as oil exporter,  
h) per cent of mountainous terrain,  
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i) noncontiguous country structure,  
j) colonial experiences,  
k) level of ethnic fractionalisation,  
l) level of democracy and  
m) recent experience of political instability.  
 
I included this relatively long list of control variables in the EEI Dataset in line with 
the recognition that all ethnic conflicts are multicausal phenomena (see also section 
4.4.), and that it is thus important to take the potential relevance of a variety of 
different political, social and economic factors into account. The following 
paragraphs will present key information on the aforementioned control variables in 
the EEI Dataset and present some brief arguments why they can be expected to affect 
the risk of violent intrastate conflict. It thereby is important to note that most of the 
following arguments are intentionally kept rather short and relatively ambiguous in 
the sense that I frequently avoid any explicit guesses whether a given control variable 
is more likely to have a positive or negative effect on the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence, or whether it is likely to be statistically significant at all. This intentional 
ambiguity is based on the acknowledgement that it remains contested for most of the 
aforementioned control variables whether they have any impact on the risk of 
(ethnic) civil war at all, or what the precise causal mechanisms might be that link 
them to the occurrence of violent intrastate conflict.
89
  
 
a) The incidence of large-scale ethnic violence is likely to be influenced by a country’s 
conflict history (cf. Hegre et al. 2001), since it is reasonable to expect that ‘the longer 
a country is at peace, the lower should be the risk of (another) war as conflict-
specific capital remains unused and peace-specific capital is accumulated’ (Hegre 
and Sambanis 2006:515). In order to control for this temporal dependence and 
following Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), I use splines and a variable – based on 
information from the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007 (PITF 2009) –  that 
                                                 
89  See e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003a) on the possible causal mechanisms linking income levels to the 
risk of civil war, and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) for a summary of different findings on the 
statistical significance inter alia of a country’s per cent of mountainous terrain. 
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denotes the duration of peace prior to the current observation (see also section 6.3.). 
This latter variable starts at 0 for each country in 1955 or, where applicable, in the 
first year of its internationally recognised independence, and is then calculated as the 
number of years prior to the current observation in which there was no incidence of 
ethnic war. It is crucial to correct for temporal dependence in the statistical models 
presented in chapter 6, as failing to do so would lead to incorrect standard errors and 
overly optimistic inferences due to inflated t-values (cf. Beck, Katz and Tucker 
1998).  
 
b) As highlighted for instance by Lake and Rothchild (1998), violent ethnic conflicts 
can spread across state borders and affect the stability of entire regions. This is inter 
alia the case because the incidence of ethnic violence in one country might lead to a 
re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of violent action among ethnopolitically 
mobilised groups in another country, and because ethnic civil wars can affect the 
balance of power between ethnic groups in an entire region (ibid.). In order to control 
for this spatial interdependence, the EEI Dataset contains two variables on the 
incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country. The first is a dummy variable 
which marks all years in which at least one neighbouring country experienced at least 
one episode of large-scale ethnic violence in the year coded, while the second 
variable provides the total number of ethnic wars that occurred in a country’s 
neighbouring countries in the year coded, i.e. the sum of all episodes of ethnic war in 
all neighbouring countries in a given year. Both variables have been coded based on 
information provided by the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007 (PITF 2009). 
It is important to consider spatial interdependence in the statistical models presented 
in chapter 6, as failing to do so could lead to over-confidence or inefficiency of the 
results in the binary time-series-cross-section analysis (cf. Franzese and Hays 2007). 
While the inclusion of a variable on the incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring 
country is inevitably endogenous,
90
 this is currently the best available method for 
dealing with spatial interdependence in binary time-series-cross-section analysis 
                                                 
90
  Specifically, the issue of endogeneity arises from the fact that, if large-scale ethnic violence is 
spatially interdependent, the incidence of ethnic war in one country might not only be influenced 
by the incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country, but conversely might influence the 
incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country as well. 
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which is neither highly computationally demanding nor difficult to interpret (cf. 
ibid.). 
 
c) There are two possible scenarios how a country’s involvement in a violent interstate 
conflict might affect its prospects of intrastate violence (Hegre et al. 2001): On the 
one hand, it could unite the population against a common enemy and thereby lower 
the risk of civil war. On the other, it could also increase the risk of intrastate violence 
by creating an opportunity for domestic insurgents to attack the weakened regime, or 
for another country’s government to incite a revolt (ibid.). The EEI Dataset therefore 
contains three variables to be able to test the effect of a country’s involvement in 
violent international conflicts on the risk of ethnic civil war. All three variables are 
based on data by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009 (Centre 
for the Study of Civil War at PRIO 2009; Gleditsch et al. 2002)
91
 and mark those 
years in which a country was involved in an extrasystemic armed conflict,
92
 interstate 
armed conflict,
93
 and extrasystemic or interstate armed conflict respectively (see 
Appendix III for further details).  
 
d) Following robust empirical evidence that a large population increases the risk of civil 
war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006), the EEI Dataset also contains a variable on total 
population in millions, based on data by the Penn World Table version 6.3 (Heston, 
Summers and Aten 2009), Gleditsch (2002, 2008) and the Population Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 
(2007).
94
 Possible explanations why larger populations should increase the risk of 
civil war include inter alia that larger country populations might heighten the 
number of potential recruits for rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003a) and that they 
aggregate more groups who are potentially hostile to one another (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000 cited in Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002b).   
                                                 
91
  The UCDP/PRIO define conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government 
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.’ (UCDP and PRIO 2009a:1) 
92
  Extrasystemic armed conflicts are armed conflicts that occur ‘between a state and a non-state group 
outside its own territory’ (UCDP and PRIO 2009a:7). 
93
  Interstate armed conflicts are armed conflicts that occur ‘between two or more states.’ (UCDP and 
PRIO 2009a:7). 
94
  Using population data from different sources in order to complete missing values for different 
country years is not uncommon, see e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003b) and Gleditsch (2002). 
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e) The EEI Dataset contains a variable on economic development as measured in levels 
of GDP per capita in thousands U.S. dollar, based on data from Gleditsch (2002, 
2008), and the Penn World Table version 6.3 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2009).
95
 
This variable has been included in the EEI Dataset following robust empirical 
evidence of a negative association between a country’s GDP per capita levels and 
the risk of violent intrastate conflict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Possible 
explanations why low levels of GDP per capita should be associated with an increase 
in the risk of civil war include inter alia that low levels of GDP per capita indicate 
low levels of state strength and hence create opportunities for rebellion, and that it is 
easier to recruit individuals for rebel movements if they perceive that there are no 
better alternatives to make economic gains (Fearon and Laitin 2003a).  
 
f) The prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability may also be influenced by a country’s 
degree of socioeconomic inequalities, as tensions over resource access and 
socioeconomic redistribution can lead to violent confrontations between the haves 
and have-nots in a given society (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Lake and Rothchild 
1996). The EEI Dataset therefore includes Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources96 
from his Democratization and Power Resources 1850-2000 dataset (Vanhanen 2003) 
                                                 
95
  For other datasets using GDP data from different sources in order to complete missing values for 
different country years, see e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003b) and Gleditsch (2002). 
96
 Vanhanen calculated the Index of Power Resources by multiplying the values of the Index of 
Occupational Diversification (i.e. the arithmetic mean of urban population and non-agricultural 
population) with the values of the Index of Knowledge Distribution (i.e. the arithmetic mean of 
students and literates) and the values of the Index of the Distribution of Economic Power 
Resources, and then dividing the product by 10,000 (FSD 2010). The Index of the Distribution of 
Economic Power Resources in turn is calculated as the sum of the two products that are obtained 
from multiplying the value of family farm area with the percentage of agricultural population, and 
the value of the degree of decentralisation of non-agricultural economic resources with the 
percentage of non-agricultural population (ibid.). It is important to note that Vanhanen only 
provides values for the Index of Power Resources in ten-year intervals (i.e. for 1948, 1958, 1968 
etc.). However, they have been added in the EEI Dataset for entire time periods, so that for 
instance the value provided in Vanhanen’s dataset for Belgium in 1948 (‘22.2’) has been added for 
this country for all years from 1955 (the start year of the EEI Dataset) to 1957; the value provided 
by Vanhanen for Belgium in 1958 (‘35.6’) then has been added for this country for all years from 
1958 to 1967, the value for 1968 (‘39.2’) for this country for all years from 1968 to 1977 and so 
on. This strategy of adding values for entire time periods admittedly could be criticised on the 
grounds that it is based on the difficult-to-justify assumption that levels of socioeconomic 
inequality are relatively time persistent (cf. Deininger and Squire 1996). On the other hand, 
however, the alternative of adding the values of the Index of Power Resources only for the years 
provided by Vanhanen (i.e. 1948, 1958 etc.) would be impractical for my data analysis, as it would 
lead to the loss of too many observations once the index is included as control variable in my 
binary time-series-cross-section analysis. 
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as indicator of socioeconomic inequalities. According to Vanhanen, the higher the 
value of the Index of Power Resources, ‘the more widely politically relevant power 
resources are usually distributed among various sections of the population’ 
(Vanhanen 1997:56).
97
 The EEI Dataset intentionally does not contain the Gini index 
as indicator of inequality, as it has several significant shortcomings, including inter 
alia widely differing data coverage across countries and over time, and often weak or 
absent documentation regarding the definitions of income or units of measurement 
used to calculate Gini coefficients (cf. Deininger and Squire 1996).  
 
g) Although there is no clear or rigorously robust empirical evidence how a country’s 
dependence on oil exports affects the risk of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006), 
there are two prominent lines of argumentation how a country’s oil wealth might 
affect the likelihood of violent intrastate conflict. Some researchers have argued that 
oil wealth should increase the risk of civil war, inter alia because it might help to 
finance rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) and because it can create 
opportunities for rebellion, as oil-producing countries ‘tend to have weaker state 
apparatuses than one would expect … because the rulers have less need for a socially 
intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues’ (Fearon and Laitin 
2003a:81). Others, however, challenge this view by highlighting that oil wealth – 
depending on issues such as state weakness, and the potential use of resource rents 
for patronage and a strengthening of the military – can, in fact, reduce the risk of 
civil war (see e.g. Bodea 2012). In order to identify a country’s status as oil exporter 
and following the example of Fearon and Laitin (2003b), the EEI Dataset contains a 
dummy variable that marks all years in which a country’s fuel exports as a 
percentage of merchandise exports exceeded 33%, using data from Fearon and Laitin 
(2003a), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (The World Bank 2010), 
government websites, newspaper articles or reports by relevant organisations such as 
the International Energy Agency or the U.S. Energy Information Administration. No 
                                                 
97  Given the type of data that underlie the calculation of the Index of Power Resources (see above), 
this index has been included in the EEI Dataset as a simple indicator of resource concentration. It 
is, however, important to note that Vanhanen (1997) assumes that higher values of the Index of 
Power Resources indicate more favourable social conditions for democratisation (ibid.). Table 1 in 
Appendix II therefore contains the result from testing possible multicollinearity between the Polity 
IV Revised Combined Polity Score (‘level of democracy’) and Vanhanen’s Index of Power 
Resources. 
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further natural resource variables have been added in the EEI Dataset following 
Hegre and Sambanis’s (2006) finding that, from different measures of natural 
resource dependence, only a country’s dependence on oil exports has a ‘marginally 
robust’ (Hegre and Sambanis 2006:531) impact on the risk of civil war. 
 
h) & i) Following the example of Fearon and Laitin (2003a), the EEI Dataset contains two 
variables on territorial conditions that might affect the risk of violent intrastate 
conflict. The first of these two variables denotes a country’s per cent of mountainous 
terrain, based (with minor alterations, see Appendix III) on data by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003a). A high percentage of mountainous terrain arguably should increase the risk 
of civil war, as it creates natural sanctuaries for potential rebels which are difficult to 
reach by the state military and police (Fearon and Laitin 2003a; cf. Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006). The second variable on territorial conditions in the EEI Dataset is a 
dummy variable that marks all years in which a country can be described as 
noncontiguous in the sense that some of its territory holding at least 10,000 people is 
separated from the land area containing the capital city either by land or 100 km of 
water (Fearon and Laitin 2003a).
98
 Also this variables is based (with minor 
alterations, see Appendix III) on data by Fearon and Laitin (2003a). A noncontiguous 
country structure may be expected to increase the risk of civil war, as insurgents who 
are based in an area that is territorially separate from the state’s centre are arguably 
more difficult to control by agents of the central government and hence might find it 
easier to mobilise (ibid.).   
 
j)  Countries that used to be under colonial rule may be expected to be at a higher risk of 
ethnic civil war than countries that did not use to be colonies, due to the socially and 
politically destabilising effects of certain colonial legacies. These legacies include 
inter alia the imposition of territorial borders that do not correspond to ethnic 
boundaries, the destruction of pre-colonial forms of social organisation and the 
systematic politicisation of ethnic distinctions due to colonial strategies of ethnic 
favouritism (Blanton, Mason and Athow 2001; DeVotta 2005; Wimmer 1997). As 
Blanton, Mason and Athow (2001) point out, patterns regarding the frequency and 
                                                 
98
   Colonial empires have been ignored for the coding of this variable (Fearon and Laitin 2003a). 
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intensity of ethnic conflict in post-colonial states thereby might depend on the 
identity of the former colonial power and their particular strategy of colonial 
administration. In line with these arguments, the EEI Dataset contains five different 
dummy variables to denote colonial experiences.  
    
     The first of these variables indicates whether a country used to be under colonial rule 
in the time period between the beginning of the 20
th
 century and the end of the 
Second World War, and marks all years of those countries which, at any point 
between 1900 and 1945, either were ruled under a League of Nations mandate or 
used to be a colony, protectorate or UN trust territory. The second dummy variable 
indicates whether a country used to be under colonial rule in the time period between 
the end of the Second World War and the early 21
st
 century, and marks all years of 
those countries which, at any point between 1946 and 2007, either were ruled under a 
League of Nations mandate or used to be a colony, protectorate or UN trust territory. 
While it is irrelevant for the coding of the aforementioned two dummy variables 
whether a country used to be ruled for instance by the French or British colonial 
power, the third, fourth and fifth variable on colonial experiences do take the identity 
of the former colonial power into account. Hence, the third variable on colonial 
experiences marks all years of those countries which, at any point between 1946 and 
2007, either were ruled under a British League of Nations mandate or used to be a 
British colony, British protectorate or UN trust territory under British administration. 
The fourth variable marks all years of those countries which, at any point between 
1946 and 2007, either were ruled under a French League of Nations mandate or used 
to be a French colony, French protectorate or UN trust territory under French 
administration. The fifth variable marks all years of those countries which, at any 
point between 1946 and 2007, either were ruled under a League of Nations mandate 
of any country other than France or the United Kingdom, or used to be a colony, 
protectorate or UN trust territory of any country other than France or the United 
Kingdom (such as, for instance, Belgium or Portugal).  
    
     It is important to emphasise that the latter three variables have been coded only for 
those countries that used to be under colonial rule at any point between 1946 and 
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2007, and that there is no dummy variable in the EEI Dataset which denotes colonial 
experiences prior to the 20
th
 century. These coding decisions are based on the 
assumption that the impact of colonial experiences on the risk of ethnic civil war 
becomes less salient over time. Put differently, post-colonial states which gained 
their internationally recognised independence relatively recently are assumed to be 
particularly affected by the socially and politically destabilising effects of certain 
colonial legacies, since they had less time to build cohesive national identities and 
effective state structures than those post-colonial states which have been independent 
for longer (cf. Henderson and Singer 2000). Sources for the coding of all five 
variables include information from the United Nations (UN 2010), the CIA World 
Factbook (CIA 2010) and, where necessary (i.e. to confirm or clarify information 
from the previous two sources), relevant government websites as well as the BBC 
country profiles (BBC Online 2010b). 
 
k) In order to be able to control for the effects of a country’s degree of ethnic diversity 
on the risk of ethnic civil war, the EEI Dataset includes the ethnic fractionalisation 
index according to Alesina et al. (2003). This index depicts ‘the probability that two 
randomly drawn individuals from the population belong to two different [ethnic] 
groups’ (Alesina et al. 2003:156), based on the formula 
  
 
 
 
     where sij is the share of group i (i = 1...N) in country j. To define ethnicity, Alesina et 
al. (2003) use a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The index ranges 
between 0 (complete ethnic homogeneity) and 1 (complete ethnic heterogeneity). As 
Alesina et al. (2003) do not provide data for all countries included in the EEI Dataset 
nor for Ethiopia following Eritrea’s internationally recognised independence in 1993 
and Pakistan prior to Bangladesh’s internationally recognised independence in 1971, 
additional values have been calculated for selected country years using the 
aforementioned formula and ethnicity data from the CIA World Factbook 1980 and 
2007 (CIA 1980, 2007), Wright (1991) and Anderson and Silver (1989) (see 
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Appendix III for more details). Arguments linking a country’s degree of ethnic 
diversity to the risk of large-scale intrastate violence include inter alia that low levels 
of ethnic fractionalisation should be associated with an increase in the risk of civil 
war, as the fewer ethnic groups there are in a given society, the larger is the potential 
recruitment pool for rebel groups that consist of members of a single ethnic group 
(cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2004).
99
 Conversely, it also could be argued that the risk of 
civil war should increase with high rather than low levels of ethnic diversity, since 
high levels of ethnic fractionalisation imply a high number of divisions in a given 
society and might make cooperation between different ethnic groups more difficult 
(cf. Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002b).  
 
     At this point, it is important to note that, even though ethnic fractionalisation indices 
have been widely used in civil war studies (Esteban and Ray 2008; Laitin and Posner 
2001), they have also attracted widespread criticism. For instance, some authors such 
as Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) have argued that polarisation indices 
are empirically superior to fractionalisation indices, while others such as Laitin and 
Posner (2001) have highlighted significant theoretical problems regarding the current 
format of ethnic fractionalisation indices. These problems include, amongst other 
things, that ethnic fractionalisation indices cannot take multiple dimensions of ethnic 
identity into account, and that hitherto there is no fractionalisation (nor, for this 
matter, polarisation) index which is sensitive to time in the sense that it would depict 
changes in the ethnic composition of different societies over a consistent number of 
years (Laitin and Posner 2001; see also section 3.2.). This lack of a time-sensitive 
ethnic fractionalisation index is particularly problematic, as constructivist theories 
suggest that a country’s level of ethnic fractionalisation is likely to change over time 
(Laitin and Posner 2001). Hence, even though I follow a common practice in 
                                                 
99
  As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the different arguments linking a given control 
variable to the risk of (ethnic) civil war are here only dealt with very briefly and hence presented 
without much critical assessment. It is, however, worth noting at this point that Collier and 
Hoeffler’s (2004) argument is flawed in the sense that the recruitment pool from a specific ethnic 
group for a given rebel movement might depend less on the overall degree of ethnic diversity in a 
given society and more on the actual size (in total numbers) of the ethnic group in question. For 
instance, if a country has a population size of 500,000 and a relatively low level of ethnic 
fractionalisation because one ethnic group represents 90% of the population, another one 8% and a 
third one 2%, the latter group still has a smaller recruitment pool than an ethnic group which 
represents 2% of the population in a country with a population size of ten million and a relatively 
high level of ethnic fractionalisation with, say, twelve different ethnic groups. 
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econometric analyses by including ethnic fractionalisation values from specific years 
for entire time periods in the EEI Dataset (cf. ibid.),
100
 the results presented in 
chapter 6 regarding the effects of levels of ethnic fractionalisation on the risk of 
ethnic civil war should not be overstated due to the inherent limitations of ethnic 
fractionalisation indices (see also section 3.2.). It is also worth pointing out that the 
EEI Dataset intentionally does not include an ethnic polarisation index, following 
empirical evidence that polarisation indices, at least when calculated according to the 
polarisation theory by Esteban and Ray (1994), tend to be highly correlated with 
Alesina et al.’s (2003) fractionalisation measures anyway (Alesina et al. 2003).  
 
l)  Although most studies do not find a significant association between a country’s level 
of democracy and the risk of large-scale intrastate violence (Hegre and Sambanis 
2006), statistical models in the civil wars literature nonetheless frequently include a 
variable on the degree of democratisation (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002b; Fearon and Laitin 2003a). There are at least three 
relevant explanations how a country’s political regime type might affect the risk of 
ethnic civil war: On the one hand, high levels of democracy can be expected to lower 
the risk of violent ethnic conflict, as institutionalised democracies empower their 
citizens politically and increase the responsiveness of the state to the interests of 
politicised ethnic groups (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2003a; Gurr 2000). Compared to 
autocratic regimes, institutionalised democracies thus generally offer more 
opportunities for ethnopolitical groups to influence the political decision-making 
process through non-violent means, and hence create fewer incentives for violent 
action (ibid.). On the other hand, however, it also could be argued that democracies 
are likely to experience more ethnic civil war than autocracies, as higher levels of 
repression under the latter regime type make it more difficult to organise rebellion 
and more costly to engage in violent action (Saideman et al. 2002). Finally, 
combining insights from the previous two arguments, neither high levels of 
democracy nor high levels of autocracy might be associated with an increase in the 
                                                 
100
 For instance, the ethnic fractionalisation value which Alesina et al. (2003) calculated for Sri Lanka 
based on ethnicity data from 2001 has been added in the EEI Dataset for this country for all years 
between 1955 and 2007; the ethnic fractionalisation value which they calculated for Thailand 
based on ethnicity data from 1983 has been added for this country for all years between 1955 and 
2007; and so on.   
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risk of ethnic civil war, due to the latter regime type’s ability to repress dissent and 
the former’s incentives for non-violent action. Instead, the relationship between 
levels of democracy and the risk of violent intrastate conflict might be non-linear, 
since hybrid regimes which combine democratic and autocratic features ‘are partly 
open yet somewhat repressive … [whereby] repression leads to grievances that 
induce groups to take action, and openness allows for them to organize and engage in 
activities against the regime.’ (Hegre et al. 2001:33)  
 
     In order to be able to control for the effects of a country’s level of democracy, the 
EEI Dataset contains the Revised Combined Polity Score according to the Polity IV 
Project dataset version p4v2008 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009a; see Appendix III for 
further details). Following empirical evidence that the relationship between levels of 
democracy and the risk of violent intrastate conflict is not linear but rather follows an 
inverted-U shape (Hegre et al. 2001), the statistical models presented in chapter 6 
will also include the quadratic term of the Revised Combined Polity Score.  
 
m) In line with Fearon and Laitin (2003a), the EEI Dataset also contains a dummy 
variable which denotes a country’s recent experience of political instability. This 
dummy variable takes on the value ‘1’ if a country’s Combined Polity Score 
according to the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008 either took on the value of 
‘-77’ or ‘-88’, or had a three-or-greater change in any of the three years prior to the 
current observation (cf. Fearon and Laitin 2003a). The coding of the political 
instability variable in the EEI Dataset differs from that in Fearon and Laitin’s 
replication data, as the latter treat the year in which a three-or-greater change in the 
Combined Polity Score occurs as instance of political instability, rather than the last 
year before such a change. For instance, the change in El Salvador’s Combined 
Polity Score from -3 in 1963 to 0 in 1964 leads Fearon and Laitin to code their 
political instability variable as ‘1’ for El Salvador from 1965 to 1967, based on the 
assumption that 1964 was particularly affected by political instability as the year in 
which the Combined Polity Score changes. In contrast, the political instability 
variable in the EEI Dataset takes on the value ‘1’ for El Salvador only from 1965 to 
1966, based on the assumption that 1964 is the first year of a new period of political 
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stability (since the Combined Polity Score remains at ‘0’ from 1964 to 1971) and that 
1963, as the last year before the change in the Combined Polity Score, is likely to 
have been more affected by political instability (see Appendix III for further details). 
According to Fearon and Laitin (2003a), a country’s recent experience of political 
instability increases the risk of civil war, as it can reduce the state’s counterinsurgent 
capabilities and ‘may indicate disorganization and weakness [at the centre] and thus 
an opportunity for a separatist or center-seeking rebellion.’ (Fearon and Laitin 
2003a:81)  
 
The tables in sections 6.4. to 6.6. provide further information on which of the 
aforementioned control variables are included in the different statistical models to 
test the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism.  
 
 
5.9. Conclusion: Aims of the EEI Dataset 
 
The EEI Dataset clearly fills the need for a comprehensive dataset which facilitates 
the systematic statistical analysis of the relationships between institutional design 
and the risk of ethnic civil war across countries and over time. It provides an 
unprecedented compilation of quantitative information on different types of political 
institutions, the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence and further variables such as 
political regime type or level of economic development which are commonly 
controlled for in the civil wars literature. This chapter has presented details on the 
variables included in the EEI Dataset, and – with reference to the graphs included in 
Appendix I – briefly described the temporal and geographical dispersion of formal 
political institutions and their combinations between 1955 and 2007 (see sections 5.4. 
to 5.7.), and of levels of corruption between 1984 and 2007 (see section 5.7.). It 
thereby is important to note that the sole purpose of these descriptions is to identify 
broad trends in the dispersion of specific formal and informal political institutions 
across countries and over time. Since I focus on the ‘downstream’ rather than the 
‘upstream’ analysis of political institutions in this thesis (see also section 1.2.), I 
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leave it to future research to investigate the manifold causes behind the patterns 
illustrated in Appendix I and outlined in sections 5.4. to 5.7..  
 
The following chapter will present the results from testing the effects of both 
institutional combinations and corruption on the risk of large-scale ethnic violence, 
using binary time-series-cross-section analysis with data from the EEI Dataset. 
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Chapter 6: Testing Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
6.1. Introduction: A Statistical Test of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 
As Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism proposes a general explanation for the effects 
of institutional combinations and informal political institutions on the risk of violent 
ethnic conflict throughout space and time, it is most suitable to test its relevance with 
a large-N, time-series-cross-section analysis (see also section 5.1.). Accordingly, this 
chapter presents my approach to and results from testing the impact of both 
institutional combinations (see chapter 3) and corruption (see chapter 4) on the risk 
of ethnic civil war, using binary time-series-cross-section analysis and data from the 
EEI Dataset (see chapter 5). In order to put the relevance of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism to the test, the following sections will 
 
 describe the hypotheses to be tested (section 6.2.), linking back to arguments 
presented in chapters 3 and 4; 
 outline the method used to test Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism (section 
6.3.); 
 present the results from testing the effects of individual formal political 
institutions (section 6.4.), institutional combinations (section 6.5.) and 
corruption (section 6.6.) on the risk of large-scale ethnic violence; and 
 describe the findings from my robustness tests (section 6.7.).  
 Section 6.8. will conclude this chapter by summarising its central points.  
 
 
6.2. Hypotheses  
 
As elaborated in chapters 3 and 4, Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism consists of two 
dimensions which derive from the recognition that political institutions are 
‘embedded entities’ in at least two regards: First, whether they are openly codified or 
not, political institutions are embedded entities in the sense that they never exist on 
their own but always form part of a wider institutional arrangement. Accordingly, the 
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first dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism highlights the need to pay 
greater attention to the form of government, type of electoral system for the 
legislature and state structure that are combined with each other in a given political 
system (see chapter 3). Second, political institutions are embedded entities in the 
sense that informal political institutions such as corruption can exist over time and 
affect the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability due to persisting patterns in human 
behaviour and despite their lack of open codification. The second dimension of 
Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism therefore emphasises the need to pay greater 
attention also to the effects of informal political institutions when analysing 
institutional incentives for violent ethnic conflict (see chapter 4). Taken together, 
these two dimensions aim to expand the research agenda of the institutional 
incentives approach to ethnic violence and overcome its predominant focus on 
single, formal political institutions (see chapter 1).   
 
The sets of expectations regarding the effects of certain types of institutional 
combinations and informal political institutions on the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence that have been outlined in chapters 3 and 4 follow from the grievance-based 
explanation of violent intrastate conflict presented in chapter 2. In short, these 
expectations centre on the argument that political institutions which systematically 
reduce the number of ethnic groups who can obtain the intrinsic and instrumental 
values of political representation are likely to increase the risk of violent ethnic 
conflict. This is because political institutions which are associated with low levels of 
political inclusiveness can be expected to contribute to perceived or objective 
asymmetries between ethnic groups in terms of their political as well as 
socioeconomic standing, and arguably give rise to emotions of anger and resentment 
among those ethnic groups who consider their chances to obtain the values of 
political representation to be comparatively low (see also section 2.4.). Based on the 
arguments presented in chapters 2 to 4, there are three key hypotheses to be tested 
within the following sections. They relate to the likely effects of a) individual formal 
political institutions, b) institutional combinations and c) corruption on the risk of 
large-scale ethnic violence: 
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a) Before turning to the effects of institutional combinations, it makes sense to first 
look at formal political institutions as discrete, separable entities, as has been typical 
for the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence (see section 1.6.). 
Following this perspective, we can expect institutions from category A of Table 1 
(section 3.7.) to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to 
institutions from category B and C, as they provide a relatively low number of 
possible political winners due to their reliance on winner-takes-all principles (see 
ibid.). Put differently, we can expect the risk of ethnic civil war to increase under a 
presidential as opposed to a parliamentary and mixed form of government; under a 
majoritarian as opposed to a PR and mixed electoral system; and under a unitary as 
opposed to a federal and mixed state structure, as the formal political institutions 
included in category A of Table 1 (section 3.7.) systematically reduce the number of 
ethnic groups that can obtain the values of political representation compared to their 
counterparts in categories B and C. These theoretical considerations lead to my first 
hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1: Individual formal political institutions that rely on winner-takes-
all principles increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to 
individual formal political institutions that seek to disperse political gains.  
 
Following the arguments outlined in sections 3.4. to 3.6., this hypothesis can be 
divided into three subhypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Presidential forms of government increase the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence compared to parliamentary and mixed forms of 
government. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature increase the 
risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to proportional and mixed 
electoral systems for the legislature. 
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Hypothesis 1c: Unitary state structures increase the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence compared to federal and mixed state structures. 
 
b) After testing Hypothesis 1 and its subhypotheses, we move beyond the mere focus 
on single, formal political institutions by addressing the first dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism. As elaborated in chapter 3, this  dimension highlights the 
need for scholars belonging to the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence 
to pay greater attention to the specific combination of formal political institutions in 
a given political system and the overall number of possible political winners it 
provides. In line with the grievance-based explanation of violent ethnic conflict 
outlined in chapter 2, we can assume that the lower the number of possible political 
winners provided by a given institutional combination, the more likely it is that this 
combination will increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. Consequently, we 
can expect in particular the combination of a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure to heighten 
the risk of large-scale ethnic violence, as it provides the lowest overall number of 
possible political winners compared to any other combination of presidential, 
parliamentary or mixed form of government, majoritarian, proportional or mixed 
electoral system for the legislature, and unitary, federal or mixed state structure (cf. 
Table 1, section 3.7.). Put differently, as they systematically reduce the number of 
ethnic groups who can obtain the values of political representation outlined in 
chapter 2, political systems which include a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure can be 
expected to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to any other 
possible combination of the different forms of government, electoral systems for the 
legislature and state structures listed in Table 1 (section 3.7.). These arguments lead 
to my second hypothesis and its subhypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional combinations which provide a relatively low 
number of possible political winners increase the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence compared to institutional combinations that provide a higher number 
of possible political winners.   
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Hypothesis 2a: Institutional combinations of a presidential form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to all other 
possible combinations of different forms of government, electoral systems for 
the legislature and state structures. 
 
c) The previous arguments all refer to the effects of formal political institutions and 
their combinations on the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability. The second 
dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism moves beyond this focus on openly 
codified institutional design by highlighting the need to pay greater attention also to 
the relevance of informal political institutions for the risk of ethnic civil war. 
Specifically, I have argued in chapter 4 that corruption (a prime example of a non-
codified political institution) can be expected to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence, as networks of corruption – given their tendency to form along ethnic lines 
and benefit certain ethnic groups over others – are likely to affect the modus 
operandi of formal political institutions in such a way that those ethnic groups who 
stand outside of these networks have comparatively low chances to obtain the values 
of political representation. This is likely to give rise to grievances among those 
ethnic groups who stand outside of ethnically exclusionary networks of corruption, 
and to heighten the risk of ethnic civil war. These theoretical considerations lead to 
my third key hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of corruption, the higher is the risk of large-
scale ethnic violence. 
 
The following section will outline the method with which I seek to test my three key  
hypotheses and their subhypotheses. 
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6.3. Method  
 
To test the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, I use a large-N, time-
series-cross-section (TSCS) analysis. This type of analysis is most suitable for my 
aims, as I do not seek to make particular predictions for specific countries, but wish 
to draw general conclusions about the relationship between different institutional 
repertoires and the risk of large-scale ethnic violence throughout space and time. For 
my statistical models, I use the data included in the EEI Dataset, as presented in 
chapter 5. Depending on the precise statistical model, year and availability of control 
variables, I thus include between 73 and 161 countries per year in my analysis. 
Regarding the control variables in my statistical models, it should be noted that I log-
transform both my population size and GDP per capita variables in most of my 
models
101
 in order to account for decreasing marginal effects (see also e.g. DeRouen 
and Sobek 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). I also include the quadratic term of the 
Revised Combined Polity Score according to the Polity IV Project dataset version 
p4v2008 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009a) in my analysis, following empirical evidence 
for a curvilinear relationship between the level of democracy and the risk of violent 
intrastate conflict (Hegre et al. 2001; see also section 5.8.).  
 
As briefly stated in section 5.3., the measurement level of the dependent variable 
plays a decisive role in choosing an appropriate estimation procedure for the large-N 
analysis. Since my dependent variable, ethnic civil war, takes on the value ‘0’ for all 
country years in which there is no large-scale ethnic violence and the value ‘1’ for all 
country years in which large-scale ethnic violence occurs (see section 5.3.), I use a 
binary choice rather than an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model. The two 
most commonly used regression models for analyses with a dichotomous dependent 
variable are binary logit and binary probit models (Long and Freese 2006). 
Following the example of authors such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005) 
and Fearon and Laitin (2003a), I report the results from using a logit model in 
sections 6.4. to 6.7.. It is, however, reasonable to assume that the use of a probit 
                                                 
101
 As will be outlined in section 6.6., one of my statistical models on the effects of corruption 
contains a non-log-transformed version of my GDP per capita variable.  
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model would lead to fairly similar findings (cf. e.g. Liao 1994; Long and Freese 
2006).      
 
Like violent intrastate conflict in general, the occurrence of ethnic civil war is likely 
to be influenced by a country’s conflict history, and to depend on earlier episodes of 
large-scale ethnic violence (cf. Hegre et al. 2001; see also section 5.8.). In order to 
control for this temporal dependence and following Beck, Katz and Tucker’s (1998) 
procedure for binary time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) analysis, I use splines and a 
variable – based on information from the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007 
(PITF 2009) –  that denotes the duration of peace prior to the current observation (see 
also section 5.8.). Specifically, the values of the three auxiliary variables ‘Spline_1’, 
‘Spline_2’ and ‘Spline_3’ in my statistical models depict the coefficients of the cubic 
spline segments for the variable on the duration of peace prior to the current 
observation, which are used to delimit the path of duration dependence (Beck, Katz 
and Tucker 1998).
102
 As mentioned in section 5.8., I use a variable on the incidence 
of ethnic war in a neighbouring country in order to control for the likely spatial 
interdependence (in addition to temporal dependence) of episodes of large-scale 
ethnic violence.  
 
A problem common to any TSCS analysis (including BTSCS) besides spatial 
interdependence and temporal dependence is the loss of efficiency if the statistical 
model does not deal with unit heterogeneity. In principle, this problem could be 
addressed by using either fixed or random effects. The use of these effects, however, 
implies certain trade-offs which ultimately render them inappropriate for BTSCS 
analysis: First, when applied to BTSCS analyses, fixed effects cause a loss of 
information from those cases for which the response variable takes on the value ‘0’, 
as ‘using fixed effects, these … observations make no contribution to the statistical 
analysis (that is, the likelihood [of an event occurring]).’ (Beck and Katz 2001:489, 
italics in original) This loss of information is particularly severe for studies on rare 
                                                 
102
 I am aware that Carter and Signorino (2010) recently offered an alternative method to Beck, Katz 
and Tucker (1998) to account for temporal dependence in BTSCS analysis. However, I prefer to 
use the procedure suggested by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), as it is – at least for now – a much 
more widely used method in the civil wars literature (see e.g. Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; 
Fjelde 2009; Thies 2010). 
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events such as for instance ethnic civil wars (cf. ibid.). Second, fixed effects are 
collinear with any independent variable that either changes slowly over time or that 
is entirely time-unvarying (Beck 2001). This would be a particularly acute problem 
for my analysis, as my key independent variables (i.e. formal political institutions 
and their combinations and, to a lesser degree, corruption) mainly change across 
units but relatively rarely over time. Third, random effects are not suitable for TSCS 
or BTSCS analysis either, as they are based on the assumption that the observed units 
are a sample from a larger population and that inferences are made about this larger 
population (ibid.). As the units in TSCS or BTSCS analysis are fixed and inferences 
are made about the observed units, not a larger, hypothetical population of similar 
countries, the use of random effects would contradict the very rationale behind TSCS 
or BTSCS analysis (see ibid.). I therefore include neither fixed nor random effects in 
my statistical models, as there are far more disadvantages than advantages to their 
use. 
 
Finally, according to Kittel (1999), it needs to be carefully assessed when using 
TSCS analysis whether one’s data should be divided into different subperiods, as the 
relationship between variables might change over time due to external shocks. For 
instance, following the assumption that the number of ethnic conflicts heightened 
drastically only with the end of the Cold War (cf. e.g. Brown 1993), it would make 
sense to distinguish between a pre- and post-1990s period in my dataset. On the other 
hand, however, e.g. the statistical research by Gurr (2000) or data by the PITF (2009) 
clearly show that the number of (violent) ethnic conflicts has increased steadily 
between the 1950s and early 1990s and did not just suddenly surge with the end of 
the Cold War (see also section 1.2.). Hence, as there is no relevant theoretical 
argument that makes the distinction of different subperiods in my data necessary, I 
treat all years between 1955 and 2007 (and, for the analysis of corruption, between 
1984 and 2007 respectively, see section 6.6.) as one complete time period.   
 
Before presenting the findings from my statistical models, two possible problems 
need to be addressed briefly: endogeneity and multicollinearity. Endogeneity might 
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affect my analysis for three key reasons (cf. Wooldridge 2002):
103
 measurement 
error, simultaneity and omitted variable bias. While the issue of ‘measurement error’ 
is self-explanatory, it is worth clarifying that ‘simultaneity’ refers to the fact that a 
given independent variable (e.g. level of economic development) might not only 
affect the dependent variable (e.g. the incidence of ethnic civil war), but that the 
dependent variable (e.g. the incidence of ethnic civil war) conversely might also 
influence the independent variable (e.g. level of economic development) (cf. ibid.). 
Moreover, ‘omitted variable bias’ can be a source of endogeneity if any of the 
explanatory variables in one’s analysis are correlated with one of the unobserved 
variables that have been relegated to the error term (ibid.). In my own statistical 
models, the risk of omitted variable bias is magnified by the aforementioned lack of 
random or fixed effects to account for unit heterogeneity.
104
  
 
I will address the issue of endogeneity empirically by lagging my key independent 
variables (i.e. individual formal political institutions, institutional combinations and 
corruption) as well as my variables on GDP per capita, population size, degree of 
socioeconomic inequalities, level of democracy and recent experience of political 
instability. I lag these specific variables, as it is reasonable to expect that they are 
particularly affected by the issue of simultaneity, i.e. that they not only influence the 
risk of ethnic civil war but that their precise values are also likely to be affected by 
the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence (cf. also e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003a).
105
 
Following the example of Fearon (2005) and Fearon and Laitin (2003a), I use one-
year lags in my statistical models. 
                                                 
103
 As mentioned in section 5.8., there is an inevitable endogeneity problem with the use of a variable 
on the incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country (see footnote 90). As I acknowledged this 
problem earlier in my analysis, I will not elaborate it any further at this point.   
104
 The issue of endogeneity is relevant, but in general should not be overstated, as its key sources 
(measurement error, simultaneity and omitted variable bias) are inevitable challenges for any 
quantitative analysis. While the risk of measurement error can be reduced by repeated checks of 
one’s data quality (as done for the EEI Dataset, see chapter 5), it is questionable how far omitted 
variable bias ever can be overcome without sacrificing the parsimony of one’s statistical models. 
Similarly, the risk of simultaneity seems ubiquitous especially in the analysis of political 
institutions, as they equally can be thought of as independent and dependent variables, i.e. as 
causes and consequences of a variety of social, economic and political phenomena (cf. Grofman 
and Stockwell 2003). Whether one is more interested in the effects of ethnic violence on political 
institutions or the impact of political institutions on ethnic violence thus ultimately depends on 
one’s personal preference without one type of research question being more valid than the other.   
105
 For other studies using lags to deal with endogeneity problems, see also e.g. Gerring and Thacker 
(2004) or Dietz, Neumayer and de Soysa (2007). 
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In order to check for potential problems of multicollinearity, I regress several of my 
explanatory variables on each other and look out for their R-square values (see 
Kanazawa and Jackson 2005). If the R-square value from any regression between 
two explanatory variables is close to 1, a reason for concern about multicollinearity 
exists (ibid.; see also e.g. Slinker and Glantz 2008). I conducted this multicollinearity 
test among all those pairs of explanatory variables for which there are theoretical 
grounds to believe that they could be highly correlated, such as former colonial 
power and form of government (cf. Shugart and Mainwaring 1997) or status as oil 
exporter and level of democracy (cf. Ross 2001). As the results from my 
multicollinearity checks in Table 1 in Appendix II show, there does not seem to be a 
problem of first-order multicollinearity in my data, as none of the R-square values is 
close to 1.   
 
As a final note in this section, it should be mentioned that the descriptives from the 
EEI Dataset confirm that we are dealing with rare events data in which the binary 
dependent variable takes on the value ‘1’ much less frequently than it takes on the 
value ‘0’ (cf. King and Zeng 2001): Out of 7266 country year observations, ethnic 
civil war is reported in only 766 cases, i.e. only in 10.5% of all observations of my 
dependent variable in the EEI Dataset. A problem that can result from such rare 
events data is the underestimation of event probabilities (ibid.). A possible solution 
to this problem, as suggested by King and Zeng (2001), is to collect data based on 
the dependent variable, i.e. to sample all available events (incidence of ethnic civil 
war) and only a very small fraction of nonevents (no incidence of ethnic civil war). 
Similar to the use of fixed effects in BTSCS analysis, this method would however 
imply a severe loss of information regarding those cases in which the response 
variable takes on the value ‘0’, and therefore has been dismissed for my statistical 
models. 
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6.4. The Effects of Individual Formal Political Institutions  
 
According to Hypothesis 1, individual formal political institutions that rely on 
winner-takes-all principles are expected to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence compared to individual formal political institutions that seek to disperse 
political gains (see section 6.2.). Hence, presidential forms of government should 
increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to parliamentary and mixed 
forms of government (Hypothesis 1a); majoritarian electoral systems for the 
legislature should increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence compared to 
proportional and mixed electoral systems for the legislature (Hypothesis 1b); and 
unitary state structures should increase the risk of large-ethnic violence compared to 
federal and mixed state structures (Hypothesis 1c). Before testing these hypotheses 
empirically, it is worth summarising some key descriptives of the formal political 
institutions under consideration (see Tables 3 to 8).  
 
A brief look at the EEI Dataset shows that gain-dispersing forms of government and 
gain-dispersing electoral systems for the legislature are much more common in 
basically open regimes than winner-takes-all forms of government and winner-takes-
all electoral systems: From a total of 7266 country year observations in the EEI 
Dataset, gain-dispersing (i.e. parliamentary and mixed) forms of government can be 
found in 2308 cases (31.8% of all observations), while winner-takes-all (i.e. 
presidential) forms of government can be found in only 1042 cases (14.3% of all 
observations) (see Table 3). Likewise, gain-dispersing (i.e. proportional and mixed) 
electoral systems for the legislature exist in 2033 out of 7266 country year 
observations (27.9% of all observations), compared to 1327 observations of winner-
takes-all (i.e. majoritarian) electoral systems (18.3% of all observations) (see Table 
4).  
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Presidential 
form of 
government 
Parliamentary 
form of 
government 
Mixed 
form of 
government 
Autocratic 
form of 
government 
Residual 
category 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(Total) 
1042 (14.3%) 1813 (25%) 495 (6.8%) 3906 (53.8%) 10 (0.1%) 
 
Table 3: Total Number of Observations of Different Forms of Government in the EEI Dataset.  
 
 
 
Majoritarian 
electoral system 
Proportional 
electoral system 
Mixed  
electoral system 
Electoral system 
under basically 
closed regime 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(Total) 
1327 (18.3%) 1550 (21.3%) 483 (6.6%) 3906 (53.8%) 
 
Table 4: Total Number of Observations of Different Electoral Systems in the EEI Dataset.  
 
 
The picture is very different when looking at state structures in basically open 
regimes. Here – in contrast to the patterns of different forms of government and 
electoral systems for the legislature – winner-takes-all institutions are much more 
common than their gain-dispersing counterparts: As Table 5 illustrates, the EEI 
Dataset records 2112 country year observations of winner-takes-all (i.e. unitary) state 
structures under a basically open regime (29.1% of all observations), but only 1248 
observations of gain-dispersing (i.e. federal and mixed) state structures (17.2% of all 
observations).
106
 
 
 
 
Unitary  
state structure 
Federal  
state structure 
Mixed  
state structure 
State structure 
under basically 
closed regime 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(Total) 
2112 (29.1%) 683 (9.4%) 565 (7.8%) 3906 (53.8%) 
 
Table 5: Total Number of Observations of Different State Structures in the EEI Dataset.  
 
                                                 
106
 See the graphs in Appendix I for a more detailed illustration of the number and dispersion of 
different forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state structures in the EEI 
Dataset. Please note that the graphs in Appendix I, unlike the numbers presented in Tables 5 and 8, 
do not distinguish between state structures under basically open and basically closed regimes.  
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Rather than looking at the total number of country year observations of gain-
dispersing versus winner-takes-all institutions, one might also be interested to know 
how often specific forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and 
state structures can be observed either during the incidence or absence of ethnic civil 
war. As Tables 6 and 8 illustrate, it is quite striking that the percentages of country 
year observations by incidence and absence of ethnic civil war are all fairly close to 
each other when comparing presidential, parliamentary and mixed forms of 
government as well as unitary, federal and mixed state structures in basically open 
regimes: Here, the proportion of country year observations under the incidence or 
absence of ethnic civil war varies only between 0.1
107
 and 3.5
108
 percentage points. 
This lack of a distinct pattern in Tables 6 and 8 stands in contrast to Table 7, which 
clearly shows that proportional electoral systems can be observed much less 
frequently under the incidence of ethnic civil war than majoritarian or mixed 
electoral systems for the legislature (i.e. only in 3.7% of all its country year 
observations, compared to 12.4% for majoritarian and 13% for mixed electoral 
systems).  
 
 
 
Presidential 
form of 
government 
Parliamentary 
form of 
government 
Mixed 
form of 
government 
Autocratic 
form of 
government 
Residual 
category 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(ethnic war) 
80 (7.7%) 174 (9.6%) 30 (6.1%) 482 (12.3%) 0 (0%) 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(no ethnic war) 
962 (92.3%) 1639 (90.4%) 465 (93.9%) 3424 (87.7%) 10 (100%) 
 
Table 6: Number of Observations of Different Forms of Government in the EEI Dataset by Incidence 
and Absence of Ethnic War.  
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 See the percentages of country year observations of unitary and mixed state structures in Table 8. 
108
 See the percentages of country year observations of parliamentary and mixed forms of government 
in Table 6. 
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Majoritarian 
electoral system 
Proportional 
electoral system 
Mixed  
electoral system 
Electoral system 
under basically 
closed regime 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(ethnic war) 
164 (12.4%) 57 (3.7%) 63 (13%) 482 (12.3%) 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(no ethnic war) 
1163 (87.6%) 1493 (96.3%) 420 (87%) 3424 (87.7%) 
 
Table 7: Number of Observations of Different Electoral Systems in the EEI Dataset by Incidence and 
Absence of Ethnic War.  
 
 
 
Unitary  
state structure 
Federal  
state structure 
Mixed  
state structure 
State structure 
under basically 
closed regime 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(ethnic war) 
168 (8.0%) 70 (10.2%) 46 (8.1%) 482 (12.3%) 
Number of 
country year 
observations 
(no ethnic war) 
1944 (92.0%) 613 (89.8%) 519 (91.9%) 3424 (87.7%) 
 
Table 8: Number of Observations of Different State Structures in the EEI Dataset by Incidence and 
Absence of Ethnic War.  
 
 
As they are purely descriptive, Tables 6 to 8 do not allow us to draw any general 
conclusions about the (arguable) association between specific formal political 
institutions and the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. Hence, I now turn to my 
BTSCS analysis for a more substantive understanding of the relationship between 
institutional design and the odds of ethnic civil war:  
 
To test Hypothesis 1 and its subhypotheses, I use eight statistical models per set of 
formal political institutions. As I employ dummy variables to check the effects of 
winner-takes-all institutions, I restrict my sample to basically open regimes when 
analysing forms of government and electoral systems for the legislature (see Tables 
9, 10 and 11). By doing so, I ensure that my reference categories only include the 
gain-dispersing institutions discussed in sections 3.4. and 3.5., and do not contain 
other forms of government or electoral systems for the legislature that are used under 
an autocratic framework. As mentioned in section 3.3., I use a slightly different 
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approach when analysing different state structures, as their distinction and 
representation-enhancing (or -reducing) effects do not necessarily presuppose a 
democratic setting. Thus, when testing the effects of unitary state structures on the 
risk of ethnic civil war, I begin by including both basically open and basically closed 
regimes in my sample (see Table 12), and only later move to restrict my sample to 
basically open regimes (see Table 13; see also footnote 39).       
 
In order to know how well my statistical models fit the data,
109
 I look at the 
percentages of correctly predicted events (i.e. incidence of ethnic war) and nonevents 
(i.e. no incidence of ethnic war), and whether they lie below or above the threshold 
of 50%. Percentages above this cut value indicate a good model fit for the data, while 
percentages below indicate a bad model fit. The results from my SPSS outputs are as 
follows: 
 
 The statistical models to test the effects of presidentialism (see Table 9) predict 
between 99% and 99.2% of nonevents, and between 91.3% and 93% of events 
correctly.  
 The statistical models to test the effects of majoritarian electoral systems for the 
legislature (see Table 10) predict between 99% and 99.1% of nonevents, and 
between 91.8% and 93.4% of events correctly.  
 The statistical models to test the effects of majoritarian electoral systems for the 
legislature without communal rolls or seat reservations (see Table 11) predict 
between 99% and 99.2% of nonevents, and between 91.8% and 93.1% of events 
correctly.  
 The statistical models to test the effects of unitary state structures with basically 
closed regimes in the sample (see Table 12) predict between 98.7% and 98.8% of 
nonevents, and between 91.8% and 92.1% of events correctly. 
  The statistical models to test the effects of unitary state structures without 
basically closed regimes in the sample (see Table 13) predict between 99.1% and 
99.2% of nonevents, and between 91.3% and 93% of events correctly.  
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 Admittedly, ‘this is a rather crude measure’ (Kanazawa and Jackson 2005:51) of model fit, 
however, it suffices to get a general insight into my models’ performance.  
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All these percentages are reassuring, as they imply that my statistical models fit the 
data well.
110
  
 
As mentioned in section 6.2., the purpose of testing Hypothesis 1 and its 
subhypotheses is to analyse formal political institutions as if they were discrete, 
separable entities, following common practice within the institutional incentives 
approach to ethnic violence (see also section 1.6.). Table 9 presents the results from 
testing the effects of presidentialism on the risk of ethnic civil war (Hypothesis 1a). 
Tables 10 and 11 present the results from testing the effects of majoritarian electoral 
systems for the legislature (Hypothesis 1b), both when considering all types of 
majoritarian electoral system (Table 10) and when considering only those 
majoritarian electoral systems that do not use seat reservations or communal rolls to 
enhance ethnic, national or religious minority representation (Table 11). Tables 12 
and 13 present the results from testing the effects of unitary state structures 
(Hypothesis 1c), when either including (Table 12) or excluding (Table 13) basically 
closed regimes from the sample. As briefly mentioned before, my key independent 
variables in the following tables are all dummy variables, i.e. the ‘presidential form 
of government’ variable takes on the value ‘1’ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, and the value ‘0’ for all years in which 
a country employed a different form of government; the ‘majoritarian electoral 
system’ variables takes on the value ‘1’ for all years in which a country employed a 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature, and the value ‘0’ for all years in 
which a country employed a different electoral system for the legislature; and so 
forth. 
                                                 
110
 When excluding the splines from the statistical models, the numbers of correctly predicted events 
and nonevents change as follows: The statistical models to test the effects of presidentialism then 
predict between 98.6% and 98.8% of nonevents, and between 81.9% and  84% of events correctly. 
The statistical models to test the effects of majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature predict 
between 98.6% and 98.8% of nonevents, and between 81.9% and 83.5% of events correctly. The 
statistical models to test the effects of majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature without 
communal rolls or seat reservations predict between 98.6% and 99% of nonevents, and between 
81.4% and 83.1% of events correctly. The statistical models to test the effects of unitary state 
structures with basically closed regimes in the sample predict between 97.9% and 98% of 
nonevents, and between 78.3% and 83.5% of events correctly. And the statistical models to test the 
effects of unitary state structures without basically closed regimes in the sample predict between 
98.6% and 98.9% of nonevents, and between 81.8% and 86.1% of events correctly. 
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Table 9: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Presidentialism on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Presidential form of governmenta  0.669*   0.732**   0.731** 0.534 0.439 0.339 0.325 0.060
(0.370) (0.371) (0.371) (0.387) (0.395) (0.439) (0.443) (0.472)
Ln GDP per capita a    0.553***    0.564***    0.566***    0.631***    0.704***    0.555***    0.563***    0.515***
(0.157) (0.158) (0.158) (0.160) (0.168) (0.168) (0.171) (0.178)
Ln population sizea   0.259**   0.231**   0.229**   0.223**  0.200*   0.286**   0.290**    0.430***
(0.104) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.108) (0.116) (0.117) (0.143)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.515***    1.542***    1.562***    1.337***    1.250***    1.375***    1.361***   1.094**
(0.417) (0.421) (0.424) (0.427) (0.422) (0.457) (0.460) (0.500)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.414 0.499 0.504 0.633 0.813 0.009 -0.001 -0.440
(0.736) (0.741) (0.740) (0.750) (0.773) (0.785) (0.786) (0.888)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 0.025 0.024 0.034
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Involvement in violent international conflict  1.323*  1.327*  1.434*  1.477*   1.706**   1.697**   1.816**
(0.762) (0.767) (0.778) (0.789) (0.771) (0.772) (0.783)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.187 -0.106 -0.029 -0.155 -0.158 -0.314
(0.448) (0.454) (0.472) (0.452) (0.452) (0.458)
Experience of colonial ruleb   0.782**  0.738*  0.734*   0.987**
(0.379) (0.414) (0.415) (0.485)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.302***
(0.437)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b  0.903*
(0.493)
Level of democracya 0.062 0.063 0.143
(0.082) (0.083) (0.104)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.022**   -0.023**   -0.033**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Status as oil exporter -0.226 -0.212
(0.805) (0.792)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.003
(0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.671
(0.476)
Peace duration    -1.978***    -2.000***    -2.009***    -1.919***    -1.867***    -1.963***    -1.960***    -1.977***
(0.205) (0.207) (0.209) (0.206) (0.203) (0.221) (0.221) (0.224)
Spline_1    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.263 -0.285 -0.245 -0.684 -0.847 -0.065 -0.044 -0.083
(0.547) (0.548) (0.557) (0.612) (0.615) (0.673) (0.678) (0.802)
Observations 2924 2924 2924 2924 2924 2912 2912 2836
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 10: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Majoritarian Electoral Systems on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Majoritarian electoral systema 0.244 0.235 0.230 0.069 -0.004 0.066 0.064 0.347
(0.326) (0.324) (0.324) (0.337) (0.341) (0.356) (0.357) (0.395)
Ln GDP per capita a    0.581***    0.589***    0.589***    0.639***    0.698***    0.553***    0.564***    0.574***
(0.166) (0.167) (0.167) (0.166) (0.172) (0.175) (0.178) (0.192)
Ln population sizea   0.260**   0.239**   0.237**   0.230**  0.208*   0.296**   0.301**    0.435***
(0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110) (0.118) (0.119) (0.141)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.160***    1.160***    1.179***    1.086***    1.062***    1.205***    1.195***  0.997**
(0.372) (0.374) (0.378) (0.380) (0.382) (0.396) (0.398) (0.428)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.635 0.731 0.725 0.798 0.965 0.098 0.081 -0.462
(0.727) (0.734) (0.733) (0.743) (0.766) (0.779) (0.782) (0.878)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.007 -0.005 0.027 0.026 0.031
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Involvement in violent international conflict 1.171 1.172  1.359*  1.423*   1.684**   1.673**   1.835**
(0.773) (0.777) (0.786) (0.793) (0.776) (0.776) (0.792)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.176 -0.089 -0.011 -0.156 -0.158 -0.327
(0.445) (0.451) (0.472) (0.450) (0.450) (0.459)
Experience of colonial ruleb   0.886**   0.810**   0.801**   1.021**
(0.372) (0.402) (0.404) (0.457)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.367***
(0.440)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b   1.053**
(0.477)
Level of democracya 0.070 0.071 0.129
(0.083) (0.083) (0.101)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.024**   -0.025**   -0.031**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Status as oil exporter -0.300 -0.175
(0.817) (0.771)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.004
(0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.828
(0.510)
Peace duration    -2.015***    -2.039***    -2.048***    -1.934***    -1.874***    -1.967***    -1.962***    -1.982***
(0.207) (0.210) (0.212) (0.207) (0.204) (0.221) (0.221) (0.224)
Spline_1    -0.022***    -0.023***    -0.023***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.010***    0.011***    0.011***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.098 -0.100 -0.054 -0.604 -0.781 -0.018 0.005 -0.236
(0.550) (0.552) (0.564) (0.626) (0.633) (0.680) (0.684) (0.824)
Observations 2924 2924 2924 2924 2924 2912 2912 2836
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 11: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Majoritarian Electoral Systems without Communal Rolls or Seat Reservations on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Majoritarian electoral system without -0.204 -0.193 -0.187 -0.410 -0.453 -0.460 -0.476 -0.257
communal rolls or seat reservationsa (0.312) (0.311) (0.312) (0.327) (0.327) (0.334) (0.336) (0.378)
Ln GDP per capita a    0.543***    0.553***    0.554***    0.645***    0.713***    0.554***    0.568***    0.513***
(0.160) (0.161) (0.161) (0.164) (0.172) (0.171) (0.173) (0.179)
Ln population sizea    0.280***   0.258**   0.256**   0.246**   0.220**    0.314***    0.321***    0.425***
(0.106) (0.108) (0.108) (0.110) (0.111) (0.118) (0.119) (0.141)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.173***    1.170***    1.191***    1.054***    1.033***    1.167***    1.153***   1.071**
(0.371) (0.374) (0.377) (0.382) (0.385) (0.398) (0.401) (0.424)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.607 0.702 0.697 0.804 0.995 0.088 0.064 -0.393
(0.726) (0.732) (0.732) (0.744) (0.770) (0.780) (0.782) (0.887)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.006 -0.005 0.030 0.028 0.036
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Involvement in violent international conflict 1.162 1.165  1.388*  1.449*   1.743**   1.730**   1.819**
(0.769) (0.774) (0.793) (0.800) (0.784) (0.785) (0.786)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.174 -0.068 0.004 -0.118 -0.118 -0.269
(0.444) (0.450) (0.472) (0.449) (0.449) (0.461)
Experience of colonial ruleb    1.027***   0.948**   0.942**   1.014**
(0.379) (0.413) (0.415) (0.459)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.463***
(0.436)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b   1.189**
(0.487)
Level of democracya 0.085 0.087 0.161
(0.084) (0.084) (0.103)
Level of democracy squareda    -0.026***  -0.027***    -0.036***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Status as oil exporter -0.413 -0.320
(0.829) (0.812)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.001
(0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.565
(0.499)
Peace duration    -2.019***    -2.042***    -2.051***    -1.919***    -1.862***    -1.952***    -1.945***    -1.968***
(0.207) (0.210) (0.212) (0.207) (0.204) (0.222) (0.221) (0.224)
Spline_1    -0.023***    -0.023***    -0.023***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***    0.010***    0.009***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.056 0.046 0.088 -0.558 -0.726 0.051 0.085 0.019
(0.550) (0.551) (0.561) (0.629) (0.635) (0.684) (0.689) (0.822)
Observations 2924 2924 2924 2924 2924 2912 2912 2836
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 12: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Unitary State Structures on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (including basically closed regimes in sample). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Unitary state structurea    0.765***    0.792***    0.782***    0.698***    0.813***    0.636***    0.613***   0.517**
(0.217) (0.219) (0.219) (0.223) (0.225) (0.226) (0.229) (0.241)
Ln GDP per capita a   0.204**   0.200**   0.199**   0.210**   0.211**   0.191**   0.205**   0.250**
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.098) (0.103)
Ln population sizea    0.386***   0.377***    0.378***    0.372***    0.366***    0.383***    0.382***    0.366***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.076)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    0.574***    0.543***    0.540***   0.405**  0.379*  0.382*  0.385* 0.288
(0.188) (0.189) (0.189) (0.194) (0.197) (0.199) (0.199) (0.216)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation    1.395***    1.427***    1.409***    1.132***    1.339***   0.911**   0.920** 0.665
(0.378) (0.378) (0.381) (0.394) (0.392) (0.403) (0.404) (0.442)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.021  0.025*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.523 0.521  0.697*   0.747**   0.761**   0.772**   0.959**
(0.377) (0.376) (0.375) (0.368) (0.372) (0.371) (0.389)--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.111 0.107 0.022 0.080 0.072 0.081
(0.236) (0.240) (0.245) (0.249) (0.250) (0.258)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.730***    0.775***    0.762***    1.106***
(0.194) (0.199) (0.201) (0.237)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.518**
(0.224)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.061***
(0.245)
Level of democracya -0.024 -0.026 -0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.008**   -0.008**   -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Status as oil exporter -0.175 0.039
(0.259) (0.273)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.007
(0.005)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.206
(0.288)
Peace duration    -1.851***   -1.860***    -1.855***    -1.810***    -1.802***    -1.805***    -1.808***    -1.789***
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.111) (0.114)
Spline_1    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant   -0.920**   -0.944**   -0.952**    -1.120***    -1.219***  -0.808*  -0.757*  -0.833*
(0.398) (0.399) (0.399) (0.407) (0.413) (0.447) (0.454) (0.499)
Observations 6093 6093 6090 6090 6090 6049 6049 5817
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 13: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Unitary State Structures on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (no basically closed regimes in sample). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Unitary state structurea  0.603*  0.609*  0.647*   0.725**   0.827** 0.542 0.535 0.309
(0.340) (0.340) (0.346) (0.357) (0.379) (0.369) (0.370) (0.422)
Ln GDP per capita a    0.574***    0.582***    0.587***    0.672***    0.730***    0.587***    0.595***    0.540***
(0.159) (0.160) (0.161) (0.163) (0.168) (0.170) (0.173) (0.182)
Ln population sizea    0.364***    0.343***    0.345***    0.342***    0.334***    0.378***    0.380***    0.448***
(0.116) (0.117) (0.118) (0.120) (0.123) (0.127) (0.128) (0.142)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.139***    1.127***    1.159***    1.018***   0.982**    1.142***    1.136***   1.052**
(0.369) (0.372) (0.375) (0.381) (0.383) (0.398) (0.399) (0.423)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.674 0.755 0.754 0.915 1.214 0.273 0.259 -0.151
(0.728) (0.733) (0.732) (0.747) (0.784) (0.785) (0.788) (0.961)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.018 -0.018 -0.020 -0.009 -0.006 0.024 0.023 0.032
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Involvement in violent international conflict 1.146 1.151  1.380*  1.465*   1.679**   1.672**   1.795**
(0.746) (0.753) (0.772) (0.777) (0.766) (0.766) (0.781)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.313 -0.204 -0.167 -0.229 -0.230 -0.341
(0.444) (0.451) (0.474) (0.451) (0.451) (0.459)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.956***   0.882**   0.874**   0.995**
(0.366) (0.401) (0.403) (0.456)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.345***
(0.437)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.342***
(0.491)
Level of democracya 0.071 0.072 0.145
(0.083) (0.083) (0.102)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.023**   -0.024**   -0.032**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Status as oil exporter -0.204 -0.195
(0.780) (0.775)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.004
(0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.504
(0.531)
Peace duration    -1.983***    -2.002***    -2.016***    -1.891***    -1.818***    -1.938***    -1.936***    -1.963***
(0.205) (0.207) (0.210) (0.204) (0.201) (0.219) (0.219) (0.224)
Spline_1    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.023***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.010***    0.010***    0.011***    0.010***    0.009***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.694 -0.699 -0.667  -1.447*   -1.832** -0.717 -0.692 -0.556
(0.656) (0.656) (0.659) (0.755) (0.802) (0.828) (0.834) (1.033)
Observations 2924 2924 2924 2924 2924 2912 2912 2836
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Taken together, the results presented in Tables 9 to 13 do not lead to any clear 
conclusions about the effects of winner-takes-all compared to gain-dispersing 
institutions on the risk of large-scale ethnic violence: While holding the different 
control variables constant, the ‘presidential form of government’ variable has a 
statistically significant effect on the incidence of ethnic war in only three out of eight 
models, at the 10% (Model 1) and 5% (Models 2 and 3) significance level 
respectively (see Table 9). According to its exp(b) coefficient (i.e. its odds ratio),
111
 
and while holding all other variables constant, a presidential form of government 
increases the odds of large-scale ethnic violence by 1.952 compared to non-
presidential forms of government in Model 1; by 2.079 in Model 2; and by 2.077 in 
Model 3.  
 
Again holding the different control variables constant, neither the ‘majoritarian 
electoral system’ nor the ‘majoritarian electoral system without communal rolls or 
seat reservations’ variable have a statistically significant effect on the incidence of 
ethnic war in any of the statistical models presented in Tables 10 and 11.
112
 Hence, 
when controlling for all other variables, there is no statistically significant difference 
between presidential forms of government and non-presidential forms of government 
regarding their impact on the incidence of ethnic war in most of my statistical models 
in Table 9, and no statistically significant difference between majoritarian and non-
majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature in any of my statistical models in 
Tables 10 and 11. Crudely put, the results from Tables 9, 10 and 11 imply that, while 
holding the control variables constant, it generally does not matter for the risk of 
large-scale ethnic violence whether the form of government or electoral system for 
the legislature in basically open regimes are based on winner-takes-all rules.   
 
                                                 
111
 The exp(b) coefficients are reported in the SPSS outputs for my statistical models, but not included 
in the tables presented in this chapter. 
112
 Leaving their statistical insignificance aside, it is nonetheless interesting to note that the 
‘majoritarian electoral system’ variable has a positive coefficient sign in all statistical models apart 
from Model 5 (see Table 10), and that – by contrast – the ‘majoritarian electoral system without 
communal rolls or seat reservations’ variable has a negative coefficient sign in all statistical 
models (see Table 11). Future research on the effects of ‘backdoor mechanisms to ensure minority 
representation’ (Reynolds 2005:307) might wish to analyse possible causes for this phenomenon in 
more detail. See also section 5.5. for a list of basically open regimes that (according to the EEI 
Dataset) have employed majoritarian electoral systems with communal rolls or seat reservations to 
enhance ethnic, national or religious minority representation.     
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By contrast, the ‘unitary state structure’ variable has a statistically significant impact 
on the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence in all statistical models presented in 
Table 12 while holding the different control variables constant. Its level of statistical 
significance is at 1% in Models 1 through 7, and only drops slightly to the 5% level 
in Model 8. These results seem to indicate that a unitary state structure – in contrast 
to a presidential form of government and majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature – is the only single, formal political institution associated with a low 
number of possible political winners according to Table 1 (section 3.7.) whose 
impact on the incidence of ethnic war is statistically significantly different from its 
gain-dispersing counterparts in all statistical models under consideration. According 
to its exp(b) coefficient, and while holding all other variables constant, a unitary state 
structure increases the odds of large-scale ethnic violence by 2.150 compared to non-
unitary state structures in Model 1; by 2.208 in Model 2; by 2.187 in Model 3; by 
2.011 in Model 4; by 2.255 in Model 5; by 1.890 in Model 6; by 1.845 in Model 7; 
and by 1.677 in Model 8. 
  
On the other hand, however, it is important to bear in mind that the sample used to 
test the effects of unitary state structures in Table 12 – unlike the samples used to test 
the effects of presidentialism and majoritarian electoral systems in Tables 9 to 11 – 
includes both basically open and basically closed regimes. Thus, to see how the 
aforementioned results might change, I test the effects of unitary state structures 
again while restricting my sample to basically open regimes (see Table 13). This test 
also addresses possible arguments (mentioned in section 3.3.) that unitary and non-
unitary state structures can be meaningfully distinguished only under a democratic 
framework. 
 
Interestingly, the results reported in Table 13 indeed indicate some relevant changes 
compared to the results reported in Table 12: When restricting my sample to 
basically open regimes, and while holding the different control variables constant, 
the ‘unitary state structure’ variable is still statistically significant in most of my 
statistical models (i.e. Models 1 to 5), but no longer in all of them. At the same time, 
also the levels of statistical significance for the ‘unitary state structure’ variable drop 
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to the 10% significance level in Models 1 to 3, and to the 5% significance level in 
Models 4 and 5. According to its exp(b) coefficient, and while holding all other 
variables constant,  a unitary state structure under a basically open regime increases 
the odds of large-scale ethnic violence by 1.828 compared to non-unitary state 
structures in Model 1; by 1.839 in Model 2; by 1.911 in Model 3; by 2.064 in Model 
4; and by 2.285 in Model 5.  
 
Overall, the results reported in Tables 9 to 13 thus provide insufficient grounds to 
reject the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 1, i.e.: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (NULL): (Individual) formal political institutions that rely on 
winner-takes-all principles do not increase the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence compared to (individual) formal political institutions that seek to 
disperse political gains.  
 
Put differently, when analysing political institutions as discrete, separable entities, 
the conclusions we can draw from our statistical results are contradictory at best and 
anticlimactic at worst. They are contradictory at best, as the design of some formal 
political institutions – specifically state structures – seems to matter more for the risk 
of large-scale ethnic violence than that of others (see in particular Table 12 compared 
to Tables 9, 10 and 11). They are anticlimactic at worst, as most statistical models in 
this section indicate that – contrary to the arguments presented in chapters 2 and 3 – 
it simply does not matter for the odds of large-scale ethnic violence whether formal 
political institutions are based on winner-takes-all principles. Yet, as I will highlight 
in section 6.5., these conclusions are a direct consequence of the one-dimensionality 
of the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence, as a much clearer picture 
emerges about the relationship between winner-takes-all institutional design and the 
risk of large-scale ethnic violence when analysing institutional combinations rather 
than individual, formal political institutions.  
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Before turning to the BTSCS analysis of institutional combinations in the next 
section, a few results regarding the control variables in Tables 9 to 13 ought to be 
mentioned briefly: 
 
 While holding all other variables constant, several control variables do not have a 
statistically significant impact on the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence in 
any of the statistical models presented in Tables 9 to 13. They include the variables 
on recent experience of political instability, level of democracy, status as oil 
exporter, per cent of mountainous terrain and noncontiguous country structure. 
 The ‘level of ethnic fractionalisation’ and ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ 
variables only reach statistical significance in Table 12, which tests the effects of 
unitary state structures on the risk of ethnic civil war under both basically open 
and basically closed regimes. According to Models 1 to 7 in Table 12, the ‘level of 
ethnic fractionalisation’ variable has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
incidence of ethnic war (at the 1% significance level in Models 1 to 5, and the 5% 
significance level in Models 6 and 7) while holding all other variables constant. 
Although these results are tentative at best – as the ‘level of ethnic 
fractionalisation’ variable does not reach statistical significance in most statistical 
models in Tables 9 to 13 –, they nonetheless seem to lend some support to the 
argument that the risk of large-scale ethnic violence increases with high rather than 
low levels of ethnic diversity (cf. e.g. Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002b; see also 
section 5.8.).  
According to Model 8 in Table 12, also the ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ 
variable has a statistically significant positive effect on the incidence of ethnic war 
(at the 10% level) while holding all other variables constant.
113
 This result is 
surprising, as it seems to indicate – following the operationalisation of the ‘level of 
socioeconomic inequalities’ variable (see section 5.8. and the EEI Dataset 
                                                 
113
 In nearly all cases when the ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ variable reaches statistical 
significance in any of my statistical models (see Tables 12, 20 and 21 in this chapter, and Tables 2- 
6, 8, 12, 16-19 and 22 in Appendix II), it has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
incidence of ethnic civil war. Only in Models 1 to 4 in Table 14 in Appendix II has the ‘level of 
socioeconomic inequalities’ variable a statistically significant negative effect on the incidence of 
ethnic civil war.  
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Codebook in Appendix III) – that an increase in socioeconomic equality should 
lead to an increase in the risk of ethnic civil war. Overall, however, we can easily 
dismiss the relevance of this result, as the ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ 
variable is clearly not robust, given that it reaches statistical significance only 
under very few model specifications (see the tables listed under footnote 113). 
 Unlike the ‘level of democracy’ variable, the ‘level of democracy squared’ 
variable is statistically significant whenever it is included in a statistical model in 
Tables 9 to 13. To be precise, the ‘level of democracy squared’ variable has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the incidence of ethnic war in Models 6, 
7 and 8 in Tables 9 to 13 while holding all other variables constant. These results 
are in line with Hegre et al.’s (2001) findings of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between levels of democracy and the risk of violent intrastate conflict (see also 
section 5.8.).  
 Unsurprisingly, while holding all other variables constant, the ‘population size’ 
variable has a statistically significant positive effect and the ‘peace duration’ a 
statistically significant negative effect on the incidence of ethnic war in all models 
in Tables 9 to 13. These results lend support to arguments that a large population 
increases the risk of civil war (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2000 cited in Elbadawi 
and Sambanis 2002b; Fearon and Laitin 2003a; Hegre and Sambanis 2006) and 
that the risk of ethnic war should decrease the longer a country is at peace (cf. 
Hegre and Sambanis 2006; see also section 5.8.).  
 Holding all other variables constant, the ‘incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring 
country’ variable has a statistically significant positive impact on the incidence of 
ethnic war in all statistical models apart from Model 8 in Table 12. These results 
further substantiate arguments on the likely spatial interdependence of ethnic civil 
wars (see e.g. Lake and Rothchild 1998; see also section 5.8.). 
 The ‘involvement in violent international conflict’ variable114 reaches statistical 
significance in all statistical models in which it is included apart from Models 2 
                                                 
114
 As stated in section 5.8., the EEI Dataset contains several dummy variables to mark a country’s 
involvement in violent international conflict. Hence, it should be clarified that all statistical models 
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and 3 in Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13. While holding all other variables constant, it has 
a statistically significant positive impact on the incidence of ethnic war, thus 
lending support to arguments that a country’s involvement in a violent interstate 
conflict increases the risk of intrastate violence (cf. Hegre et al. 2001; see also 
section 5.8.).    
 The ‘experience of colonial rule’ variable115 has a statistically significant positive 
effect on the incidence of ethnic war whenever it is included in a statistical model 
in Tables 9 to 13. In line with the expectations outlined in section 5.8. – and while 
holding all other variables constant –, countries that used to be under colonial rule 
are thus at a higher risk of ethnic civil war than countries that did not use to be 
colonies.  
In order to account for the effects of different colonial styles (cf. Blanton, Mason 
and Athow 2001; see section 5.8.), Model 5 in Tables 9 to 13 replaces the 
‘experience of colonial rule’ variable with two dummy variables on the experience 
of British colonial rule, and experience of non-British and non-French colonial 
rule respectively (‘BritRul’ and ‘OthRul’ in the EEI Dataset Codebook, Appendix 
III). Following the example of Henderson (2000), I thus use my dummy variable 
on the experience of French colonial rule (‘FrenRul’ in the EEI Dataset Codebook) 
as baseline. Holding all other variables constant, the ‘experience of colonial rule 
(British)’ and ‘experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)’ variables 
have a statistically significant positive effect whenever they are included in my 
statistical models. In line with Henderson’s (2000) findings, this indicates that 
countries that used to be ruled by a colonial power other than the French are at a 
higher risk of ethnic civil war than former French colonies.  
 Finally, the probably most surprising finding in my data analysis is that – when 
holding all other variables constant – the ‘GDP per capita’ variable has a 
statistically significant positive impact on the incidence of ethnic war in all models 
                                                                                                                                          
in this chapter use the dummy variable on involvement in an extrasystemic or interstate armed 
conflict (see ‘InterCon’ in the EEI Dataset Codebook, Appendix III). 
115
 As stated underneath the tables reporting my statistical results, all statistical models in this chapter 
use the dummy variable that marks all years of those countries which, at any point between 1946 
and 2007, either were ruled under a League of Nations mandate or used to be a colony, 
protectorate or UN trust territory (see ‘RulExp2’ in the EEI Dataset Codebook, Appendix III). 
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in Tables 9 to 13. According to my statistical models, an increase in a country’s 
level of economic development (as measured in GDP per capita levels) thus 
should lead to an increase in the risk of ethnic civil war while holding all other 
variables constant. At first sight, these results seem to stand in direct contradiction 
to well-known arguments in the civil wars literature that low (not high) levels of 
GDP per capita should be associated with an increase in the risk of intrastate 
violence (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003a; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; see also 
section 5.8.). A closer look at the academic debate, however, reveals that my 
results are not necessarily that digressive, as the aforementioned robust findings of 
a negative association between a country’s GDP per capita levels and the risk of 
violent intrastate conflict refer to the relationship between GDP per capita levels 
and the onset of civil war (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003a; Hegre and Sambanis 
2006). By contrast, my analysis focuses on the incidence of ethnic civil war, as my 
dependent variable identifies the occurrence of large-scale ethnic violence in any 
given country year, no matter whether it is the first conflict year or a continuation 
year (see also section 5.3.). Hence, unlike the research by authors such as Hegre 
and Sambanis (2006), my data analysis focuses exclusively on ethnic civil wars as 
a particular type of large-scale intrastate violence (see also section 1.3.), and 
captures the impact of levels of GDP per capita on both their onset and 
continuation.
116
 The fact that my statistical models in this and the following 
section consistently point to a statistically significant positive relationship between 
GDP per capita levels and the incidence of ethnic war (while holding all other 
variables constant) thus clearly deserves further attention in future research, and 
contributes to recent arguments that the impact of GDP per capita on the risk of 
civil war is still far from perfectly clear (cf. e.g. Brückner 2011; Djankov and 
Reynal-Querol 2010).  
 
Apart from changing my key independent variables from individual formal political 
institutions to institutional combinations, my statistical models in section 6.5. remain 
the same as in this section. As there are no major changes regarding the effects of my 
                                                 
116
 Interestingly, also Reynal-Querol (2002) finds a positive (although not statistically significant) 
relationship between levels of GDP per capita and the incidence of ethnic civil war in most of her 
statistical models while holding her other variables constant.  
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control variables in Tables 14, 16 and 17 in section 6.5. compared to Tables 9 to 13 
in this section,
117
 I will not interpret them again. Instead, the next section will 
concentrate on the effects of institutional combinations on the incidence of ethnic 
war while holding the control variables constant.     
 
 
6.5. The Effects of Institutional Combinations  
 
According to Hypothesis 2, institutional combinations which provide a relatively low 
number of possible political winners are expected to increase the risk of large-scale 
ethnic violence compared to institutional combinations that provide a higher number 
of possible political winners (see section 6.2.). Hence, in particular institutional 
combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature and unitary state structure should increase the risk of large-scale 
ethnic violence compared to all other possible combinations of different forms of 
government, electoral systems for the legislature and state structures (Hypothesis 2a). 
 
                                                 
117
 To be precise, the ‘GDP per capita’, ‘population size’, ‘experience of colonial rule (British)’ and 
‘experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)’ variables continue to exercise a 
statistically significant positive effect, and the ‘peace duration’ variable a statistically significant 
negative effect on the incidence of ethnic war in all statistical models in Tables 14, 16 and 17 
while holding all other variables constant. Likewise, the ‘recent experience of political instability’, 
‘status as oil exporter’, ‘per cent of mountainous terrain’ and ‘noncontiguous country structure’ 
variables still do not reach statistical significance in any of the statistical models in Tables 14, 16 
and 17 while holding all other variables constant. As a slight change to the results reported in 
Tables 9 to 13, and holding the other variables constant, the ‘level of ethnic fractionalisation’ and 
‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ variables do not reach statistical significance in any of the 
statistical models presented in Tables 14, 16 and 17. Moreover, the ‘level of democracy squared’ 
and ‘experience of colonial rule’ variables are no longer statistically significant whenever they are 
included in a statistical model (see Tables 9 to 13), but lose their statistical significance in Models 
6 and 7 in Table 17, and Models 6 and 7 in Table 14 respectively while holding the other variables 
constant. Surprisingly, the ‘level of democracy’ variable exercises a statistically significant 
positive effect on the incidence of ethnic war (while holding the other variables constant) 
according to Model 8 in Table 16. This result, however, can be easily dismissed, as it is clearly not 
robust to different model specifications, given that this is the only model in sections 6.4. and 6.5. 
in which this variable reaches statistical significance. Similarly to Tables 9 to 13, the ‘incidence of 
ethnic war in a neighbouring country’ and ‘involvement in violent international conflict’ variables 
are not always statistically significant in Tables 14, 16 and 17 when holding all other variables 
constant (see Model 8 in Table 16, and Models 2 and 3 in Table 14 as well as Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 
in Tables 16 and 17 respectively). When they do reach statistical significance, both variables 
continue to exercise a positive effect on the incidence of ethnic war while holding the other 
variables constant.  
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To test Hypothesis 2 and its subhypothesis, I use eight statistical models per set(s) of 
institutional combinations. As I employ dummy variables to check the effects of 
different institutional combinations, I again restrict my sample to basically open 
regimes (see Tables 14 to 17). By doing so, I ensure that my reference categories 
only include institutional combinations with the gain-dispersing institutions 
discussed in sections 3.4. and 3.5., and do not contain other forms of government or 
electoral systems for the legislature that are used under an autocratic framework. As 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix I illustrate, certain institutional combinations (such as of 
a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature 
and mixed state structure, or of a mixed form of government, mixed electoral system 
for the legislature and mixed state structure) can be observed in very few country 
years. I therefore merge the dummy variables listed in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix I 
(excluding the ones on autocracies) into larger categories, to increase the number of 
country year observations per category and avoid an inflation of my standard errors. 
To be precise, I subsume the different institutional combinations listed in Tables 1 
and 2 in Appendix I (excluding the ones on autocracies) into the following eight 
dummy variables: 
 
 a dummy variable that marks all years in which a country employed a 
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure; 
 a dummy variable that marks all years in which a country employed a 
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and non-unitary (i.e. federal or mixed) state structure; 
 a dummy variables that marks all years in which a country employed a 
presidential form of government, non-majoritarian (i.e. proportional or 
mixed) electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure; 
 a dummy variable that marks all years in which a country employed a 
presidential form of government, non-majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and non-unitary state structure; 
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 a dummy variable that marks all years in which a country employed a non-
presidential (i.e. parliamentary or mixed) form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure; 
 a dummy variable that marks all years in which a country employed a non-
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and non-unitary state structure; 
 a dummy variable that marks all years in which a country employed a non-
presidential form of government, non-majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure; and 
 a dummy variable that marks all years in which a country employed a non-
presidential form of government, non-majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and non-unitary state structure. 
 
In order to know how well my statistical models in Tables 14, 16 and 17 fit the data, 
I look at the percentages of correctly predicted events (i.e. incidence of ethnic war) 
and nonevents (i.e. no incidence of ethnic war), and whether they lie below or above 
the threshold of 50% (see also section 6.4.). The according results from my SPSS 
outputs are as follows: 
 
 The statistical models to test the effects of institutional combinations of a 
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature 
and unitary state structure (see Table 14) predict between 99% and 99.1% of 
nonevents, and between 91.3% and 92.9% of events correctly.   
 The statistical models to test the effects of institutional arrangements using 
combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system 
for the legislature and unitary state structure as baseline (see Table 16) predict 
between 99% and 99.2% of nonevents, and between 91.8% and 93.1% of events 
correctly.  
 The statistical models to test the effects of institutional arrangements using 
combinations of a non-presidential form of government, non-majoritarian electoral 
system for the legislature and non-unitary state structure as baseline (see Table 17) 
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predict between 99% and 99.1% of nonevents, and between 91.8% and 93% of 
events correctly.
118
  
 
All these percentages are reassuring, as they imply that my statistical models fit the 
data well.  
 
As mentioned in section 6.2., the purpose of testing Hypothesis 2 and its 
subhypothesis is to move beyond the mere focus on single, formal political 
institutions by addressing the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism. 
As elaborated in chapter 3, this dimension highlights the need for scholars belonging 
to the institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence to pay greater attention to 
the specific combination of formal political institutions in a given political system 
and the overall number of possible political winners it provides. Tables 14 and 15 
present the results from testing the effects of institutional combinations of a 
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure on the risk of ethnic civil war. Tables 16 and 17 present the 
results from testing the effects of a variety of different institutional arrangements on 
the risk of ethnic civil war, using either combinations of a presidential form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure (Table 16) or combinations of a non-presidential form of government, non-
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and non-unitary state structure (Table 
17) as baseline.  
                                                 
118
 When excluding the splines from the statistical models, the numbers of correctly predicted events 
and nonevents change as follows: The statistical models to test the effects of institutional 
combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure then predict between 98.6% and 98.9% of nonevents, and 
between 81.9% and 84.8% of events correctly. The statistical models to test the effects of 
institutional arrangements using combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure as baseline predict between 98.7% 
and 99% of nonevents, and between 82.3% and 85.7% of events correctly. And the statistical 
models to test the effects of institutional arrangements using combinations of a non-presidential 
form of government, non-majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and non-unitary state 
structure as baseline predict between 98.6% and 98.9% of nonevents, and between 82.3% and 
84.8% of events correctly. 
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Table 14: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System for the Legislature and 
Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of   2.011**    2.057***    2.061***   1.707**   1.561**  1.545*  1.534*  1.468*
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.778) (0.781) (0.783) (0.780) (0.781) (0.842) (0.842) (0.866)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a     0.599***     0.609***    0.610***     0.662***     0.729***    0.582***    0.590***    0.553***
(0.159) (0.160) (0.160) (0.161) (0.168) (0.170) (0.172) (0.181)
Ln population sizea     0.276***    0.252**   0.248**   0.234**  0.207*   0.297**   0.301**    0.428***
(0.105) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.116) (0.117) (0.141)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.344***    1.343***    1.368***    1.234***    1.180***    1.382***    1.375***    1.228***
(0.379) (0.383) (0.387) (0.391) (0.391) (0.413) (0.415) (0.438)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.445 0.542 0.552 0.631 0.784 0.026 0.010 -0.439
(0.744) (0.751) (0.750) (0.757) (0.777) (0.790) (0.793) (0.893)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.007 -0.005 0.024 0.023 0.031
(0.016) (0.362) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Involvement in violent international conflict 1.246 1.253  1.402*  1.465*   1.701**   1.693**   1.838**
(0.768) (0.773) (0.785) (0.794) (0.779) (0.780) (0.790)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.202 -0.104 -0.042 -0.183 -0.185 -0.351
(0.452) (0.456) (0.471) (0.457) (0.457) (0.466)
Experience of colonial ruleb  0.736* 0.640 0.633  0.841*
(0.377) (0.410) (0.412) (0.470)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.231***
(0.441)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b  0.907*
(0.469)
Level of democracya 0.067 0.068 0.131
(0.081) (0.082) (0.100)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.023**   -0.023**   -0.030**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Status as oil exporter -0.235 -0.156
(0.832) (0.799)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.004
(0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.666
(0.479)
Peace duration    -2.004***    -2.028***    -2.038***    -1.948***    -1.889***    -1.994***    -1.990***    -1.999***
(0.205) (0.207) (0.209) (0.207) (0.204) (0.222) (0.223) (0.226)
Spline_1    -0.022***    -0.023***    -0.023***    -0.022***    -0.021***    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2     0.010***     0.011***     0.011***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.153 -0.159 -0.112 -0.582 -0.762 -0.053 -0.034 -0.173
(0.544) (0.546) (0.556) (0.619) (0.619) (0.674) (0.678) (0.809)
Observations 2924 2924 2924 2924 2924 2912 2912 2836
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 15: Marginal Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government,  
Majoritarian Electoral System for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of 
Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007. 
 
 
Following the results reported in Table 14, the ‘combination of a presidential form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system and unitary state structure’ variable has a 
statistically significant impact on the incidence of ethnic war in all statistical models 
while holding the different control variables constant. Its level of statistical 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Combination of a presidential form of    0.463***    0.472***    0.473***   0.401**   0.370**
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.171) (0.176)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a  0.127* 0.127  0.129* 0.136  0.153*
(0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.083) (0.089)
Ln population sizea 0.059 0.053 0.052 0.048 0.043
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country 0.203 0.198 0.203 0.182 0.183
(0.126) (0.127) (0.129) (0.121) (0.120)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.094 0.113 0.116 0.129 0.164
(0.172) (0.176) (0.177) (0.179) (0.193)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.297 0.299  0.332*  0.349*
(0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.185)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.041 -0.021 -0.009
(0.091) (0.091) (0.098)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.160
(0.100)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.285**
(0.120)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b  0.213*
(0.123)
Level of democracya
Level of democracy squareda
Status as oil exporter
Per cent of mountainous terrain
Noncontiguous country structure
Peace duration    -0.425***    -0.424***    -0.430***   -0.399**   -0.396**
(0.155) (0.163) (0.162) (0.164) (0.156)
Spline_1    -0.005***   -0.005**    -0.005***   -0.004**   -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.002***   0.002**   0.002**   0.002**   0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3   0.000**   0.000**   0.000**   0.000**   0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln GDP per capita, ln population size and level of ethnic fractionalisation set to their maximum values;  incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country 
set to 1; level of socioeconomic inequalities set to its minimum value; all other independent variables set to their means. 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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significance is at 1% in Models 2 and 3, 5% in Models 1, 4 and 5, and 10% in 
Models 6 to 8. According to its exp(b) coefficient (i.e. its odds ratio), and while 
holding all other variables constant, institutional combinations of a presidential form 
of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure increase the odds of large-scale ethnic violence by 7.468 compared to all 
other combinations of different forms of government, electoral systems for the 
legislature and state structures in Model 1; by 7.825 in Model 2; by 7.852 in Model 
3; by 5.510 in Model 4; by 4.762 in Model 5; by 4.690 in Model 6; by 4.635 in 
Model 7; and by 4.342 in Model 8. 
 
Rather than just looking at odds ratios, we also might be interested to know the 
marginal effects of combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure on the risk of ethnic 
civil war. Before the computation of such marginal effects, researchers need to 
consider carefully at which values they would like to set their independent variables, 
as marginal effects differ depending on different value specifications (see Long and 
Freese 2006). As there is no particular rule for the specification of such values other 
than the researcher’s interest (cf. ibid.), I choose to set my ‘core’ control variables 
(i.e. the ones which appear in all my statistical models in Table 14) at the following 
values: the ‘GDP per capita’, ‘population size’ and ‘level of ethnic fractionalisation’ 
variables at their maximum values; the ‘incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring 
country’ variable to ‘1’; and the ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ variable to its 
minimum value. All other independent variables are set to their means. Based on the 
arguments outlined in sections 5.8. and 6.4., these value specifications should 
simulate an environment which is relatively favourable to the incidence of large-
scale ethnic violence.
119
   
 
                                                 
119
 Following the arguments presented in section 5.8. and the control variable results reported in 
section 6.4., high levels of GDP per capita, a large population size, high levels of ethnic 
fractionalisation and the incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country are all factors that 
contribute to the risk of ethnic civil war. Although the ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ 
variable is rarely statistically significant in my models (see section 6.4.), I nonetheless set it to its 
minimum value, following theoretical arguments that a highly unequal society should make the 
incidence of large-scale ethnic violence more likely (see section 5.8.).  
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The results in Table 15 show that, under these assigned values, institutional 
combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature and unitary state structure increase the probability of large-scale ethnic 
violence by 46.3% compared to all other combinations of different forms of 
government, electoral systems for the legislature and state structures in Model 1; by 
47.2% in Model 2; by 47.3% in Model 3; by 40.1% in Model 4; and by 37% in 
Model 5.
120
  
 
Using the same sets of control variables for my statistical models as in section 6.4., a 
much clearer picture thus emerges about the relationship between winner-takes-all 
institutional design and the risk of large-scale ethnic violence when analysing 
institutional combinations rather than individual, formal political institutions. While 
most of the results reported in Tables 9 to 13 (section 6.4.) seemed to indicate that it 
simply does not matter for the odds of large-scale ethnic violence whether formal 
political institutions are based on winner-takes-all principles, Tables 14 and 15 
illustrate clearly that (holding the different control variables constant) institutional 
combinations which are associated with a particularly low number of possible 
political winners increase the risk of ethnic civil war compared to institutional 
combinations that provide a higher number of possible political winners (see also 
section 3.7.). This finding is particularly notable, given that it is robust to all eight 
model specifications in Table 14.   
 
Taken together, the results reported in Tables 14 and 15 have two key implications: 
First, they lend empirical support to my grievance-based explanation of violent 
intrastate conflict outlined in chapter 2, as they depict the apparent link between high 
levels of political exclusiveness and the risk of ethnic civil war. Second, and even 
more importantly, they demonstrate the relevance of the first dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism, as they highlight the importance of combinations of 
formal political institutions and the overall number of possible political winners they 
                                                 
120
 I only report the results from Models 1 to 5, as – under the aforementioned value specifications – 
the marginal effects of the ‘combination of a presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system and unitary state structure’ variable lose their statistical significance in Models 6 
to 8. 
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provide: As section 6.4. illustrated, the analysis of formal political institutions as 
discrete, separable entities leads to rather contradictory if not anticlimactic 
conclusions regarding the impact of winner-takes-all institutions on the risk of ethnic 
civil war. Only when we analyse specific institutional combinations (while holding 
our various control variables constant), it becomes apparent that the odds of large-
scale ethnic violence are related to the total number of possible political winners 
within a political system. These results illustrate that it is not just of secondary, but of 
crucial relevance for our understanding about the relationship between institutional 
design and the risk of ethnic civil war which political institutions are combined with 
each other in a given political system. Consequently, scholars belonging to the 
institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence need to overcome its current one-
dimensionality, and pay greater attention to the fact that the effects of political 
institutions such as forms of government or electoral systems do not occur as isolated 
phenomena, but necessarily depend on the broader set of political institutions that are 
joint within a political system.  
 
Before concluding this section, we also might be interested to know how institutional 
combinations other than those of a presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure influence the risk of 
large-scale ethnic violence. For this purpose, Tables 16 and 17 report the results from 
testing the effects of different institutional combinations on the risk of ethnic civil 
war, using either combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure (Table 16) or 
combinations of a non-presidential form of government, non-majoritarian electoral 
system for the legislature and non-unitary state structure (Table 17) as baseline. Put 
differently, Table 16 uses institutional combinations which provide a particularly low 
number of possible political winners as baseline, while Table 17 uses institutional 
combinations which provide a particularly high number of possible political winners 
as baseline (see also Table 1, section 3.7.).  
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Table 16: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007; 
Baseline: Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of -0.749 -0.706 -0.705 -1.038 -1.120 -0.939 -0.941 -0.916
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.971) (0.964) (0.965) (1.014) (1.070) (1.045) (1.048) (1.104)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of -0.497 -0.484 -0.483 -0.387 -0.414 -0.360 -0.367 -0.589
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.631) (0.631) (0.631) (0.665) (0.689) (0.806) (0.812) (0.863)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of  -1.439*  -1.384*  -1.385*   -1.764**   -1.953** -1.501 -1.507 -1.486
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.794) (0.792) (0.792) (0.887) (0.984) (0.965) (0.970) (1.007)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of  -1.082*  -1.069*  -1.064* -0.988 -0.900 -0.753 -0.756 -0.648
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.606) (0.606) (0.609) (0.616) (0.638) (0.758) (0.760) (0.777)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of -0.787 -0.855 -0.860 -0.869 -0.916 -0.645 -0.650 -0.352
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.590) (0.592) (0.595) (0.605) (0.611) (0.728) (0.732) (0.781)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of -0.699 -0.777 -0.776 -0.573 -0.441 -0.300 -0.303 -0.463
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.674) (0.674) (0.674) (0.682) (0.695) (0.880) (0.883) (0.936)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of    -2.247***    -2.204***    -2.197***   -1.905**   -1.845** -1.469 -1.457 -1.236
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.776) (0.775) (0.781) (0.805) (0.816) (0.974) (0.986) (1.003)
and non-unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.602***    0.616***    0.616***    0.676***    0.741***    0.576***    0.578***    0.559***
(0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.172) (0.177) (0.184) (0.186) (0.200)
Ln population sizea    0.350***   0.325**   0.325**    0.348***   0.341**    0.383***    0.384***    0.479***
(0.125) (0.126) (0.170) (0.128) (0.135) (0.140) (0.140) (0.154)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   1.098**    1.144***    1.149***   0.945**  0.858*   1.011**   1.011** 0.814
(0.430) (0.434) (0.439) (0.441) (0.442) (0.472) (0.473) (0.497)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.312 0.387 0.391 0.565 0.851 0.133 0.129 -0.348
(0.754) (0.760) (0.761) (0.775) (0.828) (0.802) (0.804) (0.990)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.009 -0.008 0.019 0.018 0.029
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.961 0.965 1.130 1.209  1.439*  1.439*   1.635**
(0.769) (0.771) (0.787) (0.794) (0.794) (0.794) (0.818)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.034 0.019 0.027 -0.059 -0.062 -0.210
(0.452) (0.456) (0.480) (0.465) (0.467) (0.476)
Experience of colonial ruleb   0.897**  0.799*  0.797*   1.014**
(0.405) (0.459) (0.460) (0.516)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.326***
(0.459)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b   1.243**
(0.581)
Level of democracya 0.120 0.121  0.209*
(0.101) (0.101) (0.119)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.025**   -0.025**    -0.035***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Status as oil exporter -0.060 -0.080
(0.792) (0.795)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.005
(0.010)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.692
(0.577)
Peace duration    -1.949***    -1.961***    -1.963***    -1.876***    -1.820***    -1.943***    -1.943***    -1.961***
(0.207) (0.208) (0.209) (0.205) (0.203) (0.222) (0.222) (0.225)
Spline_1    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.009***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.710 0.710 0.715 -0.039 -0.339 0.173 0.182 0.079
(0.756) (0.757) (0.759) (0.858) (0.912) (0.923) (0.932) (1.093)
Observations 2924 2924 2924 2924 2924 2912 2912 2836
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 17: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War,  1955-2007; 
Baseline: Institutional Combinations of a Non-Presidential Form of Government,  Non-Majoritarian Electoral 
System for the Legislature and Non-Unitary State Structure. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of    2.583***    2.605***    2.605***   2.078**   1.812**   2.112**   2.143**  2.043*
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.860) (0.861) (0.862) (0.889) (0.893) (1.007) (1.033) (1.090)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of 0.881 0.904 0.900 0.418 0.195 0.519 0.539 0.493
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.917) (0.908) (0.911) (0.975) (1.035) (1.012) (1.021) (1.091)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of  1.089*  1.086*  1.085* 0.963 0.861 1.052 1.082 0.746
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.590) (0.591) (0.591) (0.614) (0.639) (0.735) (0.767) (0.815)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of 0.209 0.248 0.233 -0.285 -0.617 -0.025 0.004 -0.055
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.732) (0.731) (0.731) (0.837) (0.934) (0.917) (0.941) (0.977)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of 0.416 0.411 0.431 0.309 0.325 0.632 0.655 0.640
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.565) (0.568) (0.570) (0.574) (0.595) (0.667) (0.689) (0.710)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of 0.730 0.633 0.608 0.430 0.307 0.689 0.714 0.897
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.533) (0.537) (0.543) (0.554) (0.567) (0.638) (0.665) (0.718)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of 0.803 0.689 0.690 0.700 0.745 1.079 1.103 0.800
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.607) (0.610) (0.612) (0.607) (0.618) (0.729) (0.751) (0.800)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a     0.587***    0.605***    0.609***    0.649***    0.699***    0.609***    0.607***    0.590***
(0.186) (0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.174) (0.184) (0.185) (0.199)
Ln population sizea   0.315**   0.289**   0.289**   0.307**   0.304**    0.386***    0.385***    0.485***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.132) (0.139) (0.139) (0.153)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.326***    1.384***    1.402***   1.165**   1.049**   1.168**   1.173**  1.003*
(0.434) (0.439) (0.442) (0.450) (0.448) (0.488) (0.488) (0.513)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.462 0.550 0.572 0.703 0.994 0.182 0.194 -0.312
(0.751) (0.758) (0.759) (0.768) (0.814) (0.809) (0.813) (1.000)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.008 -0.006 0.017 0.018 0.026
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Involvement in violent international conflict 1.139 1.150 1.255 1.320  1.504*  1.506*   1.671**
(0.793) (0.797) (0.803) (0.807) (0.799) (0.799) (0.820)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.164 -0.102 -0.119 -0.103 -0.099 -0.261
(0.464) (0.465) (0.486) (0.469) (0.469) (0.479)
Experience of colonial ruleb  0.785*  0.770*  0.772*  0.947*
(0.417) (0.455) (0.455) (0.515)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   1.165**
(0.474)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b   1.205**
(0.568)
Level of democracya -0.001 -0.004 0.069
(0.095) (0.097) (0.120)
Level of democracy squareda -0.016 -0.016  -0.024*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Status as oil exporter 0.114 0.150
(0.822) (0.817)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.004
(0.010)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.749
(0.584)
Peace duration    -2.001***    -2.018***    -2.025***    -1.940***    -1.877***    -1.972***    -1.973***    -1.990***
(0.208) (0.209) (0.211) (0.209) (0.207) (0.223) (0.224) (0.227)
Spline_1    -0.022***    -0.023***    -0.023***    -0.022***    -0.021***    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.861 -0.850 -0.827 -1.262  -1.487* -0.926 -0.959 -0.867
(0.725) (0.727) (0.731) (0.789) (0.842) (0.881) (0.913) (1.071)
Observations 2924 2924 2924 2924 2924 2912 2912 2836
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Following the results in Table 16, only the following institutional combinations have 
an impact on the incidence of ethnic war that is statistically significantly different 
from that of institutional combinations of a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure while 
holding all other variables constant: combinations of a presidential form of 
government, non-majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and non-unitary 
state structure (Models 1 to 5); combinations of a non-presidential form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure (Models 1 to 3); and combinations of a non-presidential form of 
government, non-majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and non-unitary 
state structure (Models 1 to 5). Holding all other variables constant, these 
combinations each decrease the odds of large-scale ethnic violence compared to the 
baseline category. 
 
Following the results reported in Table 17, and holding all other variables constant, 
only the following institutional combinations have an impact on the incidence of 
ethnic war that is statistically significantly different from that of institutional 
combinations of a non-presidential form of government, non-majoritarian electoral 
system for the legislature and non-unitary state structure: combinations of a 
presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure (Models 1 to 8); and combinations of a presidential form of 
government, non-majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure (Models 1 to 3). Holding all other variables constant, these combinations 
each increase the odds of large-scale ethnic violence compared to the baseline 
category.  
 
All in all, the results reported in Tables 16 and 17 are somewhat ambiguous. On the 
one hand, those institutional combinations that reach statistical significance have the 
expected coefficient sign, i.e. negative in Table 16 and positive in Table 17. In line 
with the arguments outlined in section 3.7., this indicates that – while holding all 
other variables constant – (at least some) institutional combinations that provide a 
higher number of possible political winners than their baseline category decrease the 
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risk of ethnic civil war (see Table 16), and (at least some) institutional combinations 
that provide a lower number of possible political winners than their baseline category 
increase the risk of ethnic civil war (see Table 17). On the other hand, however, it is 
surprising that – according to the results reported in Tables 16 and 17, and holding 
all other variables constant – there is no statistically significant difference between 
most institutional combinations and their baseline category regarding their impact on 
the incidence of ethnic war. Also these results support the central claims of my 
thesis, as they demonstrate the need for further investigations into the effects of 
institutional combinations and why some of them seem to have a clearer impact on 
the risk of ethnic civil war than others.  
 
In sum, the results presented in this section (particularly Table 14) not only indicate 
that institutional combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure indeed increase the risk 
of large-scale ethnic violence compared to all other possible combinations of 
different forms of government, electoral systems for the legislature and state 
structures. They also demonstrate the relevance of the first dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism by highlighting the need for further investigations into 
the effects of different institutional combinations and why some of them reach 
statistical significance in Tables 16 and 17 while others don’t. The following section 
will present my results from testing the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism, using corruption as a prime example of an informal political 
institution that can be expected to affect the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability 
(see also chapter 4). 
 
 
6.6. The Effects of Corruption  
 
According to Hypothesis 3, higher levels of corruption should be associated with a 
higher risk of large-scale ethnic violence (see section 6.2.). Before testing this 
hypothesis empirically, it is worth summarising some key descriptives of my 
corruption variable (see Tables 18 and 19), the ICRG Corruption Index by The PRS 
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Group, Inc. (2009). As mentioned in section 5.7., it should be noted that The PRS 
Group, Inc. (2009) only provides corruption data from 1984 onwards. Unlike the 
results presented in sections 6.4. and 6.5., my results in this section therefore refer to 
the time period of 1984 to 2007 (not, as the previous two sections, of 1955 to 2007). 
In order to ease the interpretation of the results presented in Tables 18 to 21, I have 
inverted the ICRG Corruption Index by subtracting its original values from 6, so that 
high values of my corruption variable indicate high values of corruption and low 
values low levels of corruption (see also section 5.7.). 
 
A brief look at the EEI Dataset reveals that medium levels of corruption (with values 
of the inverted ICRG Corruption Index between 2.1 and 4) are much more common 
than high or low levels of corruption (with values of the inverted ICRG Corruption 
Index between 4.1 and 6, and 0 and 2 respectively): As Table 18 illustrates, medium 
levels of corruption can be found in 1678 out of a total of 2996 country year 
observations in the EEI Dataset (56% of all observations). By contrast, high levels of 
corruption are reported in only 422 cases (14.1% of all observations) and low levels 
of corruption in 896 cases (29.9% of all observations).   
 
 
 
High levels of 
corruption (4.1-6) 
Medium levels of 
corruption (2.1-4) 
Low levels of 
corruption (0-2) 
Number of country 
year observations 
(Total) 
422 (14.1%) 1678 (56%) 896 (29.9%) 
 
Table 18: Total Number of Observations of Different Levels of Corruption in the EEI Dataset.  
 
 
Rather than looking at the total number of country year observations of different 
levels of corruption, one might also be interested to know how often these levels of 
corruption can be observed either during the incidence or absence of ethnic civil war. 
In this context, Table 19 shows clearly that low levels of corruption can be observed 
much less frequently under the incidence of ethnic civil war than high or medium 
levels of corruption (i.e. only in 5% of all its country year observations, compared to 
14.8% for medium levels of corruption and 29.6% for high levels of corruption).  
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High levels of 
corruption (4.1-6) 
Medium levels of 
corruption (2.1-4) 
Low levels of 
corruption (0-2) 
Number of country 
year observations 
(ethnic war) 
125 (29.6%) 248 (14.8%) 45 (5%) 
Number of country 
year observations 
(no ethnic war) 
297 (70.4%) 1430 (85.2%) 851 (95%) 
 
Table 19: Number of Observations of Different Levels of Corruption in the EEI Dataset by Incidence 
and  Absence of Ethnic War.  
 
 
As they are purely descriptive, Tables 18 and 19 do not allow us to draw any general 
conclusions about the (arguable) association between levels of corruption and the 
risk of large-scale ethnic violence. Hence, I now turn to my BTSCS analysis for a 
more substantive understanding of the relationship between corruption and the odds 
of ethnic civil war:  
 
To test Hypothesis 3, I use nine different statistical models. Models 8 and 9 in Table 
20 only differ slightly from each other, as the latter includes the lagged and log-
transformed ‘GDP per capita’ variable, while the former – following the example of 
Fjelde (2009) – includes only the lagged ‘GDP per capita’ variable. In order to ease 
the interpretation of my results and allow for a more evenly distribution of my key 
independent variable, I convert all decimal values of the inverted ICRG Corruption 
Index into integers (see also Neudorfer and Theuerkauf 2011). To increase the 
relatively short scale on which the corruption variable is originally measured (see 
The PRS Group, Inc. 2009), I then square all values of my corruption variable (see 
also Neudorfer and Theuerkauf 2011).
121
 Finally, it should be noted that, in contrast 
to most tables (apart from Table 12) in sections 6.4. and 6.5., my sample to analyse 
                                                 
121
 For other research that increases the original scale of the ICRG Corruption Index, see e.g. Tanzi 
(2000) and Tavares (2003). Table 2 in Appendix II presents the results of my statistical analysis 
using the non-squared version of the inverted ICRG Corruption Index with integers. As this table 
illustrates, also the non-squared corruption variable has a statistically significant positive impact 
on the incidence of ethnic war in most models while holding all other variables constant. 
Compared to Table 20, however, my key independent variable’s level of statistical significance is 
lower in Models 1 to 6 (at the 10% rather than the 5% significance level), and it loses its statistical 
significance altogether in Models 7 and 8, holding all other variables constant (see Table 2 in 
Appendix II).  
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the effects of corruption on the incidence of ethnic war includes both basically open 
and basically closed regimes (see Tables 20 and 21).
122
  
 
In order to know how well my statistical models fit the data, I look again at the 
percentages of correctly predicted events (i.e. incidence of ethnic war) and nonevents 
(i.e. no incidence of ethnic war), and whether they lie below or above the threshold 
of 50% (see also sections 6.4. and 6.5.). According to my SPSS outputs, the 
statistical models to test the effects of corruption (see Table 20) predict between 
98.1% and 98.3% of nonevents, and between 94.4% and 94.8% of events 
correctly.
123
 These percentages are reassuring, as they imply that my statistical 
models fit the data well.  
 
As mentioned in section 6.2., the purpose of testing Hypothesis 3 is to move beyond 
the mere focus on formal political institutions by addressing the second dimension of 
Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism. As elaborated in chapter 4, this dimension 
highlights the need for scholars belonging to the institutional incentives approach to 
ethnic violence to pay greater attention to the relevance of informal (and not just 
openly codified) political institutions for the risk of ethnic civil war. Specifically, I 
have argued in chapter 4 that corruption is a prime example of an informal political 
institution that can be expected to increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence, as 
networks of corruption – given their tendency to form along ethnic lines and benefit 
certain ethnic groups over others – are likely to affect the modus operandi of formal 
political institutions in such a way that those ethnic groups who stand outside of 
these networks have comparatively low chances to obtain the values of political 
representation. This is likely to give rise to grievances among those ethnic groups 
who stand outside of ethnically exclusionary networks of corruption, and to heighten 
the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. Tables 20 and 21 present the results from 
testing the effects of corruption on the risk of ethnic civil war.  
                                                 
122
 As mentioned in sections 6.4. and 6.5., I previously restricted my sample to basically closed 
regimes (apart from Table 12) due to considerations about my reference categories. 
123
 When excluding the splines, my statistical models to test the effects of corruption predict between 
96.3% and 96.9% of nonevents, and between 92.6% and 95.8% of events correctly.   
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Table 20: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona   0.038**   0.037**   0.039**   0.040**   0.047**   0.045**   0.041**  0.037* 0.031
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Status as oil exporter  -0.675*  -0.706*   -0.758**   -0.762**    -1.213***   -1.095**  -0.956*  -0.916* -0.806
(0.348) (0.364) (0.366) (0.365) (0.440) (0.480) (0.491) (0.493) (0.489)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   0.687**   0.679**   0.615**   0.617**   0.690**   0.668**  0.592* 0.539 0.374
(0.287) (0.297) (0.302) (0.302) (0.318) (0.321) (0.327) (0.332) (0.346)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.644 0.649 0.626 0.691 0.575 0.455 0.560 0.559 0.228
(0.611) (0.633) (0.631) (0.641) (0.689) (0.716) (0.724) (0.725) (0.742)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.025 0.029  0.046*   0.044**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.021)
Level of democracya 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.021
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Level of democracy squareda -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.660 0.673 0.870 0.867 0.762 0.762 0.826
(0.592) (0.595) (0.624) (0.626) (0.629) (0.632) (0.626)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.230 -0.206 -0.190 -0.177 -0.168 -0.240
(0.381) (0.395) (0.395) (0.396) (0.395) (0.396)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.576 0.478 0.318 0.376 0.420
(0.378) (0.414) (0.436) (0.443) (0.439)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.228 0.305 0.173 0.032
(0.382) (0.392) (0.417) (0.418)
Ln population sizea 0.137 0.145 0.161
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117)
GDP per capita a -0.056
(0.057)
Ln GDP per capita a  -0.536*
(0.280)
Peace duration    -1.764***    -1.755***    -1.769***    -1.767***    -1.782***    -1.769***    -1.761***    -1.758***    -1.709***
(0.179) (0.179) (0.182) (0.181) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184) (0.182)
Spline_1    -0.018***    -0.017***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Spline_3  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant  0.946* 0.968  1.005*  1.020* 0.993 0.878 0.465 0.701 1.302
(0.513) (0.591) (0.591) (0.595) (0.678) (0.705) (0.788) (0.820) (0.887)
Observations 2715 2702 2702 2702 2655 2655 2655 2650 2650
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
Chapter 6 – Testing Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 218 
 
 
Table 21: Marginal Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007. 
 
 
Following the results reported in Table 20, the ‘level of corruption’ variable has a 
statistically significant positive impact on the incidence of ethnic war in all statistical 
models apart from Model 9 while holding the different control variables constant. Its 
level of statistical significance is at 5% in Models 1 to 7, and 10% in Model 8. 
According to its exp(b) coefficient (i.e. its odds ratio), and while holding all other 
variables constant, a one-unit increase in the ‘level of corruption’ variable increases 
the odds of large-scale ethnic violence by 1.038 in Models 1, 2 and 8; by 1.039 in 
Model 3; by 1.041 in Model 4; by 1.048 in Model 5; by 1.046 in Model 6; and by 
1.042 in Model 7. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Level of corruptiona  0.00067*  0.00065*  0.00064*  0.00067*  0.00073*  0.00067*
(0.00038) (0.0004) (0.00038) (0.00039) (0.00042) (0.00041)
Status as oil exporter  -0.00876*  -0.00895*  -0.00884*  -0.00895*   -0.01109**  -0.01000*
(0.00495) (0.00502) (0.00475) (0.00479) (0.0053) (0.00532)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country  0.00886*  0.00871* 0.00764 0.00771  0.00785* 0.00730
(0.00467) (0.00486) (0.00465) (0.0047) (0.00475) (0.00461)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.01138 0.01138 0.01032 0.01148 0.00898 0.00677
(0.01054) (0.01132) (0.01066) (0.01101) (0.01092) (0.01085)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa 0.00041 0.00041  0.00042* 0.00041 0.00036 0.00037
(0.00025) (0.00027) (0.00025) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00023)
Level of democracya 0.00000 0.00000 0.00005 0.00001 0.00005
(0.00045) (0.00043) (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00043)
Level of democracy squareda -0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00003
(0.0001) (0.00009) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00009)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.01497 0.01549 0.02080 0.01974
(0.01809) (0.01857) (0.02258) (0.02171)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.00351 -0.00298 -0.00263
(0.00554) (0.00549) (0.00529)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.00008 -0.00005
(0.00013) (0.00013)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.01090 0.00833
(0.00976) (0.00943)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.00347
(0.00583)
Ln population sizea
GDP per capita a
Ln GDP per capita a
Peace duration    -0.03120***   -0.03075**   -0.02918**   -0.02939**   -0.02782**   -0.02631**
(0.01138) (0.01192) (0.01151) (0.01159) (0.01175) (0.01145)
Spline_1    -0.00031***   -0.00031**   -0.00029**   -0.00029**   -0.00028**   -0.00027**
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012)
Spline_2   0.00013**   0.00013**   0.00012**   0.00012**   0.00012**   0.00012**
(0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005)
Spline_3 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country set to 1; status as oil exporter set to 0; level of socioeconomic inequalities set to its minimum value; all other independent
variables set to their means. 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
Chapter 6 – Testing Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism 
 219 
Rather than just looking at odds ratios, we also might be interested to know the 
marginal effects of corruption on the risk of ethnic civil war. As mentioned in section 
6.5., there is no particular rule other than the researcher’s interest where the values of 
the independent variables should be set before marginal effects are computed (cf. 
Long and Freese 2006). Here, I choose to set the ‘status as oil exporter’ variable to 
‘0’; the ‘incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country’ variable to ‘1’; and the 
‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ variable to its minimum value. All other 
independent variables are set to their means.
124
 Based on the arguments outlined in 
section 5.8. and subsequent paragraphs, these value specifications should simulate an 
environment which is relatively favourable to the incidence of large-scale ethnic 
violence.
125
   
 
The results in Table 21 show that, under these assigned values, a one-unit increase in 
the ‘level of corruption’ variable increases the probability of large-scale ethnic 
violence by 0.067% in Models 1, 4 and 6; by 0.065% in Model 2; by 0.064% in 
Model 3; and by 0.073% in Model 5.
126
 Admittedly, these values are very small 
indeed. This, however, may be due to my rather general model specifications, as 
research by Fjelde (2009) and Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2011) shows that the 
impact of different levels of corruption on the probability of intrastate violence varies 
depending on factors such as the type and degree of a country’s natural resource 
wealth. Leaving the precise values of the marginal effects aside, the most important 
finding from Table 21 for the purpose of this thesis hence is that it confirms the 
                                                 
124
 Unlike Table 15, I intentionally do not set the ‘level of ethnic fractionalisation’ variable to its 
maximum value, as I cannot rule out the possibility that the ethnically exclusionary tendencies of 
corruption vary depending on how diverse a society is (see also footnote 68). Setting the ‘level of 
ethnic fractionalisation’ variable to its mean rather than its highest value therefore seems more 
appropriate to get a more ‘average’ result at this point.  
125
 Following the arguments presented in section 5.8. and the control variable results reported below, 
the incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country should increase the risk of ethnic civil war 
(see Models 1 to 7 in Table 20), whereas being an oil exporter should decrease the risk of ethnic 
civil war (see Models 1 to 8 in Table 20) while holding all other variables constant. Although the 
‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ variable is rarely statistically significant in my BTSCS 
analysis (see also section 6.4.), I nonetheless set it to its minimum value, following theoretical 
arguments that a highly unequal society should make the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence 
more likely (see section 5.8.).  
126
 I only report the results from Models 1 to 6, as – under the aforementioned value specifications – 
the marginal effects of the ‘level of corruption’ variable lose their statistical significance in Models 
7 to 9. 
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statistically significant positive impact of corruption on the risk of ethnic civil war 
while holding all other variables constant.    
 
Taken together, the results reported in Tables 20 and 21 have two key implications: 
First, they clearly illustrate that higher levels of corruption are associated with a 
higher risk of large-scale ethnic violence. This finding is particularly notable, given 
that it is robust to eight out of nine model specifications in Table 20. Based on the 
assumption that networks of corruption tend to form along ethnic lines and benefit 
certain ethnic groups over others (see section 4.6.), these results lend empirical 
support to my grievance-based explanation of violent intrastate conflict outlined in 
chapter 2, as they depict the apparent link between high levels of political 
exclusiveness (caused by the ethnically exclusionary tendencies of corruption) and 
the risk of ethnic civil war. Second, and even more importantly, the findings reported 
in Tables 20 and 21 demonstrate the relevance of the second dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism, as they underline the importance of corruption as a prime 
example of an informal political institution: Following the results in Tables 20 and 
21,  the risk of ethnic civil war is not just influenced by formal institutional design 
(see sections 6.4. and 6.5.), but also by socially entrenched structures of political 
interactions that are neither laid down in writing nor guaranteed by the sanctioning 
mechanisms of the state. In this manner, the statistical results in this section highlight 
the need for scholars belonging to the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence to overcome its current research asymmetry in favour of formal political 
institutions, and to pay greater attention to the fact that political institutions can 
affect the prospects of ethnopolitical (in)stability even if they are not openly codified 
but exist over time due to persisting patterns in human behaviour. 
 
Having thus presented the results for my key independent variable, a few findings 
regarding the control variables in Table 20 ought to be mentioned briefly: 
 
 While holding all other variables constant, several control variables do not have a 
statistically significant impact on the incidence of large-scale ethnic violence in 
any of the statistical models presented in Table 20. They include the variables on 
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level of ethnic fractionalisation, level of democracy, level of democracy squared, 
involvement in violent international conflict, recent experience of political 
instability, per cent of mountainous terrain, noncontiguous country structure, 
experience of colonial rule, population size and the non-log-transformed GDP per 
capita variable.  
 Holding all other variables constant, the ‘incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring 
country’ variable has a statistically significant positive impact on the incidence of 
ethnic war in all statistical models apart from Models 8 and 9. These results 
provide further support for arguments on the likely spatial interdependence of 
ethnic civil wars (see e.g. Lake and Rothchild 1998; see also sections 5.8. and 
6.4.). 
 The ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ variable only reaches statistical 
significance in Models 8 and 9 (at the 10% and 5% significance level respectively) 
while holding all other variables constant. Similarly to the results reported for 
Table 12 (section 6.4.), the variable’s positive coefficient sign seems to indicate 
that an increase in socioeconomic equality should lead to an increase in the risk of 
ethnic civil war. As aforementioned, however, we can easily dismiss the relevance 
of this result, as the ‘level of socioeconomic inequalities’ variable is clearly not 
robust, given that it reaches statistical significance only under very few model 
specifications (see also section 6.4.). 
 The log-transformed ‘GDP per capita’ variable has a statistically significant 
negative effect on the incidence of ethnic war (at the 10% significance level) in 
Model 9 while holding all other variables constant. This result is in line with well-
known arguments in the civil wars literature that low levels of GDP per capita 
should be associated with an increase in the risk of intrastate violence (see e.g. 
Fearon and Laitin 2003a; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). It does, however, stand in 
contrast to my findings of a statistically significant positive impact of GDP per 
capita levels on the incidence of ethnic war (holding all other variables constant) 
when investigating the effects of formal political institutions. Taken together, the 
results reported here and in sections 6.4. and 6.5. thus clearly demonstrate the 
aforementioned need for further investigations into the relationships between GDP 
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per capita and ethnic civil war under different model specifications (see also 
section 6.4.).  
 As expected, the ‘peace duration’ variable has a statistically significant negative 
effect on the incidence of ethnic war in all models in Table 20 while holding all 
other variables constant. These results further substantiate the argument that the 
risk of ethnic war should decrease the longer a country is at peace (cf. Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006; see also sections 5.8. and 6.4.).  
 Finally, the possibly most surprising finding in my data analysis is that – when 
holding all other variables constant – the ‘status as oil exporter’ variable has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the incidence of ethnic war in all models 
apart from Model 9. It is statistically significant at the 10% significance level in 
Models 1, 2, 7 and 8, the 5% level in Models 3, 4 and 6, and the 1% level in Model 
5. According to the negative coefficient sign of my ‘status as oil exporter’ variable, 
being an oil exporter decreases the odds of large-scale ethnic violence compared to 
not being an oil exporter, holding all other variables constant. In line with the 
operationalisation of the ‘status as oil exporter’ variable (see ‘Oil’ in the EEI 
Dataset Codebook, Appendix III), and holding all other variables constant, 
countries whose fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports exceed 33% 
should thus be at a lower risk of ethnic civil war than countries whose fuel exports 
as a percentage of merchandise exports do not exceed 33%. These findings stand 
in contrast to arguments according to which oil wealth should be associated with a 
greater likelihood of violent intrastate conflict (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003a; see also section 5.8.), and lend support to research which 
highlights the potentially stability-enhancing effects of resource rents (see e.g. 
Bodea 2012; see also section 5.8.). These results, just like those for my ‘GDP per 
capita’ variable, deserve further attention in future research, given that one’s 
findings about the relationship between oil wealth and the risk of ethnic civil war 
may very well differ depending on one’s variable operationalisations (cf. Ross 
2006).   
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Before concluding this chapter and summarising its main results regarding the two 
dimensions of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism (see section 6.8.), I will very briefly 
describe the findings from my robustness tests in the following section. 
 
 
6.7. Robustness Tests  
 
To test the robustness of my findings, I am interested to know how the statistical 
results for my key independent variables change under different model or sample 
specifications. In particular, I am interested to know how they change depending on 
the inclusion of different control variables; when expanding my samples from 
sections 6.4. and 6.5. to include also basically closed regimes; and when restricting 
my samples from sections 6.5. and 6.6. by excluding one world region at a time. The 
results for my key independent variables can be regarded as robust if they neither 
lose their statistical significance nor change their coefficient sign when altering my 
model or sample details (cf. Sala-I-Martin 1997).    
 
The findings from my first robustness test – which checks whether the results for my 
key independent variables change depending on the inclusion of different control 
variables – have already been reported in the preceding sections. To recap, my results 
regarding the effects of unitary state structures when including basically closed 
regimes in the sample (see Table 12), and regarding the effects of institutional 
combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature and unitary state structure (see Table 14) stay robust under all model 
specifications in sections 6.4. and 6.5.. This is to say that they neither lose their 
statistical significance nor change their coefficient sign following the inclusion of a 
number of different control variables. Likewise, my results regarding the effects of 
corruption (see Table 20) are robust in a vast majority of the model specifications 
(i.e. 8 out of 9) presented in section 6.6.. Only under Model 9 does the corruption 
variable lose its statistical significance. Hence, my results on unitary state structures 
when including basically closed regimes in the sample; on institutional combinations 
of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature 
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and unitary state structure; and on corruption are robust in the sense that they are not 
driven by a specific set of control variables. By contrast (and as mentioned in 
sections 6.4. and 6.5.), the results regarding the effects of presidential forms of 
government (see Table 9), majoritarian electoral systems for the legislature (see 
Table 10), institutional arrangements using either combinations of a presidential form 
of government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure (see Table 16) or combinations of a non-presidential form of government, 
non-majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and non-unitary state structure 
(see Table 17) as baseline are much less robust, both in terms of the key independent 
variables’ level of statistical significance (see in particular Tables 9, 16 and 17) and 
coefficient sign (see in particular Table 10).    
 
My second robustness test checks whether the results for my key independent 
variables change when expanding my samples from sections 6.4. and 6.5. to include 
also basically closed regimes. The findings from this test are reported in Tables 3 to 
8 in Appendix II. As in section 6.4., neither my ‘majoritarian electoral system’ nor 
my ‘majoritarian electoral system without communal rolls or seat reservations’ 
variables reach statistical significance when including basically closed regimes in my 
sample (see Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix II). Likewise, most of my dummy variables 
on different institutional arrangements either do not reach statistical significance or 
lose their statistical significance relatively quickly with the addition of different 
control variables, both when excluding (see Tables 16 and 17 in section 6.5.) and 
including (see Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix II) basically closed regimes in my sample. 
More important for the central claims of my thesis, however, is the fact that the 
inclusion of basically closed regimes in my sample does not alter the statistically 
significant positive effect of the ‘combination of a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system and unitary state structure’ variable on the risk of 
ethnic civil war (holding all other variables constant) under all my model 
specifications (see Table 6 in Appendix II). This further confirms the robustness of 
my findings regarding the effects of this variable, and thus lends additional empirical 
support to my arguments about the relevance of the first dimension of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism (see also section 6.5.).    
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The aim of my final robustness test is to see whether my statistical results regarding 
the effects of corruption and institutional combinations of a presidential form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure change depending on the exclusion of geographical regions from my 
sample (cf. Plümper and Neumayer 2006). For this purpose, I exclude each of the 
regions listed in the EEI Dataset (see ‘Region’, Appendix III) one by one from my 
sample. These regions are: Africa (except North Africa); Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe; East Asia and the Pacific; Europe (except Eastern Europe) and North 
America; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; and 
South Asia. Admittedly, from all the robustness checks presented in this section, I 
am least concerned about the results from this particular test. This is because the 
figures and graphs in Appendix I clearly show that there are distinct regional patterns 
regarding the distribution of certain institutional combinations and prevalence of 
corruption. Hence, it would in a sense be surprising if my findings reported in Tables 
14 (section 6.5.) and 20 (section 6.6.) did not change depending on the regions 
included in my sample. Indeed, as the results in Tables 9 to 22 in Appendix II 
illustrate, both my ‘combination of a presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system and unitary state structure’ and ‘level of corruption’ variables are 
sensitive to the set-up of countries in my sample, as they either lose their statistical 
significance completely (see Table 15 in Appendix II) or under certain model 
specifications (see e.g. Table 21 in Appendix II) when excluding certain regions. As 
aforementioned, however, these results are somewhat expected and, in this sense, 
mainly illustrate the need for more region- and/or country-specific analyses of the 
relevance of certain institutional combinations and informal political institutions. 
 
Overall – and leaving the aforementioned sensitivity of my findings to the exclusion 
of different regions aside –, the results discussed in this section thus confirm the 
relevance of the two dimensions of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, as they further 
highlight the robustness of my key findings in sections 6.5. and 6.6. under various 
model specifications.  
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6.8. Conclusion: The Relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism  
 
As elaborated in chapter 1, the relationship between political institutions and 
ethnopolitical (in)stability typically has been analysed by putting predominant 
emphasis on the effects of single, formal political institutions such as electoral 
systems, forms of government or state structures (see e.g. Reilly 2001; Reynolds 
2002; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Suberu 2001; Wilkinson 2004). Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism seeks to overcome this rather limited research focus by highlighting 
the relevance of both institutional combinations (Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism’s 
first dimension, see chapter 3) and informal political institutions (Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism’s second dimension, see chapter 4) for the risk of large-scale ethnic 
violence. 
 
Building on arguments outlined in chapters 2 to 4, and using data from the EEI 
Dataset presented in chapter 5, this chapter has centred on my approach to and results 
from testing the relevance of the two dimensions of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism empirically. As outlined in section 6.3., I obtained my results using 
binary time-series-cross-section analysis, as I do not seek to make particular 
predictions for specific countries, but wish to draw general conclusions about the 
relationship between different institutional repertoires and the risk of large-scale 
ethnic violence throughout space and time. As discussed in sections 6.4. to 6.6., my 
statistical results illustrate that a) institutional combinations of a presidential form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure (see section 6.5.), and b) corruption (see section 6.6.) increase the risk of 
large-scale ethnic violence, while holding common control variables in the civil wars 
literature such as regime type or level of economic development constant. These 
results are particularly notable, given that the statistically significant positive effects 
of corruption and institutional combinations of a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure on the risk 
of ethnic civil war are robust to various model specifications (see sections 6.5. and 
6.6.). My results thus clearly demonstrate the relevance of Ethno-Embedded 
Institutionalism empirically, and highlight the need for scholars belonging to the 
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institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence to move beyond the mere focus 
on single, formal political institutions, and to pay greater attention to the relevance of 
both institutional combinations and informal political institutions.  
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Conclusion 
 
Hitherto, the relationships between institutional design and ethnopolitical (in)stability 
typically have been analysed by investigating the effects of single, formal political 
institutions such as electoral systems or state structures (see e.g. Reynolds 2002; 
Suberu 2001). My doctoral thesis criticises this research focus on two different yet 
equally relevant accounts: First, the tendency to single out the effects of individual 
institutions is based on the implicit – and as I claim: wrong – assumption that 
political institutions can be treated as separate entities and that it is only of secondary 
relevance of which broader set of institutions they form part. Second, despite studies 
which highlight the relevance of informal political institutions (see e.g. Sisk and 
Stefes 2005; Varshney 2002), they have received far less attention in the academic 
debate so far. 
 
In an attempt to tackle the current limitations of the institutional incentives approach 
to ethnic violence, I have presented Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism as a new 
approach to studying the effects of political institutions on the risk of ethnic civil 
war. Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism consists of two dimensions which build on 
the explicit acknowledgement that political institutions are ‘embedded entities’ in the 
sense that a) they never exist on their own but always form part of a wider 
institutional arrangement (dimension 1) and b) they can affect the prospects of 
ethnopolitical (in)stability even if they are not openly codified but exist over time 
due to persisting patterns in human behaviour (dimension 2). By highlighting the 
relevance of both institutional combinations and informal political institutions, and 
thus clearly moving beyond the mere focus on single, formal political institutions, 
Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism seeks to expand the current research agenda of the 
institutional incentives approach to ethnic violence, and to deepen our understanding 
about the relationships between institutional design and the risk of ethnic civil war. 
 
To illustrate the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, I began by defining 
crucial concepts and outlining key arguments in the academic debate on the causes of 
violent ethnic conflict in chapter 1. Chapter 2 then presented my grievance-based 
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explanation of large-scale ethnic violence which, arguably, links political institutions 
to the risk of ethnic civil war. In a nutshell, the theoretical framework outlined in 
chapter 2 states that political institutions which are associated with comparatively 
high levels of political exclusiveness are likely to increase the risk of violent ethnic 
conflict. This is because they contribute to perceived or objective asymmetries 
between ethnic groups in terms of their political and socioeconomic standing, and 
arguably give rise to emotions of anger and resentment among those ethnic groups 
who consider their chances to obtain the values of political representation (relating to 
their political recognition, the likelihood with which resources and powers are 
distributed in their favour, and their perceptions of political, physical and economic 
security) to be comparatively low.  
 
Chapter 3 focused on the first dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism by 
highlighting the relevance of the type of form of government, electoral system for the 
legislature and state structure that are combined with each other in a given political 
system. The central argument presented in chapter 3 states that the lower the number 
of possible political winners provided by a given institutional combination, the more 
likely it is that this combination will increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence. 
Consequently, in particular combinations of a presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure are 
expected to heighten the risk of ethnic civil war. This is because they provide the 
lowest overall number of possible political winners compared to any other 
combination of presidential, parliamentary or mixed form of government, 
majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral system for the legislature and unitary, 
federal or mixed state structure. I have argued that a low number of possible political 
winners should increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence, as it is likely to give 
rise to grievances among those ethnic groups who feel that the design of formal 
political institutions systematically prevents them from obtaining the values of 
political representation outlined in chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 4 centred on the second dimension of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism,  
using corruption as a prime example of an informal political institution. The central 
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argument presented in chapter 4 states that corrupt dealings are likely to increase the 
risk of ethnic civil war, as networks of corruption – given their ethnically 
exclusionary tendencies – can be assumed to affect the modus operandi of formal 
political institutions in such a way that those ethnic groups who stand outside of 
these networks have lower chances to obtain the values of political representation. 
The four scenarios by which networks of corruption can affect the modus operandi of 
formal political institutions in an ethnically exclusionary manner include the creation 
of direct incentives for political officeholders (e.g. through bribery or the sustenance 
of patronage networks) to manipulate the political decision-making process in favour 
of specific ethnic groups; the generation of distortions and ethnic bias in the political 
decision-making agenda; the establishment of a culture of selfish value-
accumulation; and the undermining of the quality or prospects of democracy. All 
four scenarios clearly violate the ideal of representational justice (Wimmer 2002) and 
result in some ethnic groups having greater influence over the political decision-
making process than others. Consequently, grievances can be expected to rise among 
those ethnic groups who cannot reap the benefits of corruption, and ethnicity to 
become a likely fault line of violent confrontation. 
 
Having outlined the central tenets of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism in chapters 3 
and 4, I moved to the empirical part of my thesis in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 
presented the newly created EEI Dataset which – as the first dataset of its kind – fills 
a clear ‘data gap’ in the current academic debate by providing an unprecedented 
compilation of quantitative information on different types of political institutions, the 
incidence of large-scale ethnic violence and common control variables in the civil 
wars literature. Using data from the EEI Dataset and binary time-series-cross-section 
analysis, chapter 6 outlined the results from testing the two dimensions of Ethno-
Embedded Institutionalism empirically. Crucially, the statistical results presented in 
chapter 6 provide empirical support for the theoretical propositions described in 
chapters 3 and 4, that a) institutional combinations of a presidential form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure, and b) corruption increase the risk of large-scale ethnic violence, while 
holding a number of different control variables (such as regime type or level of 
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economic development) constant. These results are particularly notable, given that 
the statistically significant positive effects of corruption and institutional 
combinations of a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature and unitary state structure on the risk of ethnic civil war are robust to 
various model specifications.  
 
Overall, my thesis thus contributes to the institutional incentives approach to ethnic 
violence in three relevant regards: through the theoretical conceptualisation and 
large-N testing of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism; through the presentation of a 
grievance-based explanation of large-scale ethnic violence which focuses exclusively 
on (and clearly identifies) the key values of political representation; and through the 
introduction of the EEI Dataset as a new, comprehensive data source for the 
systematic statistical analysis of institutional incentives for ethnic civil war.  
 
Having thus demonstrated the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism, it is 
important to note that this thesis should be seen as just an initial attempt to broaden 
the currently rather limited research focus of the institutional incentives approach to 
ethnic violence. To properly overcome its predominant emphasis on single, formal 
political institutions, much further work needs to be done, such as by investigating in 
more detail why some institutional combinations seem to have a clearer relationship 
with the risk of ethnic civil war than others (see section 6.5.); by testing the impact of 
corruption on the probability of large-scale ethnic violence under different country 
specifications (see section 6.6.); or by complementing my intentionally rather general 
conclusions about the relevance of Ethno-Embedded Institutionalism with more in-
depth case study analysis. In this sense, my thesis is intended not as the final word, 
but hopefully as the starting point for much-needed further research into the impact 
of institutional combinations and informal political institutions on the risk of ethnic 
civil war. 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 232 
Bibliography  
 
 
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. 2010. Regions & Countries. Available at 
http://aceproject.org/regions-en (accessed July 20, 2010).   
 
Ackerman, Peter, and Christopher Kruegler. 1994. Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The 
Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
Ackrén, Maria. 2009. Conditions for Different Autonomy Regimes in the World: A 
Fuzzy-Set Application. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press.  
 
Addison, Tony, and S. Mansoob Murshed. 2003. UNU/WIDER Special Issue on 
Conflict: Explaining Violent Conflict: Going beyond Greed versus Grievance. 
Journal of International Development 15(4): 391-396. 
 
Ai, Chunrong, and Edward C. Norton. 2003. Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit 
Models. Economics Letters 80(1): 123-129. 
 
Akçay, Selçuk. 2006. Corruption and Human Development. Cato Journal 26(1): 29-
48. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, and Beatrice Weder. 1999. Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less 
Foreign Aid? NBER Working Paper 7108. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research.   
 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and 
Romain Wacziarg. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8(2): 155-
194. 
 
Alonso, Sonia, and Rubén Ruiz. 2005. Political Representation and Ethnic Conflict 
in New Democracies. Discussion Paper SP IV 2005-201. Berlin: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
 
Alvarez, Mike, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski. 
1996. Classifying Political Regimes. Studies in Comparative International 
Development 31(2): 3-36. 
 
Anderson, Barbara A., and Brian D. Silver. 1989. Demographic Sources of the 
Changing Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Union. Population and Development 
Review 15(4): 609-656. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. 
 
Asian Development Bank, UK Department for International Development, United 
Nations Development Programme, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and 
The World Bank. 2007. Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for 
Bibliography 
 233 
Strategy and Action. Informal Discussion Paper. Available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf (accessed November 30, 
2010).  
 
Aspinall, Edward. 2007. The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and 
Identity in a Separatist Conflict. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(6): 950-972. 
 
Barry, Brian. 1975. Review: Political Accommodation and Consociational 
Democracy. British Journal of Political Science 5(4): 477-505. 
 
Bashir, Bashir, and Will Kymlicka. 2008. Introduction: Struggles for Inclusion and 
Reconciliation in Modern Democracies. In The Politics of Reconciliation in 
Multicultural Societies, eds. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1-24. 
 
BBC Online. 2010a. Fifa Launches Investigation into Vote-Selling Claims. BBC 
Online, 17 October. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/9099326.stm (accessed November 23, 2010). 
 
BBC Online. 2010b. Country Profiles. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/country_profiles/default.stm (accessed July 26, 2010). 
 
Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in 
the Past Few Years? Annual Review of Political Science 4: 271-293. 
 
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 2001. Throwing out the Baby with the Bath 
Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon. International Organization 55(2): 
487-495. 
 
Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz and Richard Tucker. 1998. Time-Series-Cross-
Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable. American Journal of Political 
Science 42(4): 1260-1288. 
 
Belmont, Katharine, Scott Mainwaring and Andrew Reynolds. 2002. Introduction: 
Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. In The Architecture of 
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. 
Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-11. 
 
Berdal, Mats. 2005. Beyond Greed and Grievance – and Not Too Soon...: A Review 
Essay. Review of International Studies 31(4): 687-698. 
 
Bermeo, Nancy. 2002. The Import of Institutions. Journal of Democracy 13(2): 96-
110. 
 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2010. Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Available at 
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/bti/ (accessed July 20, 2010).   
 
Bibliography 
 234 
Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Birnir, Jóhanna Kristín. 2007. Ethnicity and Electoral Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Blanton, Robert, T. David Mason and Brian Athow. 2001. Colonial Style and Post-
Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa. Journal of Peace Research 38(4): 473-491. 
 
Bloom, Mia M. 2003. Ethnic Conflict, State Terror and Suicide Bombing in Sri 
Lanka. Civil Wars 6(1): 54-84. 
 
Bodea, Cristina. 2012. Natural Resources, Weak States and Civil War: Can Rents 
Stabilize Coup Prone Regimes? Policy Research Working Paper 6071. Washington, 
DC: The World Bank. 
 
Bodea, Cristina, and Ibrahim A. Elbadawi. 2007. Riots, Coups and Civil War: 
Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Debate. Policy Research Working Paper 4397. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Boix, Carles. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems 
in Advanced Democracies. American Political Science Review 93(3): 609-624.  
 
Bollen, Kenneth A., and Robert W. Jackman. 1989. Democracy, Stability, and 
Dichotomies. American Sociological Review 54(4): 612-621. 
 
Bournay, Emmanuelle, UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme)/GRID-
Arendal. 2005. Crushed by War – World Conflicts. Available at 
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/crushed-by-war-world-conflicts (accessed January 3, 
2010).  
 
Brancati, Dawn. 2006. Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames 
of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism? International Organization 60(3): 651-685. 
 
Brancati, Dawn. 2009. Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through 
Decentralization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Brass, Paul R. 1991. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi 
and Newsbury Park, CA: Sage.  
 
Brass, Paul R. 1997. Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of 
Collective Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Brown, Michael E. 1993. Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict. In Ethnic 
Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 3-26. 
 
Bibliography 
 235 
Brown, Michael E. 1996. The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict. 
In The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 571-601. 
 
Brückner, Markus. 2011. Country Fixed Effects and Unit Roots: A Comment on 
Poverty and Civil War: Revisiting the Evidence. Working Paper. Adelaide: 
University of Adelaide.  
 
Brush, Stephen G. 1996. Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences: 
Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
40(4): 523-545. 
 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. 
Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Bunce, Valerie, and Stephen Watts. 2005. Managing Diversity and Sustaining 
Democracy: Ethnofederal versus Unitary States in the Postcommunist World. In 
Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, eds. Philip G. Roeder 
and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 133-
158.  
 
Caiden, Gerald E. 2007. Corruption and Governance. In Combating Corruption, 
Encouraging Ethics: A Practical Guide to Management Ethics, eds. William L. 
Richter and Frances Burke. 2
nd
 edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 78-
80.  
 
Carey, John M., and Simon Hix. 2009. The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude 
Proportional Electoral Systems. PSPE Working Paper 01-2009. London: London 
School of Economics and Political Science. 
 
Carothers, Thomas. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of 
Democracy 13(1): 5-21. 
 
Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. Back to the Future: Modeling Time 
Dependence in Binary Data. Political Analysis 18(3): 271-292. 
 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Luc Girardin. 2007. Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping 
Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies. American Political Science Review 101(1): 
173-185. 
 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min. 2010. Why Do Ethnic 
Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis. World Politics 62(1): 87-119. 
 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, CIDCM. 2007. 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) Codebook Version 2/2009. College Park, MD: University 
of Maryland. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA. 1980. The World Factbook 1980. Washington, 
DC: Central Intelligence Agency.  
Bibliography 
 236 
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA. 2007. The World Factbook 2007. Washington, DC: 
Central Intelligence Agency.  
 
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA. 2009. The World Factbook 2009: Burundi. 
Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/by.html (accessed December 20, 2009). 
 
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA. 2010. The World Factbook 2010. Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed July 26, 
2010).  
 
Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, 
PRIO. 2009. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2009. Available at 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-
Version-X-2009/ (accessed July 25, 2010).  
 
Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument. Oxford and Bloomington, IN: The International African Institute in 
association with James Currey and Indiana University Press. 
 
Chandler, David. 2002. Anti-Corruption Strategies and Democratization in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Democratization 9(2): 101-120. 
 
Cheibub, José Antonio. 2007. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cheng, Christine S., and Dominik Zaum. 2008. Introduction: Key Themes in 
Peacebuilding and Corruption. International Peacekeeping 15(3): 301-309. 
 
Clarno, Andrew J., and Toyin Falola. 1998. Patriarchy, Patronage, and Power: 
Corruption in Nigeria. In Corruption and the Crisis of Institutional Reforms in 
Africa, ed. John Mukum Mbaku. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, pp.167-
191. 
 
Cohen, Abner. 1969. Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa 
Migrants in Yoruba Towns. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
 
Cohen, Frank S. 1997. Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management 
in Democracies. Comparative Political Studies 30(5): 607-630. 
 
Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research. World Politics 49(3): 430-451. 
 
Collier, David, and Robert Adcock. 1999. Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic 
Approach to Choices about Concepts. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 537-
565. 
 
Bibliography 
 237 
Collier, Paul. 2000. Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance. Economics and 
Politics 12(3): 225-245. 
 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. On Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers 50(4): 563-573. 
 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2000. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Policy 
Research Working Paper 2355. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers 56(4): 563-595. 
 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2005. Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict. 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 625-633. 
 
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner. 2009. Beyond Greed and 
Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 61(1): 1-27. 
 
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Nicholas Sambanis. 2005. The Collier-Hoeffler 
Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design. In 
Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume I: Africa, eds. Paul Collier 
and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, pp. 1-33. 
 
Correlates of War Project, COW. 2008. State System Membership List, v2008.1. 
Available at http://correlatesofwar.org (accessed July 20, 2010).  
 
Cramer, Christopher, and Jonathan Goodhand. 2002. Try Again, Fail Again, Fail 
Better? War, the State, and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Challenge in Afghanistan. 
Development and Change 33(5): 885-909. 
 
Crawford, S. E., and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. A Grammar of Institutions. American 
Political Science Review 89(3): 582-600. 
 
Davenport, Christian. 2003. Minorities at Risk Dataset Users Manual 030703. 
College Park, MD: University of Maryland. 
 
Deininger, Klaus, and Lyn Squire. 1996. A New Data Set Measuring Income 
Inequality. The World Bank Economic Review 10(3): 565-591. 
 
DeRouen, Karl R., Jr., and David Sobek. 2004. The Dynamics of Civil War Duration 
and Outcome. Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 303-320. 
 
DeVotta, Neil. 2005. From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: The Institutional 
Bases for Sri Lanka’s Separatist War. Nations and Nationalism 11(1): 141-159. 
 
Diamond, Larry. 1988. Class, Ethnicity, and Democray in Nigeria: The Failure of 
the First Republic. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Bibliography 
 238 
Diamond, Larry. 2002. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 
13(2): 21-35. 
 
Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino. 2004. The Quality of Democracy: An 
Overview. Journal of Democracy 15(4): 20-31. 
 
Dietz, Simon, Eric Neumayer and Indra de Soysa. 2007. Corruption, the Resource 
Curse and Genuine Saving. Environment and Development Economics 12(1): 33-53. 
  
Djankov, Simeon, and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2010. Poverty and Civil War: 
Revisiting the Evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(4): 1035-1041. 
 
Doig, Alan, and Stephen Riley. 1998. Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies: 
Issues and Case Studies from Developing Countries. In Corruption and Integrity 
Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries, eds. Sahr J. Kpundeh and Irene 
Hors. New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, pp. 45-62. 
 
Dravis, Michael. 2000. Sketch: Burundi in the 1990s: From Democratization to 
Communal War. In Peoples versus State: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, ed. 
Ted Robert Gurr. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 188-
194. 
 
Duchacek, Ivo. 1973. Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions. Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC Clio Press. 
 
Dudley, Ryan, and Ross A. Miller. 1998. Group Rebellion in the 1980s. The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 77-96.  
 
Easterly, William. 2001. Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 49(4): 687-706. 
 
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and 
Ethnic Divisions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1203-1250. 
 
Eaton, Kent. 2006. Decentralization’s Nondemocratic Roots: Authoritarianism and 
Subnational Reform in Latin America. Latin American Politics and Society 48(1): 1-
26. 
  
Elazar, Daniel J. 1991. Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, 
Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements. Harlow: Longman Group. 
 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2002a. How Much War Will We See? 
Estimating the Incidence of Civil War in 161 Countries. Working Paper. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2002b. How Much War Will We See? 
Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(3): 
307-334. 
Bibliography 
 239 
Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, EISA. 2010. 
Country Profiles. Available at http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/countryindex.htm 
(accessed July 20, 2010).   
 
Elgie, Robert. 1997. Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of 
Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Regimes. 
Political  Studies 45(2): 217-231.  
 
Elgie, Robert, ed. 1999. Semi-Presidentialism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Elster, Jon. 1997. Afterword: The Making of Postcommunist Presidencies. In 
Postcommunist Presidents, ed. Ray Taras. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 225-237. 
 
Erero, John, and Tony Oladoyin. 2000. Tackling the Corruption Epidemic in Nigeria. 
In Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Country Case-Studies, eds. 
Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. and Bornwell C. Chikulo. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 
pp. 280-287. 
 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2002. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological 
Perspectives. 2
nd
 edition. London: Pluto Press.  
 
Erk, Jan, and Lawrence Anderson. 2009. The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule 
Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? Regional and Federal Studies 19(2): 
191-202. 
 
Esteban, Joan-María, and Debraj Ray. 1994. On the Measurement of Polarization. 
Econometrica 62(4): 819-851.  
 
Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. 2008. Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict. 
Journal of Peace Research 45(2): 163-182. 
 
Falola, Toyin. 1998. Corruption in the Nigerian Public Service, 1945-1960. In 
Corruption and the Crisis of Institutional Reforms in Africa, ed. John Mukum 
Mbaku. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, pp. 137-165. 
  
Fearon, James D. 2005. Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49(4): 483-507. 
 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2000. Violence and the Social Construction 
of Ethnic Identity. International Organization 54(4): 845-877. 
 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003a. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. 
American Political Science Review 97(1): 75-90. 
 
Bibliography 
 240 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003b. Additional Tables for “Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War”. Available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/addtabs.pdf (accessed July 25, 2010).   
 
Finnish Social Science Data Archive, FSD. 2010. FSD1216 Democratization and 
Power Resources 1850-2000. Available at 
http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1216/meF1216e.html (accessed July 
25, 2010).    
 
Fjelde, Hanne. 2009. Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985-99. 
Journal of Peace Research 46(2): 199-218. 
 
Fleiner, Thomas, Walter Kälin, Wolf Linder and Cheryl Saunders. 2003. Federalism, 
Decentralisation and Conflict Management in Multicultural Societies. In Federalism 
in a Changing World, Learning from Each Other: Scientific Background, 
Proceedings and Plenary Speeches of the International Conference on Federalism 
2002, eds. Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, pp. 197-215. 
 
Forum of Federations. 2010. Federalism by Country. Available at 
http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/by_country/index.php (accessed July 20, 
2010).   
 
Franzese, Robert J., Jr., and Jude C. Hays. 2007. Spatial Econometric Models of 
Cross-Sectional Interdependence in Political Science Panel and Time-Series-Cross-
Section Data. Political Analysis 15(2): 140-164. 
 
Freedom House. 2010. Freedom in the World. Available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (accessed July 20, 2010).   
 
Freedom House. 2011. Freedom in the World Country Report: North Korea. 
Available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2011&country=8068 
(accessed March 11, 2011).  
 
Fung, Archon. 2003. Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes, and 
Realities. Annual Review of Sociology 29: 515-539. 
 
Gallagher, Michael, and Paul Mitchell. 2008. Introduction to Electoral Systems. In 
The Politics of Electoral Systems, eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 3-23.    
 
Galtung, Johan. 1985. Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and 
Some Responses. Journal of Peace Research 22(2): 141-158. 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 241 
Galtung, Fredrik. 2006. Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of 
(Macro) Corruption Indices. In Measuring Corruption, eds. Charles Sampford, 
Arthur Shacklock, Carmel Connors and Fredrik Galtung. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 
101-130.  
 
Galtung, Fredrik, and Martin Tisné. 2009. A New Approach to Postwar 
Reconstruction. Journal of Democracy 20(4): 93-107. 
 
Gana, Aaron T., and Samuel G. Egwu, eds. 2003. Federalism in Africa. Volume I: 
Framing the National Question. Asmara: Africa World Press. 
 
Garcia-Montalvo, José, and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2002. Why Ethnic 
Fractionalization? Polarization, Ethnic Conflict and Growth. UPF Economics and 
Business Working Paper 660. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.  
 
Gardiner, John. 1993. Defining Corruption. In Coping with Corruption in a 
Borderless World: Proceedings of the Fifth International Anti-Corruption 
Conference, eds. Maurice Punch, Emile Kolthoff, Kees van der Vijver and Bram van 
Vliet. Deventer and Boston, MA: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, pp. 21-38. 
 
Gatti, Roberta. 2004. Explaining Corruption: Are Open Countries Less Corrupt? 
Journal of International Development 16(6): 851-861. 
 
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York, 
NY: Basic Books.  
 
Gerring, John, and Strom C. Thacker. 2004. Political Institutions and Corruption: 
The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science 
34(2): 295-330. 
 
Gibson, Edward L., ed. 2004. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. 
Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Gillespie, Kate. 2006. The Middle East’s Corruption Conundrum. Current History 
105(687): 40-46. 
 
Gillespie, Kate, and Gwenn Okruhlik. 1991. The Political Dimensions of Corruption 
Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis. Comparative Politics 24(1): 77-95. 
 
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. Expanded Trade and GDP Data. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 46(5): 712-724.  
 
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2008. Expanded Trade and GDP Data Version 5.0. 
Available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html (accessed July 
25, 2010). 
Bibliography 
 242 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg 
and Håvard Strand. 2002. Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of 
Peace Research 39(5): 615-637. 
 
Golder, Matt. 2004. Codebook: Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 
1946-2000. New York, NY: New York University. 
 
Golder, Matt. 2005. Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946-2000. 
Electoral Studies 24(1): 103-121. 
 
Goldsmith, Arthur A. 1999. Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political 
Corruption in Emerging Markets. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 
58(4): 865-883. 
 
Goodhand, Jonathan. 2008. Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs 
Economy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan. International 
Peacekeeping 15(3): 405-423. 
 
Goodin, Robert E. 1998. Institutions and Their Design. In The Theory of Institutional 
Design, ed. Robert E. Goodin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-53. 
 
Grofman, Bernard, and Robert Stockwell. 2003. Institutional Design in Plural 
Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict and Fostering Stable Democracy. In Economic 
Welfare, International Business and Global Institutional Change, eds. Ram 
Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 102-137.   
 
Guelke, Adrian, ed. 2004. Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in 
Deeply Divided Societies. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
  
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical 
Conflicts. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New 
Century. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert, and Will H. Moore. 1997. Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-
Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s. American 
Journal of Political Science 41(4): 1079-1103. 
 
Harbom, Lotta. 2009. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: Armed Conflicts 
Version 4-2009. Available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-
Bibliography 
 243 
Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/ (accessed December 10, 
2010).
i
 
 
Hardin, Russell. 1995. One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Harff, Barbara. 2003. No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of 
Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955. American Political Science Review 
97(1): 57-73. 
 
Harff, Barbara, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2003. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. 2
nd
 
edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Hartzell, Caroline A., and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing 
Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
He, Baogang. 2007. Democratization and Federalization in Asia. In Federalism in 
Asia, eds. Baogang He, Brian Galligan and Takashi Inoguchi. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, pp. 1-32.  
 
He, Baogang, Brian Galligan and Takashi Inoguchi, eds. 2007. Federalism in Asia. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Hedström, Peter, and Richard Swedberg. 1998. Social Mechanisms: An Introductory 
Essay. In Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, eds. Peter 
Hedström and Richard Swedberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-31.  
 
Hegre, Håvard, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical 
Results on Civil War Onset. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4): 508-535. 
 
Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. Toward 
a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992. 
American Political Science Review 95(1): 33-48. 
 
Heidenheimer, Arnold J., and Michael Johnston. 2002. Introduction to Part I. In 
Political Corruption, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston. 3
rd
 edition. 
New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 3-14.  
 
Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. 2004. Informal Institutions and 
Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics 2(4): 725-740. 
 
Henderson, Errol A. 2000. When States Implode: The Correlates of Africa’s Civil 
Wars, 1950-92. Studies in Comparative International Development 35(2): 28-47. 
 
                                                 
i
   NB: The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset was first presented in: Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter 
Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2002. Armed Conflict 
1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615-637. 
Bibliography 
 244 
Henderson, Errol A., and J. David Singer. 2000. Civil War in the Post-Colonial 
World, 1946-92. Journal of Peace Research 37(3): 275-299. 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. Economic, Political, and Social Incentives in the Organization 
of Rebellion in Africa. Paper prepared for the World Bank conference on ‘The 
Economics of Political Violence’, 18-19 March 2000. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University.    
 
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2009. Penn World Table Version 
6.3. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania. Available at 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt63/pwt63_form.php (accessed July 25, 2010).  
 
Hewitt, J. Joseph. 2007. Trends in Global Conflict, 1946-2005. In Peace and Conflict 
2008, eds. J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Ted Robert Gurr. Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm Publishers, pp. 21-26. 
 
Heywood, Paul. 1996. Continuity and Change: Analysing Political Corruption in 
Modern Spain. In Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America, eds. Walter 
Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbó. New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, pp. 115-136. 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1990. Comparing Democratic Systems. Journal of Democracy 
1(4): 73-79. 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering 
in a Divided Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 2002. Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes. In 
The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and 
Democracy, ed. Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-36. 
 
Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: 
Uncovering the Mechanisms. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508-537. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Immergut, Ellen M. 1998. The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism. Politics 
& Society 26(1): 5-34. 
 
Integrity Watch Afghanistan, IWA. 2007. Afghans’ Experience of Corruption: A 
Study Across Eight Provinces. Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan and United 
Nation Development Program [sic]. 
 
Bibliography 
 245 
International Crisis Group, ICG. 2006a. Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace 
Process. Asia Report No. 124. Colombo and Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
 
International Crisis Group, ICG. 2006b. Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis. Africa 
Report No. 118. Dakar and Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, IPU. 2010. PARLINE Database on National Parliaments. 
Available at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp (accessed July 20, 2010).   
 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, IPU. 2011. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Choe 
Go In Min Hoe Ui (Supreme People’s Assembly): Electoral System. Available at 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2085_B.htm (accessed March 11, 2011).  
 
Ishiyama, John. 2009. Do Ethnic Parties Promote Minority Ethnic Conflict? 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15(1): 56-83. 
  
Jain, Arvind K. 2001. Corruption: A Review. Journal of Economic Surveys 15(1): 
71-121. 
 
Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30(2): 
167-214. 
 
Jones, Mark P. 1995. Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. 
Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.  
 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2007. Civil Wars. In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
416-434. 
 
Kanazawa, Satoshi, and Jon Jackson. 2005. Quantitative Analysis 2: The Generalized 
Linear Model. Mi452 Coursepack. London: London School of Economics and 
Political Science. 
 
Kasfir, Nelson. 1979. Explaining Ethnic Political Participation. World Politics 31(3): 
365-388. 
 
Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. 
Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.  
 
Kaufmann, Chaim. 1996. Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. 
International Security 20(4): 136-175. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel. 1998. Research on Corruption: Critical Empirical Issues. In 
Economics of Corruption, ed. Arvind K. Jain. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, pp. 129-176. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 246 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. Available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp  
(accessed November 23, 2010). 
 
King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. 
Political Analysis 9(2): 137-163. 
 
Kittel, Bernhard. 1999. Sense and Sensitivity in Pooled Analysis of Political Data. 
European Journal of Political Research 35(2): 225-253. 
 
Korf, Benedikt. 2005. Rethinking the Greed-Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and 
the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka. Journal of Peace Research 42(2): 201-
217. 
 
Kunicová, Jana, and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2005. Electoral Rules and Constitutional 
Structures as Constraints on Corruption. British Journal of Political Science 35(4): 
573-606. 
 
Kurtz, Marcus J. 2004. The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons 
from Latin America. World Politics 56(2): 262-302. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. 1996. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. 2007. Multi-Nation Federalism. In Federalism in Asia, eds. 
Baogang He, Brian Galligan and Takashi Inoguchi. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 33-56. 
 
Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. 1994. Return of the Citizen: A Survey of 
Recent Work on Citizenship Theory. Ethics 104(2): 352-381. 
 
Laitin, David, and Daniel Posner. 2001. The Implications of Constructivism for 
Constructing Ethnic Fractionalization Indices. APSA-CP 12(1): 13-17. 
 
Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. 1996. Containing Fear: The Origins and 
Management of Ethnic Conflict. International Security 21(2): 41-75.  
 
Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. 1998. Spreading Fear: The Genesis of 
Transnational Ethnic Conflict. In The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, 
Diffusion, and Escalation, eds. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, pp. 3-32. 
 
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 2005. Between Two Evils: Investors Prefer Grand 
Corruption! Discussion Paper V-31-05 of the Economics Department. Passau: 
Passau University. 
 
Bibliography 
 247 
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. 2006. Measuring Corruption: The Validity and Precision 
of Subjective Indicators (CPI). In Measuring Corruption, eds. Charles Sampford, 
Arthur Shacklock, Carmel Connors and Fredrik Galtung. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 81-
99. 
 
Lauth, Hans-Joachim. 2000. Informal Institutions and Democracy. Democratization 
7(4): 21-50.  
 
Le Billon, Philippe. 2003. Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in 
Armed Conflicts. Journal of International Development 15(4): 413-426. 
 
Lecours, André. 2005. New Institutionalism: Issues and Questions. In New 
Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis, ed. André Lecours. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, pp. 3-26. 
 
Lee, Feng-yu, and Tse-min Lin. 2011. Political Institutions, Contexts, and Ethnic 
Conflict in Comparative Perspectives. Paper prepared for the 2011 IPSA-ECPR joint 
conference on ‘Whatever Happened to North-South?’, 16-19 February 2011. Sao 
Paulo: University of Sao Paulo.   
 
Leff, Nathaniel H. 1964. Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption. 
American Behavioral Scientist 8(3): 8-14. 
 
Liao, Tim Futing. 1994. Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit, and Other 
Generalized Linear Models. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. 
New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1987. Choosing an Electoral System for Democratic Elections in 
South Africa: An Evaluation of the Principal Options. Cape Town: University of 
Cape Town Institute for the Study of Public Policy, Critical Choices for South 
African Society, Occasional Paper. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1991. The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South 
Africa? Politikon 18(2): 91-101. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1996. The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational 
Interpretation. American Political Science Review 90(2): 258-268. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance 
in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 2001. Constructivism and Consociational Theory. APSA-CP 12(1): 
11-13. 
 
Bibliography 
 248 
Lijphart, Arend. 2002. The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In The Architecture 
of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. 
Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-54. 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 2004. Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of 
Democracy 15(2): 96-109. 
 
Linz, Juan J. 1990a. The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy 1(1): 51-
69. 
 
Linz, Juan J. 1990b. The Virtues of Parliamentarism. Journal of Democracy 1(4): 84-
91. 
 
Linz, Juan J. 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a 
Difference? In  The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Volume 1: Comparative 
Perspectives, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore, MD and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-87. 
 
Linz, Juan J., and Arturo Valenzuela, eds. 1994. The Failure of Presidential 
Democracy. Volume 1: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore, MD and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge. 
 
Long, J. Scott, and Jeremy Freese. 2006. Regression Models for Categorical 
Dependent Variables Using Stata. 2
nd
 edition. College Station, TX: Stata Press.   
 
Mahoney, James. 2001. Review: Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations 
in Theory and Method. Sociological Forum 16(3): 575-593. 
 
Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The 
Difficult Combination. Comparative Political Studies 26(2): 198-228. 
 
Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew S. Shugart. 1997a. Conclusion: Presidentialism and 
the Party System. In Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, eds. Scott 
Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
394-439. 
 
Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew S. Shugart. 1997b. Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and 
Democracy: A Critical Appraisal. Comparative Politics 29(4): 449-471. 
 
Majeed, Akhtar, Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds. 2006. Distribution of 
Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries: A Global Dialogue on Federalism 
Volume II. London: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
 
Malešević, Siniša. 2000. Ethnicity and Federalism in Communist Yugoslavia and its 
Successor States. In Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in 
Bibliography 
 249 
Multi-Ethnic States, ed. Yash Ghai. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
147-170. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, 
and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Mansbridge, Jane. 2000. What Does a Representative Do? Descriptive 
Representation in Communicative Settings of Distrust, Uncrystallized Interests, and 
Historically Denigrated Status. In Citizenship in Diverse Societies, eds. Will 
Kymlicka and Norman Wayne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 99-123. 
 
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and the Danger of 
War. International Security 20(1): 5-38. 
 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. The New Institutionalism: 
Organizational Factors in Political Life. American Political Science Review 78(3): 
734-749. 
 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis of Politics. New York, NY: Free Press. 
 
Marshall, Monty G., Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff. 2009. PITF State Failure 
Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2008. Dataset and 
Coding Guidelines. Arlington, VA: George Mason University.
ii
 
 
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2009a. Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008, p4v2008. Arlington, VA: George 
Mason University.
iii
  
 
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2009b. Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007. Dataset Users’ Manual. Arlington, VA 
and Vienna, VA: George Mason University and Center for Systemic Peace.
iv
 
 
Mason, T. David, and Patrick J. Fett. 1996. How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice 
Approach. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40(4): 546-568. 
 
Massicotte, Louis, and André Blais. 1999. Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual 
and Empirical Survey. Electoral Studies 18(3): 341-366. 
 
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
110(3): 681-712. 
 
                                                 
ii
    The most recent version of this codebook is available at 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfcode.htm (accessed December 10, 2010). 
iii
   The most recent version of this dataset is available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (accessed October 17, 2011). 
iv
   The most recent version of this codebook is available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (accessed October 17, 2011). 
Bibliography 
 250 
McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary. 1993. Introduction: The Macro-Political 
Regulation of Ethnic Conflict. In The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case 
Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, eds. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. 
London and New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 1-40.    
 
Meadwell, Hudson. 2009. The Political Dynamics of Secession and Institutional 
Accommodation. Regional and Federal Studies 19(2): 221-235. 
 
Méndez, Fabio, and Facundo Sepúlveda. 2006. Corruption, Growth and Political 
Regimes: Cross Country Evidence. European Journal of Political Economy 22(1): 
82-98. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. [1861] 1975. Three Essays: On Liberty, Representative 
Government, the Subjection of Women. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Mitchell, Paul. 2008. The Single Transferable Vote and Ethnic Conflict: The 
Evidence from Northern Ireland, 1982-2007. Paper prepared for the Political Science 
and Political Economy inaugural conference on ‘Designing Democratic Institutions’, 
13-14 May 2008. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. 
 
Mitra, Subrata K. 2000. The Nation, State and the Federal Process in India. In. 
Federalism and Political Performance, ed. Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt. London: 
Routledge, pp. 40-57. 
 
Montalvo, José G., and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. Ethnic Polarization, Potential 
Conflict, and Civil Wars. The American Economic Review 95(3): 796-816. 
 
Murshed, Syed Mansoob, and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin. 2009. Revisiting the 
Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict. Journal of 
International Development 21(1): 87-111. 
 
Ndikumana, Léonce. 1998. Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi. 
African Studies Review 41(1): 29-47. 
 
Neudorfer, Natascha S., and Ulrike G. Theuerkauf. 2011. Buying War Not Peace: 
The Influence of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic War. Working Paper. Munich and 
London: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München and London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
 
Ngaruko, Floribert, and Janvier D. Nkurunziza. 2005. Civil War and its Duration in 
Burundi. In Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume I: Africa, eds. 
Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, pp. 
35-61. 
 
Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 2005a. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Volume I: 
North America, Central America, and the Caribbean. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Bibliography 
 251 
Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 2005b. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Volume II: 
South America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nohlen, Dieter, and Philip Stöver, eds. 2010. Elections in Europe: A Data 
Handbook. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
 
Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann, eds. 2001a. Elections in Asia 
and the Pacific: A Data Handbook. Volume I: Middle East, Central Asia, and South 
Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann, eds. 2001b. Elections in Asia 
and the Pacific: A Data Handbook. Volume II: South East Asia, East Asia, and the 
South Pacific. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich and Bernhard Thibaut, eds. 1999. Elections in 
Africa: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Norris, Pippa. 1997. Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and 
Mixed Systems. International Political Science Review 18(3): 297-312. 
 
Norris, Pippa. 2002. Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic 
Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Democratization. In The Architecture of 
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. 
Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 206-247. 
 
Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Norris, Pippa. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb and Barry R. Weingast. 
2007. Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the 
Problems of Development. Policy Research Working Paper 4359. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. 
 
Norton, Edward C., Hua Wang and Chunrong Ai. 2004. Computing Interaction 
Effects and Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models. The Stata Journal 4(2): 154-
167. 
 
Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 1999. Commentary: Cameroon: A Country United by Ethnic 
Ambition and Difference. African Affairs 98(390): 101-118. 
 
Nye, J. S. 1967. Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.  
American Political Science Review 61(2): 417-427. 
Bibliography 
 252 
Ortino, Sergio, Mitja Žagar and Vojtech Mastny, eds. 2005. The Changing Faces of 
Federalism: Institutional Reconfiguration in Europe from East to West. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.  
 
Pande, Rohini. 2003. Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy 
Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India. The 
American Economic Review 93(4): 1132-1151. 
 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Peters, B. Guy. 2001. Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New 
Institutionalism’. London and New York, NY: Continuum. 
 
Philp, Mark. 2002. Conceptualizing Political Corruption. In Political Corruption, 
eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston. 3
rd
 edition. New Brunswick, NJ 
and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 41-57. 
 
Philp, Mark. 2008. Peacebuilding and Corruption. International Peacekeeping 15(3): 
310-327. 
 
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
 
Plümper, Thomas, and Eric Neumayer. 2006. The Unequal Burden of War: The 
Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy. International 
Organization 60(3): 723-754. 
 
Political Database of the Americas, PDBA. 2010. Electoral Systems and Data. 
Available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/elecdata.html (accessed July 20, 
2010).   
 
Political Instability Task Force, PITF. 2009. PITF Problem Set Annual Data: Ethnic 
War Problem Set, 1955-2007. Arlington, VA: George Mason University.
v
 
 
Political Instability Task Force, PITF. 2010. Consolidated Problem Set, Historical 
State Armed Conflicts and Regime Crises, 1955-2009. Available at 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ (accessed November 30, 2010). 
 
Political Instability Task Force, PITF. 2012. Political Instability Task Force: Internal 
Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-Most Recent Year. Available at 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ (accessed February 20, 2012). 
 
Polity IV Project. 2009. Polity IV Country Report 2008: Rwanda. Available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Rwanda2008.pdf (accessed March 11, 2011). 
 
                                                 
v
   The most recent version of this dataset is available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
(accessed December 10, 2010). 
Bibliography 
 253 
Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations Secretariat. 2007. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 
Available at  
http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?theme=4&variable_ID=363&acti
on=select_countries (accessed July 25, 2010).   
 
Posen, Barry R. 1993. The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. In Ethnic Conflict 
and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 103-124. 
 
Posner, Daniel N. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Przeworski, Adam. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and 
Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1972. Politics in Plural Societies: A 
Theory of Democratic Instability. Columbus, OH: Merrill. 
 
Réaume, Denise G. 2000. Official-Language Rights: Intrinsic Value and the 
Protection of Difference. In Citizenship in Diverse Societies, eds. Will Kymlicka and 
Wayne Norman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 245-272. 
 
Regan, Patrick M., and Daniel Norton. 2005. Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in 
Civil Wars. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(3): 319-336. 
 
Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for 
Conflict Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Reilly, Benjamin. 2002. Electoral Systems for Divided Societies. Journal of 
Democracy 13(2): 156-170.  
 
Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1): 29-54. 
 
Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Reynolds, Andrew, ed. 2002. The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, 
Conflict Management, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Reynolds, Andrew. 2005. Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Research Note. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(2): 301-310. 
 
Bibliography 
 254 
Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis. 2008. Electoral System Design: 
The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.  
 
Richmond, Anthony H. 1987. Ethnic Nationalism: Social Science Paradigms. 
International Social Science Journal 39(1): 3-18.  
 
Riggs, Fred W. 1997. Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism: Implications for 
Representativeness and Legitimacy. International Political Science Review 18(3): 
253-278. 
 
Roe, Paul. 2005. Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma. London and 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Roeder, Philip G. 1991. Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization. World Politics 
43(2): 196-232. 
 
Roeder, Philip G. 2005. Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing. 
In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, eds. Philip G. Roeder 
and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 51-82.  
 
Roeder, Philip G. 2009. Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting 
Nationalisms. Regional and Federal Studies 19(2): 203-219.  
 
Roeder, Philip G., and Donald Rothchild, eds. 2005. Sustainable Peace: Power and 
Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Rose, Richard. 1984. Electoral Systems: A Question of Degree or of Principle? In 
Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, eds. Arend Lijphart and 
Bernard Grofman. Westport, CT and London: Praeger, pp. 73-81. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1994. Reducing Bribery in the Public Sector. In Corruption 
& Democracy: Political Institutions, Processes and Corruption in Transition States 
in East-Central Europe and in the Former Soviet Union, ed. Duc V. Trang. 
Budapest: Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, pp. 21-28. 
 
Ross, Michael L. 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics 53(3): 325-361. 
 
Ross, Michael L. 2006. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. Annual 
Review of Political Science 9: 265-300. 
 
Rothchild, Donald, and Philip G. Roeder. 2005a. Power Sharing as an Impediment to 
Peace and Democracy. In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil 
Wars, eds. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 29-50. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 255 
Rothchild, Donald, and Philip G. Roeder. 2005b. Dilemmas of State-Building in 
Divided Societies. In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, 
eds. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 1- 25. 
 
Rubin, Barnett R. 2007. Saving Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs 86(1): 57-78. 
 
Rudolph, Joseph R., Jr. 2003. Sri Lanka: Tamil-Sinhalese Conflict in India’s 
Backyard. In Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts, ed. Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr. 
Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, pp. 225-234. 
 
Rummel, R. J. 1995. Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder. The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 39(1): 3-26.  
 
Saideman, Stephen M. 1998. Is Pandora’s Box Half Empty or Half Full? The 
Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration. In 
The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, eds. 
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 
127-150.  
 
Saideman, Stephen M., and R. William Ayres. 2000. Determining the Causes of 
Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Journal of Politics 62(4): 1126-1144. 
 
Saideman, Stephen M., David J. Lanoue, Michael Campenni and Samuel Stanton. 
2002. Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-
Series Analysis, 1985-1998. Comparative Political Studies 35(1): 103-129. 
 
Sala-I-Martin, Xavier X. 1997. I Just Ran Two Million Regressions. The American 
Economic Review 87(2): 178-183. 
 
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same 
Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1). The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 45(3): 259-282. 
 
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in 
the Quantitative Literature on Civil War. Defence and Peace Economics 13(3): 215-
243. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. American 
Political Science Review 64(4): 1033-1053. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1984. Guidelines for Concept Analysis. In Social Science 
Concepts: A Systematic Analysis, ed. Giovanni Sartori. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 
15-85.   
 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Part One: The 
Contemporary Debate. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers. 
Bibliography 
 256 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1991. Comparing and Miscomparing. Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 3(3): 243-257. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1997. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into 
Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. 2
nd
 edition. Houndmills and London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Saunders, Cheryl. 1995. Constitutional Arrangements of Federal Systems. Publius 
25(2): 61-79. 
 
Saward, Michael. 2005. Governance and the Transformation of Political 
Representation. In Remaking Governance: Peoples, Politics and the Public Sphere, 
ed. Janet Newman. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 179-196. 
 
Scherrer, Christian P. 1999. Towards a Comprehensive Analysis of Ethnicity and 
Mass Violence: Types, Dynamics, Characteristics and Trends. In Ethnicity and Intra-
State Conflict, eds. Håkan Wiberg and Christian P. Scherrer. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 
52-88. 
 
Schock, Kurt. 2005. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in 
Nondemocracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A 
Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries. The Journal of Politics 64(2): 
408-433. 
 
Selway, Joel Sawat. 2011. The Measurement of Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Other 
Multidimensional Cleavage Structures. Political Analysis 19(1): 48-65. 
 
Sen, Amartya. 2003. Democracy and Its Global Roots: Why Democratization Is Not 
the Same as Westernization. The New Republic 229(14): 28-35. 
 
Shaxson, Nicholas. 2007. Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse. International 
Affairs 83(6): 1123-1140. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 108(3): 599-617. 
 
Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: 
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and Scott Mainwaring. 1997. Presidentialism and 
Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate. In 
Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, eds. Scott Mainwaring and 
Matthew S. Shugart. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 12-54. 
 
Bibliography 
 257 
Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic 
Conflicts. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Sisk, Timothy D., and Christoph Stefes. 2005. Power Sharing as an Interim Step in 
Peace Building: Lessons from South Africa. In Sustainable Peace: Power and 
Democracy after Civil Wars, eds. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, 
NY and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 293-317. 
 
Slinker, Bryan K., and Stanton A. Glantz. 2008. Multiple Linear Regression: 
Accounting for Multiple Simultaneous Determinants of a Continuous Dependent 
Variable. Circulation 117(13): 1732-1737. 
 
Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
  
Smith, Anthony D. 1993. The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism. In Ethnic Conflict and 
International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 27-42. 
 
Smith, Daniel Jordan. 2007. A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and 
Popular Discontent in Nigeria. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Snyder, Jack. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist 
Conflict. New York, NY and London: W. W. Norton & Company.  
 
Soeters, Joseph L. 2005. Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics 
of Civil Wars. London: Routledge. 
 
Spalding, Nancy. 2000. A Cultural Explanation of Collapse into Civil War: 
Escalation of Tension in Nigeria. Culture & Psychology 6(1): 51-87. 
 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006. Political Representation. Available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/ (accessed May 10, 2009). 
 
Steffani, Winfried. 1979. Parlamentarische und Präsidentielle Demokratie: 
Strukturelle Aspekte Westlicher Demokratien. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
 
Stepan, Alfred, and Cindy Skach. 1994. Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in 
Comparative Perspective. In The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Volume 1: 
Comparative Perspectives, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore, MD 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 119-136. 
 
Stokes, Susan C. 2007. Political Clientelism. In The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 604-627. 
 
Suberu, Rotimi T. 2001. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria. Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Bibliography 
 258 
Suberu, Rotimi T., and Larry Diamond. 2002. Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict 
Management, and Democracy in Nigeria. In The Architecture of Democracy: 
Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, ed. Andrew 
Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 400-428. 
 
Svensson, Jakob. 1998. Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking. Policy Research Working 
Paper 1880. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Tanzi, Vito. 2000. Policies, Institutions and the Dark Side of Economics. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
 
Tanzi, Vito, and Hamid Davoodi. 1997. Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. 
IMF Working Paper 97/139. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Tavares, José. 2003. Does Foreign Aid Corrupt? Economics Letters 79(1): 99-106. 
 
The PRS Group, Inc. 2009. International Country Risk Guide Researcher’s Dataset: 
Table 3B (1984-2008). East Syracuse, NY: The PRS Group, Inc.  
 
The PRS Group, Inc. 2010. ICRG Methodology. Available at 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx (accessed November 23, 2010). 
 
The World Bank. 2010. World Development Indicators. Available at  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed July 25, 2010).  
 
Thelen, Kathleen, and Sven Steinmo. 1992. Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Politics. In Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-32. 
 
Thies, Cameron G. 2010. Of Rulers, Rebels, and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War 
Onset, and Primary Commodities. Journal of Peace Research 47(3): 321-332.  
 
Thompson, Dennis F. 1993. Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five. 
American Political Science Review 87(2): 369-381. 
 
Thompson, Dennis F. 1995. Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional 
Corruption. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Threlfall, Monica. 2011. The Alternative Vote Is Not the Answer to the Problems of 
Our Current Electoral System: It Is Confusing, Does Not Increase Proportionality 
and Promotes Centrist Politics. Available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2011/03/16/av-not-the-answer/ (accessed 
May 14, 2012). 
Transparency International. 2010. Corruption Perceptions Index. Available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed 
November 23, 2010). 
Bibliography 
 259 
Treisman, Daniel. 1998. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. 
Working Paper. Los Angeles: University of California. 
 
Treisman, Daniel. 2000. The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. Journal 
of Public Economics 76(3): 399-457. 
 
Treisman, Daniel. 2007. What Have We Learned about the Causes of Corruption 
from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political 
Science 10: 211-244. 
 
Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British 
Journal of Political Science 25(3): 289-325. 
 
United Nations ,UN. 2006. Member States of the United Nations. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (accessed July 20, 2010).  
 
United Nations, UN. 2010. The United Nations and Decolonization: Trust and Non-
Self-Governing Territories (1945-1999). Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml (accessed July 26, 2010).  
 
United States Library of Congress. 2010. Country Studies. Available at 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ (accessed July 20, 2010).   
 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo, 
UCDP/PRIO. 2009a. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook Version 4-
2009. Available at http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-
1423485763/Codebook_UCDP_PRIO%20Armed%20Conflict%20Dataset%20v4_20
09.pdf (accessed July 25, 2010). 
 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo, 
UCDP/PRIO. 2009b. Armed Conflict Dataset: Version History and Known Errata, 
Version 4-2009. Available at http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-
2096620071/Version_history_v4-2009.pdf (accessed July 25, 2010).  
 
Valenzuela, Arturo. 2004. Latin American Presidencies Interrupted. Journal of 
Democracy 15(4): 5-19. 
 
van den Berghe, Pierre L. 1987. The Ethnic Phenomenon. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1997. Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1999. Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A 
Comparative Analysis. Journal of Peace Research 36(1): 55-73.  
 
Bibliography 
 260 
Vanhanen, Tatu. 2003. Democratization and Power Resources 1850-2000. Computer 
File FSD1216, Version 1.0 (2003-03-10). Tampere: Finnish Social Science Data 
Archive. 
 
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2001. Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond. 
World Politics 53(3): 362-398. 
 
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in 
India. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. 
 
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2007. Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict. In The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 274-294. 
 
Vega, William A. 1992. Theoretical and Pragmatic Implications of Cultural Diversity 
for Community Research. American Journal of Community Psychology 20(3) :375-
391. 
 
Watts, Ronald L. 1998. Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations. 
Annual Review of Political Science 1: 117-137. 
  
Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic 
Riots in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Williams, Robert. 1999. Editorial: The New Politics of Corruption. Third World 
Quarterly 20(3): 487-489. 
 
Wimmer, Andreas. 1997. Who Owns the State? Understanding Ethnic Conflict in 
Post-Colonial Societies. Nations and Nationalism 3(4): 631-666. 
 
Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of 
Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wolff, Stefan. 2007. Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Wolff, Stefan. 2009. Complex Power-Sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-
Governance in Contemporary Conflict Settlements. Ethnopolitics 8(1): 27-45.  
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel 
Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Wright, Theodore P., Jr. 1991. Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in 
Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis. Comparative Politics 23(3): 299-312. 
 
Zartman, I. William. 2011. Greed and Grievance: Methodological and 
Epistemological Underpinnings of the Debate. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 
11(2): 298-307.  
Bibliography 
 261 
Zheng, Yongnian. 2007. China’s De Facto Federalism. In Federalism in Asia, eds. 
Baogang He, Brian Galligan and Takashi Inoguchi. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 213-241.   
 
 
 
Appendix I –Patterns of Political Institutions 
 
262 
 
Appendix I: Patterns of Political Institutions  
 
 
NB:  All graphs in this section are based on data from the EEI Dataset. Please see the EEI 
Dataset Codebook in Appendix III for the relevant data sources. 
 
 
 
Section A: Forms of Government 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Autocratic Forms of Government Worldwide, 1955-2007. 
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Figure 2: Democratic Forms of Government Worldwide, 1955-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Democratic Forms of Government Africa (except North Africa), 1955-2007.
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Figure 4: Democratic Forms of Government Central Asia and Eastern Europe,  
1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Democratic Forms of Government East Asia and Pacific, 1955-2007.
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Figure 6: Democratic Forms of Government Europe (except Eastern Europe) and  
North America, 1955-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Democratic Forms of Government Latin America and Caribbean, 1955-2007. 
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Figure 8: Democratic Forms of Government Middle East and North Africa, 1955-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Democratic Forms of Government South Asia, 1955-2007. 
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Section B: Electoral Systems  
 
 
Figure 10: Electoral Systems for the Presidency Worldwide, 1955-2007. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Electoral Systems for the Legislature Worldwide, 1955-2007. 
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Figure 12: Electoral Systems for the Legislature Africa (except North Africa),  
1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Electoral Systems for the Legislature Central Asia and Eastern Europe,  
1955-2007. 
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Figure 14: Electoral Systems for the Legislature East Asia and Pacific, 1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Electoral Systems for the Legislature Europe (except Eastern Europe) and 
North America, 1955-2007. 
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Figure 16: Electoral Systems for the Legislature Latin America and Caribbean,  
1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Electoral Systems for the Legislature Middle East and North Africa,  
1955-2007. 
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Figure 18: Electoral Systems for the Legislature South Asia, 1955-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Countries Worldwide Using Seat Reservations or Communal Rolls to 
Enhance Ethnic, National or Religious Minority Representation, 1955-2007. 
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Section C: State Structures  
 
 
Figure 20: State Structures Worldwide, 1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: State Structures Africa (except North Africa), 1955-2007.
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Figure 22: State Structures Central Asia and Eastern Europe, 1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: State Structures East Asia and Pacific, 1955-2007.
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Figure 24: State Structures Europe (except Eastern Europe) and North America, 
1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: State Structures Latin America and Caribbean, 1955-2007.
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Figure 26: State Structures Middle East and North Africa, 1955-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: State Structures South Asia, 1955-2007.
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Combination of presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature 
and unitary state structure 
Combination of presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
Combination of presidential form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
mixed state structure 
      
Afghanistan 2005-2007 Comoros 2002-2007 Azerbaijan 1992 
Armenia 1991-1994 Kenya 1964-1965 Philippines 1990-1997 
Belarus 1994 Nigeria 1979-1983, 1999-2007   
Benin 1960-1962 United States 1955-2007 Number of country years: 9  
Congo, Republic of 1960-1962     
Côte d'Ivoire 2000-2001 Number of country years: 75    
Cyprus 1960-1980     
Djibouti 1999-2007     
Ghana 1979-1980, 1996-2007     
Kenya 2002-2007     
Liberia 2005-2007     
Malawi 1994-2007     
Pakistan 1962-1968     
Philippines 1955-1971, 1986-1989     
Sierra Leone 2007     
Sri Lanka 1977-1988     
Uganda 1980-1984     
Zambia 1964-1967, 1991-2007     
      
Number of country years: 150      
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Section D: Institutional Combinations 
Table 1: Institutional Combinations Worldwide, 1955-2007, Ordered by Institutional Combination. 
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Combination of presidential form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
Combination of presidential form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
Combination of presidential form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature and 
mixed state structure 
      
Benin 1991-2007 Argentina 1973-1975, 1983-2007 Indonesia 2001-2007 
Bolivia 1982-1996 Brazil 1955-1960, 1963, 1985-2007 Nicaragua 1990-2007 
Burkina Faso 1977-1979 Switzerland 1955-2007   
Burundi 2002-2004 Venezuela 1958-1992 Number of country years: 25  
Chile 1955-1972,1989-2007 Number of country years: 146   
Colombia 1957-2007     
Costa Rica 1955-2007     
Cyprus 1981-2007     
Dominican Republic 1962, 1978-2007     
Ecuador 1955-1960, 1968-1969     
El Salvador 1984-2007     
Equatorial Guinea 1968     
Guatemala 1966-1973, 1986-2007     
Guyana 1992-2007     
Honduras 1982-2007     
Indonesia 1999-2000     
Liberia 2003-2004     
Mozambique 1994-2007     
Panama 1955-1967     
Paraguay 1989-2007     
Peru 1956-1967, 1980-1991, 1993-2007     
Uruguay 1955-1972, 1985-2006     
      
Number of country years: 471      
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Combination of presidential form of government, 
mixed electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
Combination of presidential form of government, 
mixed electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 Combination of presidential form of government, 
mixed electoral system for the legislature and 
mixed state structure 
      
Bolivia 1997-2007 Mexico 1994-2007 Georgia 1995-2003 
Ecuador 1979-2007 Venezuela 1993-1998 Korea, South 2006-2007 
Korea, South 1963-1971, 1987-2005   Philippines 1998-2007 
Panama 1989-2007 Number of country years: 20  Venezuela 1999-2007 
Sierra Leone 1996, 1998-2006     
Sri Lanka 1989-2007   Number of country years: 30 
      
Number of country years: 116      
  
 
 
    
Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 Combination of parliamentary form of 
government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure 
      
Albania 1991 Australia 1955-2007 Ethiopia 1992-1994 
Bangladesh 1972-1973, 1991-2006 Canada 1955-2007 Mauritius 2002-2007 
Belarus 1991-1993 Comoros 1975 New Zealand 1955-1995 
Botswana 1966-2007 Ethiopia 1995-2007 Papua New Guinea 1976-2007 
Burma (Myanmar) 1955-1961 India 1955-2007 South Africa 1963-1993 
Ethiopia 1991 Kenya 1963 Trinidad and Tobago 1996-2007 
Fiji 1970-1986, 1990-2005 Malaysia 1957-2007 United Kingdom 1955-1973, 1999-2007 
The Gambia 1965-1993 Nigeria 1960-1965   
Ghana 1969-1971 Pakistan 1955-1957, 1972-1976, 1997-1998 Number of country years: 153  
Greece 1955 Uganda 1962-1965   
Haiti 1990, 1994-1999, 2006-2007     
Jamaica 1962-2007 Number of country years: 245   
Japan 1955-1995     
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Korea, South 1960     
Laos 1955-1959, 1961-1974     
Latvia 1991-1992     
Lebanon 1955-2007     
Lesotho 1966-1969, 1993-2001     
Lithuania 1991     
Macedonia 1993-1997     
Mauritius 1968-2001     
Mongolia 1990-2007     
Nepal 1959, 1990-2001, 2006-2007     
Papua New Guinea 1975     
Sierra Leone 1961-1970     
Solomon Islands 1978-2007     
South Africa 1955-1962     
Sri Lanka 1955-1976     
Sudan 1965-1968, 1986-1988     
Syria 1955-1957     
Thailand 1969-1970, 1974-1975, 1978-1990, 1992-2000     
Trinidad and Tobago 1962-1995     
Turkey 1955-1959     
United Kingdom 1974-1998     
      
Number of country years: 565      
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Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature 
and unitary state structure 
Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature 
and mixed state structure 
      
Belgium 1955-1979 Belgium 1993-2007 Belgium 1980-1992 
Czech Republic 1993-2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-2007 Denmark 1955-2007 
Estonia 1991-2007 Czechoslovakia 1990-1992 Finland 2000-2007 
Greece 1958-1966, 1974-2006 Serbia and Montenegro 2003-2006 Italy 1958-1993 
Guyana 1966-1977 South Africa 1994-2007 Moldova 2000-2007 
Ireland 1955-2007 Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of 2000-2002 Netherlands 1955-2007 
Israel 1955-2007   Spain 1978-2007 
Latvia 1993-2007 Number of country years: 51    
Macedonia 2002-2007   Number of country years: 201  
Montenegro 2006-2007     
Namibia 1990-1993     
Norway 1955-2007     
Slovakia 1993-1998     
Spain 1977     
Sweden 1955-2007     
Turkey 1961-1970, 1973-1979, 1983-1986, 1995-2007     
      
Number of country years: 391      
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Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
mixed electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
mixed electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
Combination of parliamentary form of government, 
mixed electoral system for the legislature and 
mixed state structure 
      
Albania 1992-1995, 1997-2007 German Federal Republic 1955-1990 Georgia 1992-1994 
Cambodia 1993-1996, 1998-2007 Germany 1990-2007 Italy 1955-1957, 1994-2007 
France 1955-1957   New Zealand 1996-2007 
Greece 1956-1957, 2007 Number of country years: 54    
Hungary 1990-2007   Number of country years: 32  
Japan 1996-2007     
Lesotho 2002-2007     
Macedonia 1998-2001     
Somalia 1960-1968     
Sudan 1956-1957     
Thailand 2001-2005     
Turkey 1987-1994     
Zimbabwe 1965-1986     
      
Number of country years: 121      
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Combination of mixed form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature 
and unitary state structure 
Combination of mixed form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature 
and federal state structure 
Combination of mixed form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature 
and mixed state structure 
      
Central African Republic 1993-2002 Comoros 1990-1998 France 1999-2007 
Congo, Republic of 1991-1996 Pakistan 1988-1996, 2007 Ukraine 1991-1997 
France 1958-1985, 1988-1998 Russia 1992   
Kyrgyzstan 2005-2006   Number of country years: 16  
Madagascar 2002-2007 Number of country years: 20    
Mali 1992-2007     
Moldova 1991-1993     
Poland 1989-1990     
      
Number of country years: 84  
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Combination of mixed form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature 
and unitary state structure 
Combination of mixed form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature 
and federal state structure 
Combination of mixed form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the legislature 
and mixed state structure 
      
Algeria 2004-2007 Austria 1955-2007 Finland 1955-1999 
Bulgaria 1991-2007 Brazil 1961-1962 Moldova 1995-1999 
Burundi 2005-2007 Russia 2007 Portugal 1976-2007 
Croatia 2000-2002   Serbia 2006-2007 
East Timor 2007 Number of country years: 56  Ukraine 2006-2007 
France 1986-1987     
Guinea-Bissau 1994-2002, 2005-2007   Number of country years: 86  
Kyrgyzstan 2007     
Madagascar 1993-1997     
Moldova 1994     
Namibia 1994-2007     
Poland 1991-2007     
Romania 1990-2007     
Slovakia 1999-2007     
Slovenia 1992-2007     
      
Number of country years: 123      
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Combination of mixed form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and unitary 
state structure 
Combination of mixed form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and federal 
state structure 
Combination of mixed form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and mixed state 
structure 
      
Armenia 1995, 1998-2007 Congo, Democratic Republic of 2006-2007 Georgia 1991, 2004-2007 
Bulgaria 1990 Russia 1993-2006 Ukraine 1998-2005 
Croatia 2003-2007     
East Timor 2002-2006 Number of country years: 16  Number of country years: 13  
Lithuania 1992-2007     
Madagascar 1991-1992, 1998-2001     
Mauritania 2007     
Niger 1993-1995, 1999-2007     
Senegal 2000-2007     
Taiwan 1992-2007     
      
Number of country years: 81      
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Autocracy with a unitary state structure Autocracy with a federal state structure Autocracy with a mixed state structure 
      
Afghanistan 1955-2004 Argentina 1955-1972, 1976-1982 Azerbaijan 1991, 1993-2007 
Albania 1955-1989, 1996 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994-1995 China 1955-2007 
Algeria 1962-2003 Brazil 1964-1984 Czechoslovakia 1955-1959 
Angola 1975-2007 Cameroon 1961-1971 Iraq 1974-2007 
Armenia 1996-1997 Comoros 1976-1989, 1999-2001 Nicaragua 1987-1989 
Bahrain 1971-2007 Congo, Democratic Republic of 1960-1964 Romania 1955-1968 
Bangladesh 1971, 1974-1990, 2007 Czechoslovakia 1969-1989 Sudan 1972-1982 
Belarus 1995-2007 Ethiopia 1955-1961 Tajikistan 1991-2007 
Benin 1963-1990 Libya 1955-1962 Tanzania 1964-2007 
Bhutan 1971-2007 Mexico 1955-1993 Uzbekistan 1991-2007 
Bolivia 1955-1981 Nigeria 1966-1978, 1984-1998   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1993 Pakistan 1977-1987, 1999-2006 Number of country years: 214  
Bulgaria 1955-1989 Soviet Union 1955-1991   
Burkina Faso 1960-1976, 1980-2007 Sudan 1991-2007   
Burma (Myanmar) 1962-2007 United Arab Emirates 1971-2007   
Burundi 1962-2001 Venezuela 1955-1957   
Cambodia 1955-1992, 1997 Yugoslavia 1955-1992   
Cameroon 1960, 1972-2007 Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of 1992-1999   
Central African Republic 1960-1992, 2003-2007     
Chad 1960-2007 Number of country years: 343    
Chile 1973-1988     
Colombia 1955-1956     
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1965-2005     
Congo, Republic of 1963-1990, 1997-2007     
Côte d'Ivoire 1960-1999, 2002-2007     
Croatia 1992-1999     
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Cuba 1955-2007     
Czechoslovakia 1960-1968     
Democratic Yemen 1967-1990     
Djibouti 1977-1998     
Dominican Republic 1955-1961, 1963-1977     
Ecuador 1961-1967, 1970-1978     
Egypt 1955-1957, 1961-2007     
El Salvador 1955-1983     
Equatorial Guinea 1969-2007     
Eritrea 1993-2007     
Ethiopia 1962-1990     
Fiji 1987-1989, 2006-2007     
Gabon 1960-2007     
The Gambia 1994-2007     
German Democratic Republic 1955-1990     
Ghana 1957-1968, 1972-1978, 1981-1995     
Greece 1967-1973     
Guatemala 1955-1965, 1974-1985     
Guinea 1958-2007     
Guinea-Bissau 1974-1993, 2003-2004     
Guyana 1978-1991     
Haiti 1955-1989, 1991-1993, 2000-2005     
Honduras 1955-1981     
Hungary 1955-1989     
Indonesia 1955-1998     
Iran 1955-1996, 2004-2007     
Iraq 1955-1973     
Jordan 1955-2007     
Kazakhstan 1991-2007     
Kenya 1966-2001     
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Korea, North 1955-2007     
Korea, South 1955-1959, 1961-1962, 1972-1986     
Kuwait 1961-2007     
Kyrgyzstan 1991-2004     
Laos 1960, 1975-2007     
Lesotho 1970-1992     
Liberia 1955-2002     
Libya 1963-2007     
Madagascar 1960-1990     
Malawi 1964-1993     
Mali 1960-1991     
Mauritania 1960-2006     
Mongolia 1955-1989     
Morocco 1956-2007     
Mozambique 1975-1993     
Nepal 1955-1958, 1960-1989, 2002-2005     
Nicaragua 1955-1986     
Niger 1960-1990, 1996-1998     
Oman 1971-2007     
Pakistan 1958-1961, 1969-1971     
Panama 1968-1988     
Paraguay 1955-1988     
Peru 1955, 1962, 1968-1979, 1992     
Philippines 1972-1985     
Poland 1955-1988     
Portugal 1955-1975     
Qatar 1971-2007     
Romania 1969-1989     
Rwanda 1962-2007     
Saudi Arabia 1955-2007     
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Senegal 1960-1999     
Sierra Leone 1967, 1971-1995, 1997     
Singapore 1965-2007     
Somalia 1969-2007     
Spain 1955-1976     
Sudan 1958-1964, 1969-1971, 1983-1985, 1989-1990     
Swaziland 1968-2007     
Syria 1961-2007     
Taiwan 1955-1991     
Tanganyika 1961-1964     
Thailand 1955-1968, 1971-1973, 1976-1977, 1991, 2006-2007     
Togo 1960-2007     
Tunisia 1956-2007     
Turkey 1960, 1971-1972, 1980-1982     
Turkmenistan 1991-2007     
Uganda 1966-1979, 1985-2007     
United Arab Republic 1958-1961     
Uruguay 1973-1984     
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 1955-1976     
Vietnam, Republic of 1955-1975     
Vietnam 1976-2007     
Yemen Arab Republic 1955-1990     
Yemen 1990-2007     
Zambia 1968-1990     
Zimbabwe 1987-2007     
      
Number of country years: 3349      
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Table 2: Institutional Combinations Worldwide, 1955-2007, Ordered by Frequency. 
 
 
 
Institutional Combination 
 
 
 
 
Number of Country Years in Existence 
 
 
Autocracy with a unitary state structure 
 
 
 
 
3349 
 
Parliamentary form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure 
 
 
 
565 
 
Presidential form of government, proportional 
electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
 
 
 
471 
 
Parliamentary form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure 
 
 
 
391 
 
 
Autocracy with a federal state structure 
 
 
 
 
343 
 
Parliamentary form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure 
 
 
 
245 
 
 
Autocracy with a mixed state structure 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
Parliamentary form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure 
 
 
 
201 
 
Parliamentary form of government, 
majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure 
 
 
 
153 
 
Presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
 
 
 
150 
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Presidential form of government, proportional 
electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 
 
 
146 
 
Mixed form of government, proportional 
electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
 
 
 
123 
 
Parliamentary form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
 
 
 
121 
 
Presidential form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
 
 
 
116 
 
Mixed form of government, proportional 
electoral system for the legislature and mixed 
state structure 
 
 
 
86 
 
Mixed form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and 
unitary state structure 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
Mixed form of government, mixed electoral 
system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure 
 
 
 
81 
 
Presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 
 
 
75 
 
Mixed form of government, proportional 
electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 
 
 
56 
 
Parliamentary form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 
 
 
54 
 
Parliamentary form of government, 
proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure 
 
 
 
51 
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Parliamentary form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and mixed 
state structure 
 
 
 
32 
 
Presidential form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and mixed 
state structure 
 
 
 
30 
 
Presidential form of government, proportional 
electoral system for the legislature and mixed 
state structure 
 
 
 
25 
 
Presidential form of government, mixed 
electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 
 
 
20 
 
Mixed form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and 
federal state structure 
 
 
 
20 
 
Mixed form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and mixed 
state structure 
 
 
 
16 
 
Mixed form of government, mixed electoral 
system for the legislature and federal state 
structure 
 
 
 
16 
 
Mixed form of government, mixed electoral 
system for the legislature and mixed state 
structure 
 
 
 
13 
 
Presidential form of government, majoritarian 
electoral system for the legislature and mixed 
state structure 
 
 
 
9 
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Section E: Corruption  
 
 
Figure 28: Corruption Worldwide, 1984-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Corruption Africa (except North Africa), 1984-2007.
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Figure 30: Corruption Central Asia and Eastern Europe, 1984-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Corruption East Asia and Pacific, 1984-2007.
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Figure 32: Corruption Europe (except Eastern Europe) and North America, 1984-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Corruption Latin America and Caribbean, 1984-2007.
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Figure 34: Corruption Middle East and North Africa, 1984-2007.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Corruption South Asia, 1984-2007.
 
 
Appendix II – Results from Statistical Tests 
296 
 
Appendix II: Results from Statistical Tests  
 
Table 1: Results from Pairwise Multicollinearity Checks. 
 
Variable combination R-square value 
Involvement in a violent international conflict & Incidence of ethnic 
war in a neighbouring country 
0.01 
Level of GDP per capita & Population size 0 
Level of GDP per capita & Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources 0.43 
Level of GDP per capita & Status as oil exporter 0.02 
Level of GDP per capita & Experience of British colonial rule 0.01 
Level of GDP per capita & Experience of French colonial rule 0.04 
Level of GDP per capita & Experience of colonial rule by other 
colonial power (non-British, non-French) 
0.02 
Level of GDP per capita & Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.05 
Level of GDP per capita & Level of democracy 0.12 
Level of GDP per capita & Level of corruption 0.2 
Level of GDP per capita & Majoritarian electoral system 0 
Level of GDP per capita & Proportional electoral system 0.07 
Level of GDP per capita & Mixed electoral system 0.01 
Level of GDP per capita & Presidential form of government 0 
Level of GDP per capita & Parliamentary form of government 0.06 
Level of GDP per capita & Mixed form of government 0.02 
Level of GDP per capita & Unitary state structure 0.06 
Level of GDP per capita & Federal state structure 0.03 
Level of GDP per capita & Mixed state structure 0.02 
Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources & Population size 0 
Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources & Level of ethnic 
fractionalisation 
0.16 
Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources & Level of democracy 0.38 
Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources & Level of corruption 0.35 
Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources & Status as oil exporter 0.01 
Status as oil exporter & Level of democracy 0.05 
Status as oil exporter & Level of corruption 0.04 
Experience of British colonial rule & Level of democracy 0 
Experience of British colonial rule & Level of corruption 0.03 
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Experience of British colonial rule & Majoritarian electoral system 0.09 
Experience of British colonial rule & Proportional electoral system 0.05 
Experience of British colonial rule & Mixed electoral system 0 
Experience of British colonial rule & Presidential form of 
government 
0 
Experience of British colonial rule & Parliamentary form of 
government 
0.02 
Experience of British colonial rule & Mixed form of government 0.02 
Experience of British colonial rule & Unitary state structure 0 
Experience of British colonial rule & Federal state structure 0 
Experience of British colonial rule & Mixed state structure 0.01 
Experience of French colonial rule & Level of democracy 0.08 
Experience of French colonial rule & Level of corruption 0.02 
Experience of French colonial rule & Majoritarian electoral system 0.01 
Experience of French colonial rule & Proportional electoral system 0.04 
Experience of French colonial rule & Mixed electoral system 0 
Experience of French colonial rule & Presidential form of 
government 
0.02 
Experience of French colonial rule & Parliamentary form of 
government 
0.05 
Experience of French colonial rule & Mixed form of government 0 
Experience of French colonial rule & Unitary state structure 0.05 
Experience of French colonial rule & Federal state structure 0.02 
Experience of French colonial rule & Mixed state structure 0.02 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Level of 
democracy 
0.01 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Level of 
corruption 
0.04 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Majoritarian 
electoral system 
0 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Proportional 
electoral system 
0.01 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Mixed 
electoral system 
0 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Presidential 
form of government 
0 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & 
Parliamentary form of government 
0.01 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Mixed form 
of government 
0 
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Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Unitary state 
structure 
0 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Federal state 
structure 
0.01 
Experience of colonial rule by other colonial power & Mixed state 
structure 
0 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Level of corruption 0.11 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Majoritarian electoral system 0 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Proportional electoral system 0.06 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Mixed electoral system 0.01 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Presidential form of government 0 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Parliamentary form of 
government 
0.06 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Mixed form of government 0.02 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Unitary state structure 0.01 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Federal state structure 0 
Level of ethnic fractionalisation & Mixed state structure 0.03 
Majoritarian electoral system & Presidential form of government 0 
Majoritarian electoral system & Parliamentary form of government 0.27 
Majoritarian electoral system & Mixed form of government 0 
Majoritarian electoral system & Unitary state structure 0.02 
Majoritarian electoral system & Federal state structure 0.02 
Majoritarian electoral system & Mixed state structure 0 
Proportional electoral system & Presidential form of government 0.16 
Proportional electoral system & Parliamentary form of government 0.04 
Proportional electoral system & Mixed form of government 0.05 
Proportional electoral system & Unitary state structure 0.02 
Proportional electoral system & Federal state structure 0 
Proportional electoral system & Mixed state structure 0.03 
Mixed electoral system & Presidential form of government 0.02 
Mixed electoral system & Parliamentary form of government 0.01 
Mixed electoral system & Mixed form of government 0.03 
Mixed electoral system & Unitary state structure 0 
Mixed electoral system & Federal state structure 0 
Mixed electoral system & Mixed state structure 0 
Presidential form of government & Unitary state structure 0 
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Presidential form of government & Federal state structure 0.01 
Presidential form of government & Mixed state structure 0 
Parliamentary form of government & Unitary state structure 0.04 
Parliamentary form of government  & Federal state structure 0.01 
Parliamentary form of government & Mixed state structure 0.04 
Mixed form of government & Unitary state structure 0.01 
Mixed form of government & Federal state structure 0 
Mixed form of government & Mixed state structure 0.01 
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Table 2: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (corruption variable not squared). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona  0.206*  0.202*  0.207*  0.213*  0.250*  0.234* 0.208 0.178 0.132
(0.120) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.128) (0.131) (0.135) (0.136) (0.138)
Status as oil exporter  -0.644*  -0.681*   -0.725**   -0.729**    -1.163***   -1.049**  -0.901*  -0.857* -0.734
(0.345) (0.361) (0.363) (0.362) (0.434) (0.478) (0.488) (0.491) (0.497)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   0.679**   0.667**   0.607**   0.607**   0.684**   0.663**  0.578* 0.520 0.349
(0.286) (0.296) (0.301) (0.301) (0.317) (0.319) (0.326) (0.330) (0.345)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.647 0.646 0.622 0.674 0.550 0.438 0.548 0.540 0.190
(0.608) (0.630) (0.628) (0.637) (0.683) (0.711) (0.720) (0.720) (0.739)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.030  0.049*   0.046**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.021)
Level of democracya -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Level of democracy squareda -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.612 0.621 0.799 0.796 0.681 0.689 0.760
(0.591) (0.593) (0.621) (0.624) (0.626) (0.630) (0.623)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.185 -0.162 -0.147 -0.136 -0.129 -0.211
(0.379) (0.393) (0.393) (0.394) (0.392) (0.395)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.560 0.469 0.285 0.352 0.398
(0.377) (0.412) (0.435) (0.443) (0.439)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.215 0.302 0.161 0.025
(0.386) (0.396) (0.420) (0.421)
Ln population sizea 0.155 0.162 0.179
(0.115) (0.116) (0.117)
GDP per capita a -0.063
(0.057)
Ln GDP per capita a   -0.571**
(0.280)
Peace duration    -1.763***    -1.754***    -1.767***    -1.766***    -1.777***    -1.765***    -1.756***    -1.753***    -1.702***
(0.179) (0.179) (0.182) (0.181) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184) (0.182)
Spline_1    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Spline_3  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.725 0.767 0.802 0.809 0.765 0.693 0.263 0.569 1.267
(0.630) (0.711) (0.710) (0.714) (0.780) (0.789) (0.860) (0.900) (0.973)
Observations 2715 2702 2702 2702 2655 2655 2655 2650 2650
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 3: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Presidentialism on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (basically closed regimes in sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Presidential form of governmenta 0.230 0.248 0.246 0.104 0.023 0.163 0.156 0.020
(0.279) (0.279) (0.278) (0.294) (0.295) (0.322) (0.323) (0.334)
Ln GDP per capita a  0.158* 0.153 0.153  0.174*  0.173*  0.159*  0.184*   0.236**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.097) (0.102)
Ln population sizea    0.278***    0.267***    0.270***    0.280***    0.259***    0.299***    0.303***    0.307***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.071)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    0.600***    0.578***    0.573***   0.396**  0.369*  0.388*  0.388* 0.249
(0.193) (0.194) (0.194) (0.200) (0.205) (0.204) (0.204) (0.222)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation    1.387***    1.411***    1.382***    1.102***    1.323***   0.834**   0.858** 0.591
(0.376) (0.376) (0.378) (0.392) (0.389) (0.402) (0.404) (0.441)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.001  0.025* 0.023  0.028*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.445 0.444  0.635*  0.648*  0.697*  0.720*   0.914**
(0.388) (0.387) (0.383) (0.378) (0.378) (0.376) (0.395)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.187 0.166 0.091 0.137 0.121 0.118
(0.234) (0.238) (0.244) (0.248) (0.249) (0.257)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.790***    0.827***    0.806***   1.193***
(0.194) (0.199) (0.201) (0.238)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.525**
(0.222)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.062***
(0.251)
Level of democracya  -0.031*   -0.035** -0.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.008**   -0.008**   -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Status as oil exporter -0.280 -0.024
(0.257) (0.273)
Per cent of mountainous terrain  0.008*
(0.005)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.263
(0.285)
Peace duration    -1.893***    -1.902***    -1.896***    -1.838***    -1.841***    -1.826***    -1.829***    -1.797***
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
Spline_1    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.052 -0.046 -0.079 -0.354 -0.277 -0.094 -0.059 -0.246
(0.309) (0.309) (0.312) (0.325) (0.323) (0.367) (0.369) (0.419)
Observations 6093 6093 6090 6090 6090 6049 6049 5817
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 4: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Majoritarian Electoral Systems on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (basically closed   
regimes in sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Majoritarian electoral systema -0.046 -0.044 -0.049 -0.225 -0.180 -0.030 -0.026 0.165
(0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.234) (0.237) (0.283) (0.284) (0.302)
Ln GDP per capita a  0.162*  0.158*  0.157*  0.170*  0.170* 0.157  0.182*   0.246**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.098) (0.104)
Ln population sizea    0.285***    0.275***    0.278***    0.292***    0.266***    0.303***    0.307***    0.306***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.070)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    0.556***    0.533***    0.527***  0.365*  0.354*  0.361*  0.363* 0.237
(0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.195) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.214)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation    1.389***    1.413***    1.384***    1.064***    1.299***   0.839**   0.862** 0.599
(0.376) (0.376) (0.379) (0.394) (0.390) (0.403) (0.405) (0.441)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.005 0.001  0.025* 0.023  0.029*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.424 0.423 0.626  0.642*  0.697*  0.721*   0.911**
(0.387) (0.386) (0.380) (0.376) (0.378) (0.376) (0.397)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.188 0.172 0.096 0.128 0.112 0.122
(0.234) (0.239) (0.244) (0.248) (0.249) (0.257)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.833***    0.840***    0.818***    1.192***
(0.197) (0.200) (0.201) (0.236)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.564**
(0.226)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.070***
(0.249)
Level of democracya -0.028 -0.032 -0.024
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.008**   -0.008**   -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Status as oil exporter -0.283 -0.015
(0.258) (0.273)
Per cent of mountainous terrain  0.008*
(0.005)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.305
(0.294)
Peace duration    -1.895***    -1.904***    -1.898***    -1.833***    -1.837***    -1.827***    -1.830***    -1.798***
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
Spline_1    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.021 -0.013 -0.046 -0.340 -0.264 -0.064 -0.029 -0.277
(0.308) (0.309) (0.312) (0.326) (0.323) (0.367) (0.368) (0.422)
Observations 6093 6093 6090 6090 6090 6049 6049 5817
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 5: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Majoritarian Electoral Systems without Communal Rolls or Seat Reservations on the Risk of   
Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (basically closed regimes in sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Majoritarian electoral system without -0.164 -0.151 -0.161 -0.341 -0.353 -0.214 -0.221 -0.031
communal rolls or seat reservationsa (0.258) (0.258) (0.258) (0.264) (0.268) (0.285) (0.286) (0.3020
Ln GDP per capita a  0.164*  0.160*  0.160*  0.179*  0.178*  0.156*  0.181*   0.236**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.097) (0.102)
Ln population sizea    0.287***    0.276***    0.280***    0.291***    0.267***    0.306***    0.309***    0.308***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.070)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    0.549***    0.527***    0.521***  0.352*  0.337*  0.353*  0.355* 0.246
(0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.195) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.214)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation    1.382***    1.406***    1.376***    1.063***    1.297***   0.830**   0.853** 0.591
(0.376) (0.376) (0.379) (0.393) (0.390) (0.402) (0.404) (0.441)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.005 0.002  0.025* 0.023  0.028*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.415 0.414 0.617  0.632*  0.694*  0.719*   0.913**
(0.388) (0.387) (0.383) (0.378) (0.378) (0.376) (0.395)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.193 0.177 0.102 0.128 0.112 0.117
(0.234) (0.239) (0.244) (0.248) (0.249) (0.257)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.840***    0.853***    0.831***    1.195***
(0.196) (0.199) (0.201) (0.236)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.564**
(0.223)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.096***
(0.250)
Level of democracya -0.024 -0.027 -0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Level of democracy squareda    -0.009**   -0.008**   -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Status as oil exporter -0.287 -0.026
(0.258) (0.274)
Per cent of mountainous terrain  0.008*
(0.005)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.258
(0.290)
Peace duration    -1.894***    -1.903***    -1.896***    -1.832***    -1.834***    -1.825***    -1.828***    -1.797***
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
Spline_1    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.009 -0.002 -0.036 -0.334 -0.256 -0.040 -0.003 -0.238
(0.309) (0.309) (0.312) (0.326) (0.324) (0.367) (0.369) (0.423)
Observations 6093 6093 6090 6090 6090 6049 6049 5817
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 6: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (basically closed regimes in sample). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of    1.911***    1.929***    1.904***    1.535***   1.522**   1.588**   1.587**   1.648**
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.589) (0.589) (0.587) (0.590) (0.597) (0.617) (0.617) (0.637)
 and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a  0.179*  0.174*  0.174*   0.187**   0.184**  0.178*   0.203**   0.253**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.097) (0.102)
Ln population sizea    0.278***    0.267***    0.270***    0.276***    0.256***    0.298***    0.301***    0.304***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.071)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    0.602***    0.577***    0.572***   0.424**   0.420**   0.407**   0.409** 0.291
(0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.194) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.215)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation    1.393***    1.418***    1.390***    1.127***    1.338***   0.871**   0.894** 0.651
(0.378) (0.378) (0.381) (0.394) (0.391) (0.404) (0.406) (0.444)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.000  0.026* 0.024  0.029*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.455 0.453  0.639*  0.660*  0.689*  0.712*   0.912**
(0.390) (0.388) (0.385) (0.380) (0.381) (0.379) (0.399)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.165 0.152 0.080 0.132 0.116 0.119
(0.234) (0.237) (0.242) (0.248) (0.249) (0.257)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.733***    0.776***    0.754***    1.130***
(0.196) (0.200) (0.202) (0.240)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.446**
(0.224)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.013***
(0.248)
Level of democracya   -0.034**   -0.038** -0.024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.008**   -0.008**   -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Status as oil exporter -0.284 -0.019
(0.259) (0.275)
Per cent of mountainous terrain  0.008*
(0.005)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.261
(0.285)
Peace duration    -1.899***    -1.909***    -1.903***    -1.848***    -1.849***    -1.837***    -1.840***    -1.809***
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
Spline_1    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.059 -0.052 -0.080 -0.345 -0.293 -0.122 -0.087 -0.332
(0.310) (0.310) (0.313) (0.326) (0.324) (0.366) (0.368) (0.422)
Observations 6093 6093 6090 6090 6090 6049 6049 5817
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 7: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations on the Risk of Ethnic Civil 
War, 1955-2007; Baseline: Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of 
Government, Majoritarian Electoral System for the Legislature and Unitary State 
Structure (basically closed regimes in sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of -0.419 -0.395 -0.410 -0.841 -0.976 -0.732 -0.722 -0.823
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.740) (0.738) (0.732) (0.788) (0.829) (0.862) (0.870) (0.908)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of -0.118 -0.107 -0.119 -0.124 -0.196 -0.132 -0.156 -0.258
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.386) (0.385) (0.386) (0.411) (0.401) (0.540) (0.543) (0.568)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of -0.922 -0.895 -0.886   -1.304**   -1.580** -1.148 -1.169 -1.285
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.582) (0.582) (0.581) (0.659) (0.690) (0.775) (0.777) (0.804)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of  -0.609*  -0.594*  -0.638*   -0.720**  -0.614* -0.594 -0.594 -0.462
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.356) (0.356) (0.359) (0.362) (0.369) (0.543) (0.544) (0.558)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of -0.284 -0.296 -0.279 -0.433 -0.441 -0.321 -0.343 -0.215
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.339) (0.340) (0.340) (0.345) (0.348) (0.533) (0.535) (0.567)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of 0.063 0.062 0.041 0.125 0.133 0.309 0.288 0.201
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.414) (0.413) (0.411) (0.402) (0.401) (0.601) (0.603) (0.634)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of   -1.371**   -1.341**   -1.389**   -1.182**    -1.226** -0.949 -0.909 -0.821
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.556) (0.556) (0.564) (0.555) (0.554) (0.725) (0.721) (0.743)
and non-unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a   0.194**   0.190**   0.189**   0.199**   0.204** 0.160  0.182*   0.243**
(0.095) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.098) (0.102) (0.108)
Ln population sizea    0.326***    0.317***    0.321***    0.343***    0.323***    0.347***    0.349***    0.336***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.073)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   0.451**   0.437**   0.430** 0.238 0.202 0.249 0.254 0.145
(0.196) (0.197) (0.197) (0.204) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.224)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation    1.294***    1.316***    1.264***   0.970**    1.247***   0.826**   0.842** 0.640
(0.381) (0.382) (0.386) (0.401) (0.402) (0.407) (0.408) (0.454)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.007 0.004 0.018 0.016 0.022
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.317 0.311 0.526 0.550  0.630*  0.652*   0.848**
(0.384) (0.383) (0.378) (0.373) (0.375) (0.374) (0.394)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.244 0.218 0.131 0.142 0.124 0.137
(0.236) (0.241) (0.247) (0.251) (0.252) (0.260)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.871***    0.875***    0.855***    1.203***
(0.200) (0.207) (0.209) (0.242)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.586**
(0.229)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.161***
(0.260)
Level of democracya -0.006 -0.008 0.002
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036)
Level of democracy squareda  -0.007*  -0.007*   -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Status as oil exporter -0.230 0.002
(0.260) (0.277)
Per cent of mountainous terrain  0.008*
(0.005)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.138
(0.314)
Peace duration    -1.882***    -1.889***    -1.881***    -1.821***    -1.826***    -1.826***    -1.829***    -1.800***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.11) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115)
Spline_1    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.019***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.067 0.070 0.038 -0.309 -0.253 -0.026 0.012 -0.219
(0.324) (0.324) (0.326) (0.343) (0.344) (0.426) (0.428) (0.473)
Observations 6093 6093 6090 6090 6090 6049 6049 5817
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 8: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations on the Risk of Ethnic Civil 
War, 1955-2007; Baseline: Institutional Combinations of a Non-Presidential Form of 
Government, Non-Majoritarian Electoral System for the Legislature and Non-Unitary 
State Structure (basically closed regimes in sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of    1.863***    1.881***    1.851***   1.399**   1.381**    1.758***    1.738***    1.809***
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.593) (0.593) (0.591) (0.595) (0.604) (0.663) (0.663) (0.687)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of -0.059 -0.034 -0.043 -0.491 -0.624 0.038 0.031 -0.086
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.745) (0.743) (0.738) (0.792) (0.834) (0.808) (0.815) (0.846)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of 0.083 0.094 0.088 0.054 0.008 0.477 0.439 0.317
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.408) (0.397) (0.502) (0.505) (0.528)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a presidential form of -0.630 -0.599 -0.591 -1.017  -1.287* -0.368 -0.407 -0.535
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.576) (0.575) (0.575) (0.649) (0.678) (0.719) (0.721) (0.739)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of -0.452 -0.436 -0.468 -0.562 -0.440 0.123 0.105 0.225
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.357) (0.357) (0.360) (0.361) (0.368) (0.477) (0.477) (0.487)
and unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of -0.105 -0.121 -0.106 -0.269 -0.262 0.394 0.354 0.470
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.338) (0.340) (0.339) (0.344) (0.346) (0.466) (0.467) (0.492)
and non-unitary state structurea
Combination of a non-presidential form of 0.326 0.318 0.305 0.356 0.364   1.064**   1.025**  0.906*
government, non-majoritarian electoral system (0.403) (0.401) (0.399) (0.389) (0.387) (0.509) (0.510) (0.540)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a  0.164*  0.160*  0.158*  0.172*  0.172* 0.157  0.179*   0.239**
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.100) (0.105)
Ln population sizea    0.301***    0.290***    0.293***    0.315***    0.297***    0.338***    0.340***    0.330***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.073)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    0.556***    0.538***    0.532*** 0.334 0.315 0.293 0.296 0.191
(0.195) (0.196) (0.196) (0.204) (0.209) (0.208) (0.208) (0.225)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation    1.364***    1.389***    1.351***    1.056***    1.339***   0.896**   0.911** 0.720
(0.382) (0.382) (0.387) (0.402) (0.401) (0.409) (0.411) (0.458)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.000 0.024 0.022  0.028*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.412 0.407 0.605  0.626*  0.667*  0.687*   0.883**
(0.387) (0.386) (0.380) (0.375) (0.378) (0.376) (0.398)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.183 0.164 0.077 0.166 0.149 0.158
(0.236) (0.240) (0.246) (0.249) (0.251) (0.259)
Experience of colonial ruleb    0.835***    0.862***    0.841***    1.176***
(0.202) (0.207) (0.208) (0.243)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   0.506**
(0.234)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b    1.127***
(0.257)
Level of democracya   -0.059**   -0.060** -0.049
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.008**   -0.008**   -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Status as oil exporter -0.229 -0.001
(0.261) (0.279)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.008
(0.005)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.157
(0.314)
Peace duration    -1.904***    -1.912***    -1.906***    -1.843***    -1.848***    -1.836***    -1.839***    -1.811****
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.116)
Spline_1    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.048 -0.044 -0.068 -0.379 -0.343 -0.383 -0.336 -0.551
(0.325) (0.325) (0.327) (0.343) (0.346) (0.416) (0.419) (0.471)
Observations 6093 6093 6090 6090 6090 6049 6049 5817
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
Appendix II – Results from Statistical Tests 
307 
 
 
Table 9: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (excluding region 1 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of   2.620**   2.660**   2.652**   2.248**   2.335** 1.779 1.771 1.727
government, majoritarian electoral system (1.118) (1.120) (1.114) (1.110) (1.134) (1.135) (1.135) (1.137)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.640***    0.644***    0.649***    0.673***    0.697***   0.511**   0.520**   0.539**
(0.189) (0.189) (0.190) (0.189) (0.201) (0.203) (0.209) (0.224)
Ln population sizea  0.211* 0.198 0.198 0.156 0.152 0.216 0.219   0.360**
(0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.130) (0.137) (0.138) (0.164)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.617***    1.612***    1.617***    1.517***    1.486***    1.533***    1.524***   1.332**
(0.488) (0.491) (0.491) (0.495) (0.506) (0.504) (0.508) (0.528)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.610 0.663 0.640 0.532 0.516 -0.090 -0.084 -0.671
(1.014) (1.019) (1.019) (1.033) (1.039) (1.088) (1.090) (1.152)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.010 -0.010 0.026 0.025 0.028
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.737 0.744 0.897 0.893 1.232 1.221 1.375
(0.908) (0.913) (0.939) (0.948) (0.924) (0.925) (0.951)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.215 0.015 0.049 -0.306 -0.307 -0.486
(0.647) (0.660) (0.670) (0.678) (0.678) (0.688)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.758 0.716 0.704   1.145**
(0.472) (0.501) (0.506) (0.563)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b 0.900
(0.553)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b 0.653
(0.615)
Level of democracya 0.116 0.118 0.105
(0.106) (0.106) (0.111)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.027**   -0.027**  -0.025*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Status as oil exporter -0.173 0.011
(0.901) (0.842)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.010
(0.011)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.771
(0.522)
Peace duration     -2.489***    -2.502***    -2.507***    -2.400***    -2.378***    -2.377***    -2.375***    -2.328***
(0.293) (0.295) (0.296) (0.295) (0.297) (0.298) (0.298) (0.297)
Spline_1    -0.029***    -0.029***    -0.029***    -0.027***    -0.027***    -0.027***    -0.027***    -0.027***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Spline_2    0.013***    0.013***    0.013***    0.013***    0.013***    0.013***    0.013***    0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.306 0.302 0.345 -0.017 -0.034 0.444 0.454 0.086
(0.657) (0.658) (0.671) (0.723) (0.722) (0.798) (0.800) (0.930)
Observations 2531 2531 2531 2531 2531 2520 2520 2461
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 10: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (excluding region 2 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of   2.005**   2.063**   2.071**   1.630**  1.485* 1.432 1.372 1.371
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.818) (0.823) (0.824) (0.813) (0.813) (0.892) (0.889) (0.917)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.554***    0.553***    0.556***    0.572***    0.635***    0.512***    0.519***   0.500**
(0.175) (0.178) (0.178) (0.176) (0.186) (0.183) (0.184) (0.199)
Ln population sizea   0.241**  0.211*  0.206* 0.171 0.127   0.251**  0.242*   0.399**
(0.110) (0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.117) (0.124) (0.125) (0.154)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.118***    1.106***    1.133***   0.886**  0.804*   0.978**   0.961**  0.939*
(0.416) (0.421) (0.428) (0.440) (0.439) (0.472) (0.478) (0.488)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.714 0.844 0.855 1.049 1.270 0.429 0.448 -0.188
(0.777) (0.785) (0.786) (0.797) (0.829) (0.834) (0.834) (0.942)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 0.001 0.005 0.032 0.031 0.038
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Involvement in violent international conflict  1.418*  1.420*   1.624**   1.684**   1.875**   1.868**   1.991**
(0.793) (0.797) (0.801) (0.809) (0.792) (0.790) (0.808)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.178 -0.064 0.029 -0.113 -0.123 -0.351
(0.489) (0.489) (0.507) (0.490) (0.494) (0.512)
Experience of colonial ruleb   0.942**  0.909*   0.931**   1.030**
(0.415) (0.467) (0.473) (0.512)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.532***
(0.479)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b   1.103**
(0.501)
Level of democracya 0.006 0.007 0.083
(0.097) (0.097) (0.129)
Level of democracy squareda -0.017 -0.017  -0.027*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Status as oil exporter -1.038 -0.957
(1.382) (1.293)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.003
(0.011)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.771
(0.518)
Peace duration    -2.121***    -2.160***    -2.168***    -2.049***    -1.975***    -2.063***    -2.047***    -2.049***
(0.234) (0.239) (0.241) (0.235) (0.231) (0.251) (0.251) (0.253)
Spline_1    -0.025***    -0.025***    -0.025***    -0.024***    -0.022***    -0.023***    -0.023***    -0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Spline_2    0.012***    0.012***    0.012***    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.001 -0.002 0.036 -0.567 -0.756 0.019 0.057 0.023
(0.558) (0.560) (0.569) (0.641) (0.643) (0.704) (0.705) (0.876)
Observations 2651 2651 2651 2651 2651 2639 2639 2563
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 11: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (excluding region 3 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of    2.700***    2.702***    2.704***    2.350***   2.146**    2.286**   2.256**   2.242**
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.870) (0.867) (0.866) (0.876) (0.897) (0.963) (0.965) (1.019)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.834***    0.862***    0.863***    0.936***    1.042***    0.944***    0.983***    0.877***
(0.194) (0.197) (0.197) (0.204) (0.213) (0.222) (0.229) (0.250)
Ln population sizea   0.289**   0.255**   0.258**   0.260**  0.227*    0.352***    0.376***   0.387**
(0.117) (0.119) (0.122) (0.121) (0.127) (0.133) (0.138) (0.179)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.501***    1.537***    1.526***    1.380***    1.347***    1.663***    1.635***    1.728***
(0.420) (0.425) (0.433) (0.443) (0.450) (0.485) (0.490) (0.531)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.639 0.809 0.812 0.841 1.051 0.032 0.001 0.003
(0.828) (0.840) (0.841) (0.842) (0.863) (0.882) (0.886) (1.006)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 -0.012 0.024 0.020 0.032
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Involvement in violent international conflict  1.511*  1.512*   1.589**   1.675**   2.069**   2.057**   2.077**
(0.800) (0.799) (0.808) (0.817) (0.829) (0.831) (0.837)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.061 0.089 0.071 0.003 0.006 -0.089
(0.475) (0.477) (0.521) (0.484) (0.484) (0.488)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.655 0.672 0.669 0.470
(0.438) (0.522) (0.530) (0.625)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   1.197**
(0.463)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b 1.048
(0.853)
Level of democracya 0.040 0.040 0.180
(0.094) (0.095) (0.131)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.026**   -0.027**    -0.044***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Status as oil exporter -0.756 -0.895
(1.035) (1.084)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.003
(0.010)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.051
(0.699)
Peace duration    -1.772***    -1.800***    -1.797***    -1.744***    -1.670***    -1.756***    -1.749***    -1.783***
(0.198) (0.201) (0.202) (0.201) (0.199) (0.216) (0.215) (0.220)
Spline_1    -0.018***    -0.019***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.719 -0.765 -0.790 -1.138  -1.368* -0.518 -0.508 -0.435
(0.636) (0.642) (0.671) (0.722) (0.725) (0.773) (0.778) (0.895)
Observations 2501 2501 2501 2501 2501 2490 2490 2432
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 12: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (excluding region 4 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of   1.740**   1.828**   1.829**   1.555**  1.406*  1.358*  1.348* 1.251
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.731) (0.744) (0.746) (0.744) (0.744) (0.805) (0.807) (0.825)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.484***    0.498***    0.498***    0.548***    0.609***    0.484***    0.490***   0.470**
(0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.165) (0.172) (0.174) (0.177) (0.185)
Ln population sizea    0.284***   0.259**   0.255**   0.248**  0.222*   0.309**   0.312**    0.422***
(0.109) (0.111) (0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.122) (0.123) (0.141)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.206***    1.162***    1.179***    1.076***    1.037***    1.212***    1.203***   0.979**
(0.379) (0.386) (0.390) (0.394) (0.393) (0.413) (0.416) (0.441)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.390 0.364 0.366 0.557 0.785 0.173 0.158 0.257
(0.824) (0.831) (0.830) (0.847) (0.880) (0.880) (0.883) (0.999)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.026   0.054**   0.053**   0.067**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Involvement in violent international conflict    2.362***    2.379***    2.496***    2.549***    2.749***    2.744***    2.916***
(0.865) (0.870) (0.875) (0.885) (0.844) (0.845) (0.857)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.147 -0.066 -0.019 -0.092 -0.093 -0.234
(0.437) (0.440) (0.455) (0.442) (0.442) (0.451)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.603 0.611 0.606   1.057**
(0.378) (0.413) (0.415) (0.520)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   1.027**
(0.430)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b  0.857*
(0.477)
Level of democracya 0.068 0.069 0.137
(0.080) (0.081) (0.098)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.022**   -0.022**   -0.029**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Status as oil exporter -0.153 0.025
(0.792) (0.738)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.011
(0.010)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.605
(0.514)
Peace duration    -1.816***    -1.838***    -1.845***    -1.787***    -1.737***    -1.831***    -1.828***    -1.814***
(0.200) (0.200) (0.202) (0.201) (0.199) (0.218) (0.218) (0.222)
Spline_1    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.019***    -0.018***    -0.020***    -0.020***    -0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.008***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001**    -0.001**    -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.266 -0.209 -0.167 -0.637 -0.864 -0.344 -0.329 -1.083
(0.600) (0.604) (0.616) (0.700) (0.704) (0.746) (0.751) (0.966)
Observations 2047 2047 2047 2047 2047 2035 2035 1991
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
Appendix II – Results from Statistical Tests 
311 
 
 
Table 13: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (excluding region 5 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of   1.787**   1.833**   1.839**   1.559**  1.416*  1.425*  1.421* 1.322
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.755) (0.757) (0.758) (0.750) (0.752) (0.817) (0.818) (0.838)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.566***    0.576***    0.576***    0.632***    0.703***    0.556***    0.558***    0.517***
(0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.160) (0.167) (0.171) (0.173) (0.183)
Ln population sizea   0.261**   0.237**   0.230**   0.227**  0.198*   0.283**   0.284**    0.426***
(0.106) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.116) (0.118) (0.142)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.159***    1.159***    1.201***    1.153***    1.112***    1.275***    1.273***   1.076**
(0.390) (0.393) (0.398) (0.397) (0.400) (0.419) (0.420) (0.443)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.489 0.576 0.595 0.622 0.795 0.071 0.064 -0.461
(0.739) (0.745) (0.743) (0.746) (0.765) (0.779) (0.783) (0.883)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.009 -0.007 0.018 0.018 0.024
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Involvement in violent international conflict 1.154 1.161  1.326*  1.394*   1.594**   1.591**   1.728**
(0.745) (0.754) (0.771) (0.780) (0.768) (0.769) (0.779)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.380 -0.289 -0.236 -0.347 -0.347 -0.549
(0.467) (0.472) (0.491) (0.474) (0.474) (0.484)
Experience of colonial ruleb  0.758* 0.585 0.580 0.766
(0.401) (0.433) (0.436) (0.487)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.257***
(0.453)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b   0.975**
(0.474)
Level of democracya 0.072 0.072 0.139
(0.082) (0.083) (0.101)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.022**   -0.022**   -0.030**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Status as oil exporter -0.083 -0.051
(0.889) (0.845)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.004
(0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.748
(0.476)
Peace duration    -1.916***    -1.939***    -1.958***    -1.871***    -1.809***    -1.926***    -1.926***    -1.937***
(0.201) (0.203) (0.206) (0.204) (0.201) (0.220) (0.220) (0.224)
Spline_1    -0.021***    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.021***    -0.020***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.009***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.006 -0.010 0.080 -0.521 -0.736 0.055 0.065 0.031
(0.565) (0.566) (0.578) (0.671) (0.658) (0.735) (0.742) (0.857)
Observations 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 2219 2219 2143
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 14: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (excluding region 6 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of   1.908**   1.966**    1.981***   1.576**  1.436*  1.460*  1.456*  1.418*
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.751) (0.759) (0.762) (0.755) (0.755) (0.821) (0.822) (0.843)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.576***    0.591***    0.595***    0.673***    0.736***    0.600***    0.601***    0.564***
(0.167) (0.169) (0.169) (0.172) (0.179) (0.182) (0.184) (0.191)
Ln population sizea    0.456***    0.423***    0.417***    0.416***    0.387***    0.475***    0.476***    0.562***
(0.125) (0.128) (0.128) (0.131) (0.133) (0.142) (0.143) (0.157)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   1.034**   1.032**    1.087***   0.925**   0.911**   1.055**   1.051**  0.903*
(0.404) (0.408) (0.416) (0.418) (0.416) (0.441) (0.444) (0.478)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.434 0.552 0.582 0.804 1.042 0.174 0.168 0.097
(0.804) (0.814) (0.815) (0.833) (0.866) (0.877) (0.881) (0.965)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa   -0.048**   -0.049**   -0.051**  -0.039* -0.037 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Involvement in violent international conflict  1.490*  1.525*   1.699**   1.768**   1.893**   1.892**   2.035**
(0.817) (0.829) (0.834) (0.839) (0.825) (0.826) (0.832)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.324 -0.228 -0.228 -0.223 -0.224 -0.351
(0.466) (0.468) (0.487) (0.470) (0.470) (0.480)
Experience of colonial ruleb   0.903**  0.783*  0.782*   0.975**
(0.382) (0.412) (0.412) (0.478)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b    1.241***
(0.447)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b   1.136**
(0.476)
Level of democracya 0.057 0.057 0.116
(0.083) (0.083) (0.105)
Level of democracy squareda  -0.019*  -0.019*  -0.025*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Status as oil exporter -0.068 0.025
(0.931) (0.910)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.009
(0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure -0.342
(0.486)
Peace duration    -1.897***    -1.930***    -1.948***    -1.852***    -1.811***    -1.902***    -1.901***    -1.899***
(0.204) (0.207) (0.210) (0.207) (0.205) (0.221) (0.222) (0.224)
Spline_1    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.022***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.021***    -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***    0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.535 -0.510 -0.453 -1.157  -1.328* -0.700 -0.694 -1.139
(0.611) (0.617) (0.623) (0.715) (0.720) (0.776) (0.781) (0.925)
Observations 2818 2818 2818 2818 2818 2813 2813 2737
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 15: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Institutional Combinations of a Presidential Form of Government, Majoritarian Electoral System 
for the Legislature and Unitary State Structure on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1955-2007 (excluding region 7 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Combination of a presidential form of 1.237 1.247 1.247 0.977 0.590 0.933 0.927 0.759
government, majoritarian electoral system (0.961) (0.963) (0.963) (0.984) (1.004) (1.021) (1.020) (1.025)
and unitary state structurea
Ln GDP per capita a    0.502***    0.507***    0.506***    0.544***    0.653***   0.489**   0.496**   0.498**
(0.183) (0.183) (0.184) (0.186) (0.201) (0.196) (0.199) (0.212)
Ln population sizea   0.313**   0.309**   0.309**   0.307**   0.329**   0.359**   0.362**    0.608***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) (0.138) (0.146) (0.147) (0.196)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    1.745***    1.749***    1.752***    1.653***    1.561***    1.833***    1.832***    1.689***
(0.443) (0.444) (0.448) (0.452) (0.448) (0.483) (0.485) (0.516)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation -0.198 -0.173 -0.171 -0.153 -0.247 -0.817 -0.838  -2.312*
(0.820) (0.826) (0.826) (0.832) (0.889) (0.890) (0.896) (1.246)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 0.023 0.022 0.030
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.274 0.274 0.399 0.472 0.739 0.732 0.910
(1.032) (1.033) (1.029) (1.027) (1.069) (1.069) (1.067)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.030 0.034 0.175 -0.015 -0.017 -0.145
(0.502) (0.507) (0.529) (0.516) (0.517) (0.523)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.496 0.328 0.327 0.741
(0.445) (0.474) (0.475) (0.589)
Experience of colonial rule (British)b   1.570**
(0.686)
Experience of colonial rule (Non-British, Non-French)b 0.704
(0.508)
Level of democracya 0.082 0.083 0.147
(0.086) (0.086) (0.109)
Level of democracy squareda   -0.023**   -0.023**   -0.036**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Status as oil exporter -0.195 -0.266
(0.915) (0.898)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.008
(0.011)
Noncontiguous country structure  -1.149*
(0.667)
Peace duration    -2.143***    -2.149***    -2.152***    -2.078***    -1.972***    -2.209***    -2.205***    -2.201***
(0.252) (0.254) (0.257) (0.259) (0.250) (0.291) (0.292) (0.298)
Spline_1    -0.024***    -0.024***    -0.024***    -0.023***    -0.022***    -0.024***    -0.024***    -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Spline_2    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***    0.010***    0.011***    0.011***    0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***    -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.033 -0.042 -0.035 -0.307 -0.577 0.253 0.269 0.855
(0.602) (0.603) (0.613) (0.668) (0.669) (0.745) (0.749) (0.942)
Observations 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2756 2756 2689
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 16: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (excluding region 1 from sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona 0.026 0.029 0.031 0.033  0.047* 0.045 0.042 0.035 0.027
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Status as oil exporter -0.588 -0.491 -0.514 -0.533  -0.986* -0.571 -0.429 -0.287 -0.099
(0.455) (0.483) (0.492) (0.492) (0.589) (0.663) (0.691) (0.703) (0.712)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country  0.703*  0.796*  0.768*  0.755* 0.654 0.642 0.552 0.476 0.319
(0.379) (0.408) (0.424) (0.425) (0.463) (0.466) (0.480) (0.483) (0.485)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.514 0.689 0.629 0.618 -0.346 -0.724 -0.612 -0.648 -0.409
(0.933) (0.951) (0.984) (0.984) (1.103) (1.158) (1.170) (1.165) (1.154)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa 0.025 0,019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.027 0.030 0.056  0.061*
(0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032)
Level of democracya 0.035 0.034 0.038 0.035 0.037 0.041 0.045  0.068*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040)
Level of democracy squareda -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.165 0.239 0.681 0.628 0.564 0.559 0.546
(0.684) (0.695) (0.752) (0.753) (0.755) (0.763) (0.765)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.498 -0.409 -0.335 -0.349 -0.317 -0.436
(0.613) (0.649) (0.653) (0.655) (0.655) (0.655)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.401 0.163 0.001 0.087 0.218
(0.453) (0.497) (0.542) (0.552) (0.551)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.610 0.654 0.540 0.307
(0.492) (0.498) (0.516) (0.538)
Ln population sizea 0.104 0.123 0.143
(0.140) (0.141) (0.143)
GDP per capita a -0.077
(0.068)
Ln GDP per capita a   -0.890**
(0.437)
Peace duration    -1.800***    -1.777***    -1.781***    -1.760***    -1.786***    -1.751***    -1.739***    -1.742***    -1.666***
(0.227) (0.227) (0.229) (0.227) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.232) (0.228)
Spline_1    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.017***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Spline_2    0.008***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant  1.253* 1.123 1.147  1.212* 1.204 0.890 0.591 0.830 1.570
(0.645) (0.713) (0.719) (0.732) (0.828) (0.868) (0.959) (0.984) (1.070)
Observations 2030 2017 2017 2017 1977 1977 1977 1972 1972
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 17: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (excluding region 2 from sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona   0.050**   0.049**    0.051***    0.052***   0.051**   0.049**   0.047**  0.037* 0.033
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Status as oil exporter    -1.028***    -1.143***    -1.236***    -1.233***    -1.602***    -1.525***    -1.420***    -1.488***   -1.308**
(0.385) (0.415) (0.419) (0.417) (0.487) (0.519) (0.537) (0.544) (0.543)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country  0.606*  0.563* 0.466 0.471 0.512 0.499 0.431 0.340 0.109
(0.315) (0.323) (0.330) (0.331) (0.337) (0.338) (0.352) (0.357) (0.374)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.749 0.830 0.837 0.898 0.866 0.787 0.846 1.028 0.508
(0.664) (0.685) (0.683) (0.694) (0.721) (0.743) (0.748) (0.754) (0.757)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa  0.032* 0.032  0.035*  0.035* 0.033  0.035*  0.037*    0.092***    0.063***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.023)
Level of democracya -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 -0.021 -0.008
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Level of democracy squareda 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.866 0.877  1.090*  1.089*  1.031*  1.072*  1.172*
(0.598) (0.600) (0.615) (0.617) (0.620) (0.630) (0.614)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.205 -0.283 -0.268 -0.259 -0.244 -0.351
(0.407) (0.414) (0.415) (0.415) (0.415) (0.416)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.558 0.474 0.391 0.443 0.506
(0.393) (0.440) (0.456) (0.462) (0.458)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.174 0.215 -0.081 -0.122
(0.409) (0.415) (0.443) (0.430)
Ln population sizea 0.085 0.083 0.111
(0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
GDP per capita a   -0.158**
(0.077)
Ln GDP per capita a   -0.761**
(0.296)
Peace duration    -1.789***    -1.776***    -1.799***    -1.797***    -1.781***    -1.774***    -1.772***    -1.753***    -1.691***
(0.195) (0.195) (0.200) (0.199) (0.198) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.195)
Spline_1    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.019***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2     0.008***     0.008***     0.008***     0.008***     0.008***     0.008***     0.008***     0.008***     0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**    -0.001***   -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.790 0.724 0.756 0.771 1.057 0.961 0.730 1.227   1.839**
(0.550) (0.624) (0.623) (0.627) (0.710) (0.746) (0.814) (0.842) (0.897)
Observations 2420 2407 2407 2407 2375 2375 2375 2371 2371
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 18: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (excluding region 3 from sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona  0.037*  0.036*  0.037*  0.040*   0.050**   0.049**  0.044*  0.043* 0.040
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Status as oil exporter -0.560 -0.583 -0.607 -0.614   -1.227**  -1.134*  -1.057*  -1.055*  -1.002*
(0.371) (0.397) (0.397) (0.396) (0.531) (0.582) (0.587) (0.588) (0.600)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   0.776**   0.774**   0.723**   0.725**   0.774**   0.747**  0.664*  0.656* 0.591
(0.317) (0.324) (0.331) (0.331) (0.352) (0.360) (0.366) (0.375) (0.397)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation  1.244* 1.241 1.243 1.326 1.158 1.088 1.177 1.178 1.047
(0.748) (0.799) (0.799) (0.811) (0.861) (0.882) (0.886) (0.886) (0.927)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa  0.034*  0.035*  0.036*  0.035*  0.035*  0.036*  0.040* 0.041  0.044*
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.023)
Level of democracya 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Level of democracy squareda -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.409 0.417 0.594 0.592 0.360 0.360 0.376
(0.591) (0.595) (0.634) (0.636) (0.658) (0.659) (0.660)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.270 -0.304 -0.292 -0.257 -0.255 -0.261
(0.402) (0.415) (0.415) (0.418) (0.419) (0.418)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.789 0.740 0.480 0.489 0.482
(0.536) (0.553) (0.587) (0.596) (0.587)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.164 0.131 0.118 0.062
(0.433) (0.443) (0.465) (0.467)
Ln population sizea 0.228 0.230 0.240
(0.168) (0.169) (0.170)
GDP per capita a -0.006
(0.065)
Ln GDP per capita a -0.154
(0.323)
Peace duration    -1.711***    -1.700***    -1.707***    -1.706***    -1.705***    -1.697***    -1.698***    -1.699***    -1.690***
(0.197) (0.197) (0.199) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.199) (0.199)
Spline_1    -0.015***    -0.015***    -0.015***    -0.015***    -0.016***    -0.016***    -0.016***    -0.016***    -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.006***    0.006***    0.006***    0.006***    0.006***    0.006***    0.006***    0.006***    0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.403 0.445 0.456 0.465 0.559 0.460 -0.035 -0.015 0.212
(0.641) (0.756) (0.758) (0.764) (0.828) (0.871) (0.933) (0.956) (1.065)
Observations 2373 2360 2360 2360 2313 2313 2313 2312 2312
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 19: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (excluding region 4 from sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona  0.034*  0.033*  0.035*   0.036**   0.043**   0.042**  0.037*  0.034* 0.026
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Status as oil exporter  -0.650*  -0.684*   -0.733**   -0.738**    -1.254***   -1.167**   -1.013**   -0.985**  -0.859*
(0.341) (0.357) (0.359) (0.358) (0.438) (0.479) (0.486) (0.489) (0.494)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   0.731**   0.721**   0.656**   0.657**   0.721**   0.703**  0.602*  0.562* 0.366
(0.286) (0.296) (0.301) (0.301) (0.317) (0.320) (0.327) (0.331) (0.346)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.676 0.688 0.668 0.719 0.605 0.517 0.685 0.668 0.321
(0.615) (0.633) (0.631) (0.641) (0.687) (0.714) (0.730) (0.730) (0.746)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa   0.042**  0.042*   0.044**   0.043**  0.040*  0.041*   0.047**   0.058**    0.063***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Level of democracya -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.017
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Level of democracy squareda 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.661 0.670 0.909 0.905 0.793 0.789 0.867
(0.594) (0.596) (0.633) (0.635) (0.637) (0.637) (0.632)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.180 -0.143 -0.131 -0.109 -0.109 -0.181
(0.376) (0.391) (0.391) (0.392) (0.390) (0.391)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Noncontiguous country structure  0.738* 0.663 0.498 0.540 0.623
(0.396) (0.432) (0.450) (0.456) (0.455)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.167 0.256 0.161 -0.026
(0.378) (0.388) (0.410) (0.413)
Ln population sizea 0.167 0.170 0.194
(0.117) (0.117) (0.119)
GDP per capita a -0.042
(0.058)
Ln GDP per capita a   -0.569**
(0.276)
Peace duration    -1.748***    -1.735***    -1.750***    -1.749***    -1.760***    -1.750***    -1.740***    -1.734***    -1.676***
(0.179) (0.180) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.183)
Spline_1    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Spline_3  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.842 0.844 0.878 0.889 0.840 0.758 0.215 0.422 1.109
(0.519) (0.592) (0.591) (0.594) (0.676) (0.701) (0.802) (0.843) (0.897)
Observations 2303 2291 2291 2291 2250 2250 2250 2245 2245
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 20: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (excluding region 5 from sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona   0.037**  0.037*   0.038**   0.040**   0.047**   0.046**   0.043**  0.038* 0.033
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Status as oil exporter   -0.723**   -0.738**   -0.796**   -0.800**    -1.187***   -1.170**   -1.065**   -1.023**  -0.917*
(0.349) (0.368) (0.370) (0.369) (0.440) (0.488) (0.508) (0.510) (0.514)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country  0.500* 0.503 0.435 0.439 0.524 0.523 0.497 0.418 0.297
(0.298) (0.306) (0.311) (0.311) (0.330) (0.330) (0.333) (0.339) (0.349)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.502 0.480 0.453 0.539 0.414 0.400 0.475 0.475 0.158
(0.611) (0.637) (0.635) (0.647) (0.694) (0.718) (0.725) (0.726) (0.744)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.040 0.035
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021)
Level of democracya 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.021
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Level of democracy squareda -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.683 0.699 0.875 0.875 0.800 0.799 0.852
(0.582) (0.586) (0.612) (0.613) (0.621) (0.623) (0.616)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.295 -0.278 -0.276 -0.267 -0.259 -0.329
(0.397) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) (0.409) (0.411)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure 0.447 0.435 0.334 0.398 0.425
(0.382) (0.414) (0.438) (0.444) (0.439)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.032 0.103 -0.077 -0.157
(0.410) (0.427) (0.455) (0.447)
Ln population sizea 0.087 0.090 0.106
(0.122) (0.123) (0.124)
GDP per capita a -0.068
(0.057)
Ln GDP per capita a  -0.497*
(0.271)
Peace duration    -1.722***    -1.713***    -1.727***    -1.729***    -1.746***    -1.744***    -1.736***    -1.734***    -1.687***
(0.177) (0.177) (0.180) (0.179) (0.181) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.182)
Spline_1    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Spline_3 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001*  -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant   1.225**   1.306**   1.350**   1.362**  1.348*  1.327* 1.017 1.346  1.814*
(0.530) (0.628) (0.627) (0.632) (0.715) (0.768) (0.885) (0.922) (0.969)
Observations 2187 2174 2174 2174 2127 2127 2127 2122 2122
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 21: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (excluding region 6 from sample). 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona  0.034*  0.032* 0.031  0.033*   0.040**  0.037* 0.030 0.027 0.025
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Status as oil exporter -0.387 -0.410 -0.380 -0.393   -1.104** -0.926 -0.846 -0.771 -0.760
(0.439) (0.443) (0.443) (0.441) (0.551) (0.567) (0.562) (0.566) (0.564)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country   0.649**  0.596* 0.536 0.536 0.519 0.409 0.219 0.220 0.142
(0.311) (0.324) (0.328) (0.328) (0.357) (0.368) (0.378) (0.378) (0.385)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.447 0.405 0.361 0.435 0.615 0.410 0.766 0.705 0.525
(0.645) (0.666) (0.663) (0.673) (0.729) (0.745) (0.781) (0.781) (0.804)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.005 -0.009
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032)
Level of democracya -0.018 -0.021 -0.017 -0.010 -0.007 0.004 0.008 0.014
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Level of democracy squareda 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Involvement in violent international conflict 0.765 0.781 0.630 0.489 -0.044 0.022 0.082
(0.750) (0.759) (0.837) (0.857) (0.896) (0.901) (0.896)
Recent experience of political instabilitya -0.258 -0.182 -0.139 -0.086 -0.091 -0.142
(0.389) (0.406) (0.405) (0.406) (0.405) (0.408)
Per cent of mountainous terrain 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Noncontiguous country structure  0.815* 0.648 0.469 0.562 0.575
(0.443) (0.472) (0.483) (0.500) (0.492)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.526  0.747* 0.518 0.479
(0.434) (0.452) (0.520) (0.503)
Ln population sizea   0.306**   0.315**   0.319**
(0.137) (0.138) (0.139)
GDP per capita a -0.070
(0.084)
Ln GDP per capita a -0.341
(0.310)
Peace duration    -1.817***    -1.817***    -1.821***    -1.817***    -1.851***    -1.813***   -1.785***    -1.775***    -1.748***
(0.198) (0.198) (0.199) (0.198) (0.203) (0.203) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204)
Spline_1    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.020***    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.019***    -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***    0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant   1.272**   1.320**   1.375**   1.394** 1.097 0.793 -0.277 0.078 0.326
(0.553) (0.628) (0.627) (0.633) (0.704) (0.746) (0.908) (0.991) (1.040)
Observations 2354 2353 2353 2353 2325 2325 2325 2320 2320
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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Table 22: Logit Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, 1984-2007 (excluding region 7 from sample). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Level of corruptiona   0.044**   0.043**   0.047**   0.047**    0.058***    0.057***   0.053**   0.050**  0.042*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Status as oil exporter  -0.631*  -0.669*   -0.840**   -0.839**    -1.418***    -1.321***   -1.182**   -1.151**  -1.017*
(0.353) (0.365) (0.374) (0.375) (0.469) (0.503) (0.514) (0.517) (0.523)
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country    0.828***   0.803**   0.763**   0.763**    0.914***    0.891***   0.828**   0.794**  0.622*
(0.301) (0.315) (0.316) (0.316) (0.334) (0.337) (0.342) (0.347) (0.359)
Level of ethnic fractionalisation 0.511 0.513 0.559 0.539 0.441 0.268 0.283 0.260 -0.170
(0.640) (0.665) (0.663) (0.674) (0.775) (0.841) (0.846) (0.851) (0.894)
Level of socioeconomic inequalitiesa 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.032  0.038*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.021)
Level of democracya -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.017 0.019 0.036
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Level of democracy squareda -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Involvement in violent international conflict   1.576**   1.576**    1.993***    2.047***    1.964***    1.946***   1.853**
(0.763) (0.764) (0.751) (0.759) (0.741) (0.745) (0.732)
Recent experience of political instabilitya 0.068 0.127 0.130 0.135 0.128 0.047
(0.410) (0.434) (0.432) (0.433) (0.432) (0.433)
Per cent of mountainous terrain -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Noncontiguous country structure  0.695* 0.575 0.377 0.401 0.468
(0.405) (0.465) (0.497) (0.500) (0.499)
Experience of colonial ruleb 0.224 0.373 0.308 0.082
(0.428) (0.451) (0.471) (0.485)
Ln population sizea 0.143 0.148 0.169
(0.123) (0.123) (0.125)
GDP per capita a -0.029
(0.059)
Ln GDP per capita a  -0.550*
(0.303)
Peace duration    -1.747***    -1.734***    -1.772***    -1.770***    -1.803***    -1.791***    -1.779***    -1.778***    -1.727***
(0.191) (0.191) (0.197) (0.197) (0.199) (0.200) (0.199) (0.200) (0.198)
Spline_1    -0.017***    -0.017***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***    -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spline_2    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.007***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***    0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Spline_3  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**   -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.764 0.795 0.769 0.763 0.566 0.540 0.146 0.302 1.137
(0.542) (0.634) (0.633) (0.633) (0.798) (0.797) (0.867) (0.918) (1.014)
Observations 2623 2610 2610 2610 2563 2563 2563 2558 2558
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 10.0 and SPSS 19.
aLagged one year.
bVariable refers to colonial experience at any point between 1946 and 2007.
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CC 
Country code according to the Correlates of War (COW) Project State System 
Membership List version 2008.1.i Please be aware that due to some differences 
between the countries included in the EEI Dataset and those listed by the COW 
Project (see Country), no country codes are available for the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia, the 
Soviet Union, Tanganyika and the United Arab Republic. 
 
Region 
Region in which a country is located. The distinction of different regions of the world 
is largely based on the regional distinction used by The World Bank Group.ii Minor 
changes compared to the distinction by The World Bank Group include the addition 
of a seventh region that is not explicitly listed by The World Bank (namely “Europe 
and North America”) and the classification of the following countries that are missing 
from the World Bank listing: Australia (added in region 3), Cuba (added in region 5), 
Cyprus (added in region 2), Czechoslovakia (added in region 2), Democratic Yemen 
(added in region 6), German Democratic Republic (added in region 4), German 
Federal Republic (added in region 4), New Zealand (added in region 3), North Korea 
(added in region 3), Soviet Union (added in region 2), Taiwan (added in region 3), 
Tanganyika (added in region 1), United Arab Republic (added in region 6), 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (added in region 3), Republic of Vietnam (added in 
region 3), Yemen Arab Republic (added in region 6), Yugoslavia (added in region 2), 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro (added in region 2). 
 
“Region” takes on the following values: 
 
  1 = Africa (except North Africa) 
  2 = Central Asia and Eastern Europe 
  3 = East Asia and Pacific 
  4 = Europe (except Eastern Europe) and North America 
  5 = Latin America and Caribbean 
  6 = Middle East and North Africa 
  7 = South Asia 
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Appendix 2 includes the regional identifier for each country included in the EEI 
Dataset. 
 
Country 
Country name. The EEI Dataset contains information on all countries that are listed 
as members of the state system by the COW Project State System Membership List 
version 2008.1, and had a total population of greater than 500,000 in 2008 
according to the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008.iii Countries that ceased 
to exist before 2008, such as Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic Republic, 
have been included if they are listed as former members of the state system by the 
COW Project and had a total population of greater than 500,000 in their last year of 
existence according to the Population variable (see below).  
 
In order to qualify for state system membership according to the COW Project in the 
period under consideration (1955 to 2007), an entity must either be a member of the 
United Nations or have a population greater than 500,000 and receive diplomatic 
missions from two major powers. The additional threshold that countries need to 
have a population of greater than 500,000 in 2008 according to the Polity IV Project 
(or, where applicable, in the last year of their existence according to Population) 
excludes microstates such as Dominica, Luxembourg or Saint Kitts and Nevis from 
the EEI Dataset.  
 
The EEI Dataset includes six countries in addition to the ones listed by the COW 
Project State System Membership List version 2008.1: the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia, the 
Soviet Union, Tanganyika and the United Arab Republic.  
 
These countries are either missing from the COW Project State System Membership 
List version 2008.1 (such as the United Arab Republic) or have been subsumed 
under the conventional short name of their successor entity (e.g. in the COW Project 
State System Membership List version 2008.1 “Vietnam [1954-2008]” refers to both 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [1954-1976] and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam [1976-today]). The aforementioned six countries have been included as 
independent countries in the EEI Dataset, as they are territorially and constitutionally 
different from their successor entities, and have been recognised as separate state 
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system members by the United Nationsiv or at least two major powers. Appendix 1 
summarises the differences between the state system members listed by the COW 
Project and the countries included in the EEI Dataset.  
 
The EEI Dataset includes a total of 174 countries, namely (in order of their 
appearance in the dataset):  
 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the 
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Czech 
Republic, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East Timor, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Finland, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, German Democratic Republic, 
German Federal Republic, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, North Korea, South 
Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Soviet 
Union, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanganyika, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Republic 
of Vietnam, Vietnam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (renamed “Serbia and Montenegro” in 2003),1 Serbia, Montenegro, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
                                                 
1
 The renaming of countries before the 2000s, such as the change from “Zaire” to “Democratic 
Republic of Congo” in 1997, has not been considered in the EEI Dataset. 
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Year 
Year of observation. The EEI Dataset covers all years between 1955 and 2007. In 
order to facilitate the merging with other datasets or the transfer to different 
computer programmes, the standard start and end year for each country in the 
dataset are set to 1955 and 2007 respectively, even though – for countries that 
gained their internationally recognised independence after 1955 or/and ceased to 
exist before 2007 – observations for subsequent variables have only been added 
from the year of their internationally recognised independence until the end of their 
existence according to the COW Project State System Membership List version 
2008.1. Appendix 2 summarises the start and end year of these observations for all 
countries included in the EEI Dataset. 
 
EthnWar 
Incidence of ethnic war. “EthnWar” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” 
for all years2 in which a country experienced large-scale ethnic violence according to 
the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007.v By 
definition, this variable does not distinguish whether a country experienced one or 
more than one episode of ethnic war within the same year. The rare cases in which 
a country experienced more than one episode of ethnic war within the same year 
according to the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007 include Ethiopia 1963-64 
and 1977-78, India 1990-93, Indonesia 1981-84 and 1998-99, Yugoslavia 1991 and 
the Soviet Union 1991.  
 
Following the PITF, ethnic wars are “episodes of violent conflict between 
governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic 
challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status.” (Marshall, 
Gurr and Harff 2009:6)vi Wars are defined as “unique political events that are 
characterized by the concerted (or major) tactical and strategic use of organized 
violence in an attempt by political and/or military leaders to gain a favorable 
outcome in an ongoing, [sic] group conflict interaction process.” (ibid.:4) The PITF 
                                                 
2
 It is worth pointing out that the precise day and month in which an armed conflict started or ended 
according to the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007 or the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset version 4-2009 (see below) are irrelevant for the coding of EthnWar, WarNei, 
NWarNei, InterCon, InterCon2 and Extrasys in the EEI Dataset, so that – even if a conflict 
started relatively late (e.g. in December) or ended relatively early (e.g. in January) in a given year 
– the aforementioned variables still identify the according year as a conflict year.  
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excludes rioting and warfare between rival communal groups from its dataset 
“unless it involves conflict over political power or government policy” (ibid.:6) as a 
proxy for fighting the government itself. 
 
Two minimum thresholds must be fulfilled in order for a violent ethnic conflict to be 
included in the PITF Ethnic War Problem Set (ibid.): First, each conflict party must 
mobilise at least 1,000 people, either as armed agents, demonstrators or troops 
(mobilisation threshold), and, second, there must be 1,000 or more direct conflict-
related deaths over the full course of the armed conflict and at least one year when 
the annual conflict-related death toll exceeds 100 fatalities (conflict intensity 
threshold). The PITF defines the full course of an armed conflict as “a continual 
episode of armed conflict between agents of the state and agents of the opposition 
group during which there is no period greater than three years when annual conflict-
related fatalities are fewer than 100 in each year” (ibid.:6). Fatalities can either result 
from armed conflict, terrorism, rioting or government repression (ibid.). 
 
Please note that the EEI Dataset deviates slightly from the PITF Ethnic War 
Problem Set, 1955-2007 in that it includes information on the incidence of ethnic war 
in the Soviet Union prior to its dissolution. In the PITF Problem Set, this information 
has been noted under the conflict details for Azerbaijan and Georgia, but not added 
as a separate country listing for the Soviet Union. See Appendix 3 for the number of 
observations for this and all subsequent variables.  
 
Peaceyrs  
Number of years without large-scale ethnic violence. Based on information from the 
PITF Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007 and following the example of Nathaniel 
Beck, Jonathan Katz and Richard Tucker (1998),vii “Peaceyrs” starts at 0 for each 
country in 1955 or, where applicable, in the first year of its internationally recognised 
independence (see Year), and is then calculated as the number of years prior to the 
current observation in which there was no incidence of ethnic war. For example, 
“Peaceyrs” takes on the value “17“ for the Philippines in 1972, as prior to the 
incidence of ethnic war in this year there were 17 years without incidence of large-
scale ethnic violence since 1955; “Peaceyrs” then takes on the value “0” for the 
Philippines from 1973 to 2007, as there was no year without incidence of ethnic war 
in this country from 1972 onwards. 
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WarNei  
Incidence of ethnic war in a neighbouring country. “WarNei” is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value “1” for all years in which a neighbouring country experienced 
large-scale ethnic violence according to the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) 
Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007. For the purpose of the EEI Dataset, 
neighbouring countries are defined solely on the basis of whether they share a land 
(not maritime) border, which implies that island countries such as Sri Lanka are 
treated as having no neighbouring countries. To code this variable, land borders 
have been identified according to political maps which are publicly available on the 
internet. By definition, “WarNei” does not distinguish whether one or more than one 
neighbouring country experienced large-scale ethnic violence in a given year, or 
whether a neighbouring country experienced more than one episode of ethnic war 
within the same year.  
 
NWarNei 
Number of ethnic wars in neighbouring countries. “NWarNei“ provides the total 
number of ethnic wars that occured in a country's neighbouring countries within the 
same year. This number has been calculated as the sum of all episodes of ethnic 
war in all neighbouring countries in a given year, based on data by the Political 
Instability Task Force (PITF) Ethnic War Problem Set, 1955-2007. For instance, 
“NWarNei“ takes on the value “4” for Pakistan in 1992, as its neighbouring countries 
Afghanistan and China each experienced one episode and its neighbouring country 
India two episodes of ethnic war in that year. Like WarNei, neighbouring countries 
are defined solely on the basis of whether they share a land (not maritime) border 
according to political maps that are publicly available on the internet. 
 
InterCon  
Involvement in violent international conflict. “InterCon” is a dummy variable that 
takes on the value “1” for all years in which a country was involved as a primary 
party in at least one extrasystemic or interstate armed conflict3 that qualifies either 
as a minor armed conflict or war according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
                                                 
3
 Hence, internal and internationalised internal armed conflicts according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset have not been taken into account for the coding of “InterCon”.  
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Dataset version 4-2009,viii i.e. that has resulted either in 25 to 999 battle-related 
deaths in a given year or in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.  
 
According to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, a conflict is “a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” (UCDP and PRIO 2009a:1)ix 
Extrasystemic armed conflicts are defined as armed conflicts that occur “between a 
state and a non-state group outside its own territory” (ibid.:7), and interstate armed 
conflicts as armed conflicts that occur “between two or more states.” (ibid.)4 For 
instance, “InterCon” takes on the value “1” for Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 
1979, as the two countries were engaged as primary parties in an interstate armed 
conflict with each other in this year (intensity: minor armed conflict); likewise, 
“InterCon” takes on the value “1” for Malaysia in 1957 (the first year of its 
internationally recognised independence) and the United Kingdom between 1955 
and 1957, as the two countries – or, to be more precise, the government of the 
United Kingdom and the Communist Party of Malaya – were engaged as primary 
parties in an extrasystemic armed conflict with each other in these years (intensity in 
all these years: war).  
 
By definition, “InterCon” does not distinguish whether a country was a primary party 
to one or more than one episode of violent international conflict in a given year. The 
cases in which a country was involved in more than one violent international conflict 
within the same year according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 
4-2009 include: Cambodia 1977, China 1969, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
1975, France 1955-59 and 1961, Israel 1967 and 1973, Portugal 1963-74 and the 
United Kingdom 1955-57. 
 
Please note that there is one minor mistake in the data file for the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009 which has been corrected in the EEI 
Dataset: the end year of the interstate armed conflict between the Democratic 
                                                 
4
 A state, in turn, is defined in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook as “an 
internationally recognised sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an 
internationally unrecognised government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not 
disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the 
same territory.” (UCDP and PRIO 2009a:2) 
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Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam has been adjusted to 1975 rather 
than 1974, based on information from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 
version 4-2009 Version History.x  
 
InterCon2 
Involvement in interstate armed conflict. “InterCon2” is a dummy variable that takes 
on the value “1” for all years in which a country was involved as a primary party in at 
least one interstate armed conflict that qualifies either as a minor armed conflict or 
war according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009, i.e. that 
has resulted either in 25 to 999 battle-related deaths in a given year or in at least 
1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year. While InterCon identifies those years in 
which a country was a primary party to either an extrasystemic or interstate armed 
conflict, “InterCon2” thus indicates a country's involvement only in the latter type of 
conflict. By definition, “InterCon2” does not distinguish whether a country was a 
primary party to one or more than one episode of interstate armed conflict in a given 
year.  
 
InterCon3 
Involvement in extrasystemic armed conflict. "InterCon3” is a dummy variable that 
takes on the value “1” for all years in which a country was involved as a primary 
party in at least one extrasystemic armed conflict that qualifies either as a minor 
armed conflict or war according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 
4-2009, i.e. that has resulted either in 25 to 999 battle-related deaths in a given year 
or in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year. While InterCon identifies 
those years in which a country was a primary party to either an extrasystemic or 
interstate armed conflict, “InterCon3” thus indicates a country's involvement only in 
the former type of conflict. By definition, “InterCon3” does not distinguish whether a 
country was a primary party to one or more than one episode of extrasystemic 
armed conflict in a given year.  
 
Population  
Total population in millions. The primary source for this variable are the population 
data provided by the Penn World Table version 6.3.xi For those country years in 
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which no population data are available from this dataset, two additional sources 
were used: the population variable from Kristian Gleditsch's Expanded Trade and 
GDP Data version 5.0xii (used for Czechoslovakia 1955-92, the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam 1955-75, Democratic Yemen 1967-90, the German Democratic Republic 
1955-90, the German Federal Republic 1955-90, Pakistan 1955-70 [prior to 
independence of Bangladesh], the Republic of Vietnam 1955-75, the Soviet Union 
1955-90, the Yemen Arab Republic 1955-90 and Yugoslavia 1955-91); and the total 
population, both sexes variable from the 2006 revision of the World Population 
Prospects database by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariatxiii (used for Burma 1955-2007 and 
North Korea 1955-2007). The population size of the United Arab Republic 1958-61 
has been calculated by adding the population data provided by the Penn World 
Table version 6.3 for Egypt and Syria in these years; likewise, the population size of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro 1992-2006 has been 
calculated by adding the population data provided by the Penn World Table version 
6.3 for Montenegro and Serbia in these years. 
 
GDPpc  
GDP per capita in thousands U.S. dollars. The two sources for this variable are the 
GDP per capita, current prices data from Kristian Gleditsch's Expanded Trade and 
GDP Data version 5.0 for country years between 1955 and 2004, and the real gross 
domestic product per capita, current price data from the Penn World Table version 
6.3 for country years between 2005 and 2007.  
 
EconRes 
Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources according to Tatu Vanhanen's 
Democratization and Power Resources 1850-2000 dataset.xiv Vanhanen calculated 
this variable as the sum of the two products that are obtained from multiplying the 
value of family farm area with the percentage of agricultural population, and the 
value of the degree of decentralisation of non-agricultural economic resources with 
the percentage of non-agricultural population (FSD 2010).xv According to Vanhanen, 
the higher the value of the Index of Distribution of Economic Power Resources, “the 
more widely economic power resources based on the ownership and/or control of 
the means of production are distributed in a society.” (Vanhanen 1997:56)xvi 
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Please note that, while Vanhanen's Democratization and Power Resources 1850-
2000 dataset only provides values for the Index of Distribution of Economic Power 
Resources in ten-year intervals (i.e. for 1948, 1958, 1968 etc., without any data for 
the years in-between), these values have been added in the EEI Dataset for entire 
time periods, so that for instance the value provided in Vanhanen's dataset for 
Belgium in 1948 (“60.0”) has been added for this country for all years from 1955 (the 
start year of the EEI Dataset, see Year) to 1957; the value provided by Vanhanen 
for Belgium in 1958 (“90.0”) then has been added for this country for all years from 
1958 to 1967, the value for 1968 (“90.0”) for this country for all years from 1968 to 
1977 and so on. As exceptions to this rule, the 1988 value for Ethiopia was only 
added from 1988 to 1992 (i.e. only until the year prior to Eritrea's internationally 
recognised independence in 1993) and the 1968 value for Pakistan was only added 
from 1968 to 1970 (i.e. only until the year prior to Bangladesh's internationally 
recognised independence in 1971), in recognition of the fact that the boundary 
changes in both countries in 1993 and 1971 respectively are likely to have had an 
impact on the distribution of economic power resources within their societies in 
these and subsequent years.  
 
PowRes  
Index of Power Resources according to Tatu Vanhanen's Democratization and 
Power Resources 1850-2000 dataset. Vanhanen calculated this variable by 
multiplying the values of the Index of Occupational Diversification (i.e. the arithmetic 
mean of urban population and non-agricultural population), Index of Knowledge 
Distribution (i.e. the arithmetic mean of students and literates) and Index of the 
Distribution of Economic Power Resources (see EconRes), and then dividing the 
product by 10,000 (FSD 2010). According to Vanhanen, the higher the value of the 
Index of Power Resources, “the more widely politically relevant power resources are 
usually distributed among various sections of the population” (Vanhanen 1997:56). 
 
Please note that, while Vanhanen's Democratization and Power Resources 1850-
2000 dataset only provides values for the Index of Power Resources in ten-year 
intervals (i.e. for 1948, 1958, 1968 etc., without any data for the years in-between), 
these values have been added in the EEI Dataset for entire time periods, so that for 
instance the value provided in Vanhanen's dataset for Belgium in 1948 (“22.2”) has 
been added for this country for all years from 1955 (the start year of the EEI 
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Dataset, see Year) to 1957; the value provided by Vanhanen for Belgium in 1958 
(“35.6”) then has been added for this country for all years from 1958 to 1967, the 
value for 1968 (“39.2”) for this country for all years from 1968 to 1977 and so on. As 
exceptions to this rule, the 1988 value for Ethiopia was only added from 1988 to 
1992 (i.e. only until the year prior to Eritrea's internationally recognised 
independence in 1993) and the 1968 value for Pakistan was only added from 1968 
to 1970 (i.e. only until the year prior to Bangladesh's internationally recognised 
independence in 1971), in recognition of the fact that the boundary changes in both 
countries in 1993 and 1971 respectively are likely to have had an impact on the 
distribution of power resources within their societies in these and subsequent years.  
 
Oil  
Status as oil exporter. Following the example of James Fearon and David Laitin 
(2003a, 2003b),xvii “Oil” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” for all years 
in which a country's fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports exceeded 
33%.5 The main source for country years between 1955 and 1999 is the oil 
exporters variable provided by the replication data for Fearon and Laitin's (2003a) 
article. Since Fearon and Laitin's dataset only covers country years up to 1999, “Oil” 
has been coded for country years between 2000 and 2007 using the fuel exports as 
a percentage of merchandise exports data from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators.xviii These World Bank data were also used to double-check 
and, where necessary, correct apparent coding mistakes in Fearon and Laitin's oil 
exporters variable (e.g. Nigeria 1966-68, Norway 1978, Tunisia 1972-73).6 
 
Where no data were available from the World Bank (e.g. Equatorial Guinea after 
1983) or where there was reason for doubt about the accuracy of the information 
provided (e.g. Laos 1962-74), additional information was sought from sources 
including e.g. government websites, newspaper articles or reports by relevant 
                                                 
5
 Please note that the coding information for the oil exporters variable provided in Fearon and 
Laitin's (2003a) article and their (2003b) data notes contradict each other slightly in that the former 
states that the dummy variable marks those country years “in which fuel exports exceed one third 
[i.e. 33.3%] of export revenues” (Fearon and Laitin 2003a:81) and the latter that the dummy 
variable marks those “country years that had greater than 33% [i.e. 33.0%] fuel exports.” (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003b:4) The EEI Dataset uses the latter threshold, which is why, as mentioned above, 
“Oil” takes on the value “1” for all years in which a country's fuel exports as a percentage of 
merchandise exports exceeded 33.0% rather than 33.3%.   
6
 For a complete list of corrected values, please contact the author of the EEI Dataset. 
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organisations such as the International Energy Agency or the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, in order to complete missing data or, where necessary, 
correct the World Bank information.  
 
In line with Fearon and Laitin's coding rules, the last available value of “Oil” was 
“extended forward for each country for the most recent years” (Fearon and Laitin 
2003b:4) if no information was available from any of the aforementioned sources, 
based “on the assumption [that] once countries come 'on line' for oil production[,] 
they generally stay there” (ibid.).  
 
Mountain  
Percent of mountainous terrain according to the replication data for James Fearon 
and David Laitin's (2003a) article. Since Fearon and Laitin's dataset only covers 
country years up to 1999, values for country years between 2000 and 2007 were 
included by simply extending forward the last available value of “Mountain” for each 
country. 
 
Please note that the percent of mountainous terrain variable in Fearon and Laitin's 
replication data does not seem to take boundary changes into account, as it remains 
the same for instance for Pakistan before and after the internationally recognised 
independence of Bangladesh. Based on the recognition that boundary changes are 
likely to have an impact on a country's proportion of mountainous terrain, this has 
been corrected in the EEI Dataset insofar that no values were added from Fearon 
and Laitin's dataset for: Ethiopia prior to Eritrea's internationally recognised 
independence in 1993; Pakistan prior to Bangladesh's internationally recognised 
independence in 1971; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (whose percentage of 
mountainous terrain is the same as that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 
Fearon and Laitin's data); the German Federal Republic (whose percentage of 
mountainous terrain is the same as that of reunified Germany in Fearon and Laitin's 
data); the Soviet Union (whose percentage of mountainous terrain is the same as 
that of the Russian Federation in Fearon and Laitin's data); and Yugoslavia (whose 
percentage of mountainous terrain is the same as that of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in Fearon and Laitin's data).  
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Noncont  
Noncontiguous country according to the replication data for James Fearon and 
David Laitin's (2003a) article. “Noncont” is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
“1” for all years in which a country can be described as noncontiguous in the sense 
that some of its territory holding at least 10,000 people is separated from the land 
area containing the capital city either by land or 100 km of water (ibid.). Colonial 
empires have been ignored for the coding of this variable (ibid.).  
 
Since Fearon and Laitin's dataset only covers country years up to 1999, the 
remaining country years between 2000 and 2007 have been coded using political 
maps and demographic data which are publicly available on the internet. In the 
same manner, countries which are included in the EEI Dataset but not in Fearon 
and Laitin's replication data have been identified as either noncontiguous or not. 
Noncontiguous countries which are not among the countries considered in  Fearon 
and Laitin's dataset include Comoros, the Solomon Islands and the United Arab 
Republic.  
 
Please note that Fearon and Laitin mistakenly do not code Democratic Yemen as a 
noncontiguous country; this minor coding mistake has been corrected in the EEI 
Dataset. Also, due to differences between the EEI Dataset and Fearon and Laitin's 
replication data regarding the year in which Bangladesh gained internationally 
recognised independence, Pakistan has been identified as a noncontiguous country 
until 1970 in the EEI Dataset, rather than until 1971 as in Fearon and Laitin's 
replication data. 
 
BritRul 
Former British colony, protectorate, trust territory or subject to British League of 
Nations mandate. “BritRul” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” for all 
years of those countries which, at any point between 1946 and 2007, either were 
ruled under a British League of Nations mandate or used to be a British colony,7 
                                                 
7
 Or were part of a British colony, such as current-day Bangladesh, India and Pakistan which all 
used to be part of British India.  
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British protectorate or UN trust territory under British administration.8 For the 
purpose of the EEI Dataset, neither this variable nor RulExp1 and RulExp2 (see 
below) mark countries that had the status of a self-governing dominion or a 
protected state. Protected states are thereby distinct from protectorates because, 
unlike the latter, they had “a properly organised internal government” (UK Home 
Office 2010:1)xix and, at least de iure, were subject to the British government's direct 
involvement only in their external but not their internal affairs (ibid.). Sources for the 
coding of this variable include information from the United Nations,xx the CIA World 
Factbookxxi and, where necessary (i.e. to confirm or clarify information from the 
previous two sources), relevant government websites as well as the BBC country 
profiles.xxii 
 
The countries in the EEI Dataset that, at any point between 1946 and 2007, either 
were ruled under a British League of Nations mandate or used to be a British 
colony, British protectorate or UN trust territory under British administration include: 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burma, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Fiji, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon 
Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanganyika, Tanzania, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.   
 
Please note that – since British and Italian Somaliland were joined in independent 
Somalia, and Sudan used to be ruled by an Anglo-Egyptian condominium prior to its 
independence in 1956 – both “BritRul” and RulOth (see below) take on the value “1” 
for all years for Somalia and Sudan.    
 
FrenRul 
Former French colony, protectorate, trust territory or subject to French League of 
Nations mandate. “FrenRul” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” for all 
years of those countries which, at any point between 1946 and 2007, either were 
                                                 
8
 Please note that the previous belonging to another country (e.g. of Eritrea to Ethiopia before its 
internationally recognised independence in 1993), foreign military administrations or occupations 
were not taken into account for the coding of BritRul, FrenRul, OthRul, RulExp1and RulExp2.  
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ruled under a French League of Nations mandate or used to be a French colony,9 
French protectorate or UN trust territory under French administration. Sources for 
the coding of this variable include information from the United Nations, the CIA 
World Factbook and, where necessary (i.e. to confirm or clarify information from the 
previous two sources), relevant government websites as well as the BBC country 
profiles. 
 
The countries in the EEI Dataset that, at any point between 1946 and 2007, either 
were ruled under a French League of Nations mandate or used to be a French 
colony, French protectorate or UN trust territory under French administration 
include: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Gabon, Guinea, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, 
Syria, Togo, Tunisia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam 
and Vietnam. 
 
OthRul 
Former colony, protectorate, trust territory or subject to a League of Nations 
mandate of any country other than France or the United Kingdom. “OthRul” is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value “1” for all years of those countries which, at 
any point between 1946 and 2007, either were ruled under a League of Nations 
mandate of any country other than France or the United Kingdom or used to be a 
colony, protectorate or UN trust territory10 of any country other than France or the 
United Kingdom (such as, for instance, Belgium or Portugal). Sources for the coding 
of this variable include information from the United Nations, the CIA World Factbook 
and, where necessary (i.e. to confirm or clarify information from the previous two 
sources), relevant government websites as well as the BBC country profiles. 
 
The countries in the EEI Dataset that, at any point between 1946 and 2007, either 
were ruled under a League of Nations mandate of any country other than France or 
the United Kingdom or used to be a colony, protectorate or UN trust territory of any 
                                                 
9
 Or were part of a French colony, such as current-day Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam which all used 
to be part of French Indochina.  
10
 Or were part of a UN trust territory, such as current-day Burundi and Rwanda which both used to 
be part of the Ruanda-Urundi trust territory. 
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country other than France or the United Kingdom include: Angola, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Indonesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Rwanda, 
Somalia and Sudan. 
 
RulExp1 
Former colony, protectorate, trust territory or subject to a League of Nations 
mandate. “RulExp1” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” for all years of 
those countries which, at any point between 1900 and 1945, either were ruled under 
a League of Nations mandate or used to be a colony, protectorate or UN trust 
territory. Sources for the coding of this variable include information from the United 
Nations, the CIA World Factbook and, where necessary (i.e. to confirm or clarify 
information from the previous two sources), relevant government websites as well 
as the BBC country profiles. 
 
RulExp2 
Former colony, protectorate, trust territory or subject to a League of Nations 
mandate. “RulExp2” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” for all years of 
those countries which, at any point between 1946 and 2007, either were ruled under 
a League of Nations mandate or used to be a colony, protectorate or UN trust 
territory. Sources for the coding of this variable include information from the United 
Nations, the CIA World Factbook and, where necessary (i.e. to confirm or clarify 
information from the previous two sources), relevant government websites as well 
as the BBC country profiles. 
 
EthFrAl 
Ethnic fractionalisation index according to Alberto Alesina et al. (2003).xxiii The index   
depicts “the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the population 
belong to two different [ethnic] groups” (ibid.:156), based on the formula 
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where sij is the share of group i (i = 1...N) in country j. To define ethnicity, Alesina et 
al. use a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics (ibid.). The index ranges 
between 0 (complete ethnic homogeneity) and 1 (complete ethnic heterogeneity), 
i.e. the closer the value of “EthFrAl” to 1, the closer a given society is to being 
completely ethnically heterogeneous; conversely, the closer the value of “EthFrAl” to 
0, the closer a given society is to being completely ethnically homogeneous.  
 
The primary source for this variable are the ethnic fractionalisation data provided by 
Alesina et al. (2003). As Alesina et al. (2003) do not provide data for all countries 
included in the EEI Dataset nor for Ethiopia following Eritrea's internationally 
recognised independence in 1993 and Pakistan prior to Bangladesh's internationally 
recognised independence in 1971, additional values of “EthFrAl” have been 
calculated using the aforementioned formula and ethnicity data from the following 
sources: the CIA World Factbook 1980xxiv for Czechoslovakia 1955-92, the German 
Democratic Republic 1955-90, the German Federal Republic 1955-90 and the 
Yemen Arab Republic 1955-90; the CIA World Factbook 2007xxv for Ethiopia 1993-
2007, Montenegro 2006-07 and Serbia 2006-07; Wright (1991)xxvi for Pakistan 1955-
70; and Anderson and Silver (1989)xxvii for the Soviet Union 1955-91.  
 
Please note that the values of “EthFrAl” from the aforementioned sources have been 
added in the EEI Dataset for entire time periods rather than particular country years, 
i.e. the ethnic fractionalisation value which Alesina et al. calculated for Sri Lanka 
based on ethnicity data from 2001 has been added in the EEI Dataset for this 
country for all years between 1955 and 2007, the ethnic fractionalisation value which 
Alesina et al. calculated for Thailand based on ethnicity data from 1983 has been 
added for this country for all years between 1955 and 2007 and so on. 
 
Polity  
Revised Combined Polity Score according to the Polity IV Project dataset version 
p4v2008. Like the Polity IV Project's Combined Polity Score, the Revised Combined 
Polity Score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). It 
differs from the Combined Polity Score, as instances of so-called standardised 
authority scores (-66, -77 and -88) have been converted to conventional polity 
scores within the range of -10 to +10, in order “to facilitate the use of the POLITY 
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regime measure in time-series analyses.” (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b:15)xxviii 
Under the Combined Polity Score, the standardised authority scores mark 
interruption periods (-66), interregnum periods (-77) and transition periods (-88).  
 
The Polity IV Project team computes the Combined Polity Score which underlies the 
Revised Combined Polity Score by subtracting the Institutionalized Autocracy score 
from the Institutionalized Democracy score (ibid.). The latter two scores are derived 
from the codings of variables which measure the competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief 
executive, the competitiveness of political participation and the regulation of 
participation (ibid.).11 Please note that all “Polity” values have been calculated by the 
Polity IV Project team “according to the regime in place on December 31 of the year 
coded.” (ibid.:11)  
 
Anoc  
Anocracy. “Anoc” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” for all years in 
which a country's Combined Polity Score according to the Polity IV Project dataset 
version p4v2008 lies between -5 and +5 or takes on the value -66, -77 or -88. 
Please note that all values of the Combined Polity Score have been calculated by 
the Polity IV Project team “according to the regime in place on December 31 of the 
year coded.” (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b:11)  
 
PolThres 
Prevalence of autocratic regime features. “PolThres” is a dummy variable that takes 
on the value “1” for all years in which the autocratic features of a country's political 
regime outweighed the democratic ones. The primary source for this variable is the 
Combined Polity Score according to the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008: 
“PolThres”  takes on the value “1” for all years in which a country's Combined Polity 
Score is ≤ 0.12 For those country years in which the Combined Polity Score takes on 
                                                 
11
 Please consult the Polity IV Project Dataset Users' Manual for further details on the coding of 
these variables and how they are used to calculate the Institutionalized Democracy score and the 
Institutionalized Autocracy score. 
12
  It is worth emphasising at this point that, for the purpose of the EEI Dataset, country years in which 
the Combined Polity Score takes on the value “0” are also treated as years in which the autocratic 
features of a country’s political regime outweighed the democratic ones.  
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the value -66, -77 or -88, or in which no data are available from the Polity IV Project 
dataset version p4v2008, additional sources were consulted, including reports by 
Freedom House,xxix the Bertelsmann Transformation Index,xxx the Inter-
Parliamentary Union,xxxi the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network,xxxii the U.S. Library 
of Congress Country Studiesxxxiii and relevant academic publications. These sources 
were used to gather as much information as possible for the country and year in 
question on the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive 
recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of political 
participation and the regulation of participation (the key criteria on which the 
calculation of the Combined Polity Score is based, see Polity). Drawing on this 
information, an assessment was made whether the autocratic features of a country's 
political regime that was in place on December 31 of a given year seem to have 
outweighed the democratic ones; “PolThres” was then coded according to this 
assessment for the country years in which the Combined Polity Score takes on the 
value -66, -77 or -88, or in which no data are available from the Polity IV Project 
dataset version p4v2008.13  
 
Instab  
Recent experience of political instability. Following the example of James Fearon 
and David Laitin (2003a), “Instab” is a dummy variable that takes on the value “1” if 
a country's Combined Polity Score according to the Polity IV Project dataset version 
p4v2008 either took on the value -77 or -88 or had a three-or-greater change in any 
of the three years prior to the current observation. For instance, “Instab” takes on 
the value “1” for El Salvador in 1965 and 1966, as El Salvador's Combined Polity 
Score  according to the Polity IV Project dataset version p4v2008 changed from -3 
                                                 
13
 It is important to emphasise again that “PolThres” – just like Anoc and Instab – is coded based on 
the values of the Combined Polity Score rather than the Revised Combined Polity Score. Hence, in 
some occasions – such as for instance El Salvador 1982-83 or Hungary 1989 – when the 
standardised authority scores under the Combined Polity Score have been converted into 
conventional values >0 under the Revised Combined Polity Score (see Polity), “PolThres” might 
still take on the value “1” if additionally consulted sources indicate that the autocratic features of a 
country's political regime at the end of the year in question outweighed the democratic ones; 
conversely, “PolThres” might take on the value “0” even though the standardised authority scores 
under the Combined Polity Score have been converted into conventional values ≤ 0 under the 
Revised Combined Polity Score, if additionally consulted sources indicate that the democratic 
features of a country's political regime at the end of the year in question outweighed the autocratic 
ones (see e.g. Comoros 1995). 
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in 1963 to 0 in 1964; likewise, “Instab” takes on the value “1” for Bolivia from 1955 to 
1958, as Bolivia's Combined Polity Score took on the value -88 from 1952 to 1955.  
 
Please note that the coding of the political instability variable in the EEI Dataset 
differs from that in Fearon and Laitin's replication data, as the latter treat the year in 
which a three-or-greater change in the Combined Polity Score occurs as instance of 
political instability, rather than the last year before such a change. Hence, the 
aforementioned change in El Salvador's Combined Polity Score from -3 in 1963 to 0 
in 1964 leads Fearon and Laitin to code their political instability variable as “1” for El 
Salvador from 1965 to 1967, based on the assumption that 1964 was particularly 
affected by political instability as the year in which the Combined Polity Score 
changes. In contrast, “Instab” takes on the value “1” in the EEI Dataset for El 
Salvador only from 1965 to 1966, based on the assumption that  1964 is the first 
year of a new period of political stability (since the Combined Polity Score remains 
at “0” from 1964 to 1971) and that thus 1963 is likely to have been more affected by 
political instability as the last year before the change in the Combined Polity Score. 
 
CorrICRG  
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Corruption Index according to the ICRG 
Researcher's Dataset (Table 3B), © The PRS Group, Inc. (2009).xxxiv Starting with 
the year 1984, the index provides annual data on the level of corruption within a 
country's political system, based on assessments by country experts. It takes into 
account the extent of a variety of corrupt dealings, including “demands for special 
payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, 
tax assessments, police protection, or loans … [as well as those sorts of] actual or 
potential corruption [with which the ICRG Corruption Index is particularly concerned] 
in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, 
secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.” 
(The PRS Group, Inc. 2010)xxxv The index ranges between 0 and 6, with low 
numbers indicating high levels of corruption and high numbers indicating low levels 
of corruption.  
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LElec  
Number of legislative elections. Following, with minor alterations, the example of 
Matt Golder (2005),xxxvi “LElec“ indicates the number of a country's elections to the 
national legislature in unicameral systems, to the lower house of the national 
legislature in bicameral systems and, where applicable, to constitutional assemblies 
in years during which the democratic features of the country's political regime 
outweighed the autocratic ones. The number of legislative elections provided by 
“LElec” does not include indirect legislative elections, such as through the Basic 
Democrats system in Pakistan in 1962 and 1965. The use of several rounds of 
voting for the same legislative elections does not affect the coding of “LElec”, i.e. it 
does not increase the number of legislative elections counted.   
 
Please note three relevant differences between “LElec“ and Golder's variable on the 
number of legislative elections (Golder 2004):xxxvii first, “LElec“ automatically takes 
on the value “0“ for those country years in which PolThres takes on the value “1“, 
i.e. legislative elections in years during which the autocratic features of a country's 
political regime outweighed the democratic ones are not indicated; second, unlike 
Golder's variable, “LElec“ includes separate, direct elections to constitutional 
assemblies in its count of the number of legislative elections; third, partial elections 
(such as those in Poland in 1989) in which only a restricted number of parliamentary 
seats was freely contested through direct elections are also included in “LElec”.  
 
Countries which held two legislative elections in the same year according to “LElec“ 
include Bangladesh in 1996, Colombia in 1990, Fiji in 1977, Greece in 1989, Ireland 
in 1982, Mali in 1997, Sri Lanka in 1960, Thailand in 1992 and the United Kingdom 
in 1974.  
 
The primary source for this variable are the replication data for Golder's (2005) 
article. Since these replication data only cover country years up to 2000 and bearing 
in mind the aforementioned coding differences between Golder‘s variable on the 
number of legislative elections and “LElec“, additional sources were used to double-
check, extend and modify the information provided by Golder's dataset. These 
additional sources include data by the Oxford Scholarship Series on Elections in 
Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe,xxxviii the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network, the U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies and 
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parliament websites. Where data sources contradict each other on an election year, 
the information provided by national parliaments was chosen where available, 
otherwise the year on which three out of four sources agree. 
 
PElec  
Number of presidential elections. Following, with minor alterations, the example of 
Matt Golder (2005), “PElec“ indicates the number of a country's popular presidential 
elections in years during which the democratic features of the country's political 
regime outweighed the autocratic ones. “Popular presidential elections” are here 
defined as those elections in which presidents are either directly elected (such as in 
Ireland) or through an electoral college that has been directly elected specifically for 
the purpose of the presidential elections (such as in the United States). Presidential 
elections through electoral bodies that have not been directly elected, such as in the 
case of the German Bundesversammlung, are hence not included in the number of 
presidential elections provided by “PElec”. Direct elections to the prime minister, 
such as in Israel in 1996, 1999 and 2001, have not been included either.  
 
Please note that, like LElec and in contrast to the replication data for Golder's 
(2005) article, “PElec” automatically takes on the value “0“ for those country years in 
which PolThres takes on the value “1“, i.e. presidential elections in years during 
which the autocratic features of a country's political regime outweighed the 
democratic ones are not indicated. Apart from this criterion, it is irrelevant for the 
coding of “PElec” under which form of government popular presidential elections 
were held. The use of several rounds of voting for the same presidential elections 
does not affect the coding of “PElec”, i.e. it does not increase the number of 
presidential elections counted; in instances where different rounds of voting took 
place in more than one year, “PElec” only counts the year in which the first round of 
voting occurred, so that for example “PElec” takes on the value “1” for Madagascar 
in 1992 and “0” for Madagascar in 1993, even though the first round of voting for the 
same presidential elections took place in November 1992 and the second round in 
February 1993. Presidential elections which combine aspects of popular and non-
popular elections in different rounds of voting, such as under so-called majority 
congressional systems (Jones 1995),xxxix or in which the president is elected on the 
same ballot as candidates for seats in the legislature (such as in Guyana) have 
been included in the number of presidential elections counted by “PElec”.  
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The only country which held two presidential elections in the same year according to 
“PElec” is Argentina in 1973.  
 
The primary source for this variable are the replication data for Golder's (2005) 
article. Since these replication data only cover country years up to 2000 and bearing 
in mind the aforementioned coding difference between Golder’s variable on the 
number of presidential elections and “PElec“, additional sources were used to 
double-check, extend and modify the information provided by Golder's dataset. 
These additional sources include data by the Oxford Scholarship Series on 
Elections in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, the U.S. Library of Congress Country 
Studies and government websites. Where data sources contradict each other on an 
election year, the information provided by national governments was chosen where 
available, otherwise the year on which three out of four sources agree. 
 
MinRep 
Use of electoral mechanisms to enhance ethnic, national or religious minority 
representation in the national legislature. “MinRep” is a dummy variable that takes 
on the value “1” for all years in which a country employed specific electoral 
mechanisms designed to ensure the political representation of certain ethnic, 
national or religious minorities in the national legislature in unicameral systems or in 
the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral systems while the 
democratic features of the country's political regime outweighed the autocratic ones. 
Please note that “MinRep” automatically takes on the value “0“ for those country 
years in which PolThres takes on the value “1“, i.e. the use of electoral mechanisms 
to enhance ethnic, national or religious minority representation in years during which 
the autocratic features of a country's political regime outweighed the democratic 
ones are not indicated. As long as PolThres does not take on the value “1”, 
“MinRep” marks all country years from the year in which a country first employed 
electoral mechanisms to enhance ethnic, national or religious minority 
representation in the national legislature in its legislative elections up to (but not 
including) the year in which the same country held legislative elections that no 
longer employed these mechanisms.  
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The types of electoral mechanisms indicated by “MinRep” include seat 
reservations14 and the use of communal rolls. Not included are exemptions for 
political parties representing specific ethnic, national or religious minorities from the 
formal threshold for winning seats in the legislature; arrangements which encourage 
ethnically diverse party lists; affirmative gerrymandering; measures to enhance 
geographical communal representation (cf. Reynolds 2005);xl the use of 
representation enhancing mechanisms in institutions other than the national 
legislature in unicameral systems or the lower house of the national legislature in 
bicameral systems; and reserved seats for paramount chiefs unless they are 
explicitly intended to enhance the representation of specific minority groups.  
 
Based on these specifications, “MinRep” takes on the value “1” for: Afghanistan 
2005-07, Burma 1955-61, Burundi 2005-07, Colombia 1994-2007, Croatia 2000-07, 
Cyprus 1960-2007, Ethiopia 1994-2007, Fiji 1970-86 and 1990-2005, India 1955-
2007, Iran 1997-2003, Lebanon 1955-2007, Mauritius 1968-2007, Montenegro 
2006-07, New Zealand 1955-2007, Niger 1993-95 and 1999-2007, Pakistan 1988-
98 and 2007, Philippines 1998-2007, Romania 1990-2007, Slovenia 1992-2007, 
Syria 1955-57, Taiwan 1992-2007, Venezuela 2000-07, Zambia 1964-67 and 
Zimbabwe 1970-86. 
 
Sources for the coding of this variable include information from Reynolds (2005), 
Golder (2004, 2005), the Oxford Scholarship Series on Elections in Asia, Africa, the 
Americas and Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the ACE Electoral Knowledge 
Network, the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa,xli 
national constitutions, electoral laws and other formal documents (such as peace 
treaties) which affect the electoral mechanisms in place, and relevant academic 
publications on individual countries. Where data sources contradict each other on 
the use of electoral mechanisms designed to enhance the political representation of 
ethnic, national or religious minorities in a given country and year, the information 
provided by national constitutions and electoral laws was chosen where available, 
otherwise the information on which two out of three sources agree.  
 
                                                 
14
 The precise number of reserved seats is thereby irrelevant for the coding of “MinRep”. Mauritius's 
“best loser” system represents a special because flexible type of seat reservation arrangement that 
is also indicated by “MinRep”. On the other hand, the “minority regime allocations” (Reynolds 
2005:305) in South Africa prior to 1994 have not been included among the electoral mechanisms 
indicated by “MinRep”. 
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ElecTypLeg  
Type of electoral system for the legislature. “ElecTypLeg“ provides information on 
the type of electoral system used for a country's elections to the national legislature 
in unicameral systems and to the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral 
systems.15 Please note that “ElecTypLeg” automatically takes on the value “0“ for 
those country years in which PolThres takes on the value “1“, i.e. for those years 
during which the autocratic features of a country's political regime outweighed the 
democratic ones. In country years during which PolThres does not take on the 
value “1”, “ElecTypLeg” is coded as follows:  
 
1 = majoritarian electoral system 
2 = proportional electoral system 
3 = mixed electoral system  
 
As long as PolThres does not take on the value “1”, “ElecTypLeg” indicates the use 
of a certain type of electoral system for the legislature from the year in which a 
country first employed this system in its legislative elections up to (but not including) 
the year in which the same country held legislative elections that employed a 
different type of electoral system for the legislature. For instance, “ElecTypLeg” 
takes on the value “1“ for Sri Lanka from 1955 to 1988 and the value “3” for Sri 
Lanka from 1989 to 2007, as the country first employed a mixed electoral system for 
the legislature in the 1989 legislative elections, after having previously used a 
majoritarian electoral system for the legislature. 
 
The definition of different types of electoral system for the legislature follows, with 
minor alterations, the classification by Matt Golder (2005). According to Golder 
(2005), majoritarian electoral systems require the winning candidate to obtain either 
a plurality or majority of the vote; proportional systems allocate seats in proportion to 
a party’s (or candidates’) share of the vote; and mixed systems employ a mixture of 
majoritarian and proportional electoral rules. Unlike Golder (2005), electoral systems 
with multiple electoral tiers are not treated as a separate category in the EEI 
Dataset, but have been identified as majoritarian, proportional or mixed depending 
                                                 
15
 Electoral systems used for the elections of constitutional assemblies have not been taken into 
account for the coding of “ElecTypLeg” if the constitutional assembly (such as the one that was 
directly elected in Paraguay in 1991) existed as a representative body in addition to the national 
legislature. 
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on the electoral formula(s) used in different tiers to translate votes into seats. 
Following these definitions, majoritarian electoral systems include for instance the 
first-past-the-post, limited vote and alternative vote systems (Golder 2004). 
Proportional electoral systems include quota and highest average systems using 
party lists as well as the single transferable vote (ibid.).  
 
In line with the replication data for Golder's (2005) article, electoral systems are 
classified as mixed in the EEI Dataset if more than 5% of the deputies in the national 
legislature in unicameral systems or more than 5% of the deputies in the lower 
house of the national legislature in bicameral systems have been elected by an 
electoral formula that is different from the one used to elect all other deputies 
(Golder 2005). This includes electoral systems in which more than 5% of the seats 
in the national legislature were awarded as bonus seats to political parties that either 
won the highest number of votes at the electoral district level (such as in Sri Lanka 
since 1989) or countrywide (such as in Greece since 2007), while all other seats 
were awarded according to a proportional electoral formula. In contrast to Golder's 
replication data, questions of district magnitude have been taken into account for the 
identification of mixed electoral systems in the EEI Dataset: here, electoral systems 
also have been coded as mixed if a country (such as Somalia between 1964 and 
1968) officially employed a proportional electoral system countrywide, yet more than 
5% of the deputies in the national legislature in unicameral systems or more than 
5% of the deputies in the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral 
systems were elected in single-member districts while all other deputies were 
elected in multi-member districts. 
 
Please note that the definition of electoral systems for the legislature used for the 
EEI Dataset focuses exclusively on the type of electoral formula used to translate 
votes into seats. Issues such as whether mixed electoral systems are dependent or 
independent, potential restrictions on the number of freely contestable seats in the  
legislature, the use of communal rolls or the employment of indirect election 
arrangements such as the Basic Democrats system in Pakistan's 1962 and 1965 
legislative elections are irrelevant for the coding of “ElecTypLeg”.  
 
Sources for the coding of this variable include data by Golder (2004, 2005), the 
Oxford Scholarship Series on Elections in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, 
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the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, the Electoral 
Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, national constitutions, electoral 
laws and other formal documents (such as peace treaties) which affect the electoral 
system in place, government and parliament websites, and relevant academic 
publications on individual countries. Where data sources contradict each other on 
the type of electoral system for the legislature used in a given country and year, the 
information either provided by national constitutions, electoral laws and other formal 
documents which affect the electoral system in place or provided by government 
and parliament websites was chosen where available, otherwise the information on 
which two out of three sources agree.  
 
Maj  
Use of a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature. “Maj“ is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country employed a majoritarian 
electoral system for elections to the national legislature in unicameral systems or to 
the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral systems while the 
democratic features of the country's political regime outweighed the autocratic ones. 
“Maj” takes on the value “0“ for those country years in which PolThres takes on the 
value “1” (i.e. for those years during which the autocratic features of a country's 
political regime outweighed the democratic ones), as well as for those country years 
in which PolThres does not take on the value “1” but a type of electoral system for 
the legislature was used that was not majoritarian. As long as PolThres does not 
take on the value “1”, “Maj” indicates the use of a majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature from the year in which a country first employed this system in its 
legislative elections up to (but not including) the year in which the same country held 
legislative elections that employed a different type of electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see ElecTypLeg for further details and the sources used for the 
coding of this variable. 
 
Prop 
Use of a proportional electoral system for the legislature. “Prop“ is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country employed a proportional 
electoral system for elections to the national legislature in unicameral systems or to 
the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral systems while the 
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democratic features of the country's political regime outweighed the autocratic ones. 
“Prop” takes on the value “0“ for those country years in which PolThres takes on the 
value “1” (i.e. for those years during which the autocratic features of a country's 
political regime outweighed the democratic ones), as well as for those country years 
in which PolThres does not take on the value “1” but a type of electoral system for 
the legislature was used that was not proportional. As long as PolThres does not 
take on the value “1”, “Prop” indicates the use of a proportional electoral system for 
the legislature from the year in which a country first employed this system in its 
legislative elections up to (but not including) the year in which the same country held 
legislative elections that employed a different type of electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see ElecTypLeg for further details and the sources used for the 
coding of this variable. 
 
MixedEl  
Use of a mixed electoral system for the legislature. “MixedEl“ is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country employed a mixed 
electoral system for elections to the national legislature in unicameral systems or to 
the lower house of the national legislature in bicameral systems while the 
democratic features of the country's political regime outweighed the autocratic ones. 
“MixedEl” takes on the value “0“ for those country years in which PolThres takes on 
the value “1” (i.e. for those years during which the autocratic features of a country's 
political regime outweighed the democratic ones), as well as for those country years 
in which PolThres does not take on the value “1” but a type of electoral system for 
the legislature was used that was not mixed. As long as PolThres does not take on 
the value “1”, “MixedEl” indicates the use of a mixed electoral system for the 
legislature from the year in which a country first employed this system in its 
legislative elections up to (but not including) the year in which the same country held 
legislative elections that employed a different type of electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see ElecTypLeg for further details and the sources used for the 
coding of this variable. 
 
ElecTypPres  
Type of electoral system for the presidency. “ElecTypPres“ provides information on 
the type of electoral system used for the presidency in countries which have a 
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presidential form of government in years during which the democratic features of the 
country's political regime outweighed the autocratic ones. Accordingly, 
“ElecTypPres” automatically takes on the value “0” for those country years in which 
FormGov takes on any value other than “2” (see below). In country years during 
which FormGov takes on the value “2” , “ElecTypPres” is coded as follows: 
 
1 = plurality system 
2 = absolute majority system  
3 = qualified majority system 
4 = electoral college system 
5 = preferential electoral system 
6 = electoral system with vote distribution requirement  
 
This coding scheme follows, with minor alterations, that by Matt Golder (2004, 2005) 
for his variable on types of electoral system for the presidency. It differs from 
Golder's variable, as he distinguishes only five types of electoral system used in 
presidential elections, whereas “ElecTypPres” includes a sixth category specifically 
for electoral systems with vote distribution requirements, as employed for instance in 
Nigeria between 1979 and 1983. Moreover, “ElecTypPres”, unlike Golder's variable, 
takes on the value “99” in those country years during which FormGov takes on the 
value “2” but none of the aforementioned categories to identify different types of 
electoral system for the presidency can be usefully applied. This includes Burundi's 
transitional government between 2002 and 2004; Sri Lanka between 1977 and 
1981, i.e. in the first years following the change from a parliamentary to a 
presidential form of government; and Switzerland between 1955 and 2007 due to 
the uniqueness of the rotation principle for the Swiss presidency. Please note that 
so-called majority congressional systems (Jones 1995) have been coded as 
absolute majority systems. 
 
As long as FormGov takes on the value “2”, “ElecTypPres” indicates the use of a 
given type of electoral system for the presidency from the year in which a country 
first employed this system in its presidential elections up to (but not including) the 
year in which the same country held presidential elections that employed a different 
type of electoral system for the presidency. For instance, “ElecTypPres” takes on 
the value “1“ for Colombia from 1957 to 1993 and the value “2” for Colombia from 
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1994 to 2007, as the country first employed an absolute majority system in the 1994 
presidential elections, after having previously used a plurality electoral system for 
the presidency.  
 
Sources for the coding of this variable include data by Golder (2005), the Oxford 
Scholarship Series on Elections in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, the ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network, the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of 
Democracy in Africa, the Political Database of the Americas,xlii national constitutions, 
electoral laws and other formal documents (such as peace treaties) which affect the 
electoral system in place, government and parliament websites, and relevant 
academic publications on individual countries. Where data sources contradict each 
other on the type of electoral system for the presidency used in a given country and 
year, the information either provided by national constitutions, electoral laws and 
other formal documents which affect the electoral system in place or provided by 
government and parliament websites was chosen where available, otherwise the 
information on which two out of three sources agree.  
 
FormGov 
Form of government. “FormGov“ automatically takes on the value “0“ for those 
country years in which PolThres takes on the value “1“, i.e. for those years during 
which the autocratic features of a country's political regime outweighed the 
democratic ones. In country years during which PolThres does not take on the 
value “1”, “FormGov” is coded as follows:  
 
1 = parliamentary form of government 
2 = presidential form of government 
3 = mixed form of government 
 
The definition of different forms of government in the EEI Dataset follows the 
classification by José Cheibub (2007)xliii which centres on the question “whether the 
government can be removed by the assembly in the course of its constitutional term 
in office” (Cheibub 2007:15): systems in which the government cannot be removed 
by the legislature are presidential; systems in which the government can only be 
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removed by the legislature are parliamentary;16 and systems in which either the 
legislature or the independently (i.e. directly or indirectly)17 elected president can 
remove the government are mixed (ibid.). Further issues such as the extent of the 
president's or legislature's political powers are irrelevant for the distinction of 
different forms of government. In addition to the aforementioned categories, 
“FormGov” takes on the value “99” in those country years during which PolThres 
takes on the value “0” but none of the aforementioned categories to identify different 
forms of government can be usefully applied. This includes Albania in 1990, i.e. the 
country's last year under a Communist constitution; Niger between 1991 and 1992, 
i.e. the country's last two years under its 1989 one-party constitution; and Iran 
between 1997 and 2003 due to the uniqueness of the Islamic Republic's institutional 
arrangements.  
 
Please note that the sole basis for the coding of “FormGov” are the formal rules in 
place in a given country and year which determine the relationship between the 
government and the legislature; these formal rules include national constitutions and  
constitutional amendments as well as any other laws or formal documents (such as 
peace treaties) which have the status of constitutional clauses or constitutional laws. 
“FormGov” thereby has been coded according to the formal rules in effect (i.e. that 
have already entered into force in a given country) on December 31 of the year 
coded.  
 
In line with Cheibub's (2007) further specifications regarding the classification of 
different forms of government, first, it does not matter for the coding of “FormGov” 
whether the parliamentary vote of no confidence that can remove the government in 
parliamentary or mixed forms of government is restricted, i.e. whether the legislature 
may consider a vote of no confidence only for a limited number of times during each 
legislative session; second, given the government’s responsibility to the legislature, 
its simultaneous responsibility to an independently elected president in mixed forms 
of governments may be direct (such as when the president can unilaterally dismiss 
                                                 
16
 Please note that the precise title of a country's head of government is of secondary relevance for 
the coding of “FormGov”, so that for instance forms of government have been identified as 
parliamentary if the government can only be removed by the legislature irrespective of the fact 
whether the heads of government in these systems (such as in current-day South Africa) are called 
“presidents” rather than “prime ministers” (see Cheibub 2007).  
17
 It is worth emphasising that it is thus irrelevant for the identification of mixed forms of 
government  in the EEI Dataset whether the president was directly elected or not, as long as she 
was elected independently from the legislature.  
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the entire government or one minister at a time) or indirect (such as when the 
president removes the government by dissolving the legislature); third, an 
independently elected president is only then considered to be able to remove the 
government if she can initiate its dismissal; and fourth, the government is not 
considered to be responsible to the legislature if the legislature can remove 
ministers but not the head of government (ibid.).  
 
The primary source for this variable are the data provided in Cheibub's (2007) 
volume. Since these data only cover country years up to 2002 and are based on a 
method to distinguish democratic from non-democratic regimes that differs from the 
use of PolThres in the EEI Dataset, additional sources were used to extend, 
double-check and, where necessary, correct apparent coding mistakes in Cheibub's 
data (e.g. Haiti 1994-99, Macedonia 1993-2002, Pakistan 1972-6).18 These 
additional sources include primarily national constitutions and constitutional 
amendments as well as any other laws or formal documents (such as peace 
treaties) which have the status of constitutional clauses or constitutional laws. 
Where such formal documents could not be obtained, further information was 
sought from government and parliament websites, and relevant academic 
publications on individual countries. If different academic publications contradict 
each other on the form of government in a given country and year, the information 
was chosen on which two out of three sources agree. 
 
Parl  
Use of a parliamentary form of government. “Parl“ is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value “1“ for all years in which a country employed a form of government in 
which the government can only be removed by the legislature (Cheibub 2007) while 
the democratic features of the country's political regime outweighed the autocratic 
ones. “Parl” takes on the value “0“ for those country years in which PolThres takes 
on the value “1” (i.e. for those years during which the autocratic features of a 
country's political regime outweighed the democratic ones), as well as for those 
country years in which PolThres does not take on the value “1” but a form of 
government was used that was not parliamentary. As long as PolThres does not 
take on the value “1”, “Parl” indicates the use of a parliamentary form of government 
                                                 
18
 For a complete list of corrected values, please contact the author of the EEI Dataset. 
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according to the formal rules in effect in a given country on December 31 of the year 
coded. Please see FormGov for further details and the sources used for the coding 
of this variable. 
 
Pres  
Use of a presidential form of government. “Pres“ is a dummy variable that takes on 
the value “1“ for all years in which a country employed a form of government in 
which the government cannot be removed by the legislature (Cheibub 2007) while 
the democratic features of the country's political regime outweighed the autocratic 
ones. “Pres” takes on the value “0“ for those country years in which PolThres takes 
on the value “1” (i.e. for those years during which the autocratic features of a 
country's political regime outweighed the democratic ones), as well as for those 
country years in which PolThres does not take on the value “1” but a form of 
government was used that was not presidential. As long as PolThres does not take 
on the value “1”, “Pres” indicates the use of a presidential form of government 
according to the formal rules in effect in a given country on December 31 of the year 
coded. Please see FormGov for further details and the sources used for the coding 
of this variable. 
 
Mixed  
Use of a mixed form of government. “Mixed“ is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value “1“ for all years in which a country employed a form of government in which 
either the legislature or the independently (i.e. directly or indirectly) elected president 
can remove the government (Cheibub 2007) while the democratic features of the 
country's political regime outweighed the autocratic ones. “Mixed” automatically 
takes on the value “0“ for those country years in which PolThres takes on the value 
“1” (i.e. for those years during which the autocratic features of a country's political 
regime outweighed the democratic ones), as well as for those country years in which 
PolThres does not take on the value “1” but a form of government was used that 
was not mixed. As long as PolThres does not take on the value “1”, “Mixed” 
indicates the use of a mixed form of government according to the formal rules in 
effect in a given country on December 31 of the year coded. Please see FormGov 
for further details and the sources used for the coding of this variable. 
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FormGovAut 
Autocratic form of government. Following the example of Mike Alvarez et al. 
(1996),xliv “FormGovAut” provides information on core characteristics of a country's 
form of government in years during which the political regime's autocratic features 
outweighed the democratic ones. “FormGovAut“ automatically takes on the value “0“ 
for those country years in which PolThres takes on the value “0“, i.e. for those years 
during which the democratic features of a country's political regime outweighed the 
autocratic ones. In country years during which PolThres does not take on the value 
“0”, “FormGovAut” is coded as follows:  
 
1 =  autocratic form of government with a legislature or at least one political 
       party 
2 = autocratic form of government with an executive only 
 
In line with the coding rules for Alvarez et al.'s variable on autocratic forms of 
government (Alvarez et al. 1996), “FormGovAut” takes on the value “1” irrespective 
of the political powers of the legislature or political parties, i.e. questions such as 
whether “the legislature is a rubber stamp or the chief executive obeys dictates of 
the single party” (Alvarez et al. 1996:16) are irrelevant for the coding of this variable. 
Please note that, for the purpose of the EEI Dataset, autocratic forms of government 
with a popularly elected constituent assembly have been subsumed under the 
category of autocratic forms of government with a legislature, and that autocratic 
forms of government are only then considered to have at least one political party if 
representatives of at least one political party hold some degree of executive power. 
Autocratic forms of government in which the executive is drawn from members of a 
social or political movement rather than a political party are coded as autocratic 
forms of government with an executive only. Similarly to FormGov, “FormGovAut” 
has been coded according to the autocratic form of government that exists in a 
given country on December 31 of the year coded.  
 
The primary source for this variable are the replication data for Alvarez et al.'s 
(1996) article.xlv Since these data only cover country years up to 1990 and are 
based on a method to distinguish democratic from non-democratic regimes that 
differs from the use of PolThres in the EEI Dataset, additional sources were used to 
double-check, extend and modify the information provided by Alvarez et al.. These 
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additional sources include information from Cheibub (2007), the Oxford Scholarship 
Series on Elections in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, the Inter-
Parliamentary Union, the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in 
Africa, the U.S. Library of Congress Country Studies, government and parliament 
websites, and relevant academic publications on individual countries. Where data 
sources contradict each other on the autocratic form of government in a given 
country and year, the information provided by government or parliament websites 
was chosen where available, otherwise the information on which two out of three 
sources agree.  
 
StateStruct 
Type of state structure. “StateStruct” is coded as follows:  
 
0 = unitary state structure 
1 = federal state structure 
2 = mixed state structure 
 
Unlike for instance ElecTypLeg and FormGov, it does not matter for the coding of 
“StateStruct” whether PolThres takes on the value “0” or “1”.  
 
The EEI Dataset uses the following definitions for different types of state structure: 
state structures are unitary if there is no formally guaranteed division of power 
among multiple levels of government with distinct spheres of responsibility; state 
structures are federal if they feature a formally guaranteed “layer of institutions 
between a state’s center and its localities … [which has] its own leaders and 
representative bodies … [who also] share decision-making power with the center” 
(Bermeo 2002:98),xlvi and where both the centre and  territorially defined subunits of 
the state possess their own formally guaranteed spheres of responsibility;19 and 
state structures are mixed if otherwise unitary states contain one or more 
autonomous regions, i.e. one or more territorially defined subunits whose executive, 
legislative and judicial institutions have the formally guaranteed power to exercise 
public policy functions in one or more cultural, economic or political spheres 
                                                 
19
 Please note that, as long as this definition applies, it is of secondary relevance for the coding of 
“StateStruct” whether a country's constitution in fact uses the term “federalism” to describe the 
country's state structure. 
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independently of other sources of authority in the state (cf. Ackrén 2009; Wolff 
2009).xlvii Mixed state structures are thereby distinct from federal ones, as they do 
not “necessitate territorial subdivisions across the entire state territory” (Wolff 
2009:42-3) nor is there necessarily a formal guarantee that representatives of the 
autonomous region(s) can share political power at the centre (cf. ibid.).  
 
Please note that the sole basis for the coding of “StateStruct” are the formal rules in 
place in a given country and year which determine the type of state structure; these 
formal rules include national constitutions and constitutional amendments as well as 
any other laws or formal documents (such as peace treaties) which have the status 
of constitutional clauses or constitutional laws. This emphasis on the open 
codification of a country's state structure in the national constitution (or any other 
formal document that has constitutional status for a given country) implies that, for 
the purpose of the EEI Dataset, a region is not considered to be autonomous if a 
region's representatives declared its autonomy status but this status has not been 
formally recognised by the central government. “StateStruct” thereby has been 
coded according to the formal rules in effect in a given country (i.e. that have 
already entered into force) on December 31 of the year coded. 
 
The degree of power exercised by the representative bodies of federal state units or 
autonomous regions; the formal conditions under which the autonomy status of a 
given region may be revoked; the existence of non-territorial autonomy 
arrangements; the number of autonomous regions in a country with mixed state 
structure; and the establishment of either a bicameral national legislature (such as in 
Brazil) or a unicameral national legislature (such as in Comoros) in countries with a 
federal state structure are irrelevant for the coding of “StateStruct”.  
 
The primary source for the coding of this variable are national constitutions and 
constitutional amendments as well as any other laws or formal documents (such as 
peace treaties) which have the status of constitutional clauses or constitutional laws 
for a given country. Where such formal documents could not be obtained, further 
information was sought from government and parliament websites, the Forum of 
Federations,xlviii the volumes by Elazar (1991),xlix Gana and Egwu (2003),l Gibson 
(2004),li He, Galligan and Inoguchi (2007),lii Majeed, Watts and Brown (2006)liii and 
Ortino, Žagar and Mastny (2005),liv and relevant academic publications on individual 
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countries. Where academic publications contradict each other on the state structure 
in a given country and year, the information was chosen on which two out of three 
sources agree. 
 
Unit  
Use of a unitary state structure. “Unit“ is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
“1“ for all years in which a country's state structure did not feature a formally 
guaranteed division of power among multiple levels of government with distinct 
spheres of responsibility. This variable is coded according to the formal rules in 
effect in a given country on December 31 of the year in question. Please see 
StateStruct for further details and the sources used for the coding of this variable. 
 
Fed  
Use of a federal state structure. “Fed“ is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
“1“ for all years in which a country's state structure featured a “layer of institutions 
between a state’s center and its localities … [which has] its own leaders and 
representative bodies … [who also] share decision-making power with the center” 
(Bermeo 2002:98), and where both the centre and territorially defined subunits of 
the state possessed their own formally guaranteed spheres of responsibility. This 
variable is coded according to the formal rules in effect in a given country on 
December 31 of the year in question. Please see StateStruct for further details and 
the sources used for the coding of this variable. 
 
MixedSt 
Use of a mixed state structure. “MixedSt” is a dummy variable that takes on the 
value “1” for all years in which a country's otherwise unitary state structure 
contained one or more autonomous regions, i.e. one or more territorially defined 
subunits whose executive, legislative and judicial institutions have the formally 
guaranteed power to exercise public policy functions in one or more cultural, 
economic or political spheres independently of other sources of authority in the state 
(cf. Ackrén 2009; Wolff 2009). Please see StateStruct for further details and the 
sources used for the coding of this variable.  
 
Appendix III – The EEI Dataset Codebook 
364 
 
PresMaj 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government and majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
PresProp 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government and proportional electoral system for 
the legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
PresMixedEl 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government and mixed electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
PresUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government and unitary state structure. Please see 
FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
 
PresFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government and federal state structure.  Please see 
FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
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PresMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government and mixed state structure.  Please see 
FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
 
ParlMaj 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government and majoritarian electoral system for 
the legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
ParlProp 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government and proportional electoral system for 
the legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
ParlMixedEl 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government and mixed electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
ParlUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government and unitary state structure. Please 
see FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
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ParlFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government and federal state structure. Please 
see FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
 
ParlMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government and mixed state structure. Please 
see FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedMaj 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government and majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedProp 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government and proportional electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedMixedEl 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government and mixed electoral system for the 
legislature. Please see FormGov and ElecTypLeg for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
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MixedUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government and unitary state structure. Please see 
FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government and federal state structure. Please see 
FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government and mixed state structure. Please see 
FormGov and StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and 
sources used for their coding. 
 
MajUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure. Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
MajFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and federal state 
structure. Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
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MajMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a majoritarian electoral system for the legislature and mixed state 
structure. Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
PropUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a proportional electoral system for the legislature and unitary state 
structure. Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
PropFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a proportional electoral system for the legislature and federal state 
structure. Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
PropMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a proportional electoral system for the legislature and mixed state 
structure. Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the 
underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedElUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed electoral system for the legislature and unitary state structure. 
Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the underlying 
variables and sources used for their coding. 
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MixedElFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed electoral system for the legislature and federal state structure. 
Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the underlying 
variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedElMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed electoral system for the legislature and mixed state structure. 
Please see ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for further details of the underlying 
variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
PresMajUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
PresMajFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
PresMajMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
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PresPropUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
PresPropFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
PresPropMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
PresMixedElUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, mixed electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
PresMixedElFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, mixed electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
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StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
PresMixedElMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a presidential form of government, mixed electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlMajUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlMajFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlMajMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
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ParlPropUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlPropFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlPropMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlMixedElUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, mixed electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlMixedElFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, mixed electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
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StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
ParlMixedElMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a parliamentary form of government, mixed electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
MixedMajUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
MixedMajFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
MixedMajMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, majoritarian electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
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MixedPropUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
MixedPropFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
MixedPropMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, proportional electoral system for the 
legislature and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and 
StateStruct for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their 
coding. 
 
MixedMixedElUnit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, mixed electoral system for the legislature 
and unitary state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for 
further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
MixedMixedElFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, mixed electoral system for the legislature 
and federal state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for 
further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
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MixedMixedElMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which a country 
employed a mixed form of government, mixed electoral system for the legislature 
and mixed state structure. Please see FormGov, ElecTypLeg and StateStruct for 
further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
AutUni 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which the autocratic 
features of a country's political regime outweighed the democratic ones, and the 
country employed a unitary state structure. Please see PolThres and StateStruct 
for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
AutFed 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which the autocratic 
features of a country's political regime outweighed the democratic ones, and the 
country employed a federal state structure. Please see PolThres and StateStruct 
for further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
 
AutMixedSt 
Dummy variable that takes on the value “1“ for all years in which the autocratic 
features of a country's political regime outweighed the democratic ones, and the 
country employed a mixed state structure. Please see PolThres and StateStruct for 
further details of the underlying variables and sources used for their coding. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1. Differences between the COW Project State System Membership List v2008.1 
and the countries included in the EEI Dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
COW Project state system member Countries included in the EEI Dataset [1955-2007] 
Russia [1816-2008] Soviet Union [1955-1991] 
Russia (aka the Russian Federation, excludes former SU republics  
such as Georgia or Kazakhstan) [1992-2007] 
Tanzania [1961-2007] Tanganyika [1961-1964] 
Tanzania (United Republic of, includes Zanzibar) [1964-2007] 
missing United Arab Republic (union between Egypt and Syria) [1958-1961] 
Vietnam [1954-2008] Democratic Republic of Vietnam (aka North Vietnam) [1955-1976]* 
  
Vietnam (Socialist Republic of, merges North and South Vietnam) [1976-2007] 
Yugoslavia [1944-2008] Yugoslavia (Socialist Republic of) [1955-1992] 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (union of Serbia and Montenegro,  
renamed "Serbia and Montenegro" in 2003) [1992-2006] 
missing Serbia** [2006-2007] 
*In contrast to North Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam (aka South Vietnam) [1954-1975] is listed by the COW Project. 
** In contrast to Serbia, Montenegro [2006-2008] is listed by the COW Project. 
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Appendix 2. Start and end year of observations for all countries in the EEI Dataset. 
 
 
Regional Country Start year End year
identifier
7 Afghanistan 1955 2007
2 Albania 1955 2007
6 Algeria 1962 2007
1 Angola 1975 2007
5 Argentina 1955 2007
2 Armenia 1991 2007
3 Australia 1955 2007
4 Austria 1955 2007
2 Azerbaijan 1991 2007
6 Bahrain 1971 2007
7 Bangladesh 1971 2007
2 Belarus 1991 2007
4 Belgium 1955 2007
1 Benin 1960 2007
7 Bhutan 1971 2007
5 Bolivia 1955 2007
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 2007
1 Botswana 1966 2007
5 Brazil 1955 2007
2 Bulgaria 1955 2007
1 Burkina Faso 1960 2007
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3 Burma (Myanmar) 1955 2007 
1 Burundi 1962 2007 
3 Cambodia 1955 2007 
1 Cameroon 1960 2007 
4 Canada 1955 2007 
1 Central African Republic 1960 2007 
1 Chad 1960 2007 
5 Chile 1955 2007 
3 China 1955 2007 
5 Colombia 1955 2007 
1 Comoros 1975 2007 
1 Democratic Rep. of the Congo 1960 2007 
1 Republic of the Congo 1960 2007 
5 Costa Rica 1955 2007 
1 Côte d’Ivoire 1960 2007 
2 Croatia 1992 2007 
5 Cuba 1955 2007 
2 Cyprus 1960 2007 
2 Czechoslovakia 1955 1992 
2 Czech Republic 1993 2007 
6 Democratic Yemen 1967 1990 
4 Denmark 1955 2007 
6 Djibouti 1977 2007 
5 Dominican Republic 1955 2007 
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3 East Timor 2002 2007 
5 Ecuador 1955 2007 
6 Egypt 1955 1957* 
6 Egypt 1961 2007 
5 El Salvador 1955 2007 
1 Equatorial Guinea 1968 2007 
1 Eritrea 1993 2007 
2 Estonia 1991 2007 
1 Ethiopia 1955 2007 
3 Fiji 1970 2007 
4 Finland 1955 2007 
4 France 1955 2007 
1 Gabon 1960 2007 
1 The Gambia 1965 2007 
2 Georgia 1991 2007 
4 German Democratic Republic 1955 1990 
4 German Federal Republic 1955 1990 
4 Germany 1990 2007 
1 Ghana 1957 2007 
4 Greece 1955 2007 
5 Guatemala 1955 2007 
1 Guinea 1958 2007 
1 Guinea-Bissau 1974 2007 
5 Guyana 1966 2007 
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5 Haiti 1955 2007 
5 Honduras 1955 2007 
2 Hungary 1955 2007 
7 India 1955 2007 
3 Indonesia 1955 2007 
6 Iran 1955 2007 
6 Iraq 1955 2007 
4 Ireland 1955 2007 
6 Israel 1955 2007 
4 Italy 1955 2007 
5 Jamaica 1962 2007 
3 Japan 1955 2007 
6 Jordan 1955 2007 
2 Kazakhstan 1991 2007 
1 Kenya 1963 2007 
3 North Korea 1955 2007 
3 South Korea 1955 2007 
6 Kuwait 1961 2007 
2 Kyrgyzstan 1991 2007 
3 Laos 1955 2007 
2 Latvia 1991 2007 
6 Lebanon 1955 2007 
1 Lesotho 1966 2007 
1 Liberia 1955 2007 
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6 Libya 1955 2007 
2 Lithuania 1991 2007 
2 Macedonia 1993 2007 
1 Madagascar 1960 2007 
1 Malawi 1964 2007 
3 Malaysia 1957 2007 
1 Mali 1960 2007 
1 Mauritania 1960 2007 
1 Mauritius 1968 2007 
5 Mexico 1955 2007 
2 Moldova 1991 2007 
3 Mongolia 1955 2007 
6 Morocco 1956 2007 
1 Mozambique 1975 2007 
1 Namibia 1990 2007 
7 Nepal 1955 2007 
4 Netherlands 1955 2007 
3 New Zealand 1955 2007 
5 Nicaragua 1955 2007 
1 Niger 1960 2007 
1 Nigeria 1960 2007 
4 Norway 1955 2007 
6 Oman 1971 2007 
7 Pakistan 1955 2007 
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5 Panama 1955 2007 
3 Papua New Guinea 1975 2007 
5 Paraguay 1955 2007 
5 Peru 1955 2007 
3 Philippines 1955 2007 
2 Poland 1955 2007 
4 Portugal 1955 2007 
6 Qatar 1971 2007 
2 Romania 1955 2007 
2 Soviet Union 1955 1991 
2 Russia 1992 2007 
1 Rwanda 1962 2007 
6 Saudi Arabia 1955 2007 
1 Senegal 1960 2007 
1 Sierra Leone 1961 2007 
3 Singapore 1965 2007 
2 Slovakia 1993 2007 
2 Slovenia 1992 2007 
3 Solomon Islands 1978 2007 
1 Somalia 1960 2007 
1 South Africa 1955 2007 
4 Spain 1955 2007 
7 Sri Lanka 1955 2007 
1 Sudan 1956 2007 
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1 Swaziland 1968 2007 
4 Sweden 1955 2007 
4 Switzerland 1955 2007 
6 Syria 1955 1957* 
6 Syria 1961 2007 
3 Taiwan 1955 2007 
2 Tajikistan 1991 2007 
1 Tanganyika 1961 1964 
1 Tanzania 1964 2007 
3 Thailand 1955 2007 
1 Togo 1960 2007 
5 Trinidad and Tobago 1962 2007 
6 Tunisia 1956 2007 
2 Turkey 1955 2007 
2 Turkmenistan 1991 2007 
1 Uganda 1962 2007 
2 Ukraine 1991 2007 
6 United Arab Emirates 1971 2007 
6 United Arab Republic 1958 1961 
4 United Kingdom 1955 2007 
4 United States 1955 2007 
5 Uruguay 1955 2007 
2 Uzbekistan 1991 2007 
5 Venezuela 1955 2007 
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3 Democratic Rep. of Vietnam 1955 1976
3 Republic of Vietnam 1955 1975
3 Vietnam 1976 2007
6 Yemen Arab Republic 1955 1990
6 Yemen 1990 2007
2 Yugoslavia 1955 1992
2 Federal Rep. of Yugoslavia 1992 2006
(renamed “Serbia and Montenegro” in 2003)
2 Serbia 2006 2007
2 Montenegro 2006 2007
1 Zambia 1964 2007
1 Zimbabwe 1965 2007
* Between February 1958 and October 1961, the United Nations recognised the union between Egypt and Syria (the United Arab
 Republic) as a single member state. Syria resumed separate UN membership in October 1961, while Egypt continued under the
 name "United Arab  Republic" until changing it to the "Arab Republic of Egypt" in September 1971 (UN 2006). 1957 is listed as end
 year of Syria and Egypt before their union, as they existed separately only one month in 1958.
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Appendix 3. Number of observations for different variables in the EEI Dataset. 
 
 
Variable name   Number of observations 
EthnWar   7266 
Peaceyrs   7266 
WarNei   7266 
NWarNei   7266 
InterCon   7266 
InterCon2   7266 
InterCon3   7266 
Population   7259 
GDPpc   7242 
EconRes   6315 
PowRes   6315 
Oil   7262 
Mountain   6921 
Noncont   7266 
BritRul   7266 
FrenRul   7266 
OthRul   7266 
RulExp1   7266 
RulExp2   7266 
EthFrAl   7167 
Polity   7171 
Anoc   7244 
PolThres   7266 
Instab   7244 
Appendix III – The EEI Dataset Codebook 
386 
 
CorrICRG   2996 
LElec   7266 
PElec   7266 
MinRep   7266 
ElecTypLeg   7266 
Maj   7266 
Prop   7266 
MixedEl   7266 
ElecTypPres   7266 
FormGov   7266 
Parl   7266 
Pres   7266 
Mixed   7266 
FormGovAut   7266 
StateStruct   7266 
Unit   7266 
Fed   7266 
MixedSt   7266 
PresMaj   7266 
PresProp   7266 
PresMixedEl   7266 
PresUnit   7266 
PresFed   7266 
PresMixedSt   7266 
ParlMaj   7266 
ParlProp   7266 
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ParlMixedEl   7266 
ParlUnit   7266 
ParlFed   7266 
ParlMixedSt   7266 
MixedMaj   7266 
MixedProp   7266 
MixedMixedEl   7266 
MixedUnit   7266 
MixedFed   7266 
MixedMixedSt   7266 
MajUnit   7266 
MajFed   7266 
MajMixedSt   7266 
PropUnit   7266 
PropFed   7266 
PropMixedSt   7266 
MixedElUnit   7266 
MixedElFed   7266 
MixedElMixedSt   7266 
PresMajUnit   7266 
PresMajFed   7266 
PresMajMixedSt   7266 
PresPropUnit   7266 
PresPropFed   7266 
PresPropMixedSt   7266 
PresMixedElUnit   7266 
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PresMixedElFed   7266 
PresMixedElMixedSt   7266 
ParlMajUnit   7266 
ParlMajFed   7266 
ParlMajMixedSt   7266 
ParlPropUnit   7266 
ParlPropFed   7266 
ParlPropMixedSt   7266 
ParlMixedElUnit   7266 
ParlMixedElFed   7266 
ParlMixedElMixedSt   7266 
MixedMajUnit   7266 
MixedMajFed   7266 
MixedMajMixedSt   7266 
MixedPropUnit   7266 
MixedPropFed   7266 
MixedPropMixedSt   7266 
MixedMixedElUnit   7266 
MixedMixedElFed   7266 
MixedMixedElMixedSt   7266 
AutUni   7266 
AutFed   7266 
AutMixedSt   7266 
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